smcder
Paranormal Adept
No one is saying that. They are saying that a self is a unified model of a person. And then yes, what it feels like to be a person is a self.
CW is saying that. I'll check to see if I left the quotes off.
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No one is saying that. They are saying that a self is a unified model of a person. And then yes, what it feels like to be a person is a self.
CW is saying that. I'll check to see if I left the quotes off.
I think we have to understand that “simulation” is a metaphor. It seems like CW is arguing about details of the metaphor.
But I do think that CW is exactly correct to ask why p consciousness should be a property of these simulations if non phenomenal simulations would work just as well.
Again, panpsychism.
The relationship between matter/mechanism is correlational, not causal.
People will continue banging their heads against the wall trying to discover a causal relation between matter and p consciousness.
Even though the the perspectival nature of the mbp is right under Bach’s nose, I don’t think he sees this. I will eventually attempt to ask him about it. Maybe he does see it but feels he has an answer for it.
One could say that environmental stimuli X (em waves) correlates with conscious experience X1 (experience of green).
Or we could use a shortcut metaphor and say green experiences are how humans model em waves.
But consciousness is a unique phenomenon and we use real metaphors in an attempt to understand it (or some to “explain” it).I'm not sure that's a metaphor.
He was a rhino, ramming through the tissue thin rationalizations the defendant offered with the powerful horn of justice.
Now THAT'S a metaphor! Lol
But consciousness is a unique phenomenon and we use real metaphors in an attempt to understand it (or some to “explain” it).
Consciousness is a simulation. Consciousness is like a radio station. Consciousness is like an electromagnetic field. Consciousness is like a computer program. Consciousness is like a Turing machine. Consciousness is like a sonar system. Etc.
When people get too focused on the fit of the metaphor, they may miss what the metaphor is trying to help us understand about consciousness. We know it’s not actually any of those things.
Calling a human with human intelligence an “artificial intelligence?” Or saying human are Turing machines. Etc. I interpret it all as metaphorical. Do some take it/mean it literally? Probably.So when he says simulation, you don't think he means simulation?
What are the metaphors here?
"Of course you will not deny the fact that you are an AI that inhabits a virtual reality that is generated by the brain of your host organism." JB
So when he says simulation, you don't think he means simulation?
What are the metaphors here?
"Of course you will not deny the fact that you are an AI that inhabits a virtual reality that is generated by the brain of your host organism." JB
Calling a human with human intelligence an “artificial intelligence?” Or saying human are Turing machines. Etc. I interpret it all as metaphorical. Do some take it/mean it literally? Probably.
What? HahaWhat would "simulation" be a metaphor for that isn't itself a simulation?
What? Haha
If consciousness is really a simulation, than that means that simulations as we know them are like consciousness, rather than consciousness being like a simulation.That's my point:
The woodpecker was a jackhammer in the early morning woods.
The deer were gracile phantoms in the gray mist.
The hunter's shot was a claxhorn fired off the bow of civilization.
Yet there are no jackhammers, phantoms or claxhorns...
The simulation was ... a game of chess? Maybe, but a game of chess is an artifice. The simulation was a false promise of love. Again ... something artificial in it. If JB means simulation metaphorically, how do we rewrite his words without using a simulacrum of "simulation" itself?
JB – Then there is another thing, the self. The self is a model of what it would be like to be a person. The brain is not a person. The brain cannot feel anything, it’s a physical system. Neurons cannot feel anything, they’re just little molecular machines with a Turing machine inside of them. (smcder is Turing machine a metaphor here? for what) They cannot even approximate arbitrary function, except by evolution, which takes a very long time. What do we do if you are a brain that figures out that it would be very useful to know what it is like to be a person? It makes one. It makes a simulation of a person, a simulacrum to be more clear. A simulation basically is isomorphic in the behavior of a person, and that thing is pretending to be a person, it’s a story about a person. You and me are persons, we are selves. We are stories in a movie that the brain is creating. We are characters in that movie. The movie is a complete simulation, a VR that is running in the neocortex.
You and me are characters in this VR. In that character, the brain writes our experiences, so we *feel* what it’s like to be exposed to the reward function. We feel what it’s like to be in our universe. We don’t feel that we are a story because that is not very useful knowledge to have. Some people figure it out and they depersonalize. They start identifying with the mind itself or lose all identification. That doesn’t seem to be a useful condition. The brain is normally set up so that the self thinks that its real, and gets access to the language center, and we can talk to each other, and here we are. The self is the thing that thinks that it remembers the contents of its attention. This is why we are conscious. Some people think that a simulation cannot be conscious, only a physical system can, but they’ve got it completely backwards. A physical system cannot be conscious, only a simulation can be conscious. Consciousness is a simulated property of a simulated self."
@Soupie says:
"But consciousness is a unique phenomenon and we use real metaphors in an attempt to understand it (or some to “explain” it).
Consciousness is a simulation. Consciousness is like a radio station. Consciousness is like an electromagnetic field. Consciousness is like a computer program. Consciousness is like a Turing machine. Consciousness is like a sonar system. Etc.
When people get too focused on the fit of the metaphor, they may miss what the metaphor is trying to help us understand about consciousness. We know it’s not actually any of those things. "
First, "is like" is a simile, not a metaphor. To say "consciousness" is like a simulation ... but what is like a simulation that isn't a simulation? I'm not coming up with anything yet.
So to say consciousness is like x or y or z is very different from saying consciousness is a simulation, I don't read that metaphorically, biut literally.
If consciousness is really a simulation, than that means that simulations as we know them are like consciousness, rather than consciousness being like a simulation.
By saying that the self is a simulation of a person, I take JB (and others) to be saying that we don’t experiences all of the myriad of chemical, biological, and neurological machinations going on in our person—instead we feel pain, pleasure, itches, burns, soreness, green, hunger. These things we feel are “simulations” of the chemical biological and neurological things going on (in) us.
If this way of conceptualizing consciousness is correct, I think JB knows that the way that this has evolved and come to be in nature is different than computer simulations. However he may think it’s close enough to say consciousness is for all intents and purposes a simulation.
I think it’s more complicated than that. There’s been a few things from him that make me think he recognizes this but maybe not.
But consciousness is a unique phenomenon and we use real metaphors in an attempt to understand it (or some to “explain” it).
Consciousness is a simulation. Consciousness is like a radio station. Consciousness is like an electromagnetic field. Consciousness is like a computer program. Consciousness is like a Turing machine. Consciousness is like a sonar system. Etc.
When people get too focused on the fit of the metaphor, they may miss what the metaphor is trying to help us understand about consciousness. We know it’s not actually any of those things.
If consciousness is really a simulation, than that means that simulations as we know them are like consciousness, rather than consciousness being like a simulation.
By saying that the self is a simulation of a person, I take JB (and others) to be saying that we don’t experiences all of the myriad of chemical, biological, and neurological machinations going on in our person—instead we feel pain, pleasure, itches, burns, soreness, green, hunger. These things we feel are “simulations” of the chemical biological and neurological things going on (in) us.
If this way of conceptualizing consciousness is correct, I think JB knows that the way that this has evolved and come to be in nature is different than computer simulations. However he may think it’s close enough to say consciousness is for all intents and purposes a simulation.
If consciousness is really a simulation, than that means that simulations as we know them are like consciousness, rather than consciousness being like a simulation.
By saying that the self is a simulation of a person, I take JB (and others) to be saying that we don’t experiences all of the myriad of chemical, biological, and neurological machinations going on in our person—instead we feel pain, pleasure, itches, burns, soreness, green, hunger. These things we feel are “simulations” of the chemical biological and neurological things going on (in) us.
If this way of conceptualizing consciousness is correct, I think JB knows that the way that this has evolved and come to be in nature is different than computer simulations. However he may think it’s close enough to say consciousness is for all intents and purposes a simulation.
I think it’s more complicated than that. There’s been a few things from him that make me think he recognizes this but maybe not.
That should be:
“the relationship between matter/mechanism and p consciousness is correlational, not causal.”
Ontologically they are identical. I’m not sure how best to articulate this so as not to confuse.
Constance, don’t get lost in the metaphors. Computation is a natural and even biological process. There are purely biological ways to frame this same idea, see Anil Seth.
there is nothing unnatural about the notion that consciousness is a simulation/model. It’s not too far off from the notion that all consciousness is intentional.