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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

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Gilbert Simondon:
Wiki: In L'individuation psychique et collective, Simondon developed a theory of individual and collective individuation, in which the individual subject is considered as an effect of individuation, rather than as a cause. Thus the individual atom is replaced by the never-ending process of individuation. Simondon also conceived of "pre-individual fields" as the resources making individuation itself possible. Individuation is an always incomplete process, always leaving a "pre-individual" left-over, itself making possible future individuations. Furthermore, psychic individuation always creates both an individual and a collective subject, which individuate themselves together. Simondon criticized Norbert Wiener's theory of cybernetics, arguing that "Right from the start, Cybernetics has accepted what all theory of technology must refuse: a classification of technological objects conducted by means of established criteria and following genera and species." Simondon aimed to overcome the shortcomings of cybernetics by developing a "general phenomenology" of machines.
 
@Pharoah, the slides you present during your reading of your paper are very good indeed, and as I've said before I think the paper itself is a great accomplishment. I'm also glad to see that you now find yourself in a company of international scholars who share your approach.

Also grateful for this:

Pharoah said:
Tommi Vehkavaara:
Click to expand...

I opened a link from this page to a fascinating paper -- "The Impact of Semiotics on Philosophy" by John Deely. Here is the link to it:

http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/papers/greenbook.pdf
 
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Pharoah said:
This paper corresponds well with mine:
www.pnas.org

What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness

How, why, and when consciousness evolved remain hotly debated topics. Addressing these issues requires considering the distribution of consciousness across the animal phylogenetic tree. Here we propose that at least one invertebrate clade, the insects, has a capacity for the most basic aspect of...
www.pnas.org www.pnas.org
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Thanks for this link, @Pharoah. Yes, this Barron and Klein paper does correspond well with yours, and it too is excellent.

Linked in the box above it at the PNAS site is a brief response to Barron and Klein's paper entitled "Consciousness explained or consciousness redefined?," the very title of which betrays the author's misunderstanding of the problem of consciousness in presuming that we can either "explain" or "define/redefine" consciousness before we arrive at a comprehensive interdisciplinary understanding of what consciousness is and how it is manifested in various stages of the evolution of life.
 
This paper might be of interest to those of us participating here

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
September 2019, Volume 18, Issue 4, pp 731–758

The integrated structure of consciousness: phenomenal content, subjective attitude, and noetic complex
Katsunori MiyaharaEmail author
Olaf Witkowski

Abstract
We explore the integrated structure (or the unity) of consciousness by examining the “phenomenological axioms” of the “integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT)” from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology. After clarifying the notion of phenomenological axioms by drawing on resources from Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Section 1), we develop a critique of the integration axiom by drawing on phenomenological analyses developed by Aron Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty (Section 2 & 3). This axiom is ambiguous. It can be read either atomistically as claiming that the phenomenal content of conscious experience is an integrated complex and holistically as claiming that it is an integrated Gestalt. We argue that the latter reading provides a better characterization of the internal structure of the phenomenal content. Furthermore, the integrated structure of consciousness is not confined to the phenomenal content, but it also extends into the subjective attitude (Section 4). Subjective attitudes and phenomenal contents are interdependent constituents that jointly make up conscious experiences. This implies a novel theoretical challenge to the scientific component of IIT, which is to explain how to accommodate the subjective dimension of consciousness into its explanatory scope (Section 5). IIT can respond in a few different ways, but most importantly, it cannot just ignore it once and for all. As one possible way to address the challenge, we propose introducing a novel construct, noetic complex, to develop a fine-grained model of the neural underpinning of consciousness (Section 6).

Keywords
Unity of consciousness, Integrated information theory of consciousness, Gestalts, Holistic integration, Aron Gurwitsch, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Dynamical systems theory, Phenomenology and neuroscience.


The integrated structure of consciousness: phenomenal content, subjective attitude, and noetic complex

DOWNLOAD available here: 2018 (with O. Witkowski): The integrated structure of consciousness: Phenomenal content, subjective attitude, and noetic complex
 
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The following has begun as one of the clearest outlines of the free will problem. I know there is interest in the problem here.

philosophyofbrains.com

The Brains Blog

This series of posts discusses some key ideas from Why Free Will is Real (Harvard University Press, 2019) by Christian List.
philosophyofbrains.com philosophyofbrains.com

His solution is an “emergentist” one, although I haven’t read his full argument yet as will be outlined in upcoming future posts.
 
Constance said:
This paper might be of interest to those of us participating here

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
September 2019, Volume 18, Issue 4, pp 731–758

The integrated structure of consciousness: phenomenal content, subjective attitude, and noetic complex
Katsunori MiyaharaEmail author
Olaf Witkowski

Abstract
We explore the integrated structure (or the unity) of consciousness by examining the “phenomenological axioms” of the “integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT)” from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology. After clarifying the notion of phenomenological axioms by drawing on resources from Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Section 1), we develop a critique of the integration axiom by drawing on phenomenological analyses developed by Aron Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty (Section 2 & 3). This axiom is ambiguous. It can be read either atomistically as claiming that the phenomenal content of conscious experience is an integrated complex and holistically as claiming that it is an integrated Gestalt. We argue that the latter reading provides a better characterization of the internal structure of the phenomenal content. Furthermore, the integrated structure of consciousness is not confined to the phenomenal content, but it also extends into the subjective attitude (Section 4). Subjective attitudes and phenomenal contents are interdependent constituents that jointly make up conscious experiences. This implies a novel theoretical challenge to the scientific component of IIT, which is to explain how to accommodate the subjective dimension of consciousness into its explanatory scope (Section 5). IIT can respond in a few different ways, but most importantly, it cannot just ignore it once and for all. As one possible way to address the challenge, we propose introducing a novel construct, noetic complex, to develop a fine-grained model of the neural underpinning of consciousness (Section 6).

Keywords
Unity of consciousness, Integrated information theory of consciousness, Gestalts, Holistic integration, Aron Gurwitsch, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Dynamical systems theory, Phenomenology and neuroscience.


The integrated structure of consciousness: phenomenal content, subjective attitude, and noetic complex

DOWNLOAD available here: 2018 (with O. Witkowski): The integrated structure of consciousness: Phenomenal content, subjective attitude, and noetic complex
Click to expand...

This paper seems to have become unavailable for download at academia.edu. I have emailed the primary author, Katsunori Miyahara, to ask for his assistance or intervention. Sorry.
 
Constance said:
This paper seems to have become unavailable for download at academia.edu. I have emailed the primary author, Katsunori Miyahara, to ask for his assistance or intervention. Sorry.
Click to expand...
It would be even better if it didn't cost $40.00 USD
 
Although a neuroscientist would likely disagree, metaphysics must be discussed when exploring the nature of consciousness.

The following is an excellent talk given by theoretical physicist David Tong via the Royal Institute series. He prefaced the talk by asking “what are we made of?”

 
The World Becomes the Self's Body:
James, Merleau-Ponty, and Nishida


Nobuo Kazashi
Hiroshima City University
kazashi@intl.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp


bluered.gif (1041 bytes)



ABSTRACT: Cartesian philosophy presupposes the legitimacy of body-mind dualism, subject-object dualism, the principle of "clear and distinct ideas," and the human individual as an "autonomous agent." In contrast, the philosophical projects of James, Merleau-Ponty, and Nishida are all characterized by a critical stance taken toward these Cartesian presuppositions. That is, first, the "body" is established as the ground for our pre-reflexive yet active communion with the world. Second, the intertwining inseparability of "object-knowledge" and "self-knowledge" in our being in the world is acknowledged. Third, the phenomenon of "horizon" is thematized as an indispensable moment in the constitution of "experience." Finally, the "self" is understood as being embedded in and supported by the "field of experience." With this in mind, we can appreciate Whitehead's comparison of James' "Does Consciousness Exist?" with Descartes' Discourse on Method as the "inauguration of a new stage of philosophy." In this context the significance of Nishida's notion of "the world as the self's body" can be productively discussed.
Click to expand...


20th WCP: The World Becomes the Self's Body: James, Merleau-Ponty, and Nishida
 
Soupie said:
The following is an excellent talk given by theoretical physicist David Tong via the Royal Institute series. He prefaced the talk by asking “what are we made of?” ...
Click to expand...
Tong's talk comes mainly from the perspective of quantum physics. He also briefly mentions string theory. However a new model called Phoenix Theory has been gaining ground because it resolves sticky issues with the other models and is perfectly in harmony with the rest of how they work. Here's a starter:

 
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Constance said:
The World Becomes the Self's Body: James, Merleau-Ponty, and Nishida ...
Click to expand...

Interesting, but at the same time, the basic assumption seems to be a non-dualistic perspective on the part of MP. However, that isn't quite the way MP appears to approach the problem of duality. Rather it seems to me that he recognizes that material and mental phenomena both exist. Then he attempts to understand how that situation arises. To do that one of the things he focused on was the "Chiasm" of the subjective & objective. This is IMO the nexus of the entire problem of how to classify consciousness. I think you'll really like this paper if you haven't yet read it:

 
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