Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11

[Pharoah]

Oh, and God is not a mathematician. Isn't maths prdicated on the notion of quantities of things classed as instances of many such kinds? i.e. of equitable relationships between different things where one kind is a number of many such equal kinds.

You have to put things in categories to count them. I can count two apples and three oranges or five fruits - I haven't made any metaphysical assumptions in doing this - I don't have to assert truths about fruits to claim that things can be put into categories to be counted ...I could also count orange and red things or fresh and rotten things ...

The assumption of maths is that this constitutes an accurate reprsentation of reality... so of course, reality must conform to this notion as an accurate description.

Can you give some support for this ... ? I've not seen that anywhere ... mathematicians worry all the time about their equations applying to the real world - but then again mathematicians (and you) drive over bridges built on assumptions all the time - on the other, other hand, bridges collapse, even when the mathematics is right - see the Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapse.

But if we assume the contrary that there is no example of any kind that is a number of many such kinds, i.e., that every kind is unique, then mathematics does not exist as an accurate description of reality, just an accurate description of the reality we assume reality to be.

One unique kind plus one unique kind equals - two unique kinds. That can be very useful whether or not it's an accurate depiction of reality.

I am out of my depth with this really. What I am saying is that categorisation is a position that is convenient but we could take the view that it is flawed; that there are no true categories of things. So it is convenient to assume every hydrogen atom belongs to the same category: 'hydrogen atom'... but we could equally say there is no such category 'in reality' ie there is no true number of atoms belonging to that category; that they are in truth, as with snowflakes, unique. Just like we can say individual humans belong to the category 'human' but in truth that assumption has a deep metaphysical flaw. Mathematically there are numbers of humans but in truth that number is a category assumption. The physical reality is that there are unique individuals. So mathematics is basically convenient in its categorical assumptions but is an inaccurate tool for modelling existence....

 

[smcder]

I am out of my depth with this really. What I am saying is that categorisation is a position that is convenient but we could take the view that it is flawed; that there are no true categories of things. So it is convenient to assume every hydrogen atom belongs to the same category: 'hydrogen atom'... but we could equally say there is no such category 'in reality' ie there is no true number of atoms belonging to that category; that they are in truth, as with snowflakes, unique. Just like we can say individual humans belong to the category 'human' but in truth that assumption has a deep metaphysical flaw. Mathematically there are numbers of humans but in truth that number is a category assumption. The physical reality is that there are unique individuals. So mathematics is basically convenient in its categorical assumptions but is an inaccurate tool for modelling existence....

I agree and that's a deep point. What I think I'm saying is that it's a philosophical point, not a necessary mathematical one.

We can enumerate unique individuals - the very act of defining involves enumeration: each having both their uniqueness and their individuality in common ... in fact, we have a saying here that puts both of those qualities in perspective: "you are unique and special, just like everyone else". There are various unique paradoxes and problems with individuality ...

As for models of existence ... I think of it like the old Steven Wright joke about having a one to one scale map of the US. A model is a piece, part ... a convenience, as you say -for that, mathematics is arbitrarily accurate. (Limit x---> infinity)

Mathematicians might not be any less likely to make this mistake, but I think you could make this point to them using what they understand about categories (they are arbitrary).

 

[smcder]

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/462d/7b6b1ee8243b6aa8897be3cf306239fb43c6.pdf

@Pharoah

You may be right about mathematicians (although I still think not about mathematics)

"I. MATHEMATICIANS, PHYSICISTS, AND ENGINEERS The following is anecdotal and is by no means a scientific survey. However, in my experience of interacting with mathematicians, physicists, and engineers, I would estimate that about 80% of mathematicians lean to a Platonist view.

Physicists, on the other hand, tend to be closeted non-Platonists. An ensemble of physicists will often appear Platonist in public, but when pressed in private I can often extract a non-Platonist confession.

Engineers by and large are openly non-Platonist.

Why is that? Focusing on electrical and electronic engineering, as a key example, the engineer is well acquainted with the art of approximation. An engineer is trained to be aware of the frailty of each model and its limits when it breaks down. For example, we know that lumped circuit models are only good for low frequencies. An engineer is also fully aware of the artificial contrivance in many models. For example, an equivalent circuit only models the inputs and outputs of a circuit, and ignores all the internal details. Moreover, the engineer knows the conditions under which these simplifications can be exploited. An engineer often has control over his or her ‘‘universe’’ in that if a simple linear model does not work, the engineer, in many cases, can force a widget, by design, to operate within a restricted linear region. Thus, where an engineer cannot approximate linearity, he often linearizes by fiat. A mathematical Platonist will often argue that number is a real entity, claiming that a geometric circle is a reified construct that exists independently of the universe. An engineer, on the other hand, has no difficulty in seeing that there is no such thing as a perfect circle anywhere in the physical universe, and thus is merely a useful mental construct. In addition to the circle, many other ideal mathematical forms such as delta functions, step functions, sinusoids, etc., are in an engineer’s mathematical toolbox and used on a daily basis. Like the circle, the engineer sees delta functions, and for that matter all functions, as idealities that do not exist in the universe. Yet, they are useful for making sufficiently accurate, yet approximate, predictions. A physicist may have nightmares on studying a standard electronic engineering text, finding the use of negative time in the theory of noncausal filters. However, a non-Platonist engineer has no qualms about such transformations into negative spaces, as there is no ultimate reality there. These are all mental constructs and are dealt with in a utilitarian way, producing the results required for system design."

On the other hand, you don't want to discredit the insight of those who do work with the ideal. It's a little like the conundrum with mystics.

I suspect you are after an even deeper point and I need to review your work on noumenal consciousness.

 

[smcder]

Noumenal Consciousness | Phenomenal Experience | Personal Identity

Help me see why this isn't a conceptual problem. The thought experiment is - "was the first human able to ask this question?" - what little I think I know of the history of the self - I would answer no - this ability flows from a social/legal construct that is relatively modern and very sophisticated -and still, I think, not everyone can ask this question, is capable of asking this question.

Looked at individually, this:

"why am I me .. and not someone else? True, I could be someone else ... but I am not, I am me."


...is extraordinary.

But collectively, it loses its force and I argue, its problematic nature:

"why am I me .. and not someone else? True, I could be someone else ... but I am not, I am me."
"why am I me .. and not someone else? True, I could be someone else ... but I am not, I am me."
"why am I me .. and not someone else? True, I could be someone else ... but I am not, I am me."
"why am I me .. and not someone else? True, I could be someone else ... but I am not, I am me."



"why am I me .. and not someone else? True, I could be someone else ... but I am not, I am me."
"why am I me .. and not someone else? True, I could be someone else ... but I am not, I am me."
"why am I me .. and not someone else? True, I could be someone else ... but I am not, I am me."
"why am I me .. and not someone else? True, I could be someone else ... but I am not, I am me."

... legally, individualism flows from collective concern - a codified recognition that I am me but I could be anyone. I think this is the standpoint from which the problem arises. If that's the case, whatever explanation, if any ever comes for, for phenomenal consciousness will suffice for noumenal consciousness.

Paradoxically, clinging too closely to this question, I think makes us less human in that it may conceal or solidarity in favor of our unity. In our culture we put an unquestioning emphasis on the latter at the expense of the former - resulting in the great unhappiness of Bulkington, that Hercules of the Sea.

I present here, his six-inch epitaph.

Power Moby-Dick, the Online Annotation — Chapter 23

Chapter XXIII
The Lee Shore
page 104

"Some chapters back, one Bulkington was spoken of, a tall, new-landed mariner, encountered in New Bedford at the inn.

When on that shivering winter's night, the Pequod thrust her vindictive bows into the cold malicious waves, who should I see

page 105

standing at her helm but Bulkington! I looked with sympathetic awe and fearfulness upon the man, who in mid-winter just landed from a four years' dangerous voyage, could so unrestingly push off again for still another tempestuous term. The land seemed scorching to his feet. Wonderfullest things are ever the unmentionable; deep memories yield no epitaphs; this six-inch chapter is the stoneless grave of Bulkington. Let me only say that it fared with him as with the storm-tossed ship, that miserably drives along the leeward land. The port would fain give succor; the port is pitiful;in the port is safety, comfort, hearthstone, supper, warm blankets, friends, all that's kind to our mortalities. But in that gale, the port, the land, is that ship's direst jeopardy; she must fly all hospitality; one touch of land, though it but graze the keel, would make her shudder through and through. With all her might she crowds all sail off shore; in so doing, fights 'gainst the very winds that fain would blow her homeward; seeks all the lashed sea's landlessness again; for refuge's sake forlornly rushing into peril; her only friend her bitterest foe!

Know ye, now, Bulkington? Glimpses do ye seem to see of that mortally intolerable truth; that all deep, earnest thinking is but the intrepid effort of the soul to keep the open independence of her sea; while the wildest winds of heaven and earth conspire to cast her on the treacherous, slavish shore?

But as in landlessness alone resides the highest truth, shoreless, indefinite as God—so, better is it to perish in that howling infinite, than be ingloriously dashed upon the lee, even if that were safety! For worm-like, then, oh! who would craven crawl to land! Terrors of the terrible! is all this agony so vain? Take heart, take heart, O Bulkington! Bear thee grimly, demigod! Up from the spray of thy ocean-perishing—straight up, leaps thy apotheosis!"

 

[smcder]

Questions I ask myself about that last post:

1. what does it matter if the problem is a constructed one? The problem remains - however we come to see it.

- I think that does make it distinct from a question about reductive explanations - if you subscribe to a reductive explanation of the phenomenal you subscribe to all that has flowed from it, does flow from it and may flow from it - I think we may well ask even more unsettling questions in the future and, I think, to a degree, what kind of selves we have ... is a more open question than this problem represents - meaning the problem itself is partially constructed - a truly philosophical problem.

We are still left with the question as to why each of us happens to be the individual we are, rather than anyone else.

I think we shouldn't be misled by the vertiginous phenomenology of that dizzying question - I think it's a matter to be cleared up psychologically, rather than with physical explanation.

If we were anyone else, we would then be the individual we are, the one now asking the variant question: why do I happen to be anyone else, rather than the individual I are? (language only suffers so much elastic insult without breaking down ... !)

• I am the "I am"
• we are the "I am"
• I am the "we are"

Noumenal Consciousness | Phenomenal Experience | Personal Identity

I think my disagreement finally is with the explanation required, or not required to solve the problem.

quoting Pharoah

"The phenomenon of our experience is the property we identify as consciousness, which is why a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience would seem to explain consciousness. However, the specificity of our conscious experience tells us, that following a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, questions as to the exact nature of consciousness remain unanswered. We are still left with the question as to why each of us happens to be the individual we are, rather than anyone else. Nevertheless, the lack of observational reference does not prevent explorating quantum principles to explain the noumenon of consciousness. Indeed, this is an attractive prospect:

1. It assigns value to the vocation of individual choice and free will.
2. It identifies an evolutionary purpose to individual choice in terms of its effect on the path of consciousness.
3. Advancing the concept could demonstrate that the consciousness state is irreconcilably instrumental in the formation of the physical fabric of the universe, thereby entwining our concept of consciousness with the intrinsic properties of our physics concepts both classical and quantum.

Despite the Hierarchical Systems Theory reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, one could interpret nature in the manner of a type-F monist (Chalmers, 2003) as consisting of entities with intrinsic quantum consciousness properties that stand in causal relation within a space-time manifold, where physics emerges from the relations between entities and consciousness emerges from their intrinsic nature."

 

[smcder]

quoting Pharoah

"The phenomenon of our experience is the property we identify as consciousness, which is why a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience would seem to explain consciousness. However, the specificity of our conscious experience tells us, that following a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, questions as to the exact nature of consciousness remain unanswered. We are still left with the question as to why each of us happens to be the individual we are, rather than anyone else. Nevertheless, the lack of observational reference does not prevent explorating quantum principles to explain the noumenon of consciousness. Indeed, this is an attractive prospect:

1. It assigns value to the vocation of individual choice and free will.
2. It identifies an evolutionary purpose to individual choice in terms of its effect on the path of consciousness.
3. Advancing the concept could demonstrate that the consciousness state is irreconcilably instrumental in the formation of the physical fabric of the universe, thereby entwining our concept of consciousness with the intrinsic properties of our physics concepts both classical and quantum.

Despite the Hierarchical Systems Theory reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, one could interpret nature in the manner of a type-F monist (Chalmers, 2003) as consisting of entities with intrinsic quantum consciousness properties that stand in causal relation within a space-time manifold, where physics emerges from the relations between entities and consciousness emerges from their intrinsic nature."

"The phenomenon of our experience is the property we identify as consciousness, which is why a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience would seem to explain consciousness. However, the specificity of our conscious experience tells us, that following a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, questions as to the exact nature of consciousness remain unanswered. We are still left with the question as to why each of us happens to be the individual we are, rather than anyone else."

smcder I think such questions are answered following a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience (if and when I see one!). There is no remaining question:

why each of us happens to be the individual we are, rather than anyone else

The individual we are is "anyone else" and "everyone else" - which statement I think provides the observational reference you feel is lacking.

I'm afraid it gets worse from here, for me, as it begins to take on a "God of the gaps" flavor ... well, we may have explained phenomenal consciousness, but noumenal consciousness is a bit tricky - and even if we get quantum on it that's better because it's a bit murkier on the reductionist/deterministic scale (which I don't think it is) - and we can still draw some humanistic conclusions from out of the void:

Pharaoh

Indeed, this is an attractive prospect:

1. It assigns value to the vocation of individual choice and free will.

smcder to me this is muddled, individual choice and free will would not need value assigned as they are, on modern definition, what assigns value.

2. It identifies an evolutionary purpose to individual choice in terms of its effect on the path of consciousness.

smcder It's hard to see how, on a reductive explanation, you can separate out the effect of individual choice on the path of consciousness from the effect of the path of consciousness on individual choice - they are, at best, inter-effective ... but this identifies as a humanistic goal - individual influence or power over ... well, we can just stop there.

3. Advancing the concept could demonstrate that the consciousness state is irreconcilably instrumental in the formation of the physical fabric of the universe, thereby entwining our concept of consciousness with the intrinsic properties of our physics concepts both classical and quantum.

smcder see the objection to #2. I would say irreconcilably instrumental and irreconcilably intrument-ed "entwining" yes - but that doesn't make us masters of our fate.

pharoah Despite the Hierarchical Systems Theory reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, one could interpret nature in the manner of a type-F monist (Chalmers, 2003) as consisting of entities with intrinsic quantum consciousness properties that stand in causal relation within a space-time manifold, where physics emerges from the relations between entities and consciousness emerges from their intrinsic nature."

Hand-wavy ... at least, I am more and more discontent with dual aspect theories. Specifcially, I don't like the two sides of a coined-ness, there's some stuff here oh and, there's some stuff there on the back.

In short, its hard to separate out a reductionist account from a deterministic one - intrinsic/extrinsic intereffectuality is at best two sides of one particle whirling in the void.

To get to the various attractive aspects, the way my thinking is going nowadays, requires a non-reductionist account. Not that there no non-reductionist explanations - but rather that they lead, if one is not disciplined, down a reductive path to Scrooge's bit of undigested potato.

What the is the vocation of individual choice and free will? To be meaningful, it has to exist at that level of explanation - surely it is composed of states of mind and brain activity and physical arrangements of material, but if it exerts no causal force in itself, it is no vocation, not free and therefore unchosen. Which is as much as saying that free will isn't composed of states of mind and brain activity and physical arrangements of material. The test of our acceptance of that is whether we can say it with the equal facility that we say that states of mind, brain activity and physical arrangements of material aren't composed of free will.

 

[Constance]

Okay, but what's the point? Even if the relationship between the perceived and the perceiver isn't implied, it exists all the same. If it's not in one's mind then it's simply taken for granted.

I think the following paper, posted somewhere earlier in this thread, might be helpful:

Does a robot have an Umwelt

 

[smcder]

"why am I me and not someone else?" - I think we are not monolithic selves - I is not someone, but someone(s). Do persons with Disassociated Identity Disorder ("multiple personalities") actually have more rigid boundaries between their many selves than those without a diagnosis? What makes the disorder disfunctional is more that there is no recognition possible of the many selves - we also do not normally "recognize" this but only because we don't look and the boundaries are strengthened socially - the more we pay attention, the more I think we can see this - the disparity between the public figure and the actual person is newsworthy but very few of us don't suffer the same thing - who are you at work? At home? By yourself? Of course, there is a lot of overlap. But I think there is enough variety to see I am me and someone else - this to me strengthens the argument against there being any real puzzle to why am I me and not someone else.

 

[Randall]

I think the following paper, posted somewhere earlier in this thread, might be helpful: Does a robot have an Umwelt

Apart from it being just another story about yet another philosopher who has crawled along the same path and added his own odd sounding labels, I don't see anything new, but if you haven't already cheacked this out, you might want to:

http://www.sunypress.edu/pdf/61705.pdf

 

[Pharoah]

quoting Pharoah

"The phenomenon of our experience is the property we identify as consciousness, which is why a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience would seem to explain consciousness. However, the specificity of our conscious experience tells us, that following a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, questions as to the exact nature of consciousness remain unanswered. We are still left with the question as to why each of us happens to be the individual we are, rather than anyone else. Nevertheless, the lack of observational reference does not prevent explorating quantum principles to explain the noumenon of consciousness. Indeed, this is an attractive prospect:

1. It assigns value to the vocation of individual choice and free will.
2. It identifies an evolutionary purpose to individual choice in terms of its effect on the path of consciousness.
3. Advancing the concept could demonstrate that the consciousness state is irreconcilably instrumental in the formation of the physical fabric of the universe, thereby entwining our concept of consciousness with the intrinsic properties of our physics concepts both classical and quantum.

Despite the Hierarchical Systems Theory reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, one could interpret nature in the manner of a type-F monist (Chalmers, 2003) as consisting of entities with intrinsic quantum consciousness properties that stand in causal relation within a space-time manifold, where physics emerges from the relations between entities and consciousness emerges from their intrinsic nature."

"The phenomenon of our experience is the property we identify as consciousness, which is why a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience would seem to explain consciousness. However, the specificity of our conscious experience tells us, that following a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, questions as to the exact nature of consciousness remain unanswered. We are still left with the question as to why each of us happens to be the individual we are, rather than anyone else."

smcder I think such questions are answered following a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience (if and when I see one!). There is no remaining question:

why each of us happens to be the individual we are, rather than anyone else

The individual we are is "anyone else" and "everyone else" - which statement I think provides the observational reference you feel is lacking.

I'm afraid it gets worse from here, for me, as it begins to take on a "God of the gaps" flavor ... well, we may have explained phenomenal consciousness, but noumenal consciousness is a bit tricky - and even if we get quantum on it that's better because it's a bit murkier on the reductionist/deterministic scale (which I don't think it is) - and we can still draw some humanistic conclusions from out of the void:

Pharaoh

Indeed, this is an attractive prospect:

1. It assigns value to the vocation of individual choice and free will.

smcder to me this is muddled, individual choice and free will would not need value assigned as they are, on modern definition, what assigns value.

2. It identifies an evolutionary purpose to individual choice in terms of its effect on the path of consciousness.

smcder It's hard to see how, on a reductive explanation, you can separate out the effect of individual choice on the path of consciousness from the effect of the path of consciousness on individual choice - they are, at best, inter-effective ... but this identifies as a humanistic goal - individual influence or power over ... well, we can just stop there.

3. Advancing the concept could demonstrate that the consciousness state is irreconcilably instrumental in the formation of the physical fabric of the universe, thereby entwining our concept of consciousness with the intrinsic properties of our physics concepts both classical and quantum.

smcder see the objection to #2. I would say irreconcilably instrumental and irreconcilably intrument-ed "entwining" yes - but that doesn't make us masters of our fate.

pharoah Despite the Hierarchical Systems Theory reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, one could interpret nature in the manner of a type-F monist (Chalmers, 2003) as consisting of entities with intrinsic quantum consciousness properties that stand in causal relation within a space-time manifold, where physics emerges from the relations between entities and consciousness emerges from their intrinsic nature."

Hand-wavy ... at least, I am more and more discontent with dual aspect theories. Specifcially, I don't like the two sides of a coined-ness, there's some stuff here oh and, there's some stuff there on the back.

In short, its hard to separate out a reductionist account from a deterministic one - intrinsic/extrinsic intereffectuality is at best two sides of one particle whirling in the void.

To get to the various attractive aspects, the way my thinking is going nowadays, requires a non-reductionist account. Not that there no non-reductionist explanations - but rather that they lead, if one is not disciplined, down a reductive path to Scrooge's bit of undigested potato.

What the is the vocation of individual choice and free will? To be meaningful, it has to exist at that level of explanation - surely it is composed of states of mind and brain activity and physical arrangements of material, but if it exerts no causal force in itself, it is no vocation, not free and therefore unchosen. Which is as much as saying that free will isn't composed of states of mind and brain activity and physical arrangements of material. The test of our acceptance of that is whether we can say it with the equal facility that we say that states of mind, brain activity and physical arrangements of material aren't composed of free will.

My noumenal essay was written years ago. I know the notion of reductive explanation is wrong and I would have to rewrite that bit. Also, it is me playing with ideas and I certainly do not commit forcefully to any of it. Your views are insightful and I'm not sure which to run with... but I have no strong opinion.
The basic idea I was exploring is as follows. The noumenal essay starts by assuming that any given phenomenal experience is positioned in a specific space and time. The other assumption is that the noumenal is all possible spaces and times that a phenomenal experience could be. Forgive my layman's understanding, but as with the collapse of the wave function I was exploring the idea that the noumnal becomes the phenomenal in like fashion. Consequently, our noumenal consciousness is in fact existing in all times and spaces (all of us in equal measure) but our individual phenomenal existence is the collapse of this wave function... What 'we do' (problematic I know) individually determines where the collapse takes place.
I hope that this makes sense.
As a corollary I say that no physicalist answer can satisfy the 'uniqueness of me' (uom) question if physics relies on the mathematical paradigm that numbers of kind exist. It can satisfy why there are uoms but not any particular one of those kind. Equally, the noumenal consciousness wave function notion does not satisfy the uom either because it cannot differentiate why I end up specifically where I end up in time and space.
Why are tortoises called tortoises, and not bananas? because if they were called bananas i'd be asking why are bananas called bananas, and not, say, 'tortoises'. But... they are still called tortoises not bananas. conceivably in a twin universe they are called bananas.

 

[Pharoah]

"why am I me and not someone else?" - I think we are not monolithic selves - I is not someone, but someone(s). Do persons with Disassociated Identity Disorder ("multiple personalities") actually have more rigid boundaries between their many selves than those without a diagnosis? What makes the disorder disfunctional is more that there is no recognition possible of the many selves - we also do not normally "recognize" this but only because we don't look and the boundaries are strengthened socially - the more we pay attention, the more I think we can see this - the disparity between the public figure and the actual person is newsworthy but very few of us don't suffer the same thing - who are you at work? At home? By yourself? Of course, there is a lot of overlap. But I think there is enough variety to see I am me and someone else - this to me strengthens the argument against there being any real puzzle to why am I me and not someone else.

DID is irrelevant. And the monolithic or otherwise nature of self is not relevant either to the WAIMANSE. Nor is it about the content or the (dynamic) nature of the content of identity. It is not even about Being... or about the embeddedness of Being, either within or maybe without the body. It is about the transient placement, in the entirety of existence, of one's particular self

 

[smcder]

DID is irrelevant. And the monolithic or otherwise nature of self is not relevant either to the WAIMANSE. Nor is it about the content or the (dynamic) nature of the content of identity. It is not even about Being... or about the embeddedness of Being, either within or maybe without the body. It is about the transient placement, in the entirety of existence, of one's particular self

I understand that. And what I'm saying is that the problem disappears when you realize that it's true for everyone. It's a big part of the problem I have with conscious realism or idealism.

 

[smcder]

I just searched:

why am i me and not someone else

Here is one result:

"Why am I me" is a valid question • r/philosophy

One answer brings up indexicals and rigid designators: for example "why is that its h2o that's water?" or "why is it 2018"? Neither of which, the author says, nor any other indexical, is explainable from any physical theory.

 

[smcder]

Someone mentions DID/ MPD near the end.

 

[smcder]

https://www.quora.com/According-to-...ther-point-in-space-and-time-Why-am-I-not-you

 

[smcder]

https://philarchive.org/archive/KLA...FjAAegQIERAB&usg=AOvVaw1fz2lHSzNRmWNrJkAmLQgn

 

[Pharoah]

I understand that. And what I'm saying is that the problem disappears when you realize that it's true for everyone. It's a big part of the problem I have with conscious realism or idealism.

Yes it is the same for everyone. But as far as I am concerned, the problem is real for me and does not disappear when I acknowledge thst the same is true for everyone. If I am everyone, but just don't realise it, the problem disappears. Also, if I am the only one, the problem disappears. But I'm intersted in a non-skeptical exploration.
I don't think it has anything to do with consciousness btw... well ... ultimtely everything is connected, yes, but I think of them as distinct problems, which puts me in a minority of one I suppose.

 

[smcder]

Yes it is the same for everyone. But as far as I am concerned, the problem is real for me and does not disappear when I acknowledge thst the same is true for everyone. If I am everyone, but just don't realise it, the problem disappears. Also, if I am the only one, the problem disappears. But I'm intersted in a non-skeptical exploration.
I don't think it has anything to do with consciousness btw... well ... ultimtely everything is connected, yes, but I think of them as distinct problems, which puts me in a minority of one I suppose.

Did you read the Reddit and Quora threads and the Philpaper article?

 

[smcder]

Tim Klaassen, Why Am I Me and Not Someone Else? - PhilPapers

A better link to the paper.

 

[Pharoah]

Did you read the Reddit and Quora threads and the Philpaper article?

Reddit yes... nicely put: first contribution last para.
Klaussen not yet... v bad internet (I blame either London or apple) and not accessed v easily. What did you think of K?