Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11

[smcder]

What... so is Being and Time suspicious for similar ressons?—Its concepts western philosophy seemed to have svoided for a couple of millennia.

Bit of a stretch ...

 

[smcder]

@Soupie
No it isn't 'why is anything anything'. My sentence you quote does not articulate the question well. And consequently, the car thing is not a helpful analogy.
"If one maintains that the self (mind) and the body (matter) are ontologically distinct, and thus because physics would only satisfy questions about the body but not satisfy questions about the mind, then a dualist hasn't a clue why I am me and not you."
If physics explained mind, would it explain self? Put another way, would your 'self' be explained by an explanation of mind? Why couldn't physics explain ontologically distinct things...? ... they might both be physical. I don't think dualism or monism is relevant to the question.

If physics explained mind, would it explain self? Put another way, would your 'self' be explained by an explanation of mind? Why couldn't physics explain ontologically distinct things...? ... they might both be physical. I don't think dualism or monism is relevant to the question.

If physics explained mind, it would explain self - that's what the various hypotheticals are about, trying to see if one is consistently physicalist -

indexicals - i.e. physics doesn't explain why it is the time it is now ...

 

[Pharoah]

Then the question is why it's metaphysically inconceivable? If you are basically a physicalist why do you not buy any of the variants? Particularly the last one.

Not sure what "the last one" is referring to... and am not sure exactly what you are getting at here.
Good conceivability arguments tend to be intuitively appealing. But I think that they usually rest on some vague conceptual instrument within the argument, which is to say, to me at least, that the argument is not worth pondering.... I realise certain philosophers like these kinds of arguments.
In the example, the vague conceptual instrument is 'computer' or 'computation' and the notion that the brain is a 'computational' device. Ok, so conceivably in the future there may be non-silicon analaogue forms of computation device that mimic the brain exactly blah blah... so we are not really talking about computation as we understand computation today, but some future computational form. But that isn't the conceptual instrument that is being called upon to make the argument. I mean, the problem is always within the question which usually makes it pointless.

 

[smcder]

For CR...

@Constance
@Soupie

I guess I have in mind some general sense of ... mind is all ... the problem there, as @Soupie concedes, is why are there separate minds at all - but then on @Soupie's version, mind has the qualities it needs, to include differentiation and self-interaction...(like matters) which is why I say it's "stuffy".

 

[smcder]

Not sure what "the last one" is referring to... and am not sure exactly what you are getting at here.
Good conceivability arguments tend to be intuitively appealing. But I think that they usually rest on some vague conceptual instrument within the argument, which is to say, to me at least, that the argument is not worth pondering.... I realise certain philosophers like these kinds of arguments.
In the example, the vague conceptual instrument is 'computer' or 'computation' and the notion that the brain is a 'computational' device. Ok, so conceivably in the future there may be non-silicon analaogue forms of computation device that mimic the brain exactly blah blah... so we are not really talking about computation as we understand computation today, but some future computational form. But that isn't the conceptual instrument that is being called upon to make the argument. I mean, the problem is always within the question which usually makes it pointless.

Not vague - one variation allowed for transfer to an arrangement with any arbitrary degree of similarity to human neurons.

 

[Pharoah]

Yes. As I asked/suggested a long time ago, to suggest otherwise is to suggest not a mind-body problem, but a mind-body-self problem.

I'm not aware of others identify such a problem. So I think it falls on you to articulate why an explanation of mind does not also explain self.

If they were both physical, they wouldn't be ontologically distinct, right?

I think Nagel articulates it as well as I could in 'a view from nowhere': paraphrasing him, he says (chapter 4) Physics can explain objectivity, it might in 400 years explain subjectivity... But that explanation will not explain the individual's subjectivity. Is that trialism?
I agree with Nagel. When I read Klaussen, I thought he did not understand Nagel in the way I do... and not many people have commented on Nagel's text. I think it's brilliant.
@Soupie, your idea of what consciousness is is so different to mine that the notion that I might interpret your mind-body-self comment in the instructive or meaningful way you intend seems doubtful to me. I would love you to write a comprehensive essay on your position so that I might understand more fully you view... because I get bits of it at a time.

 

[Pharoah]

If physics explained mind, would it explain self? Put another way, would your 'self' be explained by an explanation of mind? Why couldn't physics explain ontologically distinct things...? ... they might both be physical. I don't think dualism or monism is relevant to the question.

If physics explained mind, it would explain self - that's what the various hypotheticals are about, trying to see if one is consistently physicalist -

indexicals - i.e. physics doesn't explain why it is the time it is now ...

Ah... now we are getting somewhere. The clue is in the word dualism.
dualism: there are two categories of kind. kinds of mind as you and I possess, and kinds of body as you andI possess. There are numbers of such kind. An explanation of mind and body is an explanation of such kinds. But not of the specific kind, me.
monism: there is one category of kind... etc etc.
I don't remember any philosoher saying they were trying to come up with an answer specifically to 'my' mind and 'my' body. They have been talking about the categories and whether they are distinct or not.
@Soupie scoffed at trialism... mind-body-self: no mention of that daft suggestion by philsophers of yor.
Me... I think monism, dualism, trialism wrong. It makes sense to be an infinitist.

 

[Soupie]

I think Nagel articulates it as well as I could in 'a view from nowhere': paraphrasing him, he says (chapter 4) Physics can explain objectivity, it might in 400 years explain subjectivity... But that explanation will not explain the individual's subjectivity. Is that trialism?
I agree with Nagel. When I read Klaussen, I thought he did not understand Nagel in the way I do... and not many people have commented on Nagel's text. I think it's brilliant.
@Soupie, your idea of what consciousness is is so different to mine that the notion that I might interpret your mind-body-self comment in the instructive or meaningful way you intend seems doubtful to me. I would love you to write a comprehensive essay on your position so that I might understand more fully you view... because I get bits of it at a time.

Here's a concise, simple explanation of my favored approach:

https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-l...ard-problem-or-are-we-simply-getting-it-wrong

"All of science rests on metaphysical assumptions. For as long as we continue to make the intuitively plausible assumption that our best mathematical description of the world, quantum field theory, describes fields of insentience, then yes, we face the Hard Problem of consciousness.

What happens if we drop the metaphysical assumption? In other words, what if the entire mathematical machinery of quantum field theory is transposed to an idealist ontology? Subjective experience discloses, not some ontological novelty erupting into the fabric of reality, but rather, the intrinsic nature of the physical. The conceptual framework of non-materialist physicalism potentially offers answers to all of the mysteries described above and more."

Re monism, dualism, trilism, etc and ontology

My admittedly primitive understanding of ontological distinction has to do with origin and causation.

Two phenomena might be said to be ontologically distinct if that have distinct origins and do not/cannot causally interact. It has little to do with "kinds" in my understanding.

Thus, if the mind and body both have a physical origin and can causally interact, they are not ontologically distinct.

 

[Pharoah]

Not vague - one variation allowed for transfer to an arrangement with any arbitrary degree of similarity to human neurons.

Not my cup of tea...

 

[smcder]

Ah... now we are getting somewhere. The clue is in the word dualism.
dualism: there are two categories of kind. kinds of mind as you and I possess, and kinds of body as you andI possess. There are numbers of such kind. An explanation of mind and body is an explanation of such kinds. But not of the specific kind, me.
monism: there is one category of kind... etc etc.
I don't remember any philosoher saying they were trying to come up with an answer specifically to 'my' mind and 'my' body. They have been talking about the categories and whether they are distinct or not.
@Soupie scoffed at trialism... mind-body-self: no mention of that daft suggestion by philsophers of yor.
Me... I think monism, dualism, trialism wrong. It makes sense to be an infinitist.

What would "explanation of" mean for the specific kind?

 

[Pharoah]

Here's a concise, simple explanation of my favored approach:

https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-l...ard-problem-or-are-we-simply-getting-it-wrong

"All of science rests on metaphysical assumptions. For as long as we continue to make the intuitively plausible assumption that our best mathematical description of the world, quantum field theory, describes fields of insentience, then yes, we face the Hard Problem of consciousness.

What happens if we drop the metaphysical assumption? In other words, what if the entire mathematical machinery of quantum field theory is transposed to an idealist ontology? Subjective experience discloses, not some ontological novelty erupting into the fabric of reality, but rather, the intrinsic nature of the physical. The conceptual framework of non-materialist physicalism potentially offers answers to all of the mysteries described above and more."

Re monism, dualism, trilism, etc and ontology

My admittedly primitive understanding of ontological distinction has to do with origin and causation.

Two phenomena might be said to be ontologically distinct if that have distinct origins and do not/cannot causally interact. It has little to do with "kinds" in my understanding.

Thus, if the mind and body both have a physical origin and can causally interact, they are not ontologically distinct.

Quantum fields are sentient. What does that even mean? .... actually... @Soupie you never answer my questions. You are, each time, like a Nija stepping to the side of the samuri splice

 

[Pharoah]

What would "explanation of" mean for the specific kind?

well... Lol there's a question. What is the point of the question? I mean... where are you going with it? are you suggesting that a full explanstory account of minds generally must entail an explanation of my mind specifically? So, say I "explain" mind now... to count as 'an explanation' it will necessarily explain the mind of Joe Fuzzleduck who is going to be born in 2166 in a campavan in New Deli—and every other individual in future and past existence for that matter—such that when he is a lad of reading age he will face no puzzlement as to why he in particular exists.

 

[smcder]

well... Lol there's a question. What is the point of the question? I mean... where are you going with it? are you suggesting that a full explanstory account of minds generally must entail an explanation of my mind specifically? So, say I "explain" mind now... to count as 'an explanation' it will necessarily explain the mind of Joe Fuzzleduck who is going to be born in 2166 in a campavan in New Deli—and every other individual in future and past existence for that matter—such that when he is a lad of reading age he will face no puzzlement as to why he in particular exists.

" are you suggesting that a full explanstory account of minds generally must entail an explanation of my mind specifically?"

No. "your mind" specifically (a specific mind) is not the sort of thing to which "explanation" applies.

 

[Soupie]

Quantum fields are sentient. What does that even mean? .... actually... @Soupie you never answer my questions. You are, each time, like a Nija stepping to the side of the samuri splice

Huh? You asked what my view is. You can't get around the Hard Problem mate. Strong Emergence isn't an "answer" or "explanation" either.

What does it mean to say quantum fields are sentient? It means phenomenal consciousness is fundamental.

Do you know what quantum fields are? I mean intrinsically. No, nobody knows. Reality is inferred. As the above states, we assume that quantum fields are insentient. It seems intuitve that they aren't sentient. Your tone captures it well. "Heh, he thinks quantum fields are sentient." But nevertheless is an assumption on your part.

Likewise, it seems equally intuitive that phenomenal consciousness emerges from the brain. Another assumption.

I'm not sidestepping anything. I gave you a simple, direct answer. What more do you want?

 

[Constance]

For CR...

@Constance
@Soupie

I guess I have in mind some general sense of ... mind is all ... the problem there, as @Soupie concedes, is why are there separate minds at all

That's a good question. What is the answer?



Once that's sorted out, we can move on to the following:

- but then on @Soupie's version, mind has the qualities it needs, to include differentiation and self-interaction...(like matters) which is why I say it's "stuffy".

"Stuffy" -- i.e., all-that-is is 'stuff', made of 'stuff'? A great leap backward, to the condition of the world as encountered by microbes perhaps, or their immediate evolutionary predecessors?

My next question would be: how does 'mind' assumed to be the single ontological primitive already present in, or beneath, the q substrate "differentiate" {from what does it differentiate itself?} and 'self-interact' {what 'self' does it interact with?}

 

[Constance]

[quoting @Pharoah]"are you suggesting that a full explanatory account of minds generally must entail an explanation of my mind specifically?"

No. "your mind" specifically (a specific mind) is not the sort of thing to which "explanation" applies.

I don't understand why not, given that most of what concerns us here are the innumerable variations in our time -- and in our species' philosophical, historical, and cultural histories -- of ideas concerning the nature of experience {what we experience} and the consequent multitude of interpretations of the nature of reality expressed in our species' history..

 

[Soupie]

That's a good question. What is the answer?

The question is why are there separate minds. To say that quantum fields are fields of sentience is not to say that they are minds—like human minds, dolphin minds, dog minds, etc.

Weve been over this multiple times. Sentient minds emerge from sentient quantum fields as organisms emerge from quantum fields.

My next question would be: how does 'mind' assumed to be the single ontological primitive already present in, or beneath, the q substrate "differentiate" {from what does it differentiate itself?} and 'self-interact' {what 'self' does it interact with?}

No, mind is not the ontological primitive. I've not said that.

Sentience is the ontological primitive. (I'm not addressing this nor the above scarecrows again.)

How and why do sentient quantum fields differentiate and self-interact? Good question. How and why do insentient quantum fields differentiate and self-interact? Equally good question. It's also the same question.

 

[Constance]

The question is why are there separate minds. To say that quantum fields are fields of sentience is not to say that they are minds—like human minds, dolphin minds, dog minds, etc.

Weve been over this multiple times. Sentient minds emerge from sentient quantum fields as organisms emerge from quantum fields.

So you've said multiple times without more than claiming that q fields are 'sentient'. Where is the evidence to persuade me, or us, that this is true?

No, mind is not the ontological primitive. I've not said that.
Sentience is the ontological primitive.

My impression in your earlier arguments/claims for a monistic ontology was that you proposed that matter originates in mind//mind produces matter [or the illusion of matter?]. The question remains, now that it is 'sentience' you claim to be the sole ontological primitive, what is the evidence that 'sentience' is experienced in q fields and/or particles?

 

[Randall]

As a corollary I say that no physicalist answer can satisfy the 'uniqueness of me' (uom) question ...

Are you certain of that? It seems to me that a physicalist POV holds that properties supervene on the physical, not unlike the collapse of a wave function, and therefore in any given moment that a particular thing exists, it must be unique, even if there are other things elsewhere that are constructed identically.

 

[Pharoah]

" are you suggesting that a full explanstory account of minds generally must entail an explanation of my mind specifically?"

No. "your mind" specifically (a specific mind) is not the sort of thing to which "explanation" applies.

Well... it's the only explanation I am really interested in. It is the deepest question of all and is what fuels all the others.
Besides... my point 2 or 3 threads back was that both dualism and monism do not have any bearing on this WIIMANSE question. If physicalism 'explains' that either dualism or monism present the better model of reality, it will leave untouched WIIMANSE.