Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11

[Constance]

No. I'm just saying that it can feel contingent, that it can feel like it could have been otherwise, that it can feel vertiginous, that of all these consciousnesses, one of them is you, you.

But it's not, it could not have been otherwise.

I think that one's conscious recognition of the existentiality of one's lived being, and of the temporality of being itself, is indeed a discovery of, rather than a feeling of, 'contingency' as existing at the heart of temporally experienced 'reality'. Depending on individual cases, that recognition might produce what you call a 'vertiginous' feeling but, from the basis of my own experience, I don't see that feeling as focused on the question of how one might have been another person, lived another lifetime, but rather on the question of who and what one indeed is. Harking back to Bataille, in prereflective consciousness, before we enter into reflective consciousness, we live our lives "like water in water." Reflective consciousness introduces us to the multiple levels or activities of our own consciousness, the fact that we can and do step back from the midst of that mental space within which we customarily experience the world as close at hand/on the other side of our skin and recognize the mental space in which we are also cognizant of the 'reflective cogito' also operating in our consciousness. We move from immediate experience to experience mediated by a higher-order presence coexisting within our minds. Suddenly 'who' we are, even 'what' we are, becomes ambiguous, radically open-ended to the self as well as to its surroundings, and on that basis responsible for what we do. Existentialist philosophy follows from these phenomenological discoveries.

To me, that doesn't change the world, nor does it tell us anything about what to make of our lives, which, to me, is the very hard problem and the most interesting one, but WAIM? offers no help and grants us no special status as being I who I am (me) and not someone else.

We are simply here, now...now, what shall we do here?

That's closer to what I'm saying, but I think that reflective consciousness, as an outgrowth of prereflective consciousness, does reveal to each of us our 'special status' in being who we are, as situated individuals interacting for better or worse with others in our world who are also sentient -- animals as well as other humans who all feel their existence, struggle to survive, and desire to thrive. As the later Heidegger saw it, we are 'appropriated' by the nature of our conscious being to take on our obligations to others individually and, in general, to the maintenance of social, cultural, moral/ethical, and ecological conditions in our local world that support and perpetuate the well-being of being. Thus, in his words, it is our obligation to take on the role of becoming "shepherds of being." 'What to make of our lives' is, on the basis of what phenomenology reveals, not a hard question to answer either.

 

[Constance]

Well put. I'm not doing Nagel justice I'm sure....but he is trying to show the physicalists just what their claim....to provide an objective account of everything would actually mean.

Au contraire. You've been a consistently excellent exponent of Nagel's thought in this thread, most recently in the extracts you posted a few days ago from WIILTBAB:

Thomas Nagel, What is it like to be a bat?

"Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them. I shall not pursue this subject, however. Its bearing on the topic before us (namely, the mind-body problem) is that it enables us to make a general observation about the subjective character of experience. Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being, or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view. I am not adverting here to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor. The point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is a type."
...

"In our own case we occupy the relevant point of view, but we will have as much difficulty understanding our own experience properly if we approach it from another point of view as we would if we tried to understand the experience of another species without taking up its point of view.

This bears directly on the mind-body problem. For if the facts of experience—facts about what it is like for the experiencing organism—are accessible only from one point of view, then it is a mystery how the true character of experiences could be revealed in the physical operation of that organism."

There seem to be several observations compacted in that last paragraph. Has Nagel written elsewhere about what he describes as a 'mystery' in that paragraph?

 

[Pharoah]

I'm at sea without rudder from these last posts. I think you both have a more sophisticated understanding in this area than me. I have little idea of whether you are addressing the area that I was thinking about.

 

[Constance]

Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness:
A phenomenological critique of representational theory

Josef Parnas & Dan Zahavi
Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):687-705 (1998)

Abstract

Given the recent interest in the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness it is no wonder that many authors have once more started to speak of the need for phenomenological considerations. Often however the term ‘phenomenology’ is being used simply as a synonym for ‘folk psychology', and in our article we argue that it would be far more fruitful to turn to the argumentation to be found within the continental tradition inaugurated by Husserl. In order to exemplify this claim, we criticize Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory as well as Strawson's recent contribution in this journal, and argue that a phenomenological analysis of the nature of self-awareness can provide us with a more sophisticated and accurate model for understanding both phenomenal consciousness and the notion of self.

I

As readers of the Journal of Consciousness Studies will know, ‘phenomenal con-
sciousness’ has again become a respectable scientific and philosophical topic. After a
long period of neo-behaviouristic confusion, it has become increasingly clear that an
exhaustive and adequate account of consciousness cannot satisfy itself with a mere
functional analysis of intentional behaviour, but must also take the first-personal or
subjective dimension of experience seriously. As Nagel has pointed out, a necessary
requirement for any coherent reductionism is that the entity to be reduced is properly
understood (Nagel, 1974, p. 437). An attempt to naturalize consciousness must take
its subjectivity seriously, that is, it must account for the fact that there is something it is
like for the subject to be conscious, otherwise the procedure will be question-begging.

However, not only has the problem of phenomenal consciousness become a popu-
lar theme. Recently, a number of analytical philosophers have even started to empha-
size the importance of phenomenological considerations. To take but two examples:
In his book Consciousness Reconsidered, Owen Flanagan argues in favour of what he
calls the natural method. If we wish to undertake a serious investigation of conscious-
ness, we should not only make use of neuroscientific and psychological (functional)
analyses, but also give phenomenology its due (Flanagan, 1992, p. 11). In a recent
paper Galen Strawson has claimed that a phenomenology of the self must precede a
metaphysics of the self, and that the former investigation into the sense of the self will
put constraints upon the latter investigation into the nature of the self (Strawson,
1997, pp. 406, 409). Thus, when studying consciousness, rather than, say, deep-sea
ecology, we should take phenomenological considerations into account, since an
important and non-negligible feature of consciousness is the way in which it is experienced by the subject.

But what exactly do Flanagan and Strawson refer to when they speak of ‘pheno-
menology?’ Neither makes the obvious move — namely a reference to the continen-
tal philosophical tradition bearing that name — nor, however, do they ever provide
any particular clear definition, but appear to understand ‘phenomenology’ as a kind
of a-theoretical and pre-scientific account of how things seem to be at a perceptual or
introspective glance. That is, they tacitly identify phenomenology and the common-
sense considerations of ‘folk psychology’.

For anybody familiar with the continental tradition inaugurated by Husserl, and developed and transformed by, among many others, Scheler, Heidegger, Fink, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Lévinas, and Henry, this notion of phenomenology will strike one as both vague and rather toothless.

The aim of this article will be to argue that phenomenology, understood in a far
more strict and technical (continental) sense, can make significant contributions to a
study of consciousness. In our view, it is counter-productive to continue to disregard
the detailed analyses to be found in the phenomenological tradition in the context of
the upsurge of theoretical and empirical interest in the subjective or phenomenal
dimension of consciousness.1 We will argue that the approach found in continental
phenomenology provides us with a more sophisticated and accurate model of con-
scious experience than the models currently in vogue in cognitive sciences, namely
the so-called higher-order representation theories. Our exposition will draw upon
arguments found within the phenomenological tradition rather than on the corre-
sponding phenomenological analyses which are behind these arguments. This limita-
tion is deliberate, given the critical scope of the current article.*

The main part of our article will be devoted to an analysis of the relation between
phenomenal consciousness, the notion of self, and self-awareness. We will present a
critique of higher-order representation theory of phenomenal awareness, which — in
our view — is highly paradigmatic of the current cognitivist analyses of conscious-
ness. This critique will be followed by an analysis of Strawson’s approach to the
nature of self, recently published in this journal as a keynote paper (Strawson, 1997).
We will repeat our claim that continental phenomenology offers a better conceptual
framework and is more faithful to the analysed subjective experience than his analyti-
cally inspired approach. Finally, we will present a brief case-study of a patient suffer-
ing from schizophrenia. Continental phenomenology, as a truly applied discipline,
has long been influencing psychiatric research, especially in the domain of schizo-
phrenia. This detour into psychopathology is intended to illustrate certain aspects of
the phenomenological method as well as to shed some light upon the nature of self-
awareness, because schizophrenia is a human affliction in which the conditions of
normal self-experience are sharply illuminated. . . ."

Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness: A phenomenological critique of representational theory (PDF Download Available)

 

[Constance]

I'm at sea without rudder from these last posts. I think you both have a more sophisticated understanding in this area than me. I have little idea of whether you are addressing the area that I was thinking about.

We've just invested more time in reading phenomenological philosophy than you have yet done. Let us immerse you for a few months in a short list of key papers we've discussed over the last three years here and you'll be grounded in the inescapably self-referential and self-illuminating phenomenology of consciousness. The paper I linked just above would be a good place to start, along with the other Zahavi paper I linked a few pages ago.

Re the relevance of phenomenological philosophy to the question you've posed, you'll find that this philosophy is essential to understanding the experientially disclosed subjectivity that grounds the development of selfhood.

 

[Constance]

I'm not sure that question is different from any question that shows the
irreconcilability of the subjective/objective.

I'd rephrase that to 'any question that provokes investigation of the confluent relationship of subjectivity and objectivity in lived experience, which constitutes the ground out of which we come to understand the existential nature of our being as an integral part of the world's being.

 

[smcder]

I think that one's conscious recognition of the existentiality of one's lived being, and of the temporality of being itself, is indeed a discovery of, rather than a feeling of, 'contingency' as existing at the heart of temporally experienced 'reality'. Depending on individual cases, that recognition might produce what you call a 'vertiginous' feeling but, from the basis of my own experience, I don't see that feeling as focused on the question of how one might have been another person, lived another lifetime, but rather on the question of who and what one indeed is. Harking back to Bataille, in prereflective consciousness, before we enter into reflective consciousness, we live our lives "like water in water." Reflective consciousness introduces us to the multiple levels or activities of our own consciousness, the fact that we can and do step back from the midst of that mental space within which we customarily experience the world as close at hand/on the other side of our skin and recognize the mental space in which we are also cognizant of the 'reflective cogito' also operating in our consciousness. We move from immediate experience to experience mediated by a higher-order presence coexisting within our minds. Suddenly 'who' we are, even 'what' we are, becomes ambiguous, radically open-ended to the self as well as to its surroundings, and on that basis responsible for what we do. Existentialist philosophy follows from these phenomenological discoveries.




That's closer to what I'm saying, but I think that reflective consciousness, as an outgrowth of prereflective consciousness, does reveal to each of us our 'special status' in being who we are, as situated individuals interacting for better or worse with others in our world who are also sentient -- animals as well as other humans who all feel their existence, struggle to survive, and desire to thrive. As the later Heidegger saw it, we are 'appropriated' by the nature of our conscious being to take on our obligations to others individually and, in general, to the maintenance of social, cultural, moral/ethical, and ecological conditions in our local world that support and perpetuate the well-being of being. Thus, in his words, it is our obligation to take on the role of becoming "shepherds of being." 'What to make of our lives' is, on the basis of what phenomenology reveals, not a hard question to answer either.

I'm actually making very narrow arguments/comments in responding to@Pharoah's claim that WAIM is a special question when compared to the questions he lists above.

(this is also in response to @Pharoah comment about being "out to sea".

I don't think that WAIM belongs with the questions he lists. I think what is going on with WAIM is that it feels like I could have been someone else, i.e. it feels contingent-and so we think we need an explanation. That's the only sense in which I am using "contingent" here.

But I couldn't have been someone else, so it's not contingent, so the question of the contingency of WAIM doesn't need an explanation- in fact the whole question goes away.

Another way to think of it is to realize that to ask WAIM is the epitome of a subjective question, anyone who asks it just is a "me", the me, that me that asks it when they ask it...there's only one possible me there-there's no way to be a different me at the time of the asking.

Since it's not contingent, I am necessarily me as is everyone else. Nothing special here.

That does NOT mean I am saying individuals are not special-special can only be in relation to an individual viewpoint, individual viewpoints are the source of what is special. To be objective is to give nothing a special place.

What I think we can be grateful for is the realization that we have choices about who are and what we can be. That does seem to me to be a special realization.

But WAIM I think is a confused question if one thinks it is contingent, if it's not contingent, and its not, then it's not a question at all.

 

[smcder]

The question of why there are individual consciousnesses, POVs at all, is the question HCT purports to answer: a.k.a. "whence subjectivity?" -the role of consciousness in nature.

But that's not the hard problem.

 

[Constance]

Do you read Chalmers as seeing 'the hard problem of consciousness' as the problem of why/how consciousness happens to exist, has arisen in a world formerly without it? As I read his concern it was with something more specific -- how the issue of there being consciousness has come up for our species in the first place. How we've come to think of ourselves as being consciousness. And I think with the 'hard problem' of qualia -- how things feel, how existence feels, what experience in a temporal world feels like -- he was pursuing what the phenomenologists have referred to and explicated as 'prereflective consciousness'.

Extract from SEP article "Phenomenological Approaches to Consciousness" --

". . .
2. One-level accounts of self-consciousness

It is customary to distinguish between two uses of the term ‘conscious’, a transitive and an intransitive use. On the one hand, we can speak of our being conscious of something, be it x, y, or z. On the other we can speak of our being conscious simpliciter (rather than non-conscious). For the past two or three decades, a widespread way to account for intransitive consciousness in cognitive science and analytical philosophy of mind has been by means of some kind of higher-order theory. The distinction between conscious and non-conscious mental states has been taken to rest upon the presence or absence of a relevant meta-mental state (cf. Armstrong 1968; Lycan 1987,1996; Carruthers 1996, 2000; Rosenthal 1997). Thus, intransitive consciousness has been taken to be a question of the mind directing its intentional aim at its own states and operations. As Carruthers puts it, the subjective feel of experience presupposes a capacity for higher-order awareness, and as he then continues, “such self-awareness is a conceptually necessary condition for an organism to be a subject of phenomenal feelings, or for there to be anything that its experiences are like” (Carruthers 1996, 152). But for Carruthers, the self-awareness in question is a type of reflection. In his view, a creature must be capable of reflecting upon, thinking about, and hence conceptualizing its own mental states if those mental states are to be states of which the creature is aware (Carruthers 1996, 155, 157).

One might share the view that there is a close link between consciousness and self-consciousness and still disagree about the nature of the link. And although the phenomenological view might superficially resemble the view of the higher-order theories, we are ultimately confronted with two radically divergent accounts. The phenomenologists explicitly deny that the self-consciousness that is present the moment I consciously experience something is to be understood in terms of some kind of higher-order monitoring. It does not involve an additional mental state, but is rather to be understood as an intrinsic feature of the primary experience. That is, in contrast to higher-order accounts of consciousness that claim that consciousness is an extrinsic or relational property of those mental states that have it, a property bestowed upon them from without by some further state, the phenomenologists would typically argue that the feature in virtue of which a mental state is conscious is an intrinsic property of those mental states that have it. Moreover, the phenomenologists also reject the attempt to construe intransitive consciousness in terms of transitive consciousness, that is, they reject the view that a conscious state is a state we are conscious of as object. To put it differently, not only do they reject the view that a mental state becomes conscious by being taken as an object by a higher-order state, they also reject the view (generally associated with Brentano) according to which a mental state becomes conscious by taking itself as an object (cf. Zahavi 2004, 2006).

What arguments support the phenomenological claims, however? The traditional phenomenological approach is to appeal to a correct phenomenological description and maintain that this is the best argument to be found. But if one were to look for an additional, more theoretical, argument, what would one find? One line of reasoning found in virtually all of the phenomenologists is the view that the attempt to let (intransitive) consciousness be a result of a higher-order monitoring will generate an infinite regress. On the face of it, this is a rather old idea. Typically, the regress argument has been understood in the following manner. If all occurrent mental states are conscious in the sense of being taken as objects by occurrent second-order mental states, then these second-order mental states must themselves be taken as objects by occurrent third-order mental states, and so forth ad infinitum. The standard response to this phenomenological objection is that the regress can easily be avoided by accepting the existence of non-conscious mental states. This is precisely the position adopted by the defenders of higher-order theory. For them a second-order perception or thought does not have to be conscious. It would be conscious only if accompanied by a (non-conscious) third-order thought or perception (cf. Rosenthal 1997, 745). The phenomenological reply to this solution is rather straightforward, however. The phenomenologists would concede that it is possible to halt the regress by postulating the existence of non-conscious mental states, but they would maintain that such an appeal to the non-conscious leaves us with a case of explanatory vacuity. That is, they would find it quite unclear why the relation between two otherwise non-conscious processes should make one of them conscious. Or to put it differently, they would be quite unconvinced by the claim that a state without subjective or phenomenal qualities can be transformed into one with such qualities, i.e., into an experience with first-personal character or mineness, by the mere relational addition of a non-conscious meta-state having the first-state as its intentional object.

The phenomenological alternative is to insist on the existence of pre-reflective self-consciousness. As Sartre writes: “[T]here is no infinite regress here, since a consciousness has no need at all of a reflecting [higher-order]consciousness in order to be conscious of itself. It simply does not posit itself as an object” (Sartre 1936, 29 [1957, 45]). That is, pre-reflective self-consciousness is not transitive in relation to the state (of) which it is aware. It is, as Sartre puts it, the mode of existence of consciousness itself. This does not mean that a higher-order representation is impossible, but merely that it always presupposes the existence of a prior non-objectifying, pre-reflective self-consciousness as its condition of possibility. To quote Sartre again, “it is the non-reflective consciousness which renders the reflection [and any higher-order representation of it] possible” (1943, 20 [1956, liii]). . . ."

Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The whole of that article is worth reading. It is, admittedly, worth it for me if you all read it since I won't have to keep trying to summarize its content here, but I also think that recognizing the reality and nature of prereflective consciousness will be valuable for each of you in our mutual effort to understand what consciousness is by focusing on how it has developed in the history of our species and how it develops in the history of every child of our species. In our long discussion here we have all come to the question of what consciousness is already laden with presuppositional 'explanations' of it absorbed from many sources and particularly the disciplines we have studied. We have to work through many disciplines before we can put ourselves back into our early childhood experiences to grasp how each of us gradually became aware of the 'world' around us and the intrinsic self-referentiality of that awareness, i.e., out of a pre-thetic awareness of our being and the situatedness of our being long before we became users of language and categorical thought.

It is that fund of pre-thetic lived experience that enables the later development of reflective consciousness and mind, and this personal prereflective experiencing of our existence never ceases, never leaves us. As Stevens expressed it in Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction, "we reason of these things with later reason." Reflective consciousness and reasoning proceed out of the compounding experiential grounds of prereflective, pre-rational experiences of being-in-the-world. That which we become capable of thinking about abstractly in terms of the nature of being -- our being vis a vis the world's being -- is dependent on {could not exist without the basis of} what we have previously absorbed holistically in prereflective experience, before we became trained by the categorical nature of language in the habit of cutting both the world and ourselves up into discrete pieces [which we now sit here contemplating and attempting to reintegrate].

.

 

[Pharoah]

I have revisited 'Facing up to the Hard Problem of consciousness'. I paraphrase Chalmers below... square brackets are my comments.

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. [a statement concerning generalities ie the problem of experience in general]
This subjective aspect of experience is that there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. [arguably a statement concerning generalities or particulars ie it is unclear. Organisms share something with me, namely, there is something it is like to be experiencing subjects. Alternatively, there is a particular Being that is the subject of experiencing what it is like: eureka]
If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness it is that there is something it is like to be that organism. [a statement of particulars ie a particular organism has a particular experience of what it is like]
subjective experience is perplexing. [a general statement]
For example, we experience the felt quality of redness; dark and light; the quality of depth in a visual field; the sound of a clarinet; the smell of mothballs; the felt quality of emotion; the experience of a stream of conscious thought.
These are all states of experience [a statement concerning generalities ie states of experience or a statement regarding the particular kinds of content of experience, namely, of their qualities]
Why do we have the experience of deep blue or of middle C? ["why" can be interpreted in a numerous ways. I think what he means is "why do we have, for example, 'deep blue' as the experience that it is?"] But it is anyone's guess really]
How can we explain why there is something it is like to experience? [how can we explain why...?? ...really? using language, logic, computers, our brain. I'm being silly.]
why does experience arise? [a statement concerning generalities ie experience in general]
how does experience arise? [a statement concerning generalities ie experience in general]
Why should the physical give rise to an inner life? [arguably a statement of generalities or particulars. "An inner life" in each case that there is an organism, and therefore not a particular life that is me. Alternatively, "an inner life" such as the particular Being that is me]
Sometimes terms such as "phenomenal consciousness" and "qualia" are used, but I find it more natural to speak of "conscious experience" or simply "experience". [Chalmers puts them all in the same black box and is talking of terms that relate to consciousness in general]

me:
So, put simply there is no problem[singular]. The hard problem is anything you want it to be that is related to consciousness and that you feel is unexplainable or perplexing. Its ambiguity—the essential craft of the philosophical writer—is why it makes up so many column inches.

Interestingly, 'Moving forward on the problem of consciousness' is a commentary on the responses to Facing up to the problem of consciousness.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness
It is clear, in view of his pigeonholing of type A, B, C materialism and the dualist stances, that Chalmers and others lump 'the so called problem' into the mind body problem... more stuff in the black box. That is, an explanation will confirm or deny materialism or dualism. But as I have tried to indicate above, the question concerning generalities and particulars are distinct. If HCT is valid, the distinction is made clear whereby subjectivity can be explained as a general emergent phenomenon but particulars remain unexplained, which is to say, that the mind body problem is not equivalent to subjectivity.

 

[Soupie]

@Pharoah says:

"Why do we have the experience of deep blue or of middle C? ["why" can be interpreted in a numerous ways. I think what he means is "why do we have, for example, 'deep blue' as the experience that it is?" But it is anyone's guess really]"

No. What he means is "why do we have the experience of deep blue?" It's the same question I have asked you/HTC for several years now. A question which you/HTC have yet to answer.

He's asking why—given materialism—we have conscious experience at all. Do you/HCT have an answer?

Pharoah says:

"How can we explain why there is something it is like to experience? [how can we explain why...?? ...really? using language, logic, computers, our brain. I'm being silly.]"

Can you use those things to explain why? Do you believe you have? I take it that you do.

What you/HCT have provided is a clever description of how species and individual organism have evolved and developed to perceive the world (including themselves) from unique points of view. However this is in no way an explanation for why humans—and presumably many other organism—have conscious experience.

 

[Pharoah]

from my post:
Why do we have the experience of deep blue or of middle C? ["why" can be interpreted in a numerous ways. I think what he means is "why do we have, for example, 'deep blue' as the experience that it is?" But it is anyone's guess really]"

@soupe response:
No. What he's asking is "why do we have the experience of deep blue?" It's the same question I have asked you/HTC for several years now. A question which you/HTC have yet to answer.

me:
Well... a valid answer to Chalmers question above might be, 'when neuron X fires, deep blue is experienced' or ' apes do not see deep blue, but it evolved during the last 40,000 years because of mutation x'. Am I right? yes... But No... those qualify as easy answers to the class of questions that are termed 'easy'. Ok, that's a shame... So then, how do we interpret this question as one that is of a specially hard kind? For example, is he talking about his particular existential experience or Being or just being, or maybe the general experience all humans experience of deep blues and the such like, or maybe he is talking about all creature experience of deep blue... but for a bat, of course, there is nothing it is like to experience deep blue. Ah... so we are not really talking about deep blue at all but of qualitative experience(s) in general, of which deep blue is but an example! Ah...! so he is talking about what HCT addresses, namely, qualitative experience in general! Oh dear... we can't have that can we? The question must mean something else. So then, perhaps we are talking about subjectivity and the sense of embeddedness, in general. But HCT does also give some insight there. Nevertheless, even if HCT does not address subjectivity in the way you want it addressed, what is subjectivity beyond prereflexive and reflexive qualitative experiential content?
The truth is, I don't know what Chalmers question is about and nor do you. When you @Soupie ask 'why do we have conscious experience at all' I don't know what you are asking either.

from my post:
"How can we explain why there is something it is like to experience? [how can we explain why...?? ...really? using language, logic, computers, our brain. I'm being silly.]"

@Soupie response:
Can you use those things to explain why? Do you believe you have? I take it that you do.

me:
@Soupie I am just trying to undermine Chalmers with my last post. I am trying to say that Chalmers' articulation of the "HP" is intentionally vague. The beauty is that the nature of the problem is perplexing, so he can be equally incoherent in the formulation of the questions.
Now, back to his 'how can we explain why...' question. 'Why is there something it is like to experience?', is one question. But he asks that question in the same section (Perhaps he was short of words). Does he mean, 'How is it that there is something it is like to experience'. Either way, "How can we explain why" is neither. It is an entirely different kind of inquiry. I can't really believe Chalmers means to ask it. The answer is, 'we can probably use concepts articulated with words', but who knows, perhaps we could do equally well with a pint of chablis, some dried mushrooms, a bag of carrots and a cheese grate (I'll let you know).

 

[Soupie]

Well... a valid answer to Chalmers question above might be, 'when neuron X fires, deep blue is experienced' or ' apes do not see deep blue, but it evolved during the last 40,000 years because of mutation x'. Am I right? yes...

No, those aren't valid answers. Those are correlations—or hypothetical correlations, certainly not explanatory models that explain in empirical, objective detail how, or that, conscious experience is a purely material physical processes directly causally related to other purely material physical processes.

Ah...! so he is talking about what HCT addresses, namely, qualitative experience in general! Oh dear... we can't have that can we? The question must mean something else.

HCT does not explain qualitative/conscious experience, Pharoah. It just doesn't.

HCT provides a clever description of how species and individual organisms have evolved and developed a unique point of view—a relationship, really—with the world.

HCT doesn't even sniff a material, causal explanation for why the experience of deep blue exists for humans. Sorry.

The truth is, I don't know what Chalmers question is about and nor do you. When you @Soupie ask 'why do we have conscious experience at all' I don't know what you are asking either.

What the question is asking is what work does conscious experience do in a causally closed material world (note that this is a presumption of material physicalist; if one doesn't think that 1) all of reality is material, or 2) one does think that material and non-material processes can causally interact, then this aspect of the HP is not a problem for you.)?

Either way, "How can we explain why" is neither. It is an entirely different kind of inquiry. I can't really believe Chalmers means to ask it. The answer is, 'we can probably use concepts articulated with words', but who knows, perhaps we could do equally well with a pint of chablis, some dried mushrooms, a bag of carrots and a cheese grate (I'll let you know).

Probably or probably not? Show me the model/explanation that gets anywhere near explaining how conscious experience either is material or weakly emerges from material processes.

 

[smcder]

Pharoah's hypothetical:

1. "Say in the future, humans develop a computer that can do enough calculations to show that causal processes lead to the evolution of complex forms, to life, and to organisms with subjective embedded views about the world. It demonstrates that individuals with 'minds' come into existence."

2. "Alternatively, none of the two examples above are achievable because something other than logic or reason is required for an understanding (or physicalist explanation) of anything to do with subjectivity or the existence of minds."

When you say in statement 2 that 1 is not achievable, do you mean: 1, 2 or both (below)?

1. "It demonstrates that individuals with 'minds' come into existence."

2. The computer has discovered anything about itself.

If 1 but not 2 is possible, then is it possible for the computer to predict the appearance of minds that ask WAIM?

 

[Pharoah]

Pharoah's hypothetical:

1. "Say in the future, humans develop a computer that can do enough calculations to show that causal processes lead to the evolution of complex forms, to life, and to organisms with subjective embedded views about the world. It demonstrates that individuals with 'minds' come into existence."

2. "Alternatively, none of the two examples above are achievable because something other than logic or reason is required for an understanding (or physicalist explanation) of anything to do with subjectivity or the existence of minds."

When you say in statement 2 that 1 is not achievable, do you mean: 1, 2 or both (below)?

1. "It demonstrates that individuals with 'minds' come into existence."

2. The computer has discovered anything about itself.

If 1 but not 2 is possible, then is it possible for the computer to predict the appearance of minds that ask WAIM?

@smcder I do not understand what you are asking.
When I wrote it, I had a thought that I could create a useful logical paradox. Haven't thought it through yet. What I did write is a bit muddled because of that...

 

[Pharoah]

No, those aren't valid answers. Those are correlations—or hypothetical correlations, certainly not explanatory models that explain in empirical, objective detail how, or that, conscious experience is a purely material physical processes directly causally related to other purely material physical processes.


HCT does not explain qualitative/conscious experience, Pharoah. It just doesn't.

HCT provides a clever description of how species and individual organisms have evolved and developed a unique point of view—a relationship, really—with the world.

HCT doesn't even sniff a material, causal explanation for why the experience of deep blue exists for humans. Sorry.


What the question is asking is what work does conscious experience do in a causally closed material world (note that this is a presumption of material physicalist; if one doesn't think that 1) all of reality is material, or 2) one does think that material and non-material processes can causally interact, then this aspect of the HP is not a problem for you.)?


Probably or probably not? Show me the model/explanation that gets anywhere near explaining how conscious experience either is material or weakly emerges from material processes.

Whatever you think about HCT is not the point really—Well trodden ground now.
The point I am making is that Chalmers' HP is nonsensical because you, me, and he don't know specifically what he is talking about (putting it crudely). I think the vagueness of what he is addressing is indicated by my [bracketed] commentaries. I can't make sense of it. Enlighten me.

Incidentally, I claim that HCT explains why qualitative experience evolved and is rich and complex. I provide a detailed argument and relate it to subjectivity. Typically, philosophical dialogue entails finding flaws in an argument by articulating counter arguments and highlighting inconsistencies. I think @smcder may have found a problem with HCT which is interesting. You, however, just deny that I am explaining either what I claim to be explaining or that I am not explaining what you want me to explain. Well... not a lot I can do about that. I analyse Chalmers and think I highlight inconsistency... you may disagree... not a lot I can do about that either.

 

[smcder]

Pharoah

1. Say in the future, humans develop a computer that can do enough calculations to show that causal processes lead to the evolution of complex forms, to life, and to organisms with subjective embedded views about the world. It demonstrates that individuals with 'minds' come into existence.

2. Has the computer discovered anything about itself? Well, if you assume it has just performed calculations, the answer is no.

3. Ok, now replace the computer with a person. That person makes the same discovery about complex forms, life, and subjective embedded views. Minds must exist the person cries!... 4. But the person knows nothing about itself.

Alternatively, none of the two examples above are achievable because something other than logic or reason is required for an understanding (or physicalist explanation) of anything to do with subjectivity or the existence of minds.

smcder there are four claims:

1. the evolution of complex life forms->subjectivity is computable i.e. can be "objectively" shown - of course people, who have subjectivity, develop and program the computer
2. this computer, in calculating that minds must exist - knows nothing about having a mind - we will call this poor, dumb computer, in honor of ENIAC et al M.A.R.I. Mechanistic Autonomous Reifying Integrator (because it's hard to come up with a "Y").
3. a person does #1 (of course the person knows about subjectivity to begin with - so 4 is kind of ... a problem)

The question is ...

Does

"Alternatively, none of the two examples above are achievable because something other than logic or reason is required for an understanding (or physicalist explanation) of anything to do with subjectivity or the existence of minds."

Apply to 1-4 ... or just to the 2 and 4? It turns on saying that a theory could predict the existence of minds, could account for them, in the way you say HCT does, without telling the holder of that theory anything about themselves ...

Put another way, we could "objectively" account for subjectivity in our theories (#1 and #3) ... but we would not know anything about ourselves (#2 and #4) because:

something other than logic or reason is required for an understanding (or physicalist explanation) of anything to do with subjectivity or the existence of minds.

(that something other being to have a point of view - poor MARI!)

What's interesting to me is that you don't see that problem until you get to what you call the "noumenal" by way of WAIM? Wheras to me, WAIM is no big deal, because experience is the hard problem - I think Chalmers says that clearly. And because whoever asks WAIM? is a "me" it's not contingent, I, the asker, couldn't be anyone but the me asking Why am I me?

In fact, it seems to me that if HCT can "explain" consciousness, it can predict the rise of minds that will ask "WAIM?" ... because that's what minds do ...

QED

 

[Soupie]

The point I am making is that Chalmers' HP is nonsensical because you, me, and he don't know specifically what he is talking about (putting it crudely).

Quite frankly, Pharoah, I think that's bs.

It's also absurd to suggest that I haven't made my critique of HCT clear enough for you to understand.

Can HCT provide a materialist physical explanation of how conscious experience emerges from material processes? Yes or no?

What does Soupie mean by provide an explanation, you might want to type next.

Here, have a look at a materialist physical explanation of how liquids emerge from the behavior of molecules.

Liquids

If one purports to have explained how consciousness emerges from material physical processes, then a detailed explanation as above needs be produced.

So either produce such an explanation or stop saying HCT explains consciousness.

Or, alternatively, if you are not a materialist, make it clear that HCT is not a materialist theory/model, and therefore has absolutely zero to say about the hard problem.

 

[Pharoah]

Pharoah

1. Say in the future, humans develop a computer that can do enough calculations to show that causal processes lead to the evolution of complex forms, to life, and to organisms with subjective embedded views about the world. It demonstrates that individuals with 'minds' come into existence.

2. Has the computer discovered anything about itself? Well, if you assume it has just performed calculations, the answer is no.

3. Ok, now replace the computer with a person. That person makes the same discovery about complex forms, life, and subjective embedded views. Minds must exist the person cries!... 4. But the person knows nothing about itself.

Alternatively, none of the two examples above are achievable because something other than logic or reason is required for an understanding (or physicalist explanation) of anything to do with subjectivity or the existence of minds.

smcder there are four claims:

1. the evolution of complex life forms->subjectivity is computable i.e. can be "objectively" shown - of course people, who have subjectivity, develop and program the computer
2. this computer, in calculating that minds must exist - knows nothing about having a mind - we will call this poor, dumb computer, in honor of ENIAC et al M.A.R.I. Mechanistic Autonomous Reifying Integrator (because it's hard to come up with a "Y").
3. a person does #1 (of course the person knows about subjectivity to begin with - so 4 is kind of ... a problem)

The question is ...

Does

"Alternatively, none of the two examples above are achievable because something other than logic or reason is required for an understanding (or physicalist explanation) of anything to do with subjectivity or the existence of minds."

Apply to 1-4 ... or just to the 2 and 4? It turns on saying that a theory could predict the existence of minds, could account for them, in the way you say HCT does, without telling the holder of that theory anything about themselves ...

Put another way, we could "objectively" account for subjectivity in our theories (#1 and #3) ... but we would not know anything about ourselves (#2 and #4) because:

something other than logic or reason is required for an understanding (or physicalist explanation) of anything to do with subjectivity or the existence of minds.

(that something other being to have a point of view - poor MARI!)

What's interesting to me is that you don't see that problem until you get to what you call the "noumenal" by way of WAIM? Wheras to me, WAIM is no big deal, because experience is the hard problem - I think Chalmers says that clearly. And because whoever asks WAIM? is a "me" it's not contingent, I, the asker, couldn't be anyone but the me asking Why am I me?

In fact, it seems to me that if HCT can "explain" consciousness, it can predict the rise of minds that will ask "WAIM?" ... because that's what minds do ...

QED

@smcder:
"It turns on saying that a theory could predict the existence of minds, could account for them, in the way you say HCT does, without telling the holder of that theory anything about themselves ..."
yep
"Put another way, we could "objectively" account for subjectivity in our theories (#1 and #3) ... but we would not know anything about ourselves (#2 and #4)"
yep
"What's interesting to me is that you don't see that problem until you get to what you call the "noumenal" by way of WAIM?"
yep
"Wheras to me, WAIM is no big deal, because experience is the hard problem - I think Chalmers says that clearly. And because whoever asks WAIM? is a "me" it's not contingent, I, the asker, couldn't be anyone but the me asking Why am I me?"
I'm curious. What do you think HCT says about experience?
Chalmers says experience is the HP but doesn't say whether by experience he is talking about all creatures that have it and therefore have a something it is like to experience (general properties of experience and being an experiencer), or whether he is talking about WAIM experiencing as I experience in my unique position. Of course a bat does ask WAIM but Chalmers indicates that it has a subjectivity because it has a something that it is like. So the WAIM is distinct.

 

[Pharoah]

@Soupie :
"Quite frankly, Pharoah, I think that's bs."
I had to put it in crude words because that is the level of understanding I need to go to with you.
So you disagree with my [bracketed] commentary. Fine... you disagree. I talk bs and Chalmers is a God. Glad we sorted that one out.

@Soupie: where do I say "HCT explains consciousness."
I have never said this! I have never said this!
you say: "stop saying HCT explains consciousness."
Stop putting words in my mouth and try reading the words I actually write. try reading the words I actually write. try reading the words I actually write!

I'm curious... is there such a thing as a non-materialist physical explanation?

"if you are not a materialist, make it clear that HCT is not a materialist theory/model"
HCT is a physicalist explanation but that does not make me a materialist or physicalist. That should have been obvious.