Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11

[Constance]

The how to step 1 is "the mechanism of replication" but of course I don't explain the mechanism of replication or how life emerged. Nor do I say how a biochemical mechanism does the qualitative thing. Those are Qs for people in white coats

and also field biologists.

 

[Pharoah]

Yes... Lab coats and wellies

 

[smcder]

The how to step 1 is "the mechanism of replication" but of course I don't explain the mechanism of replication or how life emerged. Nor do I say how a biochemical mechanism does the qualitative thing. Those are Qs for people in white coats

Lol

 

[smcder]

Tyler Burge begs the question against nonrepresentationalism

"On my view, it would be more philosophically parsimonious to say that in successfully perceiving the strawberry, the primate discriminated the strawberry from out of the ambient array of energy surrounding the strawberry. Another way of putting it would be that in perceiving the red strawberry the primate attended to the information specific to the features of the strawberry that were relevant to its internal needs, namely, hunger."

That sounds a lot like a qualitative ontology:

"What I am proposing, in broad terms, is that replication ultimately facilitates the emergence and ongoing evolution—courtesy of a generational discourse—of a meaningful correspondence that qualifies a unique qualitative ontology: physiological function inevitably imposes assignations of qualitative relevance on the physical properties of the environment. Clearly then, this thesis opposes the view that environmental properties possess qualities or qualitative information independently from the observing subject (see Dennett 1991, pp. 375–83; Lycan 1996, pp.

 

[smcder]

"Neural mechanisms have the capability to qualify a multitude of biochemical assimilations to accommodate sensory, affective and operant sensitivities. My expectation is that an organism possessing more than 100,000 neurons (approximately 10 million synapses) is likely to be capable of mediating a constantly changing landscape of evaluated environmental assimilations. In doing so, it experiences environmental interactions as an individuated phenomenon that is qualitatively differentiated. In this respect, we can say that such a creature possess a novel ontological status. While such creatures need not introspect about reality or acknowledge in themselves that they have this experiential understanding, they do live nonetheless in a world that is, for them, qualitatively and spatiotemporally delineated; they live as unique beings embedded in a changing spatiotemporal world of phenomenal experiences that motivate their inclinations and actions."

Why is this mediation of the 100,000 necessarily accompanied by phenomenal experiences?

 

[Pharoah]

"On my view, it would be more philosophically parsimonious to say that in successfully perceiving the strawberry, the primate discriminated the strawberry from out of the ambient array of energy surrounding the strawberry. Another way of putting it would be that in perceiving the red strawberry the primate attended to the information specific to the features of the strawberry that were relevant to its internal needs, namely, hunger."

That sounds a lot like a qualitative ontology:

"What I am proposing, in broad terms, is that replication ultimately facilitates the emergence and ongoing evolution—courtesy of a generational discourse—of a meaningful correspondence that qualifies a unique qualitative ontology: physiological function inevitably imposes assignations of qualitative relevance on the physical properties of the environment. Clearly then, this thesis opposes the view that environmental properties possess qualities or qualitative information independently from the observing subject (see Dennett 1991, pp. 375–83; Lycan 1996, pp.

Ok... so let's say he is saying the exact same thing as HCT. Great! I need say no more... If only!
But he isn't. That is not to say I disagree with him. What he says sounds reasonable enough. I also find M-P's 'Structure of Behaviour' strikingly consistent with HCT. That is encouraging to me.
But basically, @smcder, you are saying such things as, 'we already know the brain does the subjective thing. We already know that things have to be alive to do the subjective thing. We know that animals differentiate things qualitatively.' etc. Yes. But HCT offers a different, dare I say, explanatory narrative.
What I am trying to lay the foundations for is a narrative that describes the relationship of and between a hierarchy of novel ontological categories that give an intuitive and viable account of why you can get characteristics that are typically associated with subjectivity, from matter.
That this narrative is at odds with the idea (last sentence in the passage of mine you just quoted) that matter has dual aspects (one of which is qualitative) or that such a narrative is impossible, or that zombies cannot exist because that would require divergence from the necessary structure of hierarchy, and many other hotly debated philosophical topics means something, namely, that the concept of HCT is helpful. Even if you said, 'yep, HCT makes sense but adds nothing', which I feel is the way you are going on this (recently), then fine... 'I've read it all before': Ok, tell me whose work I have duplicated and then I'll happily hang up my boots (note: no wellies), put on my fury slippers and drink my meals through a straw.

 

[Pharoah]

"Neural mechanisms have the capability to qualify a multitude of biochemical assimilations to accommodate sensory, affective and operant sensitivities. My expectation is that an organism possessing more than 100,000 neurons (approximately 10 million synapses) is likely to be capable of mediating a constantly changing landscape of evaluated environmental assimilations. In doing so, it experiences environmental interactions as an individuated phenomenon that is qualitatively differentiated. In this respect, we can say that such a creature possess a novel ontological status. While such creatures need not introspect about reality or acknowledge in themselves that they have this experiential understanding, they do live nonetheless in a world that is, for them, qualitatively and spatiotemporally delineated; they live as unique beings embedded in a changing spatiotemporal world of phenomenal experiences that motivate their inclinations and actions."

Why is this mediation of the 100,000 necessarily accompanied by phenomenal experiences?

Where do I get 100,000 from? Basically, I am kind of guessing and I do note that numbers of synapses may be more important, but I think that an organism that demonstrates learning behaviours is an organism that necessarily possesses phenomenal experience—Some organisms with 100,000 neurons learn (I think). Why is the ability to learning a marker for phenomenal experience? Because if (putting yourself in the shoes—or wellies—of a fruitfly) you possess the ability to evaluate the qualitative relevance of your interactive experience with world events as and when they happen, then, in virtue of that evaluative capability, you necessarily have the capacity to respond in an evaluated kind of way. This, I think, is a reflexive condition (not sure of my terminology) that makes world experience spatiotemporally relevant to the individual. I am saying that this is the content we attribte to the status we call phenomenal experience, namely, an individuated spatiotemporal differentiation of a qualitatively assimilated world.

 

[smcder]

Ok... so let's say he is saying the exact same thing as HCT. Great! I need say no more... If only!
But he isn't. That is not to say I disagree with him. What he says sounds reasonable enough. I also find M-P's 'Structure of Behaviour' strikingly consistent with HCT. That is encouraging to me.
But basically, @smcder, you are saying such things as, 'we already know the brain does the subjective thing. We already know that things have to be alive to do the subjective thing. We know that animals differentiate things qualitatively.' etc. Yes. But HCT offers a different, dare I say, explanatory narrative.
What I am trying to lay the foundations for is a narrative that describes the relationship of and between a hierarchy of novel ontological categories that give an intuitive and viable account of why you can get characteristics that are typically associated with subjectivity, from matter.
That this narrative is at odds with the idea (last sentence in the passage of mine you just quoted) that matter has dual aspects (one of which is qualitative) or that such a narrative is impossible, or that zombies cannot exist because that would require divergence from the necessary structure of hierarchy, and many other hotly debated philosophical topics means something, namely, that the concept of HCT is helpful. Even if you said, 'yep, HCT makes sense but adds nothing', which I feel is the way you are going on this (recently), then fine... 'I've read it all before': Ok, tell me whose work I have duplicated and then I'll happily hang up my boots (note: no wellies), put on my fury slippers and drink my meals through a straw.

Even if you said, 'yep, HCT makes sense but adds nothing', which I feel is the way you are going on this (recently),

No, it's not. I sent you email.

 

[Constance]

Even if you said, 'yep, HCT makes sense but adds nothing', which I feel is the way you are going on this (recently),

No, it's not. I sent you email.

Hope you'll share it within this discussion if it relates substantively to the issues being discussed.

 

[Constance]

Why is this mediation of the 100,000 necessarily accompanied by phenomenal experiences?

I think 'mediation' is the correct term to apply concerning the consciousness-brain relation, but a critical ambiguity resides in your question, if I read it correctly: are you supposing that neurons and neural nets are prerequisites for experience, or do you think it is possible that neurons and neural nets are formed as a biological response to the challenges of lived experience in a phenomenally and temporally sensed world -- an environing world in which changing circumstances require adaptation and learning by evolving species of life?

If we follow the insights of Maturana and Varela and the more recent insights of Jaak Panksepp, we need to recognize the emergence of sensing, awareness, and seeking behavior in primordial organisms, long before the appearance of neurons in the evolution of biological species.

We can also address the question of how and why specific neural nets become compounded and synaptically interconnected in response to changing and developing individual interests and desires in our own species. Take the case of a young man {I have a specific individual in mind} formerly immersed in scientific subject matter under the influence of parents and teachers who encourage that direction of inquiry and activity as the only route to understanding the nature of reality [truth] and to achieving a pathway to personal success by pursuing a career in science. How does this young man suddenly lose interest in science and instead pursue music, and by concentrating his energies in this discipline develop increasing practical and theoretical knowledge in his newly chosen field of interest? Surely this individual's development of increasingly broad and deep appreciation of the complexity and nuances of this new subject matter, and perhaps also development of personal skills as a musician, lead to the development of new or expanding neural nets and synapses that facilitate both his deepening understanding of music and/or his own musicianship.

I think we will never understand the open-ended nature of consciousness as it responds to lived experiences in the world if we begin with the belief that everything that happens to a conscious being and everything that being selects for further attention and investment is generated in and by its neurons and neural nets. Neurons and neural nets do not give us our integrated, comprehensive, experience of living in the world; rather, they facilitate our increasing aptitudes in navigating the world both practically and intellectually, pragmatically and philosophically. But these physiological and mental aptitudes are not all that we develop; we also develop emotional intelligence and empathy, and we sense and sometimes pursue spiritual dimensions of our existence. How do neurons and neural nets generate these felt aspects of our experience?

 

[smcder]

I think 'mediation' is the correct term to apply concerning the consciousness-brain relation, but a critical ambiguity resides in your question, if I read it correctly: are you supposing that neurons and neural nets are prerequisites for experience, or do you think it is possible that neurons and neural nets are formed as a biological response to the challenges of lived experience in a phenomenally and temporally sensed world -- an environing world in which changing circumstances require adaptation and learning by evolving species of life?

If we follow the insights of Maturana and Varela and the more recent insights of Jaak Panksepp, we need to recognize the emergence of sensing, awareness, and seeking behavior in primordial organisms, long before the appearance of neurons in the evolution of biological species.

We can also address the question of how and why specific neural nets become compounded and synaptically interconnected in response to changing and developing individual interests and desires in our own species. Take the case of a young man {I have a specific individual in mind} formerly immersed in scientific subject matter under the influence of parents and teachers who encourage that direction of inquiry and activity as the only route to understanding the nature of reality [truth] and to achieving a pathway to personal success by pursuing a career in science. How does this young man suddenly lose interest in science and instead pursue music, and by concentrating his energies in this discipline develop increasing practical and theoretical knowledge in his newly chosen field of interest? Surely this individual's development of increasingly broad and deep appreciation of the complexity and nuances of this new subject matter, and perhaps also development of personal skills as a musician, lead to the development of new or expanding neural nets and synapses that facilitate both his deepening understanding of music and/or his own musicianship.

I think we will never understand the open-ended nature of consciousness as it responds to lived experiences in the world if we begin with the belief that everything that happens to a conscious being and everything that being selects for further attention and investment is generated in and by its neurons and neural nets. Neurons and neural nets do not give us our integrated, comprehensive, experience of living in the world; rather, they facilitate our increasing aptitudes in navigating the world both practically and intellectually, pragmatically and philosophically. But these physiological and mental aptitudes are not all that we develop; we also develop emotional intelligence and empathy, and we sense and sometimes pursue spiritual dimensions of our existence. How do neurons and neural nets generate these felt aspects of our experience?

That's what I keep asking @Pharoah...how?? How??? ;-)

 

[smcder]

I think 'mediation' is the correct term to apply concerning the consciousness-brain relation, but a critical ambiguity resides in your question, if I read it correctly: are you supposing that neurons and neural nets are prerequisites for experience, or do you think it is possible that neurons and neural nets are formed as a biological response to the challenges of lived experience in a phenomenally and temporally sensed world -- an environing world in which changing circumstances require adaptation and learning by evolving species of life?

If we follow the insights of Maturana and Varela and the more recent insights of Jaak Panksepp, we need to recognize the emergence of sensing, awareness, and seeking behavior in primordial organisms, long before the appearance of neurons in the evolution of biological species.

We can also address the question of how and why specific neural nets become compounded and synaptically interconnected in response to changing and developing individual interests and desires in our own species. Take the case of a young man {I have a specific individual in mind} formerly immersed in scientific subject matter under the influence of parents and teachers who encourage that direction of inquiry and activity as the only route to understanding the nature of reality [truth] and to achieving a pathway to personal success by pursuing a career in science. How does this young man suddenly lose interest in science and instead pursue music, and by concentrating his energies in this discipline develop increasing practical and theoretical knowledge in his newly chosen field of interest? Surely this individual's development of increasingly broad and deep appreciation of the complexity and nuances of this new subject matter, and perhaps also development of personal skills as a musician, lead to the development of new or expanding neural nets and synapses that facilitate both his deepening understanding of music and/or his own musicianship.

I think we will never understand the open-ended nature of consciousness as it responds to lived experiences in the world if we begin with the belief that everything that happens to a conscious being and everything that being selects for further attention and investment is generated in and by its neurons and neural nets. Neurons and neural nets do not give us our integrated, comprehensive, experience of living in the world; rather, they facilitate our increasing aptitudes in navigating the world both practically and intellectually, pragmatically and philosophically. But these physiological and mental aptitudes are not all that we develop; we also develop emotional intelligence and empathy, and we sense and sometimes pursue spiritual dimensions of our existence. How do neurons and neural nets generate these felt aspects of our experience?

With @Pharoah's permission...I will post his response.

 

[Constance]

That's what I keep asking @Pharoah...how?? How??? ;-)

In the meantime, what is your response to the question I asked you in my last post:

"I think 'mediation' is the correct term to apply concerning the consciousness-brain relation, but a critical ambiguity resides in your question, if I read it correctly: are you supposing that neurons and neural nets are prerequisites for experience, or do you think it is possible that neurons and neural nets are formed as a biological response to the challenges of lived experience in a phenomenally and temporally sensed world -- an environing world in which changing circumstances require adaptation and learning by evolving species of life?"

 

[Constance]

With @Pharoah's permission...I will post his response.

Not both sides of your exchange, begun when you emailed him? Again, only if it continues the points discussed here, and if you both agree.

 

[Pharoah]

How do neurons and neural nets generate these felt aspects of our experience?

That's what I keep asking @Pharoah...how?? How??? ;-)

I might have been tearing my hair out but I left my clothes on... so I don't have problem with sharing the emails

 

[Constance]

Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences
Volume 16, August 2017, Pages iv-vi

Editorial overview: Comparative cognition
Author links open overlay panel Jessica FCantlonBenjamin YHayden
RedirectingGet rights and content


Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2017, 16:iv–vi

For a complete overview see the Issue

Available online 22nd July 2017

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.07.008

2352-1546/© 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd.



Animal cognition is a venerable field of inquiry, with antecedents in the nineteenth century, and in ethology, and evolutionary anthropology, psychology, and field biology. The field has a rich tradition of providing elegant causal explanations of behavior at multiple levels of analysis. Some researchers seek to discover the mechanistic and computational bases of behavior [1,2]. For others, the scientific goal is to understand the proximate and ultimate causes of behaviors by systematically comparing cognition in species with shared versus distinct phylogenies and environmental pressures [3]. And for still others the scientific goal is to understand the natural history of human cognition, and its evolutionary foundations [4]. Beyond these bases, many scholars seek to understand the behaviors of model organisms for neuroscience, and as models of psychiatric disease [5]. All of these pursuits are interrelated, and each is necessary in order to explain the complex causes of behavior, and determine how human minds are built.

The role of animal cognition research in modern science is ever more critical as scientists adjust to new technologies for measuring the neural bases of behavior. New molecular techniques are revolutionizing neuroscience, neural networks are transforming artificial intelligence and cognitive science, futuristic imaging techniques are enhancing psychology, and robotics seems tangibly close to self-driving cars. But despite the excitement, these areas are experiencing a crisis of confidence. These fields are bumping up against hard limits on their interpretations of the data, and many discoveries are proving to be sterile, because we lack a sophisticated understanding of behavior (see discussion in [6,7]). As a consequence, advocates of those fields have recently taken a turn toward understanding behaviors, and the situations in which they arise. And that in turn means understanding animals in their environments, including humans in our ancestral environment.

In our view, then, animal cognition forms the foundation of neuroscience, psychology, and artificial intelligence [8]. It always has been central to those endeavors, but its importance has taken on a renewed vigor because of the critical importance of behavior to advances in new fields. At the same time, comparative cognition is also, not coincidentally, undergoing a renaissance. It has taken new ideas from its adjacent fields and built on them, and has continued to evolve internally in exciting new directions (e.g. [9–13,19]). Furthermore, new technologies are improving the ability to measure behavior precisely, even in the wild (e.g. [14,15]). As such, comparative cognition is experiencing a renewed vigor and growth, as old mysteries are resolved or reframed, and new questions are being asked. These puzzles have taken on a new importance as the foundation for new types of inquiries, but remain fascinating in their own right.

Using laboratory and field observations, and tools from psychology, biology and neuroscience, animal cognition researchers have examined the mechanisms and computations underlying a variety of behaviors, often with surprising results. Seemingly complex behaviors can be explained by simple cognitive processes and heuristics, and solutions that non-human animals devise can differ from those of humans, but can sometimes be more efficient or elegant. Insights from animal research reveal that the underlying causes of behavior are often counter to our human intuition (e.g. [16–18]).

One area of growth has been the development of novel model organisms. Scientific ideas that were developed to help understand the most well-studied species are now sufficiently established that insights from those species can be used as a foundation to understand other, less well-studied species. Our special issue highlights some of these new frontiers. Wilkinson et al. explore reptile cognition (Wilkinson), Mather and colleagues look at cephalopods (Mather et al.), Range et al. review canine cognition (Range et al.). Chittka considers cognition in honeybees (Chittka et al.) and Brown examines cognition in fishes (Brown et al.). And, finally, Hopper and colleagues consider advances in animal cognition research from the perspective of the rich resources that zoos offer (Hopper).

Other authors take on issues beyond the domain of animal cognition, but made possible by its recent successes. For example, Yorzinski considers the ability of individuals to recognize each other (Yorzinski). Beck shows the mutually informative insights that are drawn by comparing the cognition of children and animals (Beck et al.). And Marshall looks at a very new and exciting research area, collective decision-making (Marshall et al.). Other scholars in our issue probe the intersection of animal cognition and applied fields: urbanization (Griffin et al.), animal welfare (Mills et al.), and conservation (Marzluff et al.). In all three cases, authors reveal how advances in animal cognition provide new perspectives on these real world problems.

Finally, a number of authors take a look at some more classic problems in comparative cognition, but look at how they have been improved and developed by new scientific insights. For example, Sulikowski looks at the psychology of foraging decisions (Sulikowski et al.), Heilbronner considers the effects of risk and uncertainty of decision-making (Heilbronner), and O’hara looks at avian problem-solving (O’hara et al.). Likewise, Lee considers an area that has fascinated psychologists for a hundred years, the mechanisms of spatial cognition, and integrates recent empirical discoveries under a deepening theory of spatial representation (Lee et al.). Morand-Feron presents new insights into the origins of associative learning (Morand-Feron et al.) and Nieder compares the mechanisms and neural bases of numerical cognition in corvids and primates, a research area that has advanced significantly over the past 20 years (Nieder). On the hardware side, two anatomists look at the comparative evolution of animal brains (Herculano Houzel) and human brains (Sherwood et al.). Finally, Gunturkun examines links between cognition and brain size across species (Gunturkun et al.).

The contributions to this special issue represent the many levels of analysis and explanation available for the study of behavior. All of these approaches have been incubated and refined by animal researchers, with cognition at the nexus between brain and behavior. The rich theoretical and methodological traditions of comparative cognition research will be an important bridge between behavior and the interpretation of neural signals. The study of animal cognition will tell us how various species (including humans) behave in ways that are well adapted to their environments, while also retaining robust flexibility. These endeavors are central to answering three essential questions in modern science: how behavior is caused, how it is implemented by the brain, and what it means to be human.

Acknowledgements
This work was supported by an NSF CAREER award to BYH (BCS1253576) and NSF grant to JFC (DRL1459625).

References
1
N. EmeryBird Brain: an exploration of avian intelligence
Princeton University Press (2016)

2
E.A. Wasserman, T.R. ZentallComparative cognition: experimental explorations of animal intelligence
Oxford University Press, New York City, NY (2006)

3
S.J. ShettleworthWhere is the comparison in comparative cognition? Alternative research programs
Psychol Sci, 4 (1993)

4
M. Tomasello, J. CallPrimate Cognition
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK (1997)

5
E.J. Nestler, S.E. HymanAnimal models of neuropsychiatric disorders
Nature Neurosci, 13 (2010), pp. 1161-1169
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6
J.W. Krakauer, A.A. Ghazanfar, A. Gomez-Martin, M.A. MacIver, D. PoeppelNeuroscience needs behavior: correcting a reductionist bias
Neuron, 93 (2017), pp. 480-490
ArticleDownload PDFView Record in Scopus
7
A. Gomez-Martin, J.J. Paton, A.R. Kampff, R.M. Costa, Z.F. MainenBig behavioral data: psychology, ethology, and the foundations of neuroscience
Nature Neurosci, 17 (2014), pp. 1455-1462

8
E.A. WassermanComparative cognition: beginning the second century of the study of animal intelligence
Psychol Bull, 113 (1993), pp. 211-228
CrossRefView Record in Scopus
9
K. Hall, S.F. BrosnanCooperation and deception in primates
Infant Behav Develop (2016)

10
T. Hannagan, J.C. Ziegler, S. Dufau, J. Fagot, J. GraingerDeep learning of orthographic representations in baboons
PLOS ONE, 9 (2014), p. e84843
CrossRef
11
B.Y. Hayden, M.E. WaltonNeuroscience of foraging
Front Neurosci, 8 (2014)

12
A.G. Rosati, L.R. Santos, B. HarePrimate social cognition: thirty years after
Primate Neuroethol, 117 (2012)

13
E.L. MacLean, B. Hare, C.L. Nunn, E. Addessi, F. Amici, R.C. Anderson, …, N.J. BoogertThe evolution of self-control
Proc Natl Acad Sci, 111 (2014), pp. E2140-E2148
CrossRefView Record in Scopus
14
R. Kays, M.C. Crofoot, W. Jetz, M. WikelskiTerrestrial animal tracking as an eye on life and planet
Science, 348 (2015)

15
S.T. Piantadosi, J.F. CantlonTrue numerical cognition in the wild
Psychol Sci, 28 (2017), pp. 462-469
CrossRefView Record in Scopus
16
T.C. Blanchard, B.Y. HaydenMonkeys are more patient in a foraging task than in a standard inter temporal choice task
PLoS One, 10 (2015), p. e0117057
CrossRef
17
K. Sayers, C.R. MenzelMemory and foraging theory: chimpanzee utilization of optimality heuristics in the rank-order recovery of hidden foods
Animal Behav, 84 (2012), pp. 795-803
ArticleDownload PDFView Record in Scopus
18
J.R. Stevens, C. McLinn, D.W. StephensDiscounting and reciprocity in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Science, 298 (2002), pp. 2216-2218

19
T.D. Seeley, P.K. Visscher, T. Schlegel, P.M. Hogan, N.R. Franks, J.A.R. MarshallStop signals provide cross inhibition in collective decision-making by honeybee swarms
Science, 335 (2016), pp. 108-111

Editorial overview: Comparative cognition - ScienceDirect

 

[Constance]

Link to all papers ^^^:

Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences | Comparative cognition | ScienceDirect.com

 

[smcder]

In the meantime, what is your response to the question I asked you in my last post:

"I think 'mediation' is the correct term to apply concerning the consciousness-brain relation, but a critical ambiguity resides in your question, if I read it correctly: are you supposing that neurons and neural nets are prerequisites for experience, or do you think it is possible that neurons and neural nets are formed as a biological response to the challenges of lived experience in a phenomenally and temporally sensed world -- an environing world in which changing circumstances require adaptation and learning by evolving species of life?"

@Pharoah writes on page 10 of the paper linked here:

"Neural mechanisms have the capability to qualify a multitude of biochemical assimilations to accommodate sensory, affective and operant sensitivities. My expectation is that an organism possessing more than 100,000 neurons is likely to be capable of mediating a constantly changing landscape of evaluated environmental assimilations. In doing so, it experiences environmental interactions as an individuated phenomenon that is qualitatively differentiated. In this respect, we can say that such a creature would possess a novel ontological status. While such creatures need not introspect about reality or acknowledge in themselves that they have this experiential understanding, they do live nonetheless in a world that is, for them, qualitatively and spatiotemporally delineated; they live as unique beings embedded in a changing spatiotemporal world of phenomenal experiences that motivate their inclinations and actions."

My email to @Pharoah is:
----
Why is this mediation of the 100,000 necessarily accompanied by phenomenal experiences?

What I'm asking is why is this accompanied by phenomenal "feel"?
---
@Pharoah response was:

@Pharoah: "The first thing to bare in mind is that we are talking about less sophisticated animals than humans.

Moving on:

On accepting step 1, we then have the idea that the more sophisticated the qualitative assimilation of environmental particulars the more responsive an animal can be to the environment, that is, the more responsive it can potentially be in a manner that is relevant to its (physiological) needs.
Step 2: evolution ensures that we end up with organisms with very complex or subtle differentiating qualitative capabilities. Subtle attenuations to particular secondary properties such as certain movements, vibrations etc are ‘flavoured’ (for want of a good word—where flavour is their 'qualitative characters') by how they might reflect on certain kinds of needs. Such needs are related to such things as maintaining a healthy biochemistry which relate to acquiring food, shelter, mates, health, sustenance etc.
These needs, which demand certain types of actions, are relevant to how secondary properties evolve a qualitative assignation in a manner that is responsive to the types of actions they need to sanction. And so, the organism feels (in broad terms) about those worldly particulars in ways that reflect all these various components.
Overdetermination comes in here, but noting that we have moved from the cause and effect world of matter and are referencing a new qualitative ontology that implicates relevant actions in response to particular environmental interactions that are not merely lumps of matter, but are items with qualities unique to the individual: it is now a different world beyond matter. (But I find the cause and effect concept problematic anyway, which is where I attack the overdetermination challenge)

Moving to an example: If there is a sudden noise, what we are talking about is an articulated vibration 'of a certain kind'. As a musician, if I want my audience to be excited I articulate in a certain way. I can change that class of articulation from one that sounds exciting, to one that sounds angry—it really is that easy. Of the former, why is a certain articulation causing my audience to be excited? because the feel of that sound (which nota bene, is necessarily a temporal event) is exciting. Why is it exciting? because that sound signature demands we are alert to danger. The response: pupils enlarge, heart beats faster, blood pressure rises, sensory focus stops us thinking what we were previously engaged in. This is a simple recognition of 'the feel' because that is some part of the biochemistry. And in a complex world of sensory stimulations and needs and possible choices, an animal has this complex phenomenon going on. A phenomenon of rich and constantly changing spatiotemporal impressions and influences. This is its phenomenal experience.

Now, phenomenal experience for the human is very much entwined with the individual's idea, or conception, of subjective identity. We cannot easily separate the two. This complicates our idea of freedom of will, but I again argue for a further ontological step."

---

That is the end of that email exchange.

 

[smcder]

Pavlov's plants: new study shows plants can learn from experience

 

[smcder]

"I think 'mediation' is the correct term to apply concerning the consciousness-brain relation, but a critical ambiguity resides in your question, if I read it correctly: are you supposing that neurons and neural nets are prerequisites for experience, or do you think it is possible that neurons and neural nets are formed as a biological response to the challenges of lived experience in a phenomenally and temporally sensed world -- an environing world in which changing circumstances require adaptation and learning by evolving species of life?"

Stephen J Gould wrote about re-winding the tape (evolution) and running it again....to get something very different.

In the article on plants I just linked:

Pavlov's plants: new study shows plants can learn from experience

Gagliano says: "Plants may lack brains and neural tissues but they do possess a sophisticated calcium-based signaling network in their cells similar to animals’ memory processes." So plants use a calcium signaling network in some ways as animals use neurons....or to "solve" similar problems.

Corvids have developed a neo-palladium that bears comparison to the mammalian neo-cortex.

So it does seems possible to say:

"that neurons and neural nets are formed as a biological response to the challenges of lived experience in a phenomenally and temporally sensed world -- an environing world in which changing circumstances require adaptation and learning by evolving species of life?"

And then, there is this:

A single-celled organism capable of learning