Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

[smcder]

EM wavelength between 590-625 nm

neural spikes trains

phenomenal orange

Which of these is most likely to be actual?

Phenomenal orange, per Strawson and "a la" (as you like to say , Russell, would be the only one of which we have intrinsic knowledge.

 

[Randall]

Regardless of whether you call your position materialism or physicalism, it still entails strong emergence.

Not necessarily: If we define strong emergence as the direct causal action of a high-level system upon its components; qualities produced this way are irreducible to the system's constituent parts (Laughlin 2005), and run that against the pile of bricks analogy, then consciousness as we experience it can be reduced to its constituent parts ( individual quanta of consciousness ). Meaning both are constructed from the same thing. All that has changed is the sheer number and how that number manifests at the macro scale.

And that position would mean the MBP is still relevant (ie still a problem) for you.
Sure, you can simply say phenomenal consciousness just is emitted by a functioning brain, but this is hardly a solution to the mbp. Sure you can just say this phenomenal consciousness field just is material or just is physical, but we could just say it was made out of spaghetti.

Claiming consciousness is made out of spaghetti is flippant nonsense, whereas suggesting that consciousness is composed of fundamental quanta of something physical that is not fully understood is not flippant nonsense.

It hardly makes the mbp irrelevant to you.

Actually it does make the MBP irrelevant ( to me). The mind body problem hinges on the premise that the mind and the body are fundamentally different in nature. I do not operate under that premise. I operate on the premise that everything is physical according to the particular physicalist view that I hold. You are of course entitled to hold a completely different view for yourself. But that would not change the situation for mine.

Just saying that phenomenal consciousness is emitted from the brain doesn’t solve or resolve the mbp. We would still be left asking the same question: How does the mind relate to the body? They seem to be related but how!?

The MBP as defined by its premise is not specifically relevant to the above comment because the same question can also be asked from an entirely physicalist perspective. In other words, not having a physicalist answer that is provable, doesn't prove the premise of the MBP correct. That is a common logical fallacy.

I don’t know how one would even go about proving strong emergence. It’s seems to establish a correlation at best. But we already have that. When the brain is in state X the patient reports conscious state Y.

And if we are going to suggest a duality between the brain and this consciousness field, it raises a host of other issues such as over determination, epiphenominalism, the problem of mental causation, the nature of subjectivity, the qualia palette problem, and the binding problem.

In the end, getting lose with terms doesn’t help us.

I'm not getting "lose" ( I think you meant "loose" ) with my terms. I've been very specific all along. However that doesn't change the fact that the questions you pose are still good. I just submit that my view does not by its nature preclude possible explanations for them. I am also not entirely alone.

For example, Patrick Lewtas has ideas similar to mine that provides a theoretical solution ( or dissolution of ) the palette problem. From this, the binding problem can also be extrapolated. All one needs to do is think about it. That being said, these theories might also be completely wong. I don't know. But I do know your objections thus far do not provide me with sufficient reason to think so.

 

[Soupie]

Not necessarily: If we define strong emergence as the direct causal action of a high-level system upon its components; qualities produced this way are irreducible to the system's constituent parts (Laughlin 2005), and run that against the pile of bricks analogy, then consciousness as we experience it can be reduced to its constituent parts ( individual quanta of consciousness ). Meaning both are constructed from the same thing. All that has changed is the sheer number and how that number manifests at the macro scale.

Claiming consciousness is made out of spaghetti is flippant nonsense, whereas suggesting that consciousness is composed of fundamental quanta of something physical that is not fully understood is not flippant nonsense.

Actually it does make the MBP irrelevant ( to me). The mind body problem hinges on the premise that the mind and the body are fundamentally different in nature. I do not operate under that premise. I operate on the premise that everything is physical according to the particular physicalist view that I hold. You are of course entitled to hold a completely different view for yourself. But that would not change the situation for mine.

The MBP as defined by its premise is not specifically relevant to the above comment because the same question can also be asked from an entirely physicalist perspective. In other words, not having a physicalist answer that is provable, doesn't prove the premise of the MBP correct. That is a common logical fallacy.

I'm not getting "lose" ( I think you meant "loose" ) with my terms. I've been very specific all along. However that doesn't change the fact that the questions you pose are still good. I just submit that my view does not by its nature preclude possible explanations for them. I am also not entirely alone.

For example, Patrick Lewtas has ideas similar to mine that provides a theoretical solution ( or dissolution of ) the palette problem. From this, the binding problem can also be extrapolated. All one needs to do is think about it. That being said, these theories might also be completely wong. I don't know. But I do know your objections thus far do not provide me with sufficient reason to think so.

Did I miss the part when you changed your view from consciousness being a field emitted by the brain to consciousness being composed of consciousness quanta!?

when did that happen?

what do consciousness quanta have to do with the brain? Anything!?

And no I diD absolutely mean lose. Your getting the L for chAnging you’re theory with out telling Anyone.

 

[Randall]

Did I miss the part when you changed your view from consciousness being a field emitted by the brain to consciousness being composed of consciousness quanta!? when did that happen? what do consciousness quanta have to do with the brain? Anything!? And no I diD absolutely mean lose. Your getting the L for chAnging you’re theory with out telling Anyone.

Considering quanta represents more of an evolution than a change. I've only had one major change in perspective throughout this whole discussion, and that had to do with a shift away from the idea that consciousness would be a natural byproduct of sufficiently intelligent computers based on current non-quantum microprocessor technology.

Quanta are compatible with the field theory in that they might be analogous to what is happening with EM fields that involve virtual particles. Anyway, I don't want to be a cause for any negative waves ( or particles ), so you guys just go ahead and carry on. It's nice to see a little participation happening on the thread again.

 

[Soupie]

Considering quanta represents more of an evolution than a change. I've only had one major change in perspective throughout this whole discussion, and that had to do with a shift away from the idea that consciousness would be a natural byproduct of sufficiently intelligent computers based on current non-quantum microprocessor technology.

Quanta are compatible with the field theory in that they might be analogous to what is happening with EM fields that involve virtual particles. Anyway, I don't want to be a cause for any negative waves ( or particles ), so you guys just go ahead and carry on. It's nice to see a little participation happening on the thread again.

Sure. In QFT the fundamental fields are composed of quanta, and what we call particles and virtual particles are oscillations/perturbations of these fields/matrixes of quanta.

I’m pretty unclear on your current view, but it seems to be that consciousness as we experience it (the human mind) emerges within a fundamental consciousness field.

If I have that right, I’m not sure how this fundamental consciousness fields relates to the other fundamental quantum fields, and specifically the fields of which the human brain is comprised.
Is this fundamental consciousness field truly fundamental—on par with the other fields—or does this consciousness field emerge somewhere later down stream, as the result of other, truly fundamental fields interactivity?

The reason the MBP is still an issue for you, despite your denial, as that you can’t explain in mechanical terms how your consciousness field is related to the other known fields.
It’s not enough to say that it’s physical; you have to explain how it is or could even be physical.
Also I’m not sure your fully grok the challenge that subjectivity presents. Which is why you believe you can dismiss the MBP and the HP. Saying that consciousness is a field does not explain subjectivity, it’s origin, nature, and how it relates to the physical world (the body).
The fascinating thing for me is that in the year 2019 we can all have such diverse views regarding the origin and nature of consciousness. Moreover there is a diversity of views about why there is a diversity of views.

 

[Soupie]

Edit

Considering quanta represents more of an evolution than a change. I've only had one major change in perspective throughout this whole discussion, and that had to do with a shift away from the idea that consciousness would be a natural byproduct of sufficiently intelligent computers based on current non-quantum microprocessor technology.

Quanta are compatible with the field theory in that they might be analogous to what is happening with EM fields that involve virtual particles. Anyway, I don't want to be a cause for any negative waves ( or particles ), so you guys just go ahead and carry on. It's nice to see a little participation happening on the thread again.

Sure. In QFT the fundamental fields are composed of quanta, and what we call particles and virtual particles are oscillations/perturbations of these fields/matrixes of quanta.

I’m pretty unclear on your current view, but it seems to be that consciousness as we experience it (the human mind) emerges within a fundamental consciousness field.

If I have that right, I’m not sure how this fundamental consciousness field relates to the other fundamental quantum fields, and specifically the fields of which the human brain is comprised.

Is this fundamental consciousness field truly fundamental—on par with the other fields—or does this consciousness field emerge somewhere later down stream, as the result of the other, truly fundamental fields interactions?

The reason the MBP is still an issue for you, despite your denial, is that you can’t explain in mechanical terms how your consciousness field is related to the other known fields.
It’s not enough to say that it’s physical; you have to explain how it is or could even be physical. That is the MBP, explaining how the mind could be physical. Assuming that it just is, is not a solution!

Also I’m not sure you fully grok the challenge that subjectivity presents. Which is why you believe you can dismiss the MBP and the HP. Saying that consciousness is a field does not explain subjectivity, it’s origin, nature, and how it relates to the physical world (the body).

The fascinating thing for me is that in the year 2019 we can all have such diverse views regarding the origin and nature of consciousness. Moreover there is a diversity of views about why there is a diversity of views.

 

[Randall]

... The fascinating thing for me is that in the year 2019 we can all have such diverse views regarding the origin and nature of consciousness. Moreover there is a diversity of views about why there is a diversity of views.

I couldn't agree more.

 

[smcder]

 

[Constance]

(POSTED TO RANDLE) Sure. In QFT the fundamental fields are composed of quanta, and what we call particles and virtual particles are oscillations/perturbations of these fields/matrixes of quanta.

I’m pretty unclear on your current view, but it seems to be that consciousness as we experience it (the human mind) emerges within a fundamental consciousness field.

If I have that right, I’m not sure how this fundamental consciousness fields relates to the other fundamental quantum fields, and specifically the fields of which the human brain is comprised.
Is this fundamental consciousness field truly fundamental—on par with the other fields—or does this consciousness field emerge somewhere later down stream, as the result of other, truly fundamental fields interactivity?

The reason the MBP is still an issue for you, despite your denial, is that you can’t explain in mechanical terms how your consciousness field is related to the other known fields.
It’s not enough to say that it’s physical; you have to explain how it is or could even be physical.
Also I’m not sure your fully grok the challenge that subjectivity presents. Which is why you believe you can dismiss the MBP and the HP. Saying that consciousness is a field does not explain subjectivity, it’s origin, nature, and how it relates to the physical world (the body).
The fascinating thing for me is that in the year 2019 we can all have such diverse views regarding the origin and nature of consciousness. Moreover there is a diversity of views about why there is a diversity of views.

"The reason the MBP is still an issue for you, despite your denial, as that you can’t explain in mechanical terms how your consciousness field is related to the other known fields.
It’s not enough to say that it’s physical; you have to explain how it is or could even be physical.

Also I’m not sure you fully grok the challenge that subjectivity presents. Which is why you believe you can dismiss the MBP and the HP. Saying that consciousness is a field does not explain subjectivity, it’s origin, nature, and how it relates to the physical world (the body)."

I like the clarity of this paragraph. I would also add that the abstract 'field' thesis argued for by Randle does not explain how and why we experience our lives, our be-ing, as our own, take responsibility for the way we conduct ourselves in the world of others, and thus clearly recognize our possession of personal agency. I am responding to this post by @Soupie because I have just come across a very clearly delineated description of the phenomenologically understood nature of subjectivity in a paper received today in my email entitled "Disturbance of Intentionality: A Phenomenological Study of Body-Affecting First-Rank Symptoms in Schizophrenia," published in PLOS. I'll first copy and paste this clarifying introductory section of the paper elaborating the subjective character of consciousness, both prereflective and reflective, and follow it with a link to the entire paper.


"3: Intentionality and the sense of agency

From a phenomenological point of view, consciousness is not self-enclosed, but open to objects in the world, it has a world-involving character, i.e. it is intentional [61]. For Husserl, intentionality is the essential and intrinsic aspect of consciousness [62], “like a universal medium which bears in itself all mental processes, even those which are not themselves characterized as intentive” [63]. Our mental acts are always directed to something (“directedness”) and they are about something (“aboutness”) [64]. However, we are not simply aware of an object, rather we experience it within the horizon of a universal “as-structure”. We always hope, smell, see, desire, remember or fear something as something, i.e. in a pre-structured and specific way; it is necessarily an experience of a specific type [63,64]: watching a movie, celebrating a birthday, loving a friend, smelling a rose, paying a bill, saying a word etc. [64]. Therefore, each conscious act constitutes its specific object in a certain mode of givenness. In Husserl’s terminology, each mental process has a “material”, which is given in a specific “quality”, e.g., a cake that appears as attractive and desired. This a priori correlation constitutes our openness and relationship to the world [50]. Furthermore, intentionality implies the meaningful interaction between an embodied subject and objects in the environment. Merleau-Ponty speaks of the “intentional arc” [50] which is a mobile vector issuing from the body in all directed actions, providing an orientation towards any object in the world that we are engaged with [50,51,65].

Husserl [66] further describes the passive synthesis of gestalt formation based on the fact that all directed bodily experiences and movements are constituted as “consciously performed intentional acts“ [36, p. 82, 44]. These are dynamic self-organizing processes connected within the framework of activity and founded in a passive synthesis: “…all activity essentially presupposes a foundation of passivity as well as an objectlike formation that is already pre-constituted in it.” [66, p.276]. As Husserl further writes: “the whole of conscious life is unified synthetically” [67, pp. 80-81]. Consequently, the passive synthesis of gestalt formation in bodily acts is a dynamic constitution of multiple aspects of mind and body unified in a meaningful way. For example, if I want to pick up a cup, the decision and intentional effort to do so is conjoined with the kinaesthetic experience of moving my arm and hand, and with the visual perception of cup, arm and hand. At the same time, the perception, decision and intentional effort guarantee the directed bodily movement to be experienced as a coherent gestalt [44].

Furthermore, in his writings from the Ideas I onwards, Husserl [63] developed an account of intentionality in which two moments of the a priori correlation are distinguished: the noesis or noetic act (sinnbildender Bewusstseinsakt) and noema or noematic sense (Sinngehalt des Bewusstseinsaktes). Every act consists of noetic moments, which can be described as “directions of the regard of the pure Ego to the objects ‘meant’ by it, owing to sense-bestowal to the object which is ‘inherent in the sense’ for the Ego” [63, p. 214]. This means that every mental process includes “in itself something such as a ‘sense’” [63, p. 213]. Noesis always incorporates noema: “Perception, for example, has its noema, most basically its perceptual sense, i.e., the perceived as perceived”, “the remembered as remembered” etc. [63, p. 214]. Both poles of intentionality are a priori conditions of all object-full experiences and their correlation characterizes consciousness [84]. Moreover, they constitute our relationship to the world and guarantee the tacit world-embeddedness of the subject [36].

Finally, intentionality is double-layered. The basic level can be called “operative or bodily intentionality” [51, p. 136, 65]; it is the pre-reflective and procedural experience which has as a main phenomenal component the character of ipseity. Ipseity or basic self-awareness (“the self-feeling of one’s self” [57, p.122]) is a medium in which any experience, mental state or intentional action is embedded [10,68]. Ipseity mediates the first-personal mode of perception and experience. It enables the subject “to be affected by an object (hetero-affection)” and to subsequently take action towards it [51]. The second type of intentionality is founded on this stratum of consciousness and is often called “active or explicit intentionality” [51, p. 136]. It enables consciously directed actions [51]. The explicitness of this mode of consciousness entails the possibility to make one’s own mental processes thematic in a volitional manner, i.e. to reflect on one’s own experiences and their contents.

Based on the medium of ipseity, I experience my own thinking, feeling, perceiving, moving etc. immediately, noninferentially from the first-person perspective or as mine. According to Gallagher [56], the notion of mineness can be split into a sense of ownership (SO) and a sense of agency (SA). SO is the feeling that the body as a whole or functional units within the body, such as a limb one is moving, belongs to oneself. The subject simultaneously is the body (Leib), but also has the body (Körper ). This double-aspectivity of the body, with the SO being more a feature of the second aspect, has been a central motive in phenomenological anthropology [69]. SA, on the other hand, is the feeling that the subject is the agent who is generating and performing his intentional actions [56]. Gallagher goes even further and distinguishes between an experiential, pre-reflective SA and an attribution of agency. He argues that the higher-order SA depends on the first-order experience of agency. For example, if a subject tries to pick up a cup, he must first have a sense of moving his arm. This first-order phenomenal experience is implicit, embodied and non-conceptual. The higher-order SA is mirrored in the fact that the subject is able to control and attribute the agency to himself [64].

4: Aims of the study

The overall aim of this study is to define the fundamental phenomenological pattern of the two body-affecting FRS. Through the lived body, the subject tacitly participates in the field of experience, interacts within the world [70–72] and also experiences himself as a bounded, temporally persistent entity [73]. Recent psychiatric research on individuals in the prodromal phase of schizophrenia has shown that fundamental disturbances of the lived body (concerning the feeling of mineness) may precede the development of more superficial positive symptoms such as FRS [74]. Therefore, our phenomenological explanation of the two FRS accounts for the relationship between disorders of pre-reflective self-experience and symptoms of acute schizophrenia [75]. Moreover, we describe the transition from non-psychotic anomalies of bodily experience to full-blown disorders of agency such as delusions of alien control. In this article, we put forward the hypothesis that the aforementioned two FRS can be seen as expressions of a disturbance of intentionality and agency [76, pp. 132-153,273-279]. We also hypothesize that the two FRS are, although clinically different, interrelated and of a very similar phenomenological structure being rooted in the disorder of basic self-awareness. Referring to research by Klosterkötter [52,54,77] and Köhler [78], we describe their emergence as a sequence of four stages, leading from abnormal bodily sensations to delusions of being controlled. Since anomalous bodily experiences are considered to be potential markers of beginning schizophrenia [79,80], our study will help to better understand the experiential core gestalt of the prodromal phase of schizophrenia."

https://www.academia.edu/4403347/Di...chizophrenia_2013_?email_work_card=view-paper

 

[Randall]

... I would also add that the abstract 'field' thesis argued for by Randle does not explain how and why we experience our lives, our be-ing, as our own, take responsibility for the way we conduct ourselves in the world of others, and thus clearly recognize our possession of personal agency ...

Fields and quanta were never intended as an explanation for: "why we experience our lives, our be-ing ..." Those sorts of "why questions" are for behaviorists, historians, psychologists and the like. It's best not to conflate "why questions" with "what questions". For example, theories about what gravity is doesn't say anything about why gravity is. In fact there may be no "why". It may be the case that it simply is.

 

[Constance]

Fields and quanta were never intended as an explanation for: "why we experience our lives, our be-ing ..." Those sorts of "why questions" are for behaviorists, historians, psychologists and the like. It's best not to conflate "why questions" with "what questions". For example, theories about what gravity is doesn't say anything about why gravity is. In fact there may be no "why". It may be the case that it simply is.

So you're not interested at all in how animal and human consciousness and mind evolve and develop in the environing physical world as we experience it? Why didn't you say so earlier? And why are you still pursuing the subject matter of this thread?

 

[Constance]

So you're not interested at all in how animal and human consciousness and mind evolve and develop in the environing physical world as we experience it? Why didn't you say so earlier? And why are you still pursuing the subject matter of this thread?

ps, no offense intended. Just asking.

 

[smcder]

 

[Randall]

So you're not interested at all in how animal and human consciousness and mind evolve and develop in the environing physical world as we experience it? Why didn't you say so earlier? And why are you still pursuing the subject matter of this thread?

Questions about how and what are different than questions about why. Conflating them causes false assumptions like the ones above. Here's a brief article that might help with what I'm attempting to convey: Science does not ask “Why?”

 

[Randall]

What's the point of that?

 

[Michael Allen]

As I struggle to understand what you write in this post it occurs to me that you can help out by defining the terms and words you are employing. To that end, I will highlight in red the terms and words that seem ambiguous and/or puzzling to me and ask that you define them in a response.

“My axiom:
"Axiom: In order to comfort yourself with the "glitch" of understanding within your own consciousness, you must by definition reject the full nature and background that makes your consciousness (as a phenomenon to your "self") as non-existent.

(1) The very reality that underlies the structure (comprehended only by the very entity we think we are) requires exiting the very framework that sustains our experience, understanding and comprehension of the same…"

{note 1: you seem to claim that ‘the very entity we think we are’ is an illusion produced by the ‘framework’ [structures of experience, structures of consciousness] which we sense/discover/recognize/understand in analyzing the relations and structures of our sense perceptions. So are you indeed arguing that what we perceive and reflect upon cannot enlighten us regarding the nature of our existence/our being?}

{note 2: Would the following sentence come closer to your meaning if you removed the preposition 'as'? : "you must by definition reject the full nature and background that makes your consciousness (as a phenomenon to your "self") as non-existent." In either case, you seem to be saying that if we attempt to bracket and dismiss the entire sense of an environing world that arises around us, including our sense of ourselves within it, we might demonstrate to ourselves that we do not exist. For me, this recommendation seems to rest on a misunderstanding of the term 'phenomenon'. See Renaud Barbaras, The Being of the Phenomenon, at Amazon.com: Renaud Barbarus, The Being of the Phenomenon: Books}

"(2) Heidegger did not succeed in explaining this concept...because he had to use the language of being that arises in the very framework that needed explaining...by definition you cannot explain fully a system within the semantical framework of the system that allows such meaning structures to exist."

{Granted and setting aside the shortcomings of human languages, do you actually hold that reflective consciousness, which requires the development of language in order to be expressed, is not grounded in prereflective/non-thetic consciousness of existence, of being, on the part of early humans and a range of other evolving species on earth?}


"(3) I don't know why he didn't take the step of expanding his explanation beyond the usual (and he definitely got extremely close to the edge or horizon of our linguistic domain) meaning within our own everyday intuitions...perhaps it is due to the ability of his detractors to make fun of his "edge" signs pointing to the wordless structure of being that caused him to halt before his thesis pointed to meanings that were ineffable."

{Are you requiring of Heidegger that he should have been capable of eff-ing ‘the ineffable’? What would doing so look and sound like? Can you do this for Heidegger -- analyzing his ‘edge’ writings -- and save him from his detractors? Or do you wish to persuade others that phenomenological/existential philosophy is empty of ontological significance?}

"The hilarity of this entire drama unfolds when the heideggerian rejoinder reminds the "user" of being of the basic Ineffability of a named being referenced in the background that was forgotten but taken for granted in the nexus of everyday existence.”

{I’m at a loss to appreciate the ‘hilarity’ of what you call ‘this entire drama’. Can you persuade me that it is ‘hilarious’?}

Sorry for my late reply, Constance. I spend a lot of time sleeping, eating and working (priority implied). Let's start with the first retort:

{note 1: you seem to claim that ‘the very entity we think we are’ is an illusion produced by the ‘framework’ [structures of experience, structures of consciousness] which we sense/discover/recognize/understand in analyzing the relations and structures of our sense perceptions. So are you indeed arguing that what we perceive and reflect upon cannot enlighten us regarding the nature of our existence/our being?}

Agreed...except for the "illusion" part. An "illusion" is a phenomena registered that isn't in our reality what it seems. The problem with using this example is that it doesn't translate to the real basis for the reality which we endure or persist in the world. "Not being what seems" is a metaphor that can only apply to the entire framework that underlies our experience of the same. So we cannot rightly call the entire basis of our experience an "illusion"--the basis and framework has already encompassed examples of things that are dynamically "discovered" by the mechanism that underlies Dasein.

The same is true for the "structures" you identify as the "source" of our "experience." Dasein "thinks" it is enlightened by the objects that are the foundation of it's own being ... but logically (with or without the framework that makes Dasein) we do not have to percieve or reflect upon the ready-at-hand or present-at-hand components to find the necessary background that encompasses both.

In either case, you seem to be saying that if we attempt to bracket and dismiss the entire sense of an environing world that arises around us, including our sense of ourselves within it, we might demonstrate to ourselves that we do not exist. For me, this recommendation seems to rest on a misunderstanding of the term 'phenomenon'.

Why are you bracketing? From whence comes the desire to separate the "environing" world from the embedded "Dasein" that would not even experience it's own "being" without the framework which it cannot completely (by definition) understand? What you are saying in your reductio is actually extremely profound: we do not exist. That is a true statement made by any Dasein that is embedded in a world answering the question of being.

In other words, "we do not exist" as existence-creators is a truism. We do not exist...we are the fountainhead of the experience that is later labeled (lamely) as "existence" The eye will never see itself in the full reality of its ability to witness and reflect on the same.

 

[Randall]

The same is true for the "structures" you identify as the "source" of our "experience." Dasein "thinks" it is enlightened by the objects that are the foundation of it's own being ... but logically (with or without the framework that makes Dasein) we do not have to perceive or reflect upon the ready-at-hand or present-at-hand components to find the necessary background that encompasses both.

Absolutely brilliant. There is no spoon.

 

[Soupie]

Frontiers | Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity

One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current rese...

www.frontiersin.org

One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (see Against Causal Accounts of NCCs) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. ...

The most straightforward approach is to try to explain the correlations in causal terms: NCCs are the causes of the states of consciousness. To “go from correlation to causation” is a move typical of the sciences and it might seem intuitively appealing to treat brain states as the causal sources of states of consciousness. No wonder, then, that we find advocates of the causal interpretation of NCCs. Neisser (2012); Sergent and Dehaene (2012), and Wessel (2012) put forward such causal accounts. Crick and Koch (2003), the founders of the field of modern consciousness studies, also want to “explain NCC in causal terms.” Still, we believe that this explanatory strategy is deeply problematic. It is far less plausible than the identity account of mind-brain correlation. To see why, consider the picture put forward by the causal accounts. A neurophysiological process causes a phenomenal state of consciousness; therefore, it is differentfrom that state, because causes and effects are always distinct. ...

However, materialist principles dictate that every conscious state must be implemented materially, i.e., by some brain state(s). Since the conscious state is different from the neurophysiological processes that are causing it, it must, on pain of psycho-physical dualism (cf. Fell et al., 2004), be implemented by a material process distinct from its neural cause. Thus we end up with two material processes involved in the production of the conscious mental state, not one. The first material brain process would be, according to the causal approach, the cause of a conscious state. The second neural process then would be the implementation of the phenomenal conscious state P, though it would not be its cause. Without this second material process the conscious state would not have a place in a materialist universe. ...

This paper is about the vertical relations between NCCs and their corresponding states of consciousness. These relations cannot be causal because attempts to treat vertical relations in a causal manner lead to the confusions described above. To accept only non-causal vertical relations means that not only the simple and straightforward causality, but also the more nuanced causal relations such as emergence6 cannot be admitted as vertical brain-mind relations. Identity, on the other hand, is not a causal relation, and thus can, in principle, serve as an appropriate candidate for the relation between conscious states and their NCCs.”

 

[Soupie]

The above is what Dennett might refer to as double transduction, and leads many materialists to favor weak and strong emergence.

Consciousness doesn’t emerge from brain activity, it just is brain activity.

 

[Soupie]

At the same time, we recognize that “brain activity” is the human perceptual and conceptual understanding of an actual process transcending human perception and conception.