Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

[Soupie]

So the physical is the foundation of the phenomenal

I would say the phenomenal is the foundation of the physical.

 

[Michael Allen]

I would say the phenomenal is the foundation of the physical.

What's the difference? (sorry...just cracked open a bottle of Forcas-Hosten)

[spoiler alert]

From what I can tell both are terms used by the very generator of the terms...so unless one term is slightly less fictional than the other, then I don't see how we grok anything one way or the other.

 

[Soupie]

What's the difference? (sorry...just cracked open a bottle of Forcas-Hosten)

[spoiler alert]

From what I can tell both are terms used by the very generator of the terms...so unless one term is slightly less fictional than the other, then I don't see how we grok anything one way or the other.

Physical is the form, phenomenal is the substance.

 

[Michael Allen]

I would say the phenomenal is the foundation of the physical.

Phenomenal: "perceptible by the senses or through immediate experience."

Physical: "relating to things perceived through the senses as opposed to the mind; tangible or concrete."

There's a queer loop in those definitions....one seems to throw in an "extra" that is "not tangible"...ironic that the addition of such brings us to want to add "tangible" and "concrete"... I dare say our asking the question and recursively drawing on the phenomenal drives the same into the pathological desire for "tangibility" where there is none (for the generator of tangibility cannot find anything tangible when it faces it's own)

 

[Michael Allen]

Physical is the form, phenomenal is the substance.

Substance is a "particular kind of matter [what is that?] with uniform properties [with respect to who?]" or a better definition might be Locke's "that for which we know not what." "Form" is another notion that cannot exist without the former confusing "particular kind...of ...matter"....

We drown ourselves in our own terms.

 

[Soupie]

Phenomenal: "perceptible by the senses or through immediate experience."

Physical: "relating to things perceived through the senses as opposed to the mind; tangible or concrete."

There's a queer loop in those definitions....

I would “simply” say that physics relates to the form of what-is and phenomenology the substance of what-is.

 

[Randall]

As an aside to the current discussion, it occurs to me that apart from those who maintain the idea that everything is consciousness, we often find ourselves in the position of describing consciousness as something that is different from other facets of existence. It seems to me that in this regard there are different classes to consider. For example there are actions, e.g. a gear turns, a body walks, a synapse fires. Then there are experiences. These two classes ( actions & experiences ) seem to be fundamentally different in nature.

One might be tempted to add that a brain thinks, but I would dispute that thinking and consciousness should be equated. Thinking is more synonymous with analyzing than experiencing. A complicated enough set of gates and relays can accomplish analysis without the need for any experience of it. On the other hand, we humans seem largely dependent on our experience of things. Without it, all we would have are reflexes and other biological systems that perform automatically, and usually behind the scenes.

 

[Michael Allen]

I would “simply” say that physics relates to the form of what-is and phenomenology the substance of what-is.

And I am curious as to whether they are mutually exclusive relations; i..e whether there are common components of these two definitions perhaps obscured by our attempts to delineate them

 

[Constance]

I don’t think they directly address this claim in the article but there is quite a bit about this in the literature. If you’re sincerely curious about it, I could link some articles here. Lmk

Thanks, please do. I actually am interested in what kinds of experimental research is provided to support this claim.

 

[Constance]

@Constance

I don’t think they directly address this claim in the article but there is quite a bit about this in the literature. If you’re sincerely curious about it, I could link some articles here. Lmk

Interestingly, the authors admit in the article that consciousness may be linked to feedforward processes, so long as they produce counterfactual information. Ie information counterfactual to information coming from sensory systems.

In other words, they admit that counterfactual information could be generated by feedforward or feedback neural systems.

For my own part, I don’t think the manifestation of consciousness is necessarily contingent on representations generated by feedforward or recurrent networks. I think it’s contingent on the intrinsic nature of the representation. Something that we will never be able to determine from the “outside.”

You'll probably recall that a year or two ago we discussed here the problems arising from the term/concept 'representation/s', and I spoke to the phenomenological view that what we encounter in experience are things and others as they are phenomenally presented to us (from a given and changeable point of view, in a certain light and color that changes with the movements of the sun, and so forth). So that what we gather in our various sensed perceptions of things and others is an understanding that there is a certain stability and repetition in much of our environment, along with the accumulating sense that our perceptual experiences are related to our own movements in the world (in other words, related to ourselves as perceivers, and dependent on our paying attention for their appearing to take place). We gradually accumulate representational concepts of what exists in our world by repeated encounters with various sorts or kinds of apparent things, but we are always open to perceiving variations in the different types or kinds of things we become familiar with, such as tall or short types of vegetation, different kinds of paths made by different kinds of animals. So we don't come to understand the environing world by storing 'representations' of every separate 'thing' or being we come across, since the stream of our consciousness (in prereflectivity as well as in reflectivity) is always flowing, just as the temporal world we live in and the living and nonliving things within it flow towards us continually in changes and variations. Consciousness is fluid because life/existence is fluid just as the phenomenally encountered world is fluid. So, if you can forgive me for that digression, I want to ask what you mean by writing above that you think "the manifestation of consciousness is . . . contingent on the intrinsic nature of the representation. Something that we will never be able to determine from the 'outside.'" What do you mean by 'the outside'?

I hope that's not too wordy and perhaps ineptly expressed. It's 1 a.m. and I'm tired. Also I've been away from my computer all day while its operating system was revised and restored so I haven't been able yet to continue reading the text that @smcder linked yesterday. I will do so tomorrow and try to understand the research and thinking behind that text and any others you provide.

 

[Constance]

In other words, the difference between a conscious representation and a non-conscious representation (whether manifested by an organism or theoretically by a machine) has to do with the intrinsic character of the representation.

Physical systems aren’t conscious, simulations are.

Before I shut down my computer and myself for the night, I do want to respond to this post as well since you again refer to "the intrinsic character of the representation" and interestingly suggest that this 'intrinsic character?' relates to "the difference between a conscious representation and a non-consciousess representation." What is the difference in your view between 'a conscious representation' and a 'non-conscious representation'? I also don't (yet) understand what is meant in your last sentence above: "Physical systems aren’t conscious, simulations are." Thanks and good night.

 

[smcder]

You'll probably recall that a year or two ago we discussed here the problems arising from the term/concept 'representation/s', and I spoke to the phenomenological view that what we encounter in experience are things and others as they are phenomenally presented to us (from a given and changeable point of view, in a certain light and color that changes with the movements of the sun, and so forth). So that what we gather in our various sensed perceptions of things and others is an understanding that there is a certain stability and repetition in much of our environment, along with the accumulating sense that our perceptual experiences are related to our own movements in the world (in other words, related to ourselves as perceivers, and dependent on our paying attention for their appearing to take place). We gradually accumulate representational concepts of what exists in our world by repeated encounters with various sorts or kinds of apparent things, but we are always open to perceiving variations in the different types or kinds of things we become familiar with, such as tall or short types of vegetation, different kinds of paths made by different kinds of animals. So we don't come to understand the environing world by storing 'representations' of every separate 'thing' or being we come across, since the stream of our consciousness (in prereflectivity as well as in reflectivity) is always flowing, just as the temporal world we live in and the living and nonliving things within it flow towards us continually in changes and variations. Consciousness is fluid because life/existence is fluid just as the phenomenally encountered world is fluid. So, if you can forgive me for that digression, I want to ask what you mean by writing above that you think "the manifestation of consciousness is . . . contingent on the intrinsic nature of the representation. Something that we will never be able to determine from the 'outside.'" What do you mean by 'the outside'?

I hope that's not too wordy and perhaps ineptly expressed. It's 1 a.m. and I'm tired. Also I've been away from my computer all day while its operating system was revised and restored so I haven't been able yet to continue reading the text that @smcder linked yesterday. I will do so tomorrow and try to understand the research and thinking behind that text and any others you provide.

@Soupie posted that text originally

 

[Soupie]

As an aside to the current discussion, it occurs to me that apart from those who maintain the idea that everything is consciousness, we often find ourselves in the position of describing consciousness as something that is different from other facets of existence. It seems to me that in this regard there are different classes to consider. For example there are actions, e.g. a gear turns, a body walks, a synapse fires. Then there are experiences. These two classes ( actions & experiences ) seem to be fundamentally different in nature.

One might be tempted to add that a brain thinks, but I would dispute that thinking and consciousness should be equated. Thinking is more synonymous with analyzing than experiencing. A complicated enough set of gates and relays can accomplish analysis without the need for any experience of it. On the other hand, we humans seem largely dependent on our experience of things. Without it, all we would have are reflexes and other biological systems that perform automatically, and usually behind the scenes.

But those who maintain that only neurons have p consciousness make an equally outrageous and completely unsupportable claim. There is nothing magical about neuron cells. The partial panpsychism (as it has been described) of the notion that the phenomenal aspect of consciousness only has its locus in some brain cells some of the time is magical thinking.

it’s akin to thinking that paper and ink only exist the map of which they compose.

or that our car keys only exist when we shine the flashlight on them.

or that images (light) we see through the binoculars only exists when it’s in focus.

just because we become aware of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness when we are conscious does not mean the phenomena aspect of consciousness only exists with consciousness. Its poor logic.

 

[Soupie]

@USI Calgary
But those who maintain that only neurons have p consciousness make an equally outrageous and completely unsupportable claim. There is nothing magical about neuron cells. The partial panpsychism (as it has been described) of the notion that the phenomenal aspect of consciousness only has its locus in some brain cells some of the time is magical thinking.

it’s akin to thinking that paper and ink only exist the map of which they compose.

or that our car keys only exist when we shine the flashlight on them.

or that images (light) we see through the binoculars only exists when it’s in focus.

just because we become aware of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness when we are conscious does not mean the phenomena aspect of consciousness only exists with consciousness. Its poor logic.

 

[Soupie]

You'll probably recall that a year or two ago we discussed here the problems arising from the term/concept 'representation/s', and I spoke to the phenomenological view that what we encounter in experience are things and others as they are phenomenally presented to us (from a given and changeable point of view, in a certain light and color that changes with the movements of the sun, and so forth). So that what we gather in our various sensed perceptions of things and others is an understanding that there is a certain stability and repetition in much of our environment, along with the accumulating sense that our perceptual experiences are related to our own movements in the world (in other words, related to ourselves as perceivers, and dependent on our paying attention for their appearing to take place). We gradually accumulate representational concepts of what exists in our world by repeated encounters with various sorts or kinds of apparent things, but we are always open to perceiving variations in the different types or kinds of things we become familiar with, such as tall or short types of vegetation, different kinds of paths made by different kinds of animals. So we don't come to understand the environing world by storing 'representations' of every separate 'thing' or being we come across, since the stream of our consciousness (in prereflectivity as well as in reflectivity) is always flowing, just as the temporal world we live in and the living and nonliving things within it flow towards us continually in changes and variations. Consciousness is fluid because life/existence is fluid just as the phenomenally encountered world is fluid.

I’m not suggesting we come to understand the world by storing representations. The models/simulations/representations manifested in the brain happen in real-time, on the fly. They are as fluid—although not nearly as complex and rich—as the world they are reflecting.

So, if you can forgive me for that digression, I want to ask what you mean by writing above that you think "the manifestation of consciousness is . . . contingent on the intrinsic nature of the representation. Something that we will never be able to determine from the 'outside.'" What do you mean by 'the outside'?

From the 3rd person perspective, objectively. We will never be able to distinguish a conscious brain state from a non-conscious brain state objectively.

There will be and certainly are brain states that are correlated with conscious states. For example, the state of the brain during anesthesia during which individuals are unresponsive and later report an absence of consciousness and non-anesthetized brain states in which people are responsive and/or can report consciousness are clearly objectively distinguishable.

 

[Soupie]

@Constance

for example, the paper I submitted above offers the (of course premature) suggestion that representations/models/simulations that are intrinsically counterfactual are those that are conscious.

it doesn’t matter if those representations/models/simulations are manifested by feedforward or feedback/recurrent neural processes. What matters is the intrinsic nature of those representations. In this case, the authors suggest the intrinsic nature is “information” that is counterfactual to the actual state of what-is.

I think it’s a thought provoking idea. A new idea we haven’t discussed here. Which is why I presented it.

now, I happen to disagree that actual and counterfactual sims/reps/models are the difference between conscious and non conscious brain states.

As radical/ridiculous as it may sound, I’m suggesting the difference between a conscious and a non conscious sim/rep/model is the intrinsic content/symbolism of the brain state. Namely that it includes a self model.

Something that is intrinsic to the system/organism/agent that manifests the rep/sim/model.

 

[Soupie]

I also don't (yet) understand what is meant in your last sentence above: "Physical systems aren’t conscious, simulations are." Thanks and good night.

From the objective, 3rd person, physical, mechanistic perspective, there is no consciousness, there is no “something it’s like to be.”

Only self models manifested within organisms are conscious.

the self that we experience as being conscious is a model our body is manifesting to allow it adaptively move through and interact with the world.
One must conceptually flip between the world as we experience it at the personal, “lived” level which is within the simulation our body is manifesting, and the world as it beyond our models of it—which so far as we can discern consists of roughly 12 quantum fields that differentiate and interact via spatiotemporal perturbations.

And yes I understand that even our physics models of what is are within the simulation. But they can reflect—I believe—some veridical patterns of what is.

 

[Randall]

I certainly appreciate the value of logic, so let's have a closer look at your reply in an effort to make some sense of it.

But those who maintain that only neurons have p consciousness make an equally outrageous and completely unsupportable claim.

With respect to the loaded statement, "an equally outrageous and completely unsupportable claim." I need to be sure about what is being referenced before I can properly respond.

I could assume you have interpreted my observation about the existence of actions and experiences to be a claim, in which case, we should first recognize them as observations rather than claims. In other words, actions like gears turning is not a claim, it is an observation about gears that illustrates the context of what I mean by actions. It is neither outrageous or unsupportable.

In the matter of experiences, they certainly exist for me, and therefore there is nothing unsupportable about that observation either, at least not for me. How supportable or unsupportable the assumption that experiences exist for others besides ourselves all depends on the level of evidence one requires. I cannot prove other people are having experiences, but I do propose that it is not outrageous to suppose that they do. You are free to suppose they don't if that is your preference, though I'm not sure what good it would do.

There is nothing magical about neuron cells.

I don't recall making any claim that neurons are magical.

The partial panpsychism (as it has been described) of the notion that the phenomenal aspect of consciousness only has its locus in some brain cells some of the time is magical thinking.

Whether or not magical thinking is involved in any way at all depends on the particular way one looks at that descriptor ( Magical Thinking ), suffice it to say that regardless of one's interpretation, the idea that there is a causal connection between the actions performed by the brain with respect to the existence of consciousness, is far from outrageous or completely unsupportable. There are far too many direct correlations that support the idea to simply handwave it. It would be far more outrageous ( IMO ) to dismiss such evidence.

it’s akin to thinking that paper and ink only exist the map of which they compose. or that our car keys only exist when we shine the flashlight on them. or that images (light) we see through the binoculars only exists when it’s in focus.

Those analogies do not apply to this particular situation. To clarify using your own examples, it's more like I'm saying that putting ink on paper or turning a key are actions, whereas experiencing what it's like to put ink on paper or turn a key is something entirely different. An inkjet printer may perform the action of putting ink on paper without having any experience of it. Similarly, a key may perform the action of opening a lock without the key having any experience of doing so. Or the action of focusing a set of binoculars can be done without the binoculars experiencing what it's like to be in focus.

just because we become aware of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness when we are conscious does not mean the phenomena aspect of consciousness only exists with consciousness. Its poor logic.

I suppose that depends on what you mean by "phenomenal aspect". If by "phenomenal aspect", you are referring to the objective reality corresponding to the experiential phenomena, e.g. the material paper, car keys, or binoculars, then I would agree. However if you are equating the phenomenal aspect of consciousness with experiential phenomena, e.g. what it's like to write with a pen on paper, turn a car key, or look through binoculars, then that would be another matter.

Whatever the case may be, there still remains a division between actions and experiences. That is unless we consider experiences to be a actions. Perhaps a good case can be made that experiencing is an action e.g. "I am performing the act of experiencing". But to me experiencing is more like a consequence of actions in the brain and body. Or is that just an illusion?

A turning gear is an action, but it doesn't produce anything extra beyond that, apart from friction and heat. A synapse fires, and all sorts of things happen that are far more complex than a gear turning or a microchip gate opening. The best evidence suggests that billions of them in action seem to be the cause of our experiences. Somehow, these particular actions elicit experiences.

That's enough for now, but the upshot is that we are left asking: How then do these experiences invoke new neural actions, and if we are assuming that they do, then what action is taking place? Where exactly is the interface?

 

[Soupie]

There are far too many direct correlations that support the idea to simply handwave it. It would be far more outrageous ( IMO ) to dismiss such evidence.

What evidence is there that the brain “causes” the phenomenal aspect of consciousness or creates the phenomenal aspect of consciousness as a new substance or thing?

Those analogies do not apply to this particular situation.

They do, you just don’t understand them.

You are saying that because the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is correlated with the brain, that it follows that the brain creates or causes to exist the phenomenal aspect of consciousness.

We become aware (create models of world and self) via body/brain processes. Via this process, we become aware of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness.

However, it’s a mistake to therefore suppose that simply because we become aware of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness via brain processes (world and self models) that it follows that the phenomenal aspect of consciousness exists only at the locus of the brain, or that the brain somehow creates, emits, or secretes the phenomenal aspect of consciousness.

Thus, your position is akin to saying that ink and paper, of which a map consists, only exist in the locus of maps.

Yes, I understand that the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is different than physical actions or physical qualities. I’m glad that you finally do as well.

Its a metaphor.

You're saying that because human minds (the map) are made of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness (ink and paper) the phenomenal aspect of consciousness (ink and paper) only exist in the brain (the map).

I’m saying this is bad logic.

 

[Soupie]

@USI Calgary

What evidence is there that the brain “causes” the phenomenal aspect of consciousness or creates the phenomenal aspect of consciousness as a new substance or thing?

They analogies do apply, you just don’t understand them.

You are saying that because the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is correlated with the brain, that it follows that the brain creates or causes to exist the phenomenal aspect of consciousness.

We become aware (create models of world and self) via body/brain processes. Via this process, we become aware of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness.

However, it’s a mistake to therefore suppose that simply because we become aware of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness via brain processes (world and self models) that it follows that the phenomenal aspect of consciousness exists only at the locus of the brain, or that the brain somehow creates, emits, or secretes the phenomenal aspect of consciousness.

Thus, your position is akin to saying that ink and paper, of which a map consists, only exist in the locus of maps.

Yes, I understand that the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is different than physical actions or physical qualities. I’m glad that you finally do as well.

You're saying that because human minds (the map) are made of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness (ink and paper) the phenomenal aspect of consciousness (ink and paper) only exist in the brain (the map).

I’m saying this is bad logic.