Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11

[Soupie]

Very interesting I began hearing both until I was interrupted by someone. After which I heard it strongly one way, and was not able to hear it as I first had.

Yanny or Laurel? The internet is fighting over this robot's mysterious word

 

[smcder]

THE PHILOSOPHER’S GAZE: MODERNITY IN THE SHADOWS OF ENLIGHTENMENT, DAVID MICHAEL LEVIN, at The Philosopher's Gaze

{note, re Levin’s critique of MP, and that of Levinas, see http://www.artsrn.ualberta.ca/symposium/files/original/b74874d0216e448896d5d3e74485595a.PDF}

SEP, M-P: “Merleau-Ponty argues that the basic level of perceptual experience is the gestalt, the meaningful whole of figure against ground, and that the indeterminate and contextual aspects of the perceived world are positive phenomenon that cannot be eliminated from a complete account. Sensing, in contrast with knowing, is a “living communication with the world that makes it present to us as the familiar place of our life” (PP: 79/53), investing the perceived world with meanings and values that refer essentially to our bodies and lives. We forget this “phenomenal field”, the world as it appears directly to perception, as a consequence of perception’s own tendency to forget itself in favor of the perceived that it discloses. Perception orients itself toward the truth, placing its faith in the eventual convergence of perspectives and progressive determination of what was previously indeterminate. But it thereby naturally projects a completed and invariant “truth in itself” as its goal. Science extends and amplified this natural tendency through increasingly precise measurements of the invariants in perception, leading eventually to the theoretical construction of an objective world of determinate things. Once this determinism of the “in itself” is extended universally and applied even to the body and the perceptual relation itself, then its ongoing dependence on the “originary faith” of perception is obscured; perception is reduced to “confused appearances” that require methodical reinterpretation, and the eventual result is dualism, solipsism, and skepticism. The “fundamental philosophical act” would therefore be to “return to the lived world beneath the objective world” (PP: 83/57). This requires a transcendental reduction: a reversal of perception’s natural tendency to cover its own tracks and a bracketing of our unquestioned belief in the objective world. Yet this cannot be a recourse to any transcendental consciousness that looks on the world from outside and is not itself emergent from and conditioned by the phenomenal field. Rather than a transcendental ego, Merleau-Ponty speaks of a “transcendental field”, emphasizing that reflection always has a situated and partial perspective as a consequence of being located within the field on which it reflects."

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

... perceptions own tendency to forget itself ... a reversal of perception’s natural tendency to cover its own tracks ...

We forget this “phenomenal field”, the world as it appears directly to perception, as a consequence of perception’s own tendency to forget itself in favor of the perceived that it discloses. Perception orients itself toward the truth, placing its faith in the eventual convergence of perspectives and progressive determination of what was previously indeterminate. But it thereby naturally projects a completed and invariant “truth in itself” as its goal.

smcder I want to highlight this as so important:

Science extends and amplified this natural tendency through increasingly precise measurements of the invariants in perception, leading eventually to the theoretical construction of an objective world of determinate things.

Once this determinism of the “in itself” is extended universally and applied even to the body and the perceptual relation itself, then its ongoing dependence on the “originary faith” of perception is obscured; perception is reduced to “confused appearances” that require methodical reinterpretation, and the eventual result is dualism, solipsism, and skepticism.

smcder and this:

The “fundamental philosophical act” would therefore be to “return to the lived world beneath the objective world” (PP: 83/57). This requires a transcendental reduction: a reversal of perception’s natural tendency to cover its own tracks and a bracketing of our unquestioned belief in the objective world. Yet this cannot be a recourse to any transcendental consciousness that looks on the world from outside and is not itself emergent from and conditioned by the phenomenal field. Rather than a transcendental ego, Merleau-Ponty speaks of a “transcendental field”, emphasizing that reflection always has a situated and partial perspective as a consequence of being located within the field on which it reflects."

 

[smcder]

@smcder

This looks it will be helpful re "the intrinsic nature of matter" approach to the MBP.

William E. Seager, The 'intrinsic nature' argument for panpsychism - PhilPapers

http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~seager/intnat.pdf

yes ... here:

While in a certain sense it is quite true to say that states of consciousness have parts, the phenomenon of the unity of consciousness shows that the nature of a state of consciousness is more than the mere inter-relatedness of these parts. William James pointed this out in a famous passage: ‘Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence’ (1890/1950, p. 160). We can read this as an argument against the idea that conscious states are ‘structural’ in any ordinary sense. Contrast the situation of conscious states with the obvious fallacy in this analogue of James’s remark: take a hundred men and give them each a girder. Let them jam the girders together however they will, nowhere will there be a bridge made out of the girders. The emergence of bridges is ordinary fare but the emergence of consciousness seems altogether different.

 

[Soupie]

We can read this as an argument against the idea that conscious states are ‘structural’ in any ordinary sense.

What I would, and have said, is that the structure, interaction, and differentiation we perceive in the world is infered from the real structure, interaction, and differentiation of the INM.

While I do think subjective experience of the kind we experience will be found to have a necessary physical structure, what that structure actually is in-itself will likely forever be beyond us. It's doubtful we could get out of our own way to "see" it.

And even if we say, as Strawson does, that we know what consciousness is because we are consciousness, deep insight into its origin eludes us. We know there's an external world out there beyond and beneath our phenomenal world, indeed grounding our phenomenal world, but we can't get a clear view of it.

 

[Constance]

@smcder

This looks it will be helpful re "the intrinsic nature of matter" approach to the MBP.

William E. Seager, The 'intrinsic nature' argument for panpsychism - PhilPapers

http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~seager/intnat.pdf

This looks very interesting. I'll try to find time to read it today.

 

[Constance]

While I do think subjective experience of the kind we experience will be found to have a necessary physical structure, what that structure actually is in-itself will likely forever be beyond us. It's doubtful we could get out of our own way to "see" it.

And even if we say, as Strawson does, that we know what consciousness is because we are consciousness, deep insight into its origin eludes us. We know there's an external world out there beyond and beneath our phenomenal world, indeed grounding our phenomenal world, but we can't get a clear view of it.

''What our eyes behold may well be the text of life but one's meditations on the text and the disclosures of these meditations are no less a part of the structure of reality.''
Wallace Stevens (1879-1955), U.S. poet. "Three Academic Pieces," no. 1, The Necessary Angel (first published 1947, repr. 1951).

And see "The Ultimate Poem is Abstract" at The Ultimate Poem Is Abstract by Wallace Stevens

 

[Soupie]

@smcder

Soupie said: What I would [say], and have said, is that the structure, interaction, and differentiation we perceive in the world is infered from the real structure, interaction, and differentiation of the INM.

It seems we agree that our perception/knowledge of the mind-independent world is skewed by our being imbedded in the world.

Why do I argue [or, explore the idea] that the mind-independent world may be radically different than we perceive it to be?

So it appears that the sights, sounds and other sensations of life as we experience it are generated by regions within the posterior cortex. As far as we can tell, almost all conscious experiences have their origin there.

On the monist view I am exploring, the mind and brain are identical. This nexus is so important, such a source of information.

On this view, the mind-brain nexus is where the perceptual system in-itself perceives itself for itself. And on the face of it, the brain and the mind seem radically different.

On my view, this radical difference is a perspectival and perceptual artifact. And therefore I treat all our perceptions with equal skepticism.

 

[smcder]

How an Antiquarian Horologist Brings Tiny Machines Back to Life

"Cox, originally trained as a jeweler, studied the philosophy of metaphysics in college. It was then that she learned about art and technology of the Renaissance period, such as beautifully detailed automatons—“kind of the first artificial intelligence,” she says. It was a hands-on approach to metaphysical problems.

Part of the magic of automatons is the mechanical optical illusion—a ship moving in waves, a deer drinking water—all created through a network of tiny inner gears and disks. Recently, Cox has noticed a renewed interest in this historical, analog form of magic—and in particular, its tangibility. “People are needing a more grounded association with what they can see and feel,” she says. “They are craving that experience of holding something, looking at something.” "

 

[Constance]

It seems we agree that our perception/knowledge of the mind-independent world is skewed by our being imbedded in the world.

I think that 'skewed' is an inapt word choice and that it is clearly thesis-driven. Your thesis itself seems to be ambiguous in recognizing a) the naturally embodied local and regional limitations of human sense perception and resulting limitations on accruable knowledge of the nature and structure of 'reality' in terms of 'All-That-Is', and b) commitment to the belief that some human minds or humanly produced technologies can nevertheless leap beyond the physical extent of Being -- of what-is within the universe we inhabit and beyond it as a whole -- to objectively discover the nature and structure of Being as a whole. One of the problems in attempting such an objective perspective is that we have no idea whether Being is finite or infinite, bounded or unbounded. Most physicists still think in terms of the knowable 'universe' in which our planet exists as a closed, thus deterministic, system.

Our being 'embedded' by nature within the conditions and affordances of what we can perceive and thus think [construct in thought] concerning the nature of our being and Being as a whole beyond our horizons of visibility and measureabiity is a given whose limitations we cannot escape. It seems absurd -- indeed, it is absurd in the existentialist meaning of that word -- to think or expect that we or any biological species similar to ours, situated in naturally evolved and developing 'worlds', could ultimately see into and know What-Is in the World extending beyond these horizons.

Here are some definitions

 

[Constance]

Meant to add these entries concerning 'skewed' and 'skew' from the American Heritage Dictionary online:

"Skewed

Also found in: Thesaurus, Medical, Financial, Encyclopedia, Wikipedia.
skew
(skyo͞o)
v. skewed, skew·ing, skews
v.tr.
1. To turn or place at an angle: skew the cutting edge of a plane.
2. To give a bias to; distort: The use of a limited sample skewed the findings of the study.
v.intr.
1. To take an oblique course or direction.
2. To look obliquely or sideways.
3. To display a statistical tendency toward: a television program that skews toward teenagers.
adj.
1. Placed or turned to one side; asymmetric.
2. Distorted or biased in meaning or effect.
3. Having a part that diverges, as in gearing.
4.
a. Mathematics Neither parallel nor intersecting. Used of straight lines in space.
b. Statistics Not symmetrical about the mean. Used of distributions.
n.
An oblique or slanting movement, position, or direction.
[Middle English skewen, to escape, run sideways, from Old North French eskiuer, of Germanic origin.]
skew′ness n.
American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition. Copyright © 2016 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. Published by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. All rights reserved."

skewed

 

[Soupie]

It seems absurd -- indeed, it is absurd in the existentialist meaning of that word -- to think or expect that we or any biological species similar to ours, situated in naturally evolved and developing 'worlds', could ultimately see into and know What-Is in the World extending beyond these horizons.

I'm not trying to objectively see the what-is nor do I think or expect that we could see into what-is beyond our human horizons. However I am suggesting this fact impacts the MBP.

 

[Soupie]

I'm not trying to objectively see the what-is nor do I think or expect that we could see into what-is beyond our human horizons. However I am suggesting this fact impacts the MBP.

Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of nature. And that is because, in the last analysis, we ourselves are a part of the mystery that we are trying to solve.

I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as a derivative of consciousness. We cannot get behind consciousness. Everything that we talk about, everything that we regard as existing postulates consciousness.

~ Max Planck

Most mainstream neuroscientists seem to regard consciousness as something that emerges, projects, radiates, is generated, and/or oozes from the brain.

Besides all the problems with weak and strong emergence, the other elephant in the room is that even if consciousness does somehow weakly or strongly emerge from the brain as a new substance or thing, and regardless if it is a material or non-material thing, we still won't be able to perceive it in-itself. Which means we will be in the exact same situation we are in now; that is, our state of the art science seems to indicate that almost all conscious experience shares a powerful nexus with a small locus of the human brain—but our phenomenology seems radically different from this small locus of brain tissue.

So some people insist that our minds therefore cannot be identical to this tissue. No, the mind must somehow emerge from this tissue (or be something else other than the brain itself). Ufology, for instance, suggests that the mind is emitted from the brain in the way that a magnet emits a magnetic field. Do we suppose that if we somehow get a magnifying glass on this field that we will see someone's thoughts, feelings, and perceptions playing like some kind of movie?

The answer is no, we would not. We cannot perceive consciousness in-itself. (We cannot perceive anything in-itself.)

Our perception of (our own) consciousness will never "look like" (our own) consciousness.

We can't get behind it.

Everything tells us that the brain and mind are identical, except for our own eyes. And we should anticipate that if we believe that perception is inferential. The reflexive consequences of the mind studying itself seems to be lost on most neuroscientists.

 

[Constance]

I'm not trying to objectively see the what-is nor do I think or expect that we could see into what-is beyond our human horizons. However I am suggesting this fact impacts the MBP.

Okay. How do you think it impacts the MBP?

 

[Soupie]

Okay. How do you think it impacts the MBP?

Ok. If you sincerely don't know the answer to that question, then I'm dubious the following will help. But here goes:

(1) Science can tell us nothing about the intrinsic nature of matter.

(2) Science and phenomenology (1st person report) indicate an exclusive nexus between the mind and brain.

(3) On a monist view, the mind and brain are numerically identical.

(4) The perceived differences between the mind and brain are perspectival and perceptual artifacts.

(5) The Mind-Body problem is resolved.

 

[Constance]

Thanks for the response.

Re (2), phenomenology does not "indicate an exclusive nexus between the mind and brain."

Re (3), what do you mean by "numerically identical"?

Would you expand on (4)?

and also explain how the Mind-Body problem is resolved by points (1) - (4)?

 

[Soupie]

Thanks for the response.

Re (2), phenomenology does not "indicate an exclusive nexus between the mind and brain."

I'm not referring to phenomenological philosophy but rather 1st person report, subjective experience, psychology, etc.

Of course when someone reports having experience x, we still don't know for sure that they are... however, science that incorporates such 1st person reports strongly indicates an exclusive nexus between the mind and brain. No other locus of the body shares the relationship that the mind and brain do.

Phenomenology (psychology) - Wikipedia

Re (3), what do you mean by "numerically identical"?

"The question is about numerical identity. To say that this and that are numerically identical is to say that they are one and the same: one thing rather than two. This is different from qualitative identity. Things are qualitatively identical when they are exactly similar." Google

Would you expand on (4)?

Much of the discussion @smcder and I have been having over the past year or two involves point 4. Perhaps review our discussions and the articles we've looked at?

and also explain how the Mind-Body problem is resolved by points (1) - (4)?

MBP: what is the relation between the mind and body? They seem connected but we can't see how that might be.

Points 1-4: mind and body are the same thing, they just seem like two different things due to the reflexive, inferential nature of a mind perceiving itself.

 

[Soupie]

yes ... here:

While in a certain sense it is quite true to say that states of consciousness have parts, the phenomenon of the unity of consciousness shows that the nature of a state of consciousness is more than the mere inter-relatedness of these parts. William James pointed this out in a famous passage: ‘Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence’ (1890/1950, p. 160). We can read this as an argument against the idea that conscious states are ‘structural’ in any ordinary sense. Contrast the situation of conscious states with the obvious fallacy in this analogue of James’s remark: take a hundred men and give them each a girder. Let them jam the girders together however they will, nowhere will there be a bridge made out of the girders. The emergence of bridges is ordinary fare but the emergence of consciousness seems altogether different.

I'm still working my way through this paper (very busy past couple of days) but I want to come back to the concept of intrinsic and extrinsic properties, qualities, and/or nature.

The paper notes that this concepts are less then clear. However the author proceeds with a working definition for extrinsic properties as relational properties and contrasts these with intrinsic properties.

On my view, I handle the distinction differently. And as you have helpfully pointed out in the past, there is more than likely material out there that captures the following.

Initially I have thought as though there are three types of properties: intrinsic, extrinsic (relational), and perceptual/mind-dependent properties.

However, on my view, I don't think it's coherent to point three different types of properties. Rather, I think there are intrinsic (mind indepdent) properties and extrinsic (mind-dependent) properties.

So on this view, where would so-called relational properties fall? Are relational properties mind-independent or mind-dependent?

Someone might insist that what-is has intrinsic and extrinsic (relational) properties in-itself, that is, independent of perceiving minds.

However, to us—inferentially perceiving minds—we can't access these "extrinsic/relational" properties directly.

So such a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties is meaningless.

It seems nature has properties in-itself (intrinsic) and minds (part and parcel of nature, of course) are simultaneously constituted by these intrinsic properties but are able to perceive these intrinsic properties as perceptual contents (extrinsic).

 

[Constance]

I'm not referring to phenomenological philosophy but rather 1st person report, subjective experience, psychology, etc.

Of course when someone reports having experience x, we still don't know for sure that they are... however, science that incorporates such 1st person reports strongly indicates an exclusive nexus between the mind and brain. No other locus of the body shares the relationship that the mind and brain do.

Phenomenology (psychology) - Wikipedia


"The question is about numerical identity. To say that this and that are numerically identical is to say that they are one and the same: one thing rather than two. This is different from qualitative identity. Things are qualitatively identical when they are exactly similar." Google


Much of the discussion @smcder and I have been having over the past year or two involves point 4. Perhaps review our discussions and the articles we've looked at?


MBP: what is the relation between the mind and body? They seem connected but we can't see how that might be.

Points 1-4: mind and body are the same thing, they just seem like two different things due to the reflexive, inferential nature of a mind perceiving itself.

Thanks for these responses to my questions. I'm still not clear about what you're claiming or why you've chosen those four numbered claims as a mean to do it.. I have not actually read all the posts you've written in this latest discussion or followed it day by day, so I'm going to go back to where we began some pages ago and reread all of it.

 

[Constance]

. . . It seems nature has properties in-itself (intrinsic) and minds (part and parcel of nature, of course) are simultaneously constituted by these intrinsic properties but are able to perceive these intrinsic properties as perceptual contents (extrinsic).

That's an interesting idea.

 

[Pharoah]

Intrinsic property? How can a property be intrinsic? All properties are relational and are therefore in some sense extrinsic. The intrinsic nature of the world (from a realist stance) is its non relational nature outside of our concept of ‘property’.
What is the nature of a wave function before collapse?