Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

[Constance]

. . . Perhaps this is the best way to proceed--I am not sure why "understanding" is required. And we are as much "mechanical" (but more complicated) and yet are confused about our own origins. What I am trying to make clear is that 'consciousness' can evolve itself without understanding itself through it's own basis in (and through) time and space. We are already proof. Appearances are often misleading...there is the possibility that we've already created it by accident. But if by accident then we lack the criteria to know what that has already made an impact on our own world. So I agree that we don't have an understanding--that doesn't prevent the possibility of bringing about another entity that can think for itself and suffer "existence" in the same...we've already done this for millions of years...it's called sexual reproduction

The problem is that we don't know and cannot predict what kind of 'entity' we might produce by 'catch as catch can' experiments. Why would an entirely mechanical entity "suffer 'existence' in the same [way that we do]"? It might help you to see the unpredictability of its doing so if you read this paper by Zahavi on mirror neurons that have developed in the evolution of species in our own planetary history.

"Empathy and Mirroring: Husserl and Gallese"
Dan Zahavi

Extract -- "... Gallese isn’t merely arguing that action understanding relies on mirror-resonance mechanisms. He ultimately claims that all kinds of interpersonal relations including action understanding, the attribution of intentions, and the recognition of emotions and sensations rely on automatic and unconscious embodied simulation routines (Gallese 2003a, 517). The very same neural substrate, which is activated when we execute actions or subjectively experience emotions and sensations, is also activated when we observe somebody else act or experience emotions and sensations. So, when we encounter somebody, and observe their actions, or their displayed emotions or sensations, we don’t just see them. In addition to the sensory information we receive from the other, internal representations of the body states associated with the other’s actions, emotions and sensations are evoked in us, and it is “as if” we were doing a similar action or experiencing a similar emotion or sensation. It is because of this automatic, non-predicative and non-inferential embodied simulation mechanism, it is because the activation of these neural mechanisms allows us to share actions, intentions, feelings and emotions with others, that we are able to understand others (Gallese 2001, 44-45, 2009, 527). It is against this background that Gallese defines empathy as involving a form of simulation (Gallese 2003a, 519), and argues that it allows for a direct experiential understanding of others, one that doesn’t rely on cognitive operations or conceptual reasoning (Gallese 28 et al. 2004, 396). . . ."

Empathy and Mirroring: Husserl and Gallese

ACADEMIA.EDU

Empathy and Mirroring: Husserl and Gallese

 

[smcder]

It is a funny conclusion -- that because our consciousness is a product (or by-product...whatever...) and the truism that we don't have to understand (in the way that somehow satisfies our curiosity completely) our "selves" in order to reproduce (sexual reproduction doesn't require the deep understanding of "ourselves" or "consciousness" in order to create another being--children)...how these two premises should lead the same to conclude we don't need the ability to reproduce eludes even my own twisted ways of thinking and logic




To illustrate

" understanding consciousness isn't required in order for us to create conscious machines "

Does anyone here claim to fully understand or "grok" consciousness? Or has our own self-examination of our abiltiy to do self-examination reduce our ability to have a child who ponders the same? Understanding the basis of what we call "consciousness" is not required to create copies of the same questioners...perhaps the word "machine" is a distraction.

"perhaps the word "machine" is a distraction"

What criteria would make a human consciousness non mechanical?

 

[smcder]

"perhaps the word "machine" is a distraction"

What criteria would make a human consciousness non mechanical?

@USI Calgary how would you answer?

 

[Constance]

Would you suppose the builders of this hillside to be conscious?

 

[Constance]

And this one?

 

[Constance]

 

[Randall]

@USI Calgary how would you answer?

 

[Soupie]

Someone on tweeter posed the following question:

“Can anyone recommend fiction that explores how alien the psychology of advanced AI might be?”

first thought is how important science fiction and philosophy have been to advancing human “understanding.”

second I’m reminded of the book blindsight @smcder has referenced in which ai lack phenomenal consciousness. So they may have a “psychology” but conceivably lack p consciousness.

I think the hypothesis I shared recently regarding which brain states are phenomenal is as interesting as any proposed. And that is brain states which represent counter factual world and self states are those that are phenomenal.

and as we’ve discussed consciousness seems to be embodied which among many things seems to mean it is grounded in our bodily senses and perceptions. So the psychology of an ai would be grounded in how it chunked and/or parsed reality. Which would be at a different grain, temporally and information bandwidth.

I’m sure all of you could speculate about this at a highly level of sophistication than I could.

 

[Randall]

Someone on tweeter posed the following question:
“Can anyone recommend fiction that explores how alien the psychology of advanced AI might be?”

The most popular example I can think of is of course the remake of the series Battlestar Galactica. There we see a wide range of psychology from the seemingly robotic drones to the advanced models that cannot be differentiated from humans.

 

[Randall]

And of course Ex Machina

 

[Randall]

Not to Mention Star Trek TNG

 

[Randall]

Let's not forget I Robot

 

[Randall]

And we would be derelict not to include AI

 

[Randall]

And how could we forget one of the greatest films of all time - The Matrix

 

[Randall]

At the risk of repeating myself - Transcendence

​

 

[Randall]

This one has been made into many a meme - 2001 A Space Odyssey

And this list goes on ...​

 

[Constance]

I'm reading a paper on AI and AC [Artificial Consciousness] projects going forward in what we have sometimes referred to as 'machine consciousness'. The AC projects are very interesting and more subtle than AI, and they are distinguished and defined in this paper. I think the paper will be of interest to all of us participating here.

"Towards an integrative theory of consciousness: part 2 (an anthology of various other models)."
De Sousa A1.
Author information

Abstract
The study of consciousness has today moved beyond neurobiology and cognitive models. In the past few years, there has been a surge of research into various newer areas. The present article looks at the non-neurobiological and non-cognitive theories regarding this complex phenomenon, especially ones that self-psychology, self-theory, artificial intelligence, quantum physics, visual cognitive science and philosophy have to offer. Self-psychology has proposed the need to understand the self and its development, and the ramifications of the self for morality and empathy, which will help us understand consciousness better. There have been inroads made from the fields of computer science, machine technology and artificial intelligence, including robotics, into understanding the consciousness of these machines and their implications for human consciousness. These areas are explored. Visual cortex and emotional theories along with their implications are discussed. The phylogeny and evolution of the phenomenon of consciousness is also highlighted, with theories on the emergence of consciousness in fetal and neonatal life. Quantum physics and its insights into the mind, along with the implications of consciousness and physics and their interface are debated. The role of neurophilosophy to understand human consciousness, the functions of such a concept, embodiment, the dark side of consciousness, future research needs and limitations of a scientific theory of consciousness complete the review. The importance and salient features of each theory are discussed along with certain pitfalls, if present. A need for the integration of various theories to understand consciousness from a holistic perspective is stressed.
KEYWORDS:
Artificial Intelligence; Consciousness; Philosophy; Quantum physics; Self

Towards An Integrative Theory Of Consciousness: Part 2 (An Anthology Of Various Other Models)

 

[Randall]

Towards An Integrative Theory Of Consciousness: Part 2 (An Anthology Of Various Other Models)

Excellent article. I particularly liked this part:

"Machine consciousness has also been criticised by researchers who claim that the processing of an algorithm is not enough to evoke phenomenal awareness, because subtle and largely unknown physical principles are needed to perform the non-computational actions that lie at the root of consciousness."

In this discussion thread we've actually been through much more than the article, but the article puts a lot of the highlights together in one place. I highly recommend it to anyone who has just tuned into this discussion. Nice find Constance.

 

[Constance]

"Intercorporeity and the First-Person Plural in Merleau-Ponty"
Philip J. Walsh

Abstract: A theory of the first-person plural occupies a unique place in philosophical investigations intointersubjectivity and social cognition. In order for the referent of the first-person plural -- 'the We' --
to come into existence, it seems there must be a shared ground of communicative possibility, but this requires a non-circular explanation of how this ground could be shared in the absence of a pre-existing context of communicative conventions. Margaret Gilbert's and John Searle's theories of collective intentionality capture important aspects of the We, but fail to fully account for this shared ground of communicative possibility. This paper argues that Merleau-Ponty's concept of intercorporeity helps reconcile the positive aspects of these accounts while also explaining how the genesis of the social world is continuous with perceptual life in general. This enables an account of the first-person plural as dependent on reciprocal communicative interaction (a la Gilbert) without the need to posit a primitive or primordial 'we-model' of consciousness (a la Searle). 'Intercorporeity' designates a bodily openness to others that is not fundamentally different in kind from the generalstyle of bodily comportment found in Merleau-Ponty's rich analyses of perceptual life.
Keywords: first-person plural; collective intentionality; intercorporeity; Merleau-Ponty; social cognition; communication.


"Introduction

There is more to social life than simply transcending one's solipsistic sphere and recognizing that others exist. Beyond the mere ability to discern beings with minds and their expressive behavior, we are able to interact with them and form groups. In other words, beyond the ability of an I to recognize another I, it seems possible that individuals somehow enter into a relationship that can be referred to in the first-person plural -- a we. Within the broad scope of investigations intointersubjectivity and social cognition, the nature of the referent of the first-person plural -- hereafter, simply 'the We' -- occupies a unique place. For, on the one hand, it seems that to study our social existence, in its most basic form, we must begin with the question of how it is possible to transcend individual subjectivity. On this approach we start with the I and proceed outward, theorizing the conditions under which one can recognize or know another I. On the other hand, there is a sense in which sociality pervades nearly all aspects of life. This affords an approach that starts with the social (in some sufficiently broad sense) and works inward, theorizing the conditions under which individual mental life is constituted within a social context. . . ."

https://www.academia.edu/41549533/I...l_in_Merleau-Ponty?email_work_card=view-paper

 

[Randall]

"Intercorporeity and the First-Person Plural in Merleau-Ponty" https://www.academia.edu/41549533/Intercorporeity_and_the_First-Person_Plural_in_Merleau-Ponty?email_work_card=view-paper

I don't like having to sign-up with vendors to download, so I'll have to go over it in more detail later on the website. Too much for me to gulp down all at once. In the meantime I did a little cross referencing and ran across this one: Intercorporeality as a theory of social cognition