Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10

[Constance]

Beyond the first three subgroups of problems, C extends the complexity of the "combination problem' as follows:

". . . There are a few other aspects of the combination problem, corresponding to different aspects of macroexperience that need explaining. There is the unity problem: how do microexperiences come together to yield a unified consciousness? There is the boundary problem (Rosenberg 1998): how do microexperiences come together to yield a bounded consciousness? There is the awareness problem: how do microexperiences come together to yield awareness of qualities? And there is the grain problem (Maxwell 1979; Lockwood 1993): how do microexperiences come together 2Dainton (2011) calls this problem the “derivation problem”. 5 to yield homogeneous macroexperiences, such as a homogeneous experience of red, instead of an enormous jagged array of distinct qualities? Some of these problems might be assimilated to earlier problems (the first three plausibly involve aspects of subjective character, the last involves an aspect of qualitative character, and all involve aspects of structure), but it is useful to have them on the table explicitly.

It is common for a proposed solution to the combination problem to address only one of these problems: most often the subject combination problem and occasionally the quality combination problem. It should be stressed that a satisfactory solution to the combination problem must address all of these problems. This raises the bar for a solution, as it is far from clear that any single proposal can solve all the problems at once. One might appeal to separate proposals for solving the problems one at a time, but then it is far from clear that these proposals will be compatible with each other. At the very least, any proposed solution to the combination problem should indicate which problems it is addressing, and which problems it is not.

The formulation of the problems above is misleading in one respect. I have typically said “how do microexperiences come together to yield X”, or perhaps “how do microsubjects” or “how do microqualities”. However, constitutive panpsychism is not committed to the claim that macroexperience is wholly grounded in microexperience. It could be partly grounded in causal or structural relations among the microexperiences, or in other microphysical properties, or even in other quiddities if there are non-phenomenal quiddities as well. We can put all this by saying that constitutive panpsychism requires macroexperiences to be wholly grounded in microexperiences and microphysics, where microphysics is understood broadly to include all of the above. The formulations of the relevant problems can then all take the form “How do microexperiences and microphysics come together to yield X?”. With the problems understood this way, the panpsychist has more resources to play with, but the problems still seem very difficult to solve. . . . ."

This is the most interesting paper I've yet read by Chalmers.

 

[Randall]

You're entitled to your opinion, of course, but from what I have seen in your posts in this thread over these two or three years, you have not seriously engaged in reading enough of the papers and books we have linked and discussed here to be capable of evaluating the progress of contemporary consciousness studies and the reflection of that development in our discussions in the forum.

Other subjects likely interest you more, and I'm not faulting you for your limited research in this demanding interdisciplinary subject matter. But I do think that if you are not willing to engage more fully with it yourself, the value of your critiques of what the rest of us are doing here is in doubt.

Hmm. The ability to cut and paste walls of text also leaves the comprehension of the poster in doubt. What's needed to determine comprehension is something that illustrates it by way of a meaningful comparison to other relevant information we've covered. For example, it's rather synchronistic how Chalmers' paper "The Combination Problem for Panpsychism" popped up here along with my positing of the idea of Post Mysterianism. Both speak to the value of all the walls of texts, piles of books and other media that attempts to either conglomerate or distil the subject matter into something more meaningful than itself . It also makes your comment on my ability to evaluate the subject matter quite ironic, though I suspect you don't see why. But I do love your jazz ensemble posts .

 

[Constance]

Hmm. The ability to cut and paste walls of text also leaves the comprehension of the poster in doubt. What's needed to determine comprehension is something that illustrates it by way of a meaningful comparison to other relevant information we've covered. For example, it's rather synchronistic how Chalmers' paper "The Combination Problem for Panpsychism" popped up here along with my positing of the idea of Post Mysterianism. Both speak to the value of all the walls of texts, piles of books and other media that attempts to either conglomerate or distil the subject matter into something more meaningful than itself . It also makes your comment on my ability to evaluate the subject matter quite ironic, though I suspect you don't see why. But I do love your jazz ensemble posts .

Is your 'idea of post-mysterianism' meant to be an escape clause from significant participation in this thread? I for one would be happy to see you sign out with it. You have nothing to offer here. Bye now.

 

[Constance]

ESA Science & Technology: Has Cassini found a universal driver for prebiotic chemistry at Titan?

 

[Randall]

Is your 'idea of post-mysterianism' meant to be an escape clause from significant participation in this thread? I for one would be happy to see you sign out with it. You have nothing to offer here. Bye now.

With respect to the big picture, nobody here ( self included ) has made any really "significant" contributions, and I would further submit that all the walls of text and references posted here in the future will be equally insignificant, other than to provide personal intellectual entertainment ( which is fine ). If you want to call that an "escape clause" be my guest, but it's just as valid a position to take as some of the others we've covered, and it frees up time for other things; like mowing my lawn.

​

 

[Constance]

From Chalmers's paper "The Combination Problem for Panpsychism":

"... We can understand microphysical structure and macrophysical structure as the quasi-mathematical structure of microphysical and macrophysical entities as characterized by physics. Macrophenomenal structure is the structure we find within our phenomenology. In both cases, structure includes both internal structure (the internal geometrical structure of a complex physical entity, the internal structure of a visual field) as well as what we might [call?] external structure: the structure of spaces within which properties are embedded (the scalar structure of mass, the three-dimensional structure of color space). The structural mismatch argument can be put in the form of an apparently inconsistent tetrad:

(1) Microphenomenal structure is isomorphic to microphysical structure.

(2) Microphenomenal structure constitutes macrophenomenal structure.

(3) Microphysical structure constitutes macrophysical structure.

(4) Macrophenomenal structure is not isomorphic to macrophysical structure.

Here (1) is an apparent commitment of Russellian panpsychism, (2) is an apparent commitment of constitutive panpsychism, and (3) is a widely accepted view of the physical. (4) reflects the plausible datum of mismatch between the structure of consciousness and the structure of the brain. When combined with the additional premise saying that (1)-(4) are inconsistent, it follows that constitutive Russellian panpsychism is false.

A corresponding argument against panprotopsychism replaces “microphenomenal” by “protophenomenal” in premises (1) and (2). These premises are then apparent commitments of Russellian and constitutive panprotopsychism respectively, so that the inconsistency of the premises yields an argument against constitutive Russellian panprotopsychism.

Although the structural mismatch argument has received relatively little attention to date, I think it is one of the more powerful arguments against constitutive Russellian versions of panpsychism and panprotopsychism. There are various ways to respond to the argument, but doing so is not at all trivial. I consider the argument at some length later in this article.

5 Noncombinatorial responses

The most obvious sort of panpsychist response to the combination problem is a combinatorial response: show how microexperiences can constitutively combine to yield macroexperiences. But there are also noncombinatorial responses, which deny that microexperiences constitutively combine to yield macroexperiences.

The most obvious sort of noncombinatorial response is emergent panpsychism, which holds that macroexperiences are strongly emergent from microexperiences and are not constituted by them. This view rejects constitutive panpsychism, so it does not need to give an account of mental combination.

Another noncombinatorial response is identity panpsychism, on which macroexperiences are identical to microexperiences. On this view, macroexperiences are already present at the fundamental level and no combination is required. Given that microexperiences constitute themselves, this view is nevertheless a form of constitutive panpsychism.

A third noncombinatorial response is autonomous panpsychism, which holds that macroexperiences are autonomous from microexperiences, in that they are neither constituted by, emergent from, nor identical to microexperiences. On one version of this view, microexperiences are emergent from or constituted by macroexperiences. On another version, microexperiences and macroexperiences are both autonomous, with neither depending on the other.

These three noncombinatorial responses contrast with the more familiar combinatorial panpsychism, on which microexperiences collectively constitute macroexperiences. It is worth noting that all forms of panprotopsychism are combinatorial: by definition, protophenomenal properties are distinct from but can collectively constitute phenomenal properties.

This taxonomy divides panpsychist responses to the combination problem into four classes: emergent panpsychism, autonomous panpsychism, identity panpsychism, and combinatorial panpsychism. The first three are noncombinatorial responses, while the third is a combinatorial response. The last two are forms of constitutive panpsychism, while the first to are forms of nonconstitutive panpsychism.

Each of these four broad classes subsumes various specific sorts of response in turn. In this section I discuss the noncombinatorial responses: emergent panpsychism, autonomous panpsychism and identity panpsychism. . . . ." (pp.14-15)

http://consc.net/papers/combination.pdf

 

[smcder]

From Chalmers's paper "The Combination Problem for Panpsychism":

"... We can understand microphysical structure and macrophysical structure as the quasi-mathematical structure of microphysical and macrophysical entities as characterized by physics. Macrophenomenal structure is the structure we find within our phenomenology. In both cases, structure includes both internal structure (the internal geometrical structure of a complex physical entity, the internal structure of a visual field) as well as what we might [call?] external structure: the structure of spaces within which properties are embedded (the scalar structure of mass, the three-dimensional structure of color space). The structural mismatch argument can be put in the form of an apparently inconsistent tetrad:

(1) Microphenomenal structure is isomorphic to microphysical structure.

(2) Microphenomenal structure constitutes macrophenomenal structure.

(3) Microphysical structure constitutes macrophysical structure.

(4) Macrophenomenal structure is not isomorphic to macrophysical structure.

Here (1) is an apparent commitment of Russellian panpsychism, (2) is an apparent commitment of constitutive panpsychism, and (3) is a widely accepted view of the physical. (4) reflects the plausible datum of mismatch between the structure of consciousness and the structure of the brain. When combined with the additional premise saying that (1)-(4) are inconsistent, it follows that constitutive Russellian panpsychism is false.

A corresponding argument against panprotopsychism replaces “microphenomenal” by “protophenomenal” in premises (1) and (2). These premises are then apparent commitments of Russellian and constitutive panprotopsychism respectively, so that the inconsistency of the premises yields an argument against constitutive Russellian panprotopsychism.

Although the structural mismatch argument has received relatively little attention to date, I think it is one of the more powerful arguments against constitutive Russellian versions of panpsychism and panprotopsychism. There are various ways to respond to the argument, but doing so is not at all trivial. I consider the argument at some length later in this article.

5 Noncombinatorial responses

The most obvious sort of panpsychist response to the combination problem is a combinatorial response: show how microexperiences can constitutively combine to yield macroexperiences. But there are also noncombinatorial responses, which deny that microexperiences constitutively combine to yield macroexperiences.

The most obvious sort of noncombinatorial response is emergent panpsychism, which holds that macroexperiences are strongly emergent from microexperiences and are not constituted by them. This view rejects constitutive panpsychism, so it does not need to give an account of mental combination.

Another noncombinatorial response is identity panpsychism, on which macroexperiences are identical to microexperiences. On this view, macroexperiences are already present at the fundamental level and no combination is required. Given that microexperiences constitute themselves, this view is nevertheless a form of constitutive panpsychism.

A third noncombinatorial response is autonomous panpsychism, which holds that macroexperiences are autonomous from microexperiences, in that they are neither constituted by, emergent from, nor identical to microexperiences. On one version of this view, microexperiences are emergent from or constituted by macroexperiences. On another version, microexperiences and macroexperiences are both autonomous, with neither depending on the other.

These three noncombinatorial responses contrast with the more familiar combinatorial panpsychism, on which microexperiences collectively constitute macroexperiences. It is worth noting that all forms of panprotopsychism are combinatorial: by definition, protophenomenal properties are distinct from but can collectively constitute phenomenal properties.

This taxonomy divides panpsychist responses to the combination problem into four classes: emergent panpsychism, autonomous panpsychism, identity panpsychism, and combinatorial panpsychism. The first three are noncombinatorial responses, while the third is a combinatorial response. The last two are forms of constitutive panpsychism, while the first to are forms of nonconstitutive panpsychism.

Each of these four broad classes subsumes various specific sorts of response in turn. In this section I discuss the noncombinatorial responses: emergent panpsychism, autonomous panpsychism and identity panpsychism. . . . ." (pp.14-15)

http://consc.net/papers/combination.pdf

this is from a presentation at the conference @Soupie posted above:

A DILLEMMA FOR RUSSELLIAN MONISTS ABOUT
CONSCIOUSNESS*

A DILEMMA FOR RUSSELLIAN MONISTS ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS

Adam Pautz
First Draft of December 15th, 2015
Brown University

"Unfortunately, my aim here is negative. My main claim is that the Hegelian
synthesis argument for Russellian monism fails. Maybe Russellian monism can
avoid one big problem: the conceivability problem. But there are other profound
problems with physicalism and dualism, even if some of them haven’t received as
much attention. I will argue that, if we look at these other problems, we can see that
Russellian monism doesn’t avoid them. In fact, depending on the version, Russellian
monism combines these problems and makes them even more intractable. I
should say at the outset that the problems for Russellian monism I will be developing
are distinct from the familiar ones you might be expecting. In particular, they
are all different from the various versions of the “combination problem”."

He goes on to discuss “psychophysical luck” as a problem common to Dualism and Russellian Monism. (see section 4 in particular)

 

[smcder]

And again I think this is important for the big hurdle that panprotopsychism runs into: the combination problem.

This conception of protoconsciousness and consciousness avoids the CP because rather than a process of combination we have a process of differentiation.

Nu? So now you have the Differentiation Problem ...

 

[Randall]

Excerpt From: Most Popular Theories of Consciousness Are Worse Than Wrong

"Some scholars retreat to the position that consciousness must be a primary property of information that cannot be explained. If information is present, so is a primordial, conscious experience of it. The more information that is integrated together, the richer the conscious experience. This type of thinking leads straight to a mystical theory called panpsychism, the claim that everything in the universe is conscious, each in its own way, since everything contains at least some information. Rocks, trees, rivers, stars. This theory is the ultimate in phlegm theories. It has enormous intuitive appeal to people who are prone to project consciousness onto the objects around them, but it explains absolutely nothing."​

 

[Soupie]

Excerpt From: Most Popular Theories of Consciousness Are Worse Than Wrong

"Some scholars retreat to the position that consciousness must be a primary property of information that cannot be explained. If information is present, so is a primordial, conscious experience of it. The more information that is integrated together, the richer the conscious experience. This type of thinking leads straight to a mystical theory called panpsychism, the claim that everything in the universe is conscious, each in its own way, since everything contains at least some information. Rocks, trees, rivers, stars. This theory is the ultimate in phlegm theories. It has enormous intuitive appeal to people who are prone to project consciousness onto the objects around them, but it explains absolutely nothing."​

This was posted and discussed months ago.

 

[smcder]

This was posted and discussed months ago.

Yep. Randall may still have us on ignore. If so, @Constance might let him know.

 

[Constance]

Excerpt From: Most Popular Theories of Consciousness Are Worse Than Wrong
"Some scholars retreat to the position that consciousness must be a primary property of information that cannot be explained. If information is present, so is a primordial, conscious experience of it. The more information that is integrated together, the richer the conscious experience. This type of thinking leads straight to a mystical theory called panpsychism, the claim that everything in the universe is conscious, each in its own way, since everything contains at least some information. Rocks, trees, rivers, stars. This theory is the ultimate in phlegm theories. It has enormous intuitive appeal to people who are prone to project consciousness onto the objects around them, but it explains absolutely nothing."[/INDENT][/INDENT]

Graziano oversimplifies the philosophical and scientific problems addressed in the field of CS as a whole. Let's take a longer extract from this magazine article to see what he actually has on offer. I've underscored the relevant passages to foreground the presuppositions on which his own best guess is based.

"When I talk to other scientists about the study of consciousness, very often the first thing I’m asked to explain is why the topic is worth scientific attention. I argue that it’s not just a topic for philosophers or poets, and it’s not just a matter of opinion or belief. We can actually build rational theories of consciousness, theories that have explanatory power and that can be tested experimentally. And it’s crucial knowledge. Consciousness has a specific, practical impact on brain function. If you want to understand how the brain works, you need to understand that part of the machine. No neuroscientist, and no expert in artificial intelligence, should scoff at consciousness.

Here’s how we can construct theories that do a better job of explaining, even if they appeal less to our biases and intuitions. The brain is an information-processing machine. It takes in data, transforms it, and uses it to help guide behavior. When that machine ups and says, “Hey, I have a conscious experience of myself and the things around me,” that assertion is based on data computed in the brain. As scientists we can ask a series of basic questions. How did the machine arrive at that self-description? What’s the specific, adaptive use of that self-description? What networks in the brain compute that type of information? These are all scientifically approachable questions. And we are beginning to see specific, testable theories that can answer them. The theories that show the most promise are sometimes called metacognitive theories. They are theories of how the brain computes information about itself and its own processes.

Graziano's second paragraph consists entirely of presuppositional beliefs held by computer scientists and AI promoters. He goes on to add further assumptions.

The brain constructs packets of information, virtual models, that describe things in the world. Anything useful to monitor and predict, the brain can construct a model of it. These simulations change continuously as new information comes in, and they’re used to guide ongoing behavior. For example, the visual system constructs rich, detailed models of the objects in the visual world—a desk, a car, another person. But the brain doesn’t just model concrete objects in the external world. It also models its own internal processes. It constructs simulations of its own cognition.

And those simulations are never accurate. They contain incomplete, sometimes surreal information. The brain constructs a distorted, cartoon sketch of itself and its world. And this is why we’re so certain that we have a kind of magic feeling inside us.

Graziano's assertions in the underscored sentences above are mere speculations; he provides no evidence to support the notion that the brain "constructs" a "sketch of itself and its world", nor does he provide any account of how or why, in doing so, the brain either comes to believe that 'it' is conscious or actually becomes 'conscious'.

This type of theory can explain some things and not others. It does not explain how the brain generates consciousness. It explains why we claim to have consciousness and why we’re so certain of that claim.

Yes indeed, this type of theory [actually a hypothesis] "does not explain how the brain 'generates' consciousness" [though this lack of explanation does not deter those who hold it from making the presuppositional claim that the brain generates consciousness. Nor does the hypothesis Graziano summarizes "explain why we claim to have consciousness and why we're so certain of that claim." Both of these assertions are based in presuppositions and speculations. And the balance of what Graziano offers in the remaining few paragraphs of this piece is the usual promissory note that this would-be theory of consciousness will eventually be proved, maybe in 50 years.

It gives a general outline for a machine that processes information and, in the act of doing so, concludes that it has a subjective experience of that information. The machine has no way of realizing that this self-description is, well, not totally wrong, but distorted. What it has is a deep processing of information. What it concludes it has is something else—conscious experience.

The approach definitely doesn’t resonate with our common intuitions and biases. In this type of theory, consciousness isn’t magical. It isn’t mysterious. It isn’t a vibration. It doesn’t emerge like an energy. It’s not even very hard to understand. It’s a surreal, cartoonish description, a self-portrait. The theory has none of the intrinsic appeal of a good, crowd-pleasing phlegm theory. But a theory doesn’t have to be emotionally satisfying to be true.

The explanation is sound enough that in principle, one could build the machine. Give it fifty years, and I think we’ll get there. Computer scientists already know how to construct a computing device that takes in information, that constructs models or simulations, and that draws on those simulations to arrive at conclusions and guide behavior. Every component is buildable at least in principle, even if the details are beyond current knowledge. With a phlegm theory, you can’t build artificial consciousness, any more than you can make people lazy by injecting phlegm into them."

 

[smcder]

Graziano oversimplifies the philosophical and scientific problems addressed in the field of CS as a whole. Let's take a longer extract from this magazine article to see what he actually has on offer. I've underscored the relevant passages to foreground the presuppositions on which his own best guess is based.

"When I talk to other scientists about the study of consciousness, very often the first thing I’m asked to explain is why the topic is worth scientific attention. I argue that it’s not just a topic for philosophers or poets, and it’s not just a matter of opinion or belief. We can actually build rational theories of consciousness, theories that have explanatory power and that can be tested experimentally. And it’s crucial knowledge. Consciousness has a specific, practical impact on brain function. If you want to understand how the brain works, you need to understand that part of the machine. No neuroscientist, and no expert in artificial intelligence, should scoff at consciousness.

Here’s how we can construct theories that do a better job of explaining, even if they appeal less to our biases and intuitions. The brain is an information-processing machine. It takes in data, transforms it, and uses it to help guide behavior. When that machine ups and says, “Hey, I have a conscious experience of myself and the things around me,” that assertion is based on data computed in the brain. As scientists we can ask a series of basic questions. How did the machine arrive at that self-description? What’s the specific, adaptive use of that self-description? What networks in the brain compute that type of information? These are all scientifically approachable questions. And we are beginning to see specific, testable theories that can answer them. The theories that show the most promise are sometimes called metacognitive theories. They are theories of how the brain computes information about itself and its own processes.


The brain constructs packets of information, virtual models, that describe things in the world. Anything useful to monitor and predict, the brain can construct a model of it. These simulations change continuously as new information comes in, and they’re used to guide ongoing behavior. For example, the visual system constructs rich, detailed models of the objects in the visual world—a desk, a car, another person. But the brain doesn’t just model concrete objects in the external world. It also models its own internal processes. It constructs simulations of its own cognition.

And those simulations are never accurate. They contain incomplete, sometimes surreal information. The brain constructs a distorted, cartoon sketch of itself and its world. And this is why we’re so certain that we have a kind of magic feeling inside us.

A theory doesn’t have to be emotionally satisfying to be true.
This type of theory can explain some things and not others. It does not explain how the brain generates consciousness. It explains why we claim to have consciousness and why we’re so certain of that claim. It gives a general outline for a machine that processes information and, in the act of doing so, concludes that it has a subjective experience of that information. The machine has no way of realizing that this self-description is, well, not totally wrong, but distorted. What it has is a deep processing of information. What it concludes it has is something else—conscious experience.

The approach definitely doesn’t resonate with our common intuitions and biases. In this type of theory, consciousness isn’t magical. It isn’t mysterious. It isn’t a vibration. It doesn’t emerge like an energy. It’s not even very hard to understand. It’s a surreal, cartoonish description, a self-portrait. The theory has none of the intrinsic appeal of a good, crowd-pleasing phlegm theory. But a theory doesn’t have to be emotionally satisfying to be true.

The explanation is sound enough that in principle, one could build the machine. Give it fifty years, and I think we’ll get there. Computer scientists already know how to construct a computing device that takes in information, that constructs models or simulations, and that draws on those simulations to arrive at conclusions and guide behavior. Every component is buildable at least in principle, even if the details are beyond current knowledge. With a phlegm theory, you can’t build artificial consciousness, any more than you can make people lazy by injecting phlegm into them."

The rule on these kind of predictions is to take your maximum expected lifetime and add 20 years ... Graziano is my age so that's just about right.

 

[smcder]

What IS a "phlegm theory"?

 

[Randall]

Computer scientists already know how to construct a computing device that takes in information, that constructs models or simulations, and that draws on those simulations to arrive at conclusions and guide behavior. Every component is buildable at least in principle, even if the details are beyond current knowledge ...

The thing about this, and we've covered this numerous times in the past, is that the emergence of new and unexpected phenomena from combinations of materials and energy, e.g. magnetism ( sorry Steve ) requires that specific types of things be organized and energized in specific kinds of ways. So just like the 3D computer model of a magnet on your PC screen will have no magnetic properties itself ( no matter what resolution of detail it is ), there's no assurance that a brain modeled by a computer will possess any consciousness ( no matter how finely detailed the model or large and powerful a computer is used ). This analogy speaks directly to the issues in Chalmers paper ( cited above ) and it reveals the fatal flaw in panpsychism. Those who embrace panpsychism are blind to the demarcation points between form and function and meaning. They're engaging in a logical fallacy: The Association Fallacy:

Premise A is a B ( The brain is material ... )
Premise A is also a C ( and is also conscious ... )
Conclusion Therefore, all Bs are Cs ( Therefore all materials are also conscious. )

The above should make it crystal clear to anyone viewing this thread that virtually any view of panpsychism cannot be logically supported and therefore cannot be relied on. Therefore we should be on guard and learn to recognize it when we see it extrapolated out into lengthy papers or videos on AI or pop-philosophy.

 

[Constance]

What IS a "phlegm theory"?

Near as I can figure it's any theory that recognizes consciousness as embodied, thereby recognizing consciousness as germinating in the lived bodily experiences of evolving species of life on earth. Graziano perhaps selects 'phlegm' from among the multiple manifestations of fluidity and viscosity essential to supporting biological life because phlegm is for him the most disgusting and repellant manifestation of life.

Btw, I've now inserted my comments on Graziano's Atlantic article since I preemptively posted my extract from it before adding these comments.

 

[smcder]

David Chalmers on reddit.com

I'm David Chalmers, philosopher interested in consciousness, technology, and many other things. AMA. • r/philosophy

What do you think about Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness?

I think i mentioned him briefly somewhere else on this page. i'm very interested in his general strategy of explaining our intuitions about consciousness as the result of an illusory self-model. that said i think he needs to do much more to spell out the details of the model. i haven't seen nearly enough specifics to explain the things that need to be explained. he also has interesting things to say about attention but i think those are somewhat independent of his views about explaining consciousness.
And here is that other mention:

regarding the paradox of phenomenal judgment: i agree the key is finding a functional explanations of why we make judgments such as "i am conscious", "consciousness is mysterious", "there's a hard problem of consciousness over and above the easy problems", and so on. i tried to give the beginnings of such an explanation at a couple of points in "the conscious mind", but it wasn't well-developed and i guess it didn't do much for you. illusionists like dennett, humphrey, graziano, drescher, and others have also tried giving elements of such a story, but usually also in a very sketchy way that doesn't seem fully adequate to the behavior that needs to be explained. still i think there is a real research program here that philosophers and scientists of all stripes ought to be able to buy into. even most dualists and panpsychists ought to allow that there's some sort of broadly functional story here, though they will draw different conclusions (e.g. interactionist dualists will deny that this functional story is grounded in a physical story). it's an under-researched area at the moment and i hope it gets a lot more attention in the coming years. i'm hoping to return soon to this area myself.

 

[smcder]

The Conscious Entities (brief) response to Graziano's piece:

Phlegm theory

and here are all the entries on Graziano at C.E.

Conscious Entities » Graziano

 

[Constance]

Behav Brain Sci. 1999 Jun;22(3):341-65; discussion 366-423.

Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception.
Pylyshyn Z.

Abstract
Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to cognition. This target article sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, psychophysics, perceptual learning, and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, corresponding to what some people have called early vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge, and utilities in determining the function it computes--in other words, it is cognitively impenetrable. That part of vision is complex and involves top-down interactions that are internal to the early vision system. Its function is to provide a structured representation of the 3-D surfaces of objects sufficient to serve as an index into memory, with somewhat different outputs being made available to other systems such as those dealing with motor control. The paper also addresses certain conceptual and methodological issues raised by this claim, such as whether signal detection theory and event-related potentials can be used to assess cognitive penetration of vision. A distinction is made among several stages in visual processing, including, in addition to the inflexible early-vision stage, a pre-perceptual attention-allocation stage and a post-perceptual evaluation, selection, and inference stage, which accesses long-term memory. These two stages provide the primary ways in which cognition can affect the outcome of visual perception. The paper discusses arguments from computer vision and psychology showing that vision is "intelligent" and involves elements of "problem solving." The cases of apparently intelligent interpretation sometimes cited in support of this claim do not show cognitive penetration; rather, they show that certain natural constraints on interpretation, concerned primarily with optical and geometrical properties of the world, have been compiled into the visual system. The paper also examines a number of examples where instructions and "hints" are alleged to affect what is seen. In each case it is concluded that the evidence is more readily assimilated to the view that when cognitive effects are found, they have a locus outside early vision, in such processes as the allocation of focal attention and the identification of the stimulus.

Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception. - PubMed - NCBI



This brief note is an extract from an NDPR review by Adam Pautz of The Wonder of Consciousness: Understanding the Mind Through Philosophical Reflection by Harold Langsam.

"...why do conscious experiences, if they are not reducible to dispositions to believe things, necessarily give us such dispositions?"

I think the likely explanation is to be found in the experientially accrued confidence that conscious beings gradually develop {prereflectively and reflectively} in living, and surviving, in a world in which developing perceptual interpretations of things and gestalts support what MP referred to as the "perceptual faith" in the reality of the experienced world. As MP points out, lived experience includes instances of incorrect interpretation sooner or later recognized to have been incorrect, from which conscious/minded beings also learn to question their interpretations of what-is and alter their behaviors, in humans (and perhaps other animals) enabling critical thinking.

 

[Constance]

The Conscious Entities (brief) response to Graziano's piece:

Phlegm theory

and here are all the entries on Graziano at C.E.

Conscious Entities » Graziano

Many thanks for the links.