Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

[Michael Allen]

Curious claims, and insupportable.



Can it be that you are insentient about your own native sentience? Or perhaps forgetful of its roots as they were laid down in your childhood encounters with the natural world? Hope not.

Curious claim is a failed joke..."artifice" --> "artificial" --> "artificer"... why are we so bigoted about the thinking machines we "create" when we are already machines that think? The further you dig down into any "living" being, the closer you get to a machine...what is DNA -- the most inorganic packet of information in terms of Carbon, Nitrogen, Hydrogen and Oxygen....

CNO cycle - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Coincidence? (this is a cheap shot)


As far as the second...I hope so.

 

[Randall]

... why are we so bigoted about the thinking machines we "create" when we are already machines that think?

Bigotry requires an objective equivalency to be ignored in favor of a subjective preference. It may be the case that on one level, electronic computers and humans can be seen as machines, but that equivalency may also be entirely superficial where consciousness is concerned. There is a vast difference between humans and electronic computers in terms of construction.

Therefore it may be the case that because of those differences, only the type of design and construction we find in humans and animals with similar brains can give rise to consciousness. Where consciousness is concerned, we cannot yet safely assume that electronic microchips are fully equivalent to biological systems. That is just a fact. Not a prejudice.

 

[Constance]

Curious claim is a failed joke..."artifice" --> "artificial" --> "artificer"... why are we so bigoted about the thinking machines we "create" when we are already machines that think? The further you dig down into any "living" being, the closer you get to a machine...what is DNA -- the most inorganic packet of information in terms of Carbon, Nitrogen, Hydrogen and Oxygen....

CNO cycle - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Coincidence? (this is a cheap shot)


As far as the second...I hope so.

This gives the impression that you believe yourself to be a machine, or at least seek to hold on to the belief that you are a machine. Do I read you correctly?

 

[smcder]

Again ... here's the context, I think it's important to keep this in mind when "interfacing" with the "MichaelAlien" "machine" ...at least in ethanol mode ... ;-) (what is the machine equivalent of ethanol?)

***WARNING...PURE TROLL HERE***

(1) Can consciousness understand the limits of its own self-grok-ness?
(2) Have we reached either point (1) or it's negation?

"michaelalien" outputs:

Curious claim is a failed joke..."artifice" --> "artificial" --> "artificer"... why are we so bigoted about the thinking machines we "create" when we are already machines that think? The further you dig down into any "living" being, the closer you get to a machine...what is DNA -- the most inorganic packet of information in terms of Carbon, Nitrogen, Hydrogen and Oxygen....

That's a clear claim. The argument is we are machines that think. (do non human machines think in all possible senses of the word, at this time? how would we show that they can? etc etc) If I read you correctly, you argue that digging down into any "living" (why quotes?) being, you get close to a machine (DNA?) ... (not sure what you mean by "inorganic" since organic chemistry is broadly, carbon based ...?) so, if that is correct, then you have to show that if there are machine elements in something -----> then that thing is a machine ... see E.O. Wilson's "Consilience".

Also, (again) what is your working definition of a machine?

 

[smcder]

@USI Calgary says:

"Bigotry requires an objective equivalency to be ignored in favor of a subjective preference. It may be the case that on one level, electronic computers and humans can be seen as machines, but that equivalency may also be entirely superficial where consciousness is concerned. There is a vast difference between humans and electronic computers in terms of construction.

Therefore it may be the case that because of those differences, only the type of design and construction we find in humans and animals with similar brains can give rise to consciousness. Where consciousness is concerned, we cannot yet safely assume that electronic microchips are fully equivalent to biological systems. That is just a fact. Not a prejudice."

The definitions "machine" and "organism/living being/person/individual" developed inextricably alongside one another.

The tacit agreement developed that science/technology/industry gets everything but the mind (or soul) which would be the province of the church - thus setting up the terms for philosophy of mind in the West. The gap supposedly is getting narrower and narrower but appears to me to be about the same width and centers exactly where @USI Calgary puts it: consciousness.

I've posted this before, and will try to find the reference, but early clockwork automata are central to this problem. The high technology of the ruling class - expensive because hand wrought by almost uniquely talented individuals - over time they were more broadly exhibited allowing the ruling class to show off their possessions. Interestingly, the life-like aspects of these automata (monkey see...monkey do) and the implicit message that living things were just complicated machines and the implicit message therein that we were also living things and so were also just complicated machines (less and less shielded by the breakdown in nearly universal faith) led to something unexpected ... revolution. Those fomenting revolt pointed out that if we are all machines, then the rulers are machines and thus without divine right ... and thus subject to revolt.

Alongside the more formal definitions are the connotations of machines as being "built by" "designed by" vs. organisms which evolved (or were created) being unable to repair or reproduce, and most importantly, incapable of independent thought and action which are all generally attributed to organisms and people. Individual identity and protections follow on for people (and quite arguably all "sentient" beings, which means, maybe slightly less arguably, all beings).

So if there is a difference in machine and organism, a good place to look for it is in consciousness. If machines do ultimately show comparable qualities of thought to humans it could be:

1) on the basis of the above "limitations" (i.e. as designed and determined mechanisms or automata) then we will need to look at the above "human" qualities carefully (human rights and responsibilities, criminal culpability for example, in light of our status as machines)

or

2) on the basis of machines becoming more or less organisms, evolving in some fashion and leaving the question open, or we will show these outcomes in some other way, for example by showing humans are machines or can not be.

All of that, it seems to me, is a very open question, since there is no current explanation of consciousness. And if, as michaelalien may be saying, there never will be one, then we may never know if we are "machines". The ethical implications of that are obvious, aren't they? ;-)

 

[Randall]

... we may never know if we are "machines". The ethical implications of that are obvious, aren't they? ;-)

I think Michael, you and I would probably all agree that from a certain perspective, humans can be viewed as machines. Therefore I think we would probably also all agree that machine consciousness is a possibility. The problem is determining whether or not consciousness exists in something other than ourselves, regardless of whether or not we see it as a machine. So the machine argument is sort of a red herring. Coincidentally or otherwise:

Intelligence Is The Red-Herring Of AI

One of most contentious aspects of AI is the meaning of 'intelligence.' No one debates the meaning of the word 'strength,' or belittles the idea that machines can be stronger than human, or tries to re-define mechanical strength to mean some mysterious physico-spiritual capability unique to humans.

www.forbes.com

 

[Constance]

Curious claim is a failed joke..."artifice" --> "artificial" --> "artificer"... why are we so bigoted about the thinking machines we "create" when we are already machines that think? The further you dig down into any "living" being, the closer you get to a machine...what is DNA -- the most inorganic packet of information in terms of Carbon, Nitrogen, Hydrogen and Oxygen....

CNO cycle - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The difference is life {being-here, experience}.

Coincidence? (this is a cheap shot)

??

As far as the second...I hope so.

Why?

 

[Constance]

@USI Calgary says:

"Bigotry requires an objective equivalency to be ignored in favor of a subjective preference. It may be the case that on one level, electronic computers and humans can be seen as machines, but that equivalency may also be entirely superficial where consciousness is concerned. There is a vast difference between humans and electronic computers in terms of construction.

Therefore it may be the case that because of those differences, only the type of design and construction we find in humans and animals with similar brains can give rise to consciousness.

That sentence suggests that you believe in Intelligent Design, which I don't think you believe in. So then what or whom would be responsible, in your opinion, for the design and implementation of the evolving development of affectivity and awareness in living organisms from primordial cells to our species {and accordingly of all the species of life that might have evolved on other planets}?


You add: "Where consciousness is concerned, we cannot yet safely assume that electronic microchips are fully equivalent to biological systems."

Hardly. What research by computer scientists and biologists do you think would be necessary to make this assumption? And what are the grounds claimed by any researchers who entertain this claim seriously?

@smcder wrote:

The definitions "machine" and "organism/living being/person/individual" developed inextricably alongside one another.

The tacit agreement developed that science/technology/industry gets everything but the mind (or soul) which would be the province of the church - thus setting up the terms for philosophy of mind in the West. The gap supposedly is getting narrower and narrower but appears to me to be about the same width and centers exactly where @USI Calgary puts it: consciousness.

An interesting proposal. Alongside this, and as you well recognize, philosophy of mind in the East has not contemplated a similar proposition.

I've posted this before, and will try to find the reference, but early clockwork automata are central to this problem. The high technology of the ruling class - expensive because hand wrought by almost uniquely talented individuals - over time they were more broadly exhibited allowing the ruling class to show off their possessions. Interestingly, the life-like aspects of these automata (monkey see...monkey do) and the implicit message that living things were just complicated machines and the implicit message therein that we were also living things and so were also just complicated machines (less and less shielded by the breakdown in nearly universal faith) led to something unexpected ... revolution. Those fomenting revolt pointed out that if we are all machines, then the rulers are machines and thus without divine right ... and thus subject to revolt.

Alongside the more formal definitions are the connotations of machines as being "built by" "designed by" vs. organisms which evolved (or were created) being unable to repair or reproduce, and most importantly, incapable of independent thought and action which are all generally attributed to organisms and people. Individual identity and protections follow on for people (and quite arguably all "sentient" beings, which means, maybe slightly less arguably, all beings).

An interesting proposal, but I do not think that the history of challenges to and revolts against the power of the ruling classes were inspired by such abstract reasoning. Rather, humans sensed and saw -- i.e., understood within their own lived realities -- the innate injustice of suppression of the masses by princes and kings and their systems of manipulation and control.

So if there is a difference in machine and organism, a good place to look for it is in consciousness. If machines do ultimately show comparable qualities of thought to humans it could be:

1) on the basis of the above "limitations" (i.e. as designed and determined mechanisms or automata) then we will need to look at the above "human" qualities carefully (human rights and responsibilities, criminal culpability for example, in light of our status as machines)

or

2) on the basis of machines becoming more or less organisms, evolving in some fashion and leaving the question open, or we will show these outcomes in some other way, for example by showing humans are machines or can not be.

All of that, it seems to me, is a very open question, since there is no current explanation of consciousness. And if, as michaelalien may be saying, there never will be one, then we may never know if we are "machines". The ethical implications of that are obvious, aren't they? ;-)

The excellent film Blade Runner brings all these issues to the fore, and in doing so it illustrates our species' ability to anticipate the moral and ethical results of creating a race of androids whose intelligence demands that they be entitled to continuing existence, rather than their being destroyed in order to make use of more advanced models enslavement and irresponsibility. The larger environment presented in this film, where most biological species have been destroyed in the effort to produce a fully machined world in the interests of its capitalist oligarchs and controllers, is a major player in the imagined world of this film. Humans still living in this degraded world emptied of traces of the natural world they remember seek to purchase computerized replicants of species of life no longer living. We've discussed this film earlier in this forum. I think we might do so again to foreground the issues raised by the drive toward implementation of AI in our current world, issues that go much deeper than the computer scientists and the capitalists who support them have been able to recognize.

Re your identification of consciousness as the core issue, I agree that it is. You wrote: "All of that, it seems to me, is a very open question, since there is no current explanation of consciousness." I argue, by contrast, that we all know what consciousness is because we all experience it. Leading philosophers and scientists recognize this in our time, but have not yet come to confront the ways in which our native consciousness is devalued and even suppressed in our time. Our failure as a species is that we no longer understand what consciousness enables in our lived realities: an ethical approach to what our embodied consciousnesses recognize as needful in our times, the overcoming of the current negative dispositions and abuses of living beings such as ourselves and all the animals with whom we share a still living environment and world which we are on the cusp of destroying rather than working to preserve.

ETA: I meant to comment on this sentence above: "If machines do ultimately show comparable qualities of thought to humans it could be . . . ." Wasn't the title of the book on which Blade Runner was based Do Androids Dream of Electronic Sheep? Should we lose the world we've developed here to be replaced by machines who dream a pale copy of what we have known and cared for, compassionately, in person? Have we nearly lost all sense of the living context in which we have been able to develop the range of our philosophies?

 

[Randall]

That sentence suggests that you believe in Intelligent Design, which I don't think you believe. So then what or whom would be responsible, in your opinion, for the design and implementation of the evolving development of affectivity and awareness in living organisms from primordial cells to our species {and accordingly of all the species of life that might have evolved on other planets}?

I had the same thought as you about using the word "design", but was at a loss at that moment for a more neutral word. Perhaps the word "form" or "configuration" would have been more apropos. My thought was that the word "design" alone doesn't necessitate a "designer", as in "made by design" but doesn't rule it out either, and because the situation with consciousness might be either one ( depending on the situation ), the word "design" was fitting.

Example: A quote from Darwin's greatest discovery: Design without designer: "Darwin accepted that organisms are “designed” for certain purposes, that is, they are functionally organized." - SOURCE -

You add: "Where consciousness is concerned, we cannot yet safely assume that electronic microchips are fully equivalent to biological systems."

Hardly. What research by computer scientists and biologists do you think would be necessary to make this assumption? And what are the grounds claimed by any researchers who entertain this claim seriously?

I'm not sure of your question. The assumption is that, "We cannot yet safely assume ..." That is my position. I imagine there are others who would agree, but I don't have a list of researchers or their specific grounds for either agreeing or disagreeing. You already know my reasoning ?, so I suppose it could be compared to the reasoning of others who are doing related research e.g. A.I. and computational modeling of neural systems.

If this were possible, would consciousness be retained ?

 

[Constance]

I had the same thought as you about using the word "design", but was at a loss at that moment for a more neutral word. Perhaps the word "form" or "configuration" would have been more apropos. My thought was that the word "design" alone doesn't necessitate a "designer", as in "made by design" but doesn't rule it out either, and because the situation with consciousness might be either one ( depending on the situation ), the word "design" was fitting.

Example: A quote from Darwin's greatest discovery: Design without designer: "Darwin accepted that organisms are “designed” for certain purposes, that is, they are functionally organized." - SOURCE -

I'll just grab this paragraph from the article you link:

"Darwin accepted that organisms are “designed” for certain purposes, that is, they are functionally organized. Organisms are adapted to certain ways of life and their parts are adapted to perform certain functions. Fish are adapted to live in water, kidneys are designed to regulate the composition of blood, and the human hand is made for grasping. But Darwin went on to provide a natural explanation of the design. The seemingly purposeful aspects of living beings could now be explained, like the phenomena of the inanimate world, by the methods of science, as the result of natural laws manifested in natural processes."

And ask how the progressions of evolutionary physical changes in the evolution of species [fin to hand, as it were] 'explains' and overcomes 'the seemingly purposeful aspects of living beings'?

The human hand might have evolved for 'grasping' things, but the human mind also grasps things and others, grasps the depth of what-is that cannot be accounted for by physical laws, grasps the complexity of existence, and produces the situation in which we humans have to decide how to think and what to do with our aegis over all other living beings in our world.

Animals too express developing purposes in their evolving behaviors. None of this has been explained on the basis of purely physical laws. Nor do I think Darwin himself believed that his theory of natural selection would be capable of doing so. It seems to me that the scientific dogma that everything in our experienced lives can be 'explained' in physical terms, by the operation of 'natural laws, has become another dogma, one still escaping the challenges of empirical analysis and critical thought.

I'm not sure of your question. The assumption is that, "We cannot yet safely assume ..." That is my position. I imagine there are others who would agree, but I don't have a list of researchers or their specific grounds for either agreeing or disagreeing. You already know my reasoning ?, so I suppose it could be compared to the reasoning of others who are doing related research e.g. A.I. and computational modeling of neural systems.

My question concerns the assumption itself that consciousness and mind could be realized and develop in artificial computational platforms. 'We cannot yet safely assume etc.' Far from 'yet', in my opinion, and yet the race goes on to produce 'general artificial intelligence' that could obliterate the world we live in without regard to the safety of this too-well-funded enterprise.

​

 

[Constance]

For @Michael Allen: I offer the following two linked books so that you might appreciate the perspectives they provide on the demonstrable nature of lived being, of humans and of the species evolved here before our own.

The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (The MIT Press) 2nd Edition
Francisco Varela et al.

"A new edition of a classic work that originated the “embodied cognition” movement and was one of the first to link science and Buddhist practices.

This classic book, first published in 1991, was one of the first to propose the “embodied cognition” approach in cognitive science. It pioneered the connections between phenomenology and science and between Buddhist practices and science—claims that have since become highly influential. Through this cross-fertilization of disparate fields of study, The Embodied Mind introduced a new form of cognitive science called “enaction,” in which both the environment and first person experience are aspects of embodiment. However, enactive embodiment is not the grasping of an independent, outside world by a brain, a mind, or a self; rather it is the bringing forth of an interdependent world in and through embodied action. Although enacted cognition lacks an absolute foundation, the book shows how that does not lead to either experiential or philosophical nihilism. Above all, the book's arguments were powered by the conviction that the sciences of mind must encompass lived human experience and the possibilities for transformation inherent in human experience.

This revised edition includes substantive introductions by Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch that clarify central arguments of the work and discuss and evaluate subsequent research that has expanded on the themes of the book, including the renewed theoretical and practical interest in Buddhism and mindfulness. A preface by Jon Kabat-Zinn, the originator of the mindfulness-based stress reduction program, contextualizes the book and describes its influence on his life and work."

The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (The MIT Press) 2, Varela, Francisco J., Thompson, Evan, Rosch, Eleanor, Kabat-Zinn, Jon - Amazon.com


Mind in Life
Evan Thompson

"How is life related to the mind? Thompson explores this so-called explanatory gap between biological life and consciousness, drawing on sources as diverse as molecular biology, evolutionary theory, artificial life, complex systems theory, neuroscience, psychology, Continental Phenomenology, and analytic philosophy. Ultimately he shows that mind and life are more continuous than previously accepted, and that current explanations do not adequately address the myriad facets of the biology and phenomenology of mind."

Reviews:

"I think this book deserves close study, since it offers a holistic and dynamic perspective on how life and mind interact and how mind, body, and world form an inseparable unity...Thompson has written a book that for philosophers may give a new incentive to rethink and reconceptualize our place in the world that surpasses dualistic thinking. If that was the purpose of the book, it has succeeded. (Taede A. Smedes Metapsychology 2008-05-20)"

"The aim of Evan Thompson's Mind in Life is to suggest a new way forward in the long-running attempt to connect biological knowledge about how body and brain work with our phenomenological experience of life. The book is an impressive work of synthesis, drawing together an array of themes in biology, neuroscience, cognitive science, phenomenology, and consciousness studies...This is a highly impressive work, of considerable scope, importance, and originality. The book is not, nor does it claim to be, an easy read for a general audience: the fields of consciousness studies and phenomenology are replete with necessary jargon, and Mind in Life builds on decades of discovery and debate. On the other hand, the argument is accessible to nonspecialists willing to take the time, for Thompson presents complex ideas with commendable fluency. For philosophers of biology, as for cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind, Mind in Life is sure to become essential reading. (John C. Waller Isis 2008-12-01)"

"The book is a tremendous success and amounts to a superior contribution to recent and current debates in the philosophy of mind. Thompson displays a deeply impressive grasp of the relevant literature across a range of disciplines, including biology, phenomenology, psychology and neuroscience. Not only has he read widely, he has an admirable intellectual independence, and is confident of the arguments he wants to demonstrate and the direction he wants the sciences of the mind to take...One of the richest contributions to the study of "mind in life" in recent years. It deserves to become a major work of reference and inspiration for research in the immediate future and, indeed, for many years to come. It provides a genuine and far-reaching clarification of core issues in the philosophy and science of the mind, and is to be greatly welcomed. (Keith Ansell-Pearson Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2009-06-01)"

Mind in Life - Kindle edition by Thompson, Evan. Politics & Social Sciences Kindle eBooks @ Amazon.com.

 

[Randall]

... why are we so bigoted about the thinking machines we "create" when we are already machines that think?

If we could safely assume that a non-biological machine is only superficially different from a human, and not zimply a philosophical zombie, there would be no justification for not giving it the same sort of consideration as any sentient being. The problem is that we don't know that we can safely make that assumption, and we may never know.

 

[Michael Allen]

If we could safely assume that a non-biological machine is only superficially different from a human, and not zimply a philosophical zombie, there would be no justification for not giving it the same sort of consideration as any sentient being. The problem is that we don't know that we can safely make that assumption, and we may never know.

the p-zombie is nothing more than the imagined (i.e. negative) results of a silly turing test applied to ourselves.

 

[Randall]

the p-zombie is nothing more than the imagined (i.e. negative) results of a silly turing test applied to ourselves.

Handwaving and the use of pejoratives seems beneath a person of your intelligence. Maybe getting a bit cabin fevered? Here's a little light reading by a guy named Daniel Kostic ( see attachment ).

 

[Constance]

the p-zombie is nothing more than the imagined (i.e. negative) results of a silly turing test applied to ourselves.

 

[Randall]

Priceless

 

[Constance]

A whole lot more to think about . . .

The Cultural Evolution of Human Nature

 

[Randall]

A whole lot more to think about . . . The Cultural Evolution of Human Nature

Interesting, but I think we need to be careful not to equate cultural evolution with cultural improvement or superiority. For example if the Nazis had won the war, few of us today would think of that as a "cultural evolution", but the Nazis would no doubt have felt it fitting with their notion of superiority. Culture is dependent on socialization, which is a learned behavior. Biological evolution is very different. It isn't learned. It's encoded genetically, and it clashes constantly with our socialization.

 

[Constance]

Interesting, but I think we need to be careful not to equate cultural evolution with cultural improvement or superiority. For example if the Nazis had won the war, few of us today would think of that as a "cultural evolution", but the Nazis would no doubt have felt it fitting with their notion of superiority. Culture is dependent on socialization, which is a learned behavior. Biological evolution is very different. It isn't learned. It's encoded genetically, and it clashes constantly with our socialization.

This extract from the paper provides a good orientation to what the paper is about:

"... Cultural evolution proceeds much more quickly than genetic evolution, because individuals can change behaviours within one lifetime, and there is no need to wait for death or reproduction for the distribution of cultural traits to change. What is more, genetic and cultural evolution can interact; cultural adaptation can remove the pressure for genetic adaptation, and even change the adaptive environment to which genetic change responds...."

 

[Randall]

This extract from the paper provides a good orientation to what the paper is about:

"... Cultural evolution proceeds much more quickly than genetic evolution, because individuals can change behaviours within one lifetime, and there is no need to wait for death or reproduction for the distribution of cultural traits to change. What is more, genetic and cultural evolution can interact; cultural adaptation can remove the pressure for genetic adaptation, and even change the adaptive environment to which genetic change responds...."

Yes. This all seems rather straightforward. Why did it catch your attention? At the moment I'm trying to figure out the difference between more culturally evolved and more socialized. Right now I don't see the difference. If socialization ≠ cultural evolution, what is the difference?