Michael Allen
Paranormal Adept
UFOs, Language and Occam's Razor
1.1 Really Verbose Prologue...
I expected to begin the topic with a simple examination and revision of the ufology language. –-reworking the terms “alien,” “extraterrestrial,” “unidentified flying object,” as well as the acronyms “ETBE," “ETV,” “UFO” or “IFO.” However, my revision led to a new direction concerning the vital metaphysical underpinnings in scientific thinking. I realized, through this effort, that many of the sightings continuing throughout the 20th century fell under the label of "pseudo-science" not because of the (assumed) “falsehood” of the thousands of reports worldwide, but on account of an ontological and metaphysical bankruptcy in science and science culture. I speculated that the human language, during the 19th and 18th century, was gradually re-invented for fast technological advance, but that the effect of such a restructuring would squander away the human element into a “matrix” of mechanical reasoning. My original suspicions were felt as early as 1999 while reading Korzybski's Science and Sanity, and found that human language simply wasn't fit to bring us through the immense changes brought about by late 19th and 20th century technological advances. Without the revision of language, as Korzybski predicted, humanity would stand at the verge of total annihilation.
In defense against this possible catastrophe, the language used for universal identification of all phenomena and elite “eventually identifiable” concrete particulars, and the associated category games, equivocations and Aristotelian platitudes, will be laid to rest and a new foundation emerge from the ashes of this controversial debate. In addition, I will address the lingual (and meta-lingual) material support of of encyclopædic content, i.e. what is presented to the public as the contemporary “neutral point of view.[NPOV]” In doing so, I will demand additional qualifiers and indices concerning terms of identification, such as we see applied to the unexplained objects(missing index: according to who?) in the sky. Under this counter-scheme, since we are no longer able to find a proper reference for NPOV, we will use “UFO” as a temporal adjective applied to an object. “Identified” or “unidentified” begs the question as to what authority (and under what pretense) uses these adjectives. A motion to divide the petitio principi “UFO" into “unidentified” and “object” will be made, thus identifying the agents who resist interpretations of events subversive to their policies.
The ontology framework assumed in UFO sightings–-by officialdom–-is a basis for the reduction of the singular facts of a sighting to the library of events within the witness' background. Whether the reports issue from trained military personnel and analysts or laymen, the “UFO" skeptics extend this dogmatic belief to universal reality. For when the novelty of the event passes beyond the library of events and impressions catalogued by the experiencer, their report's final relation to the skeptic's ontology is the universal qualifier, “subjective hysterical witness," who cannot–-and shall not–-believe that the object seen is “identified" or even “identifiable" outside the terms of the witness' or skeptic's experiential background. Hence the term “UFO” or “UFOB” is a categorical restriction of phenomena to the preemptive categories asserted by the skeptics; which is a reduction of all perceived events to what must be experientially “logical” within the library of the individual witness or the canonical libraries of the skeptic. Later we will see how this idea of “necessity” in the skeptic's ontological categories provide a specious counterfeit of “Occam's Razor.”
When a witness of an extraordinary “UFO event" describes their moment of experience, the language used often fails (esp. for first timers) to describe the event in its totality. This is axiomatic and is assumed by UFO “believers” and skeptics alike. Furthermore, the explanation rendered by the skeptic (I will adopt the usage of Stanton Friedman's "negativist" term briefly--as it fits well within a descriptive account of human ontological failure) places the witness' familiarity of the situation well below what is psychologically appropriate with respect to the the assumed regularities of alternative explanations–-i.e. weather balloons, comets, meteors, planets and the like. Given the nature of such common events as accepted “official” hypotheses of observed UFO phenomena, the likelihood that psychologists might also diagnose the first-hand observer as “hysterical,” or even delusional, is increased in turn; this is a conclusion built in to the library of observable phenomena put in place by the negativists as the de facto source for all UFO related events. And the increasing frequency of implementing the hysteria “garbage pail” diagnosis stems from the obvious witness' “overreaction” to events subtitled as “normal phenomena” by the skeptic. Many such examples, included within the canon of debunkery, as “war nerves,” “psychological contagions,” and “stress,” are employed to provide additional support for hysteria despite the stark result brought about in vacuo from the forced implementation of this inferior negativist ontology. But to illustrate the inferiority of this ontology, we must examine the elements of identification employed by the negativist.
Naturally, with these negativist's “critical examination” of the testimony–-a second hand abstraction–-the already depressed language of the witness is further reduced ( i.e. intentionally or not) to match the immense library of ordinary atmospheric and celestial phenomena. This methodology works quite well for isolated cases, but when the larger and larger populations begin to witness the same events, the less likely such events can fall into the dogmatic category of misidentified ordinary flying objects . However the skeptic may fume concerning the possibility of misidentification , probable object misidentification does not mean that the skeptic can preempt the facts of the witness' testimony with their own identification scheme.
So the first-order abstractions (i.e. event-labels, analogies, etc.) maintained by the witness of these events are funneled into the ontology assumed by the UFO skeptic, who will only certify language forms appropriate to their interpretation of Occam's razor. Our use of “interpretation” is deliberate, and should highlight the important difference in the criterion of “simplicity” as asserted by William of Ockham and the criterion of multiplicity assumed by the skeptics.
Skepticism does not imply preemptive identification of FOBjs no matter the consequences of maintaining a neutral position on the subject. However that is precisely what you see within the annals of mid-20th century FObj skepticism: Multiplicative alternative hypotheses, with all their compound effects–-two at a time, three at a time, etc.–-are employed frequently by the “debunkers” under the notion that if one “throws enough mud at a wall, the some of it must stick.” So while the skeptics would like to continue their preaching of “simplicity” and “Occam's" razor,” their doctrine concerning “UFO” witness reports is one of incredible and unnecessary complexity .
Such psychological skepticism easily vacillates from one known explanation (i.e. an Echo I or II satellite) to another (a planet such as Venus) or even to the internal phenomenon of “mass hysteria” as the “final explanation.” Multiplicities are quite evident in famous cases like the Portage County Ohio incident on April 17, 1966, when Sheriff Deputies Dale Spaur, and Wilbur Neff witnessed a large disc-shaped craft–-40ft in diameter–-hovering “150 feet” over their patrol car, four miles east of Rudolph. According to the paid negativists, any hypothesis concerning the facts reported by the witnesses is acceptable as long as the actual informational content of the sighting is obscured by an ordinary object or event–-i.e. Echo I,II satellite, weather balloon, or the planet Venus. At this point, one should question the necessity of dismissing the qualitative and quantitative unity and singularity of facts and particulars referenced by a particular observer–-i.e. a 40ft diameter object hovering 150ft over a patrol car in Portage County, Ohio–-substituting, instead, the doctrinal canon of multiplicity: i.e. that of ordinary phenomena–-satellites, planets, weather balloons, etc. How this particular method earns the endorsement of “principle of economy” is anyone's guess.
Pepper, Stephen C. Concept and Quality: A World Hypothesis. from “The Paul Carus Lectures,” Series 13, 1961. ed. Eugene Freeman. (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1967)
The skeptics have (innocently or otherwise) relied–-ironically–-upon the maxim pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate; “Plurality should not be posited without necessity”(William of Ockham, b.1285 A.C.E.). In designing a language to “fit the facts” appropriate to the known entities within the phenomenal canon acceptable to the skeptics, a post facto multiplication of entities as a field of possible explanation(s) overshadow the singular fact behind the extraordinary event seen by these observers of phenomena. There is no ontological difference between the creation of new hypothetical entities to explain a phenomenal event and the obstinate insertion of an entire canon of known phenomena as the most “plausible explanation(s)” of the event. This methodology entails a grossly mismatched application of an entire field of the “ordinary” juxtaposed against the singular quantitative and qualitative description of the event by the first-hand observer.
1.1 Really Verbose Prologue...
I expected to begin the topic with a simple examination and revision of the ufology language. –-reworking the terms “alien,” “extraterrestrial,” “unidentified flying object,” as well as the acronyms “ETBE," “ETV,” “UFO” or “IFO.” However, my revision led to a new direction concerning the vital metaphysical underpinnings in scientific thinking. I realized, through this effort, that many of the sightings continuing throughout the 20th century fell under the label of "pseudo-science" not because of the (assumed) “falsehood” of the thousands of reports worldwide, but on account of an ontological and metaphysical bankruptcy in science and science culture. I speculated that the human language, during the 19th and 18th century, was gradually re-invented for fast technological advance, but that the effect of such a restructuring would squander away the human element into a “matrix” of mechanical reasoning. My original suspicions were felt as early as 1999 while reading Korzybski's Science and Sanity, and found that human language simply wasn't fit to bring us through the immense changes brought about by late 19th and 20th century technological advances. Without the revision of language, as Korzybski predicted, humanity would stand at the verge of total annihilation.
In defense against this possible catastrophe, the language used for universal identification of all phenomena and elite “eventually identifiable” concrete particulars, and the associated category games, equivocations and Aristotelian platitudes, will be laid to rest and a new foundation emerge from the ashes of this controversial debate. In addition, I will address the lingual (and meta-lingual) material support of of encyclopædic content, i.e. what is presented to the public as the contemporary “neutral point of view.[NPOV]” In doing so, I will demand additional qualifiers and indices concerning terms of identification, such as we see applied to the unexplained objects(missing index: according to who?) in the sky. Under this counter-scheme, since we are no longer able to find a proper reference for NPOV, we will use “UFO” as a temporal adjective applied to an object. “Identified” or “unidentified” begs the question as to what authority (and under what pretense) uses these adjectives. A motion to divide the petitio principi “UFO" into “unidentified” and “object” will be made, thus identifying the agents who resist interpretations of events subversive to their policies.
The ontology framework assumed in UFO sightings–-by officialdom–-is a basis for the reduction of the singular facts of a sighting to the library of events within the witness' background. Whether the reports issue from trained military personnel and analysts or laymen, the “UFO" skeptics extend this dogmatic belief to universal reality. For when the novelty of the event passes beyond the library of events and impressions catalogued by the experiencer, their report's final relation to the skeptic's ontology is the universal qualifier, “subjective hysterical witness," who cannot–-and shall not–-believe that the object seen is “identified" or even “identifiable" outside the terms of the witness' or skeptic's experiential background. Hence the term “UFO” or “UFOB” is a categorical restriction of phenomena to the preemptive categories asserted by the skeptics; which is a reduction of all perceived events to what must be experientially “logical” within the library of the individual witness or the canonical libraries of the skeptic. Later we will see how this idea of “necessity” in the skeptic's ontological categories provide a specious counterfeit of “Occam's Razor.”
When a witness of an extraordinary “UFO event" describes their moment of experience, the language used often fails (esp. for first timers) to describe the event in its totality. This is axiomatic and is assumed by UFO “believers” and skeptics alike. Furthermore, the explanation rendered by the skeptic (I will adopt the usage of Stanton Friedman's "negativist" term briefly--as it fits well within a descriptive account of human ontological failure) places the witness' familiarity of the situation well below what is psychologically appropriate with respect to the the assumed regularities of alternative explanations–-i.e. weather balloons, comets, meteors, planets and the like. Given the nature of such common events as accepted “official” hypotheses of observed UFO phenomena, the likelihood that psychologists might also diagnose the first-hand observer as “hysterical,” or even delusional, is increased in turn; this is a conclusion built in to the library of observable phenomena put in place by the negativists as the de facto source for all UFO related events. And the increasing frequency of implementing the hysteria “garbage pail” diagnosis stems from the obvious witness' “overreaction” to events subtitled as “normal phenomena” by the skeptic. Many such examples, included within the canon of debunkery, as “war nerves,” “psychological contagions,” and “stress,” are employed to provide additional support for hysteria despite the stark result brought about in vacuo from the forced implementation of this inferior negativist ontology. But to illustrate the inferiority of this ontology, we must examine the elements of identification employed by the negativist.
Naturally, with these negativist's “critical examination” of the testimony–-a second hand abstraction–-the already depressed language of the witness is further reduced ( i.e. intentionally or not) to match the immense library of ordinary atmospheric and celestial phenomena. This methodology works quite well for isolated cases, but when the larger and larger populations begin to witness the same events, the less likely such events can fall into the dogmatic category of misidentified ordinary flying objects . However the skeptic may fume concerning the possibility of misidentification , probable object misidentification does not mean that the skeptic can preempt the facts of the witness' testimony with their own identification scheme.
So the first-order abstractions (i.e. event-labels, analogies, etc.) maintained by the witness of these events are funneled into the ontology assumed by the UFO skeptic, who will only certify language forms appropriate to their interpretation of Occam's razor. Our use of “interpretation” is deliberate, and should highlight the important difference in the criterion of “simplicity” as asserted by William of Ockham and the criterion of multiplicity assumed by the skeptics.
Skepticism does not imply preemptive identification of FOBjs no matter the consequences of maintaining a neutral position on the subject. However that is precisely what you see within the annals of mid-20th century FObj skepticism: Multiplicative alternative hypotheses, with all their compound effects–-two at a time, three at a time, etc.–-are employed frequently by the “debunkers” under the notion that if one “throws enough mud at a wall, the some of it must stick.” So while the skeptics would like to continue their preaching of “simplicity” and “Occam's" razor,” their doctrine concerning “UFO” witness reports is one of incredible and unnecessary complexity .
Such psychological skepticism easily vacillates from one known explanation (i.e. an Echo I or II satellite) to another (a planet such as Venus) or even to the internal phenomenon of “mass hysteria” as the “final explanation.” Multiplicities are quite evident in famous cases like the Portage County Ohio incident on April 17, 1966, when Sheriff Deputies Dale Spaur, and Wilbur Neff witnessed a large disc-shaped craft–-40ft in diameter–-hovering “150 feet” over their patrol car, four miles east of Rudolph. According to the paid negativists, any hypothesis concerning the facts reported by the witnesses is acceptable as long as the actual informational content of the sighting is obscured by an ordinary object or event–-i.e. Echo I,II satellite, weather balloon, or the planet Venus. At this point, one should question the necessity of dismissing the qualitative and quantitative unity and singularity of facts and particulars referenced by a particular observer–-i.e. a 40ft diameter object hovering 150ft over a patrol car in Portage County, Ohio–-substituting, instead, the doctrinal canon of multiplicity: i.e. that of ordinary phenomena–-satellites, planets, weather balloons, etc. How this particular method earns the endorsement of “principle of economy” is anyone's guess.
Pepper, Stephen C. Concept and Quality: A World Hypothesis. from “The Paul Carus Lectures,” Series 13, 1961. ed. Eugene Freeman. (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1967)
The skeptics have (innocently or otherwise) relied–-ironically–-upon the maxim pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate; “Plurality should not be posited without necessity”(William of Ockham, b.1285 A.C.E.). In designing a language to “fit the facts” appropriate to the known entities within the phenomenal canon acceptable to the skeptics, a post facto multiplication of entities as a field of possible explanation(s) overshadow the singular fact behind the extraordinary event seen by these observers of phenomena. There is no ontological difference between the creation of new hypothetical entities to explain a phenomenal event and the obstinate insertion of an entire canon of known phenomena as the most “plausible explanation(s)” of the event. This methodology entails a grossly mismatched application of an entire field of the “ordinary” juxtaposed against the singular quantitative and qualitative description of the event by the first-hand observer.
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