Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11

[smcder]

The Five Marks of the Mental

Tuomas K. Pernu 1,2*

1 Department of Philosophy, King’s College London, London, United Kingdom,
2 Division of Physiology and Neuroscience, Department of Biosciences, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

The mental realm seems different to the physical realm; the mental is thought to be dependent on, yet distinct from the physical. But how, exactly, are the two realms supposed to be different, and what, exactly, creates the seemingly insurmountable juxtaposition between the mental and the physical? This review identifies and discusses five marks of the mental, features that set characteristically mental phenomena apart from the characteristically physical phenomena. These five marks (intentionality, consciousness, freewill, teleology, and normativity) are not presented as a set of features that define mentality. Rather, each of them is something we seem to associate with phenomena we consider mental, and each of them seems to be in tension with the physical view of reality in its own particular way. It is thus suggested how there is no single mind-body problem, but a set of distinct but interconnected problems. Each of these separate problems is analyzed, and their differences, similarities and connections are identified. This provides a useful basis for future theoretical work on psychology and philosophy of mind, that until now has too often suffered from unclarities, inadequacies, and conflations.
Keywords: access consciousness, folk psychology, free will, mind-body problem, intentionality, normativity, phenomenal consciousness, teleology

philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14935/1/The%20Five%20Marks%20of%20the%20Mental.pdf

I'd like to re-read this...I think it was posted a bit back...and note, I don't think there are any claims in the recent material I've posted (at least those most recent about cognition, computation and perception) on these five aspects of mind...on consciousness.

 

[smcder]

when @Soupie asks "what is consciousness for?" ... I think that it's "for" "for-ness".... That compactly, for me, gets at aboutness, meaning, intentionality...following the blog links above to discussions on whether cognition is computation ...
One recurrent idea is that computation is simply physical changes in a system that someone initiates calling it computation.

Vis-a-vis (or a la la!):

Computation is a lens

 

[Constance]

This paper showed up tonight in a notice of several papers new to academia.edu. Steve will recognize some of its references to Eastern practices. It gave me a strange sense of possibly being able to maintain awareness at two levels of Being. See what you think.

Rudolph Bauer, Ph.D.
Washington Center for Consciousness Studies and
the Washington Center for Phenomenological and Existential Psychotherapy Studies


The Direct Experience of Our Ontological Sense of Being as Self.docx

Three additional papers by the same author linked at the side on the opening page at the link:

Transitional Space: An Opening of the Experiential Realm Beyond the Mind: A Phenomenology
By rudolph bauer
Download

Considerations of Mind-Awareness Distinction
By rudolph bauer
Download

Timeless Awareness as Dzogchen: A Phenomenological View
By rudolph bauer
Download

 

[Soupie]

As posted above:

Notes from Two Scientific Psychologists: Brains Don't Have to be Computers (A Purple Peril)

"The Polar Planimeter

I'd like to illustrate with the example of the polar planimeter. My favourite perceptual psychophysicist, Sverker Runeson, wrote a paper in 1976 called 'On the possibility of "smart" perceptual mechanisms'. In it, he described the idea of a smart device and used the planimeter as an example.I blogged about "smartness" and this device in one of my first posts on this blog because it's one of the standard examples in the field of how to get behaviour without computation; the other, of course, is the Watt's Steam Governor."

T. Van Gelder's paper:

"What might cognition be, if not computation?" can be found here:

http://people.bu.edu/pbokulic/class/vanGelder-reading.pdf

I have searched high and low for a detailed explanation of the dynamical approach ever since I read Mind and Life. I hope this paper delivers. Thanks!

 

[Soupie]

I'd like to re-read this...I think it was posted a bit back...and note, I don't think there are any claims in the recent material I've posted (at least those most recent about cognition, computation and perception) on these five aspects of mind...on consciousness.

Honest question:

When 'perception' is referenced in the mainstream, for example arguments about embodied vs representational perception, these arguments don't necessary involve phenomenal consciousness, right? Representations just mean neural representations. And the embodied view doesn't need p-consciousness at all.

When 'cognition' is referenced—which the mainstream considers 'mind'—consciousness is involved, right? It has to be, no? Even though the mainstream view is cognition=computation via neurons, thoughts themselves are mental, albeit epiphenomenal.

Do I have that right, at least at the mainstream level?

Or does/can the mainstream discuss cognition sans consciousness?

 

[Soupie]

If we think of minds as the part of us that has cognitive experiences, then I wouldn't say that the Watt governor is a good metaphor for the embodied mind. I would say however that it is a good metaphor for the regulation of perceptual stimuli. For example the iris response as a regulator for the amount of light entering the eye, and the other sensor-motor feedback loops that regulate appropriate exposure to environmental stimuli. These are much more like the Watt regulator. The resulting experiential phenomena are however entirely different despite being dependent upon stimuli. As simply as I can put it. The volume control is not the music. Then again maybe the metaphor was intended to be interpreted differently than the way I am.

No, you've got it. If complex behavior can proceed sans consciousness, why do we have it and what does it do?

To wit:

>> resulting experiential phenomena

What makes you think experiential phenomena result from physical, perceptual processes?

 

[Soupie]

Honest question:

When 'perception' is referenced in the mainstream, for example arguments about embodied vs representational perception, these arguments don't necessary involve phenomenal consciousness, right? Representations just mean neural representations. And the embodied view doesn't need p-consciousness at all.

When 'cognition' is referenced—which the mainstream considers 'mind'—consciousness is involved, right? It has to be, no? Even though the mainstream view is cognition=computation via neurons, thoughts themselves are mental, albeit epiphenomenal.

Do I have that right, at least at the mainstream level?

Or does/can the mainstream discuss cognition sans consciousness?

Sigh. Doesn't seem to be a clear answer...

"Cognition is "the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses." ... Consciousness: the state of being conscious; awareness of one's own existence, sensations, thoughts, surroundings, etc. 2."

Perception can be cognition. Cognition is mental. So cognition is consciousness?

Note, in the mainstream, consciousness often refers to self-awareness and not phenomenal consciousness.

 

[Soupie]

I'd like to re-read this...I think it was posted a bit back...and note, I don't think there are any claims in the recent material I've posted (at least those most recent about cognition, computation and perception) on these five aspects of mind...on consciousness.

Yes, I will reread again as well. It does strike me that these marks are all marks of a subjective, perspectival view on what-is as well. Except in the case of consciousness (if defined as phenomenal consciousness, "raw feel").

"These five marks (intentionality, consciousness, freewill, teleology, and normativity) are not presented as a set of features that define mentality. Rather, each of them is something we seem to associate with phenomena we consider mental, and each of them seems to be in tension with the physical view of reality in its own particular way."

 

[smcder]

I have searched high and low for a detailed explanation of the dynamical approach ever since I read Mind and Life. I hope this paper delivers. Thanks!

As in the underlined text above, this is about how to get behavior without computation. Keep reading and following links and you'll find no one agrees on whether these examples do that ... Or even on what computation is.

 

[Randall]

No, you've got it. If complex behavior can proceed sans consciousness, why do we have it and what does it do? What makes you think experiential phenomena result from physical, perceptual processes?

Now there's a rhetorical question that has been discussed ad nauseum .

 

[smcder]

Honest question:

When 'perception' is referenced in the mainstream, for example arguments about embodied vs representational perception, these arguments don't necessary involve phenomenal consciousness, right? Representations just mean neural representations. And the embodied view doesn't need p-consciousness at all.

When 'cognition' is referenced—which the mainstream considers 'mind'—consciousness is involved, right? It has to be, no? Even though the mainstream view is cognition=computation via neurons, thoughts themselves are mental, albeit epiphenomenal.

Do I have that right, at least at the mainstream level?

Or does/can the mainstream discuss cognition sans consciousness?

What "mainstream" are you talking about? What books, articles, journals, talks are "mainstream"?

Also which are not? What does the non-mainstream say about consciousness?

Consciousness may not be showing up where you're looking for it because what would be said about it? Basically, I think you'd have to look at the scope of the particular publication or field it represents...and read lots of articles as I suspect each has a somewhat proprietary view.

 

[smcder]

No, you've got it. If complex behavior can proceed sans consciousness, why do we have it and what does it do?

To wit:

>> resulting experiential phenomena

What makes you think experiential phenomena result from physical, perceptual processes?

If you build a "mainstream" around w what can be quantified, what is utile...if you require p<.05, then how much time will you spend on consciousness? One place to look for it is in studies on how we get things wrong, on how we reason, on not seeing the gorilla during the basketball game. These focus on consciousness in terms of what we are thinking...and how we get it wrong or how it's not relevant. And we know in day to day life our conscious experience is often decoupled from our measurable, utile activity.

 

[smcder]

Sigh. Doesn't seem to be a clear answer...

"Cognition is "the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses." ... Consciousness: the state of being conscious; awareness of one's own existence, sensations, thoughts, surroundings, etc. 2."

Perception can be cognition. Cognition is mental. So cognition is consciousness?

Note, in the mainstream, consciousness often refers to self-awareness and not phenomenal consciousness.

Perception can be cognition. Cognition is mental. So cognition is consciousness?

A can be B.
B is C.
So B is D?

...

 

[Soupie]

Now there's a rhetorical question that has been discussed ad nauseum .

It's the same question.

 

[Soupie]

As in the underlined text above, this is about how to get behavior without computation. Keep reading and following links and you'll find no one agrees on whether these examples do that ... Or even on what computation is.

Sigh. I was hopeful when the abstract referred to 'mind.' That's where I keep getting tripped up, mind doesn't necessary mean consciousness, likewise with perception and representation.

 

[Soupie]

Perception can be cognition. Cognition is mental. So cognition is consciousness?

A can be B.
B is C.
So B is D?

...

Ha I was assuming mental=consciousness, but per the literature that's not even the case, huh?

 

[Soupie]

What "mainstream" are you talking about? What books, articles, journals, talks are "mainstream"?

Also which are not? What does the non-mainstream say about consciousness?

Consciousness may not be showing up where you're looking for it because what would be said about it? Basically, I think you'd have to look at the scope of the particular publication or field it represents...and read lots of articles as I suspect each has a somewhat proprietary view.

Mostly psychology and neuroscience.

 

[Soupie]

Im finding this entry to be helpful. Does a good job of including multiple perspectives, including phenomenology.

Mental Representation (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

 

[smcder]

Mostly psychology and neuroscience.

What do you think should be said there that isn't being said?

 

[smcder]

I have searched high and low for a detailed explanation of the dynamical approach ever since I read Mind and Life. I hope this paper delivers. Thanks!

Try this...

http://www.abrg.group.shef.ac.uk/people/tony/teaching/articles/VanGelderDAC.html

Keep in mind it was written in 1994...basically the two models differ in where TAMO comes in...