Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

[smcder]

I think that question is at the very heart of the quest for an engineered consciousness.

If the argument is that no one can "get their heads around" (apprehend) a 2-4 billion transistor smart phone that has to be designed with the aid of a computer running an algorithm that was itself made with the aid of a computer...then I would say we do nonetheless comprehend a lot about how such a smart phone works and how logic gates scale up to produce very complex actions. Compare that to what we know about the (presumed) building blocks of consciousness.

 

[smcder]

The point I'm making is that we've gotten to the point where the MBP ( duality ) is no more resolvable than the problem of existence itself, which is also an age old problem that will probably never be fully understood. Therefore the solution to the MBP is that there is no solution. We can only accept that there are minds and bodies and deal with that situation as a given. By accepting what is, the two become one & neither, and in doing so, the "problem" vanishes, and we can make practical advancements.

But above you say:

"This to me seems to be the case with minds and bodies. Both exist, and we may never know all the answers as to how exactly everything about them comes into being, just like we don't know everything about how a magnetic field comes into being. All we know are the situations that make it happen. Isn't learning that good enough?"

Maybe not contradictory, but I think these are not the same positions:

1. The solution to the MBP is that there is no solution.
2. We may never know all the answers ... (because I think is trivially true of everything we know anything about) and therefore can't lead one to conclude (1) ... do you think we will or could know something more about how a magnetic field comes into being? Not just a detail, but something as basic as what we already know? Is there no more possible revolution on the order of Copernicus?
3. not one of your positions (I don't think) we know all we can know about the mind body problem

For example if mind and body were correlated to some third thing, or mind and body stand in relation such that body is necessary but not sufficient, that would be worth knowing.

Formulating the problem as Nagel did (somewhere) that one could look at a brain scan of someone eating chocolate and know what it it like to eat chocolate seems impossible, (although "objective" and "subjective" are words given opposite meanings and may not be the actual facts of experience) formulating it as McGinn does:

"Now I want to marshall some reasons for thinking that consciousness is actually a rather simple natural fact; objectively, consciousness
is nothing very special. ... But now, think of these various aspects of mind from the point of view of evolutionary biology. Surely language and the propositional attitudes are more complex and advanced evolutionary achievements than the mere possession of consciousness by a physical organism. Thus it seems that we are better at understanding some of the more complex aspects of mind than the simpler ones. Consciousness arises early in evolutionary history and is found right across the animal kingdom. In some respects it seems that the biological engineering required for consciousness is less fancy than that needed for certain kinds of complex motor behaviour. Yet we can come to understand the latter while drawing a total blank with respect to the former. Conscious states seem biologically quite primitive, comparatively speaking. So the theory T that explains the occurrence of consciousness in a physical world is very probably less objectively complex (by some standard) than a range
of other theories that do not defy our intellects. If only we could know the psychophysical mechanism it might surprise us with its simplicity, its utter
naturalness."

does not sound impossible (though he argues we will not understand it for other reasons) and makes nothing of the "problem" of "self-reference' in understanding it as he argues it is just a relatively simple natural mechanism.

So if we had the same level of knowledge of "the building blocks" of consciousness - as we do of NAND and NOR gates, would we not understand how to make consciousness and resolve the mind body problem as surely as we have the 4 billion transistor smart phone problem? Or perhaps we would understand that it can't be engineered as its not a machine. Either way, we would have what we would think of as a full understanding which is not "know all the answers as to how exactly everything about ... etc etc". Or is there some principle you can point to that says we cannot have this level of understanding, because that too, would be worth knowing.

 

[smcder]

I don't claim we can be sure other humans are conscious. I only claim that it's reasonable to assume that all normal humans have the same capacity for consciousness.

I don't claim we be sure some humans aren’t zombies. I only claim that it's reasonable to assume that all normal humans aren't zombies.

I think it's reasonable to assume for the sake of investigation that biology in general ( not specifically biological mechanics ) makes consciousness apparent, ( not that it creates it ). By that I mean that biology creates a situation whereby consciousness as we experience it happens.

Whatever their reasons are, apparently they're probably wrong ...

Why Panpsychism Is Probably Wrong

It’s enchanting to think that everything—from atoms to rocks to trees—is conscious, but it doesn’t explain much about the world.

www.theatlantic.com

lol

 

[smcder]

I can't speak for Michael, but one thing that comes to mind is that all we need to determine with reasonable certainty is what situations result in consciousness in order to create practical applications. That is different from understanding all the nuances of what exactly consciousness is composed of or what imparts it on the world. For example, if we are able to repair brain damage that results in a patient regaining consciousness, we don't need to know how it works. We just need to know it works with the same certainty as other things we aren't entirely sure of, like that pain killers work.

Right... because that degree of certainty was sufficient to make safe, effective, non-addicting pain killers... ;-) A little too pat.

 

[smcder]

Special to me? Am I the only one who thinks the mbp is special? Is it? Indeed.

If you don’t see that the mbp is a special scientific problem, or perhaps feel comfortable suggesting that it’s not, I’m certainly not going to try to convince you it is haha.

I was trying to find a column by Colin McGinn that talked about other "mysteries" i.e. that the mbp wasn't unique (but might still be special, of course) I didn't find it, but I did come across this...

An Argument Against Materialism - Colin McGinn

If materialism were true, we should be able to know about matter by introspection; but we don’t, so it isn’t. For materialism is a theory of the nature of mind—what constitutes mental states—and so we ought to know this nature by knowing about the things that have it; but we don’t. If it is the …

www.colinmcginn.net

 

[Constance]

I was trying to find a column by Colin McGinn that talked about other "mysteries" i.e. that the mbp wasn't unique (but might still be special, of course) I didn't find it, but I did come across this...

An Argument Against Materialism - Colin McGinn

If materialism were true, we should be able to know about matter by introspection; but we don’t, so it isn’t. For materialism is a theory of the nature of mind—what constitutes mental states—and so we ought to know this nature by knowing about the things that have it; but we don’t. If it is the …

www.colinmcginn.net

Enjoyed that. McGinn usually raises the bar. I wanted to read more at McGinn's blog section so I came upon this one -- 'Understanding the Duck-Rabbit' -- which is interesting and is followed by some interesting comments, but I think that none of them, including McGinn's, have yet uncovered how these ambiguous figures work -- why most people will experience the sudden reversal between seeing one image or the other. McGinn calls them 'mental images', but I think that needs to be unpacked beyond his referring to their being identified as sourced in memory. Understanding the Duck-Rabbit - Colin McGinn

 

[Randall]

Maybe not contradictory, but I think these are not the same positions:

When I restate a position in an attempt to get a point across, it's typical to try another approach that leads to the same place. So it's normal to see them as slightly different.

1. The solution to the MBP is that there is no solution.

I'm not sure if I'm succeeding at getting across what I'm thinking there.

2. We may never know all the answers ... (because I think is trivially true of everything we know anything about) and therefore can't lead one to conclude (1) ... do you think we will or could know something more about how a magnetic field comes into being? Not just a detail, but something as basic as what we already know? Is there no more possible revolution on the order of Copernicus?

I don't see how an answer to the fundamental existence of EM fields is possible, but on a practical level, there may very well be new insights.

3. not one of your positions (I don't think) we know all we can know about the mind body problem

Again, from my perspective, if the"problem" in the MBP is duality, then there is no "problem" ( as I described above ). However if the "problem" with respect to the MBP is something more general, like how do we fix a patient who cannot regain consciousness, then we most certainly have a lot left to learn, and neuroscience is helping us along in that direction.

For example if mind and body were correlated to some third thing, or mind and body stand in relation such that body is necessary but not sufficient, that would be worth knowing.

Knowing whatever the case is about any situation, is IMO worth knowing, provided that the seeker actually wants to know it. For example, I have an aversion to doctors, so although they may be helpful for providing information about a condition, sometimes it's not "worth it" to me ( personally ) to go out of my way to seek out a doctor, and instead, work it out myself.

Formulating the problem as Nagel did (somewhere) that one could look at a brain scan of someone eating chocolate and know what it it like to eat chocolate seems impossible, (although "objective" and "subjective" are words given opposite meanings and may not be the actual facts of experience) formulating it as McGinn does:

"Now I want to marshall some reasons for thinking that consciousness is actually a rather simple natural fact; objectively, consciousness
is nothing very special. ... But now, think of these various aspects of mind from the point of view of evolutionary biology. Surely language and the propositional attitudes are more complex and advanced evolutionary achievements than the mere possession of consciousness by a physical organism. Thus it seems that we are better at understanding some of the more complex aspects of mind than the simpler ones. Consciousness arises early in evolutionary history and is found right across the animal kingdom. In some respects it seems that the biological engineering required for consciousness is less fancy than that needed for certain kinds of complex motor behaviour. Yet we can come to understand the latter while drawing a total blank with respect to the former. Conscious states seem biologically quite primitive, comparatively speaking. So the theory T that explains the occurrence of consciousness in a physical world is very probably less objectively complex (by some standard) than a range
of other theories that do not defy our intellects. If only we could know the psychophysical mechanism it might surprise us with its simplicity, its utter
naturalness."

I tend to resonate with the above position.

So if we had the same level of knowledge of "the building blocks" of consciousness - as we do of NAND and NOR gates, would we not understand how to make consciousness and resolve the mind body problem as surely as we have the 4 billion transistor smart phone problem? Or perhaps we would understand that it can't be engineered as its not a machine. Either way, we would have what we would think of as a full understanding which is not "know all the answers as to how exactly everything about ... etc etc". Or is there some principle you can point to that says we cannot have this level of understanding, because that too, would be worth knowing.

Again, it depends on which "problem" we're talking about. The fundamental nature of minds and bodies, or a practical understanding of the situations that involve minds and bodies. The former we'll never know. The latter seems possible ( to me ) to eventually figure out.

 

[Randall]

Enjoyed that. McGinn usually raises the bar. I wanted to read more at McGinn's blog section so I came upon this one -- 'Understanding the Duck-Rabbit' -- which is interesting and is followed by some interesting comments, but I think that none of them, including McGinn's, have yet uncovered how these ambiguous figures work -- why most people will experience the sudden reversal between seeing one image or the other. McGinn calls them 'mental images', but I think that needs to be unpacked beyond his referring to their being identified as sourced in memory. Understanding the Duck-Rabbit - Colin McGinn

The duck/rabbit situation seems to be fairly simple to apprehend in the context of perception, memory, and pattern matching. We are natural pattern matchers. Therefore so long as a person has sufficient perceptual experience in memory to identify rabbits and ducks, they will be able to pattern match both ducks and rabbits on the image. I don't see the big mystery, other than the bigger mystery of perception itself.

 

[Soupie]

Consciousness arises early in evolutionary history and is found right across the animal kingdom. In some respects it seems that the biological engineering required for consciousness is less fancy than that needed for certain kinds of complex motor behaviour. Yet we can come to understand the latter while drawing a total blank with respect to the former. Conscious states seem biologically quite primitive, comparatively speaking. So the theory T that explains the occurrence of consciousness in a physical world is very probably less objectively complex (by some standard) than a range
of other theories that do not defy our intellects. If only we could know the psychophysical mechanism it might surprise us with its simplicity, its utter
naturalness."

If only we could know the psychophysical mechanism it might surprise us with its simplicity, its utter
naturalness."

 

[Constance]

The duck/rabbit situation seems to be fairly simple to apprehend in the context of perception, memory, and pattern matching. We are natural pattern matchers. Therefore so long as a person has sufficient perceptual experience in memory to identify rabbits and ducks, they will be able to pattern match both ducks and rabbits on the image. I don't see the big mystery, other than the bigger mystery of perception itself.

If you read this essay by McGinn I think you will find the matter is more complex and subtle, and raises interesting questions about how most people experience what Wittgenstein called the 'sudden sense of wonder' that occurs when the alternative image [in such ambiguously dual images] spontaneously appears for them. Note the number of questions and proposals McGinn raises in his second and succeeding paragraphs. I don't agree with some of his claims. Looking at the rabbit-duck example and reading McGinn's analysis/interpretation is a good object lesson for us in the ambiguity out of which accurate perception is achieved. In fact, it's a good 'subject/object' lesson regarding the phenomenology of perception. The question I think needs answering is how the conscious mind behind or beneath the eyes brings about the sudden recognition of the alternative interpretation of what is seen in the dual image. How much more do we have to learn about the nature of consciousness before we can answer that question?

 

[Constance]

Re "the psychophysical mechanism" discussed above, how much is our thinking predisposed to look for a single explanatory 'thing/object' somewhere in the 'brain' to bridge the explanatory gap? First, why 'the' mechanism, as if there must be only one? More importantly, why are we currently being persuaded that the entire body is not involved in the development of proto-consciousness out of the "awareness" and "affectivity" Panksepp has identified as the core capacities present in life/living organisms, from the beginnings of the evolution of species on earth to our own strange selves?

 

[Randall]

... The question I think needs answering is how the conscious mind behind or beneath the eyes brings about the sudden recognition of the alternative interpretation of what is seen in the dual image. How much more do we have to learn about the nature of consciousness before we can answer that question?

The above question seems to boil down to the role consciousness plays in pattern recognition. I'm not sure we need to learn anything more about the nature of consciousness to answer that question. But then again, that depends on what you mean by, "the nature of consciousness". Words like "role", "purpose", or "function", might be construed as "the nature of". Then again, "the nature of" might be an allusion to something more ethereal or metaphysical.

 

[Constance]

. . . Words like "role", "purpose", or "function", might be construed as "nature of".

Only, I think, by careless writers, who get that way by being inattentive readers.

 

[Randall]

Only, I think, by careless writers, who get that way by being inattentive readers.

Here's something all those careless writers and inattentive readers might find more interesting than boring papers and dreary books:

What Is Consciousness & How Does it Function? (Pt. 1) - Closer To Truth​

 

[Randall]

Right... because that degree of certainty was sufficient to make safe, effective, non-addicting pain killers... ;-) A little too pat.

Exactly. If big pharma can create a consciousness pill, just imagine all the the negative consequences. The next thing you know teenagers will be grinding them up and snorting them at rave parties, where they become highly addicted to consciousness, and well, just can't stop until their parents step in with an intervention program, and before you know it there will be consciousness support groups where people finally break their addiction and can slip peacefully back into their commas ;-)

 

[smcder]

Exactly. If big pharma can create a consciousness pill, just imagine all the the negative consequences. The next thing you know teenagers will be grinding them up and snorting them at rave parties, where they become highly addicted to consciousness, and well, just can't stop until their parents step in with an intervention program, and before you know it there will be consciousness support groups where people finally break their addiction and can slip peacefully back into their commas ;-)

Zzzzzzz ,,,,,,,,

Nah, I'm just saying you do both kinds of research - basic and applied.

 

[Randall]

Zzzzzzz ,,,,,,,, Nah, I'm just saying you do both kinds of research - basic and applied.

Remember that for your answer to be relevant to the issue that precipitated it, it needs to address this: Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12
We still haven't heard from @Michael Allen on it either.

 

[smcder]

Re "the psychophysical mechanism" discussed above, how much is our thinking predisposed to look for a single explanatory 'thing/object' somewhere in the 'brain' to bridge the explanatory gap? First, why 'the' mechanism, as if there must be only one? More importantly, why are we currently being persuaded that the entire body is not involved in the development of proto-consciousness out of the "awareness" and "affectivity" Panksepp has identified as the core capacities present in life/living organisms, from the beginnings of the evolution of species on earth to our own strange selves?

Agreed. That example is in service to McGinn's argument from cognitive closure that we might not have the right kind of minds to understand consciousness even if it is relatively simple. And here I think he means phenomenal consciousness at its most basic as available broadly in nature (he argues). None of which might be right.

For my purposes in that post, even if the whole body and more are involved - that doesn't necessarily mean a problem of self reference is fatal to the understanding of consciousness.

 

[smcder]

When I restate a position in an attempt to get a point across, it's typical to try another approach that leads to the same place. So it's normal to see them as slightly different.

I'm not sure if I'm succeeding at getting across what I'm thinking there.

I don't see how an answer to the fundamental existence of EM fields is possible, but on a practical level, there may very well be new insights.

Again, from my perspective, if the"problem" in the MBP is duality, then there is no "problem" ( as I described above ). However if the "problem" with respect to the MBP is something more general, like how do we fix a patient who cannot regain consciousness, then we most certainly have a lot left to learn, and neuroscience is helping us along in that direction.

Knowing whatever the case is about any situation, is IMO worth knowing, provided that the seeker actually wants to know it. For example, I have an aversion to doctors, so although they may be helpful for providing information about a condition, sometimes it's not "worth it" to me ( personally ) to go out of my way to seek out a doctor, and instead, work it out myself.

I tend to resonate with the above position.

Again, it depends on which "problem" we're talking about. The fundamental nature of minds and bodies, or a practical understanding of the situations that involve minds and bodies. The former we'll never know. The latter seems possible ( to me ) to eventually figure out.

Why not just work out your aversion to doctors?

 

[Constance]

Agreed. That example is in service to McGinn's argument from cognitive closure that we might not have the right kind of minds to understand consciousness even if it is relatively simple. And here I think he means phenomenal consciousness at its most basic as available broadly in nature (he argues). None of which might be right.

For my purposes in that post, even if the whole body and more are involved - that doesn't necessarily mean a problem of self reference is fatal to the understanding of consciousness.

Right. Self-awareness and self-reference are born in affectivity, the germinal beginnings of which Maturana and Varela recognized in the 'autopoiesis' of primordial single-celled organisms. And we would not even be acquainted with our own consciousnesses were tacit self-reference not present in our awareness and perception, even in the early stages of our prereflective existence. I really do not consider self-reference to be a problem.