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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 13

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I think your sketch captures those large penetrating oval eyes and the fluidity of his variable, loosely managed hair. And I think you capture a certain sensitivity in his eyes and face as a whole that show up in many videotapes of his lectures. I've seen photos of Dennet but not of Nagel. Will look him up.

Thank you. Sometimes he looks a bit haunted.

We are very, very good at recognizing faces. That means that only a few lines are needed to represent a face but it also means they have to be exactly right.

Al Hirschfeld was a caricaturist of famous people - the best part of his work is its minimalism:

Liza Minnelli:

liza.jpg

Lucy:

60a7dc3cd6216532e11ced85b904c838.jpg
Now, if you take even just a part of these drawings, for example:

60a7dc3cd6216532e11ced85b904c838.jpg


You'll find them almost as recognizable as the whole. Of course Lucy had a famous face, but even in cases where someone isn't as well known, catching something "signature" about them will prompt the viewer to fill in the details even if the overall picture isn't very accurate.

My favorites are of Sinatra ... this one is particularly good because it captures both the poise of the man when still and the way he moved:

sinatra arms.jpg
 
And again, again, again ... if consciousness is a post-construction, if it lags ... then it is not identical to the neural action at the time of events but of actions afterward and probably including other neurons.
You’re going to have to walk me through apparently. Not getting it.

“at the time of events?”

Are you asking if we move our hand away from the burner bc we feel pain? No, not in that instance. But that doesn’t mean there is a problem of mental causation.

there’s other reasons having a conscious experience of being a person who burns their hand can be adaptive. Again the spatiotemporal window.

if the hand gets burnt but the rest of the body (by way of a conscious memory of a self feeling pain) doesn’t experience it, then the body as a whole might allow it to happen again.
 
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Probably shouldn't use transcendent either. Also probably shouldn't say things like "the inferred objective process instantiating my subjective experience." at least not in mixed company.
Ha well there are more subjective terms and more objective terms that we can use. Of course no human terms are completely objective. That’s an oxymoron.
 
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This is where I think the language of simulation, etc. confuses. You perceive the world directly through the senses and you experience the world directly through whatever processses ... there is no extra layer of simulation as in the Matrix, where what was perceived/experienced was generated by computers. (hopefully)
Yes. But the mbp is confusing. No getting around it.

I’m not saying there isn’t a reality out there beyond our subjective experience. I haven’t been the one talking about matrices and what not.

if the consciousness arises from the body—as some of is belive—then that mean the process by which it does so will be beyond our subjective terms. Some of us seem to have a problem with talking about consciousness in non-personal terms. We start complaining about matrixes and what not. Can’t be helped. ?‍♂️
 
if the hand gets burnt but the rest of the body (by way of a conscious memory of a self feeling pain) doesn’t experience it, then the body as a whole might allow it to happen again.
But there’s two ways ( perspectives ) for talking about this.

one perspective - Neurons firings

Second perspective - a self feeling pain and moving hand
 
@smcder

I understand that this approach may be wrong. But I can’t add that disclaimer everyone I make a post. Also I understand that I can’t prove this approach is correct. Again with the disclaimer.

I am I believe making two moves. They are perhaps subtle ( or confusing ) but they are crucial. ( I don’t know which move to make first, or explain first. You can help me there. )

The mbp is the problem of how two apparent things, the mind and the body are related. Not only do there seem to be two things, mind and body, they seem to be radically different.

One move is to say that they are in fact one thing, and that they only seem to be two radically different things.

How can we make this move?

Take for instance, a car and a rabbit. Could we say that they seem to be two things but are in fact one thing? No.

so how can we say that mind and body are the same thing?

It has to do with the nature of the mind. The mind IS knowing/perceiving. It is the means with which we know and perceive.

The relation therefore between the mind and anything will be a special relationship, unique. Much different than the relation between a car and a rabbit, or any other physical things.

So the second move is to understand that the mbp is the problem of the process of knowing/perceiving, knowing/perceiving itself.

we don’t get that dynamic with a car and a rabbit.

How can they be the same? Because its a self-referential relationship.

Why do they seem different? Because knowing/perceiving is fundamentally a subjective process.
 
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The mbp has three elements that make it intractable:

1) Uniqueness. There is no other relationship like it.

2) Subjectivity. The inferential, limited, perspectival nature of ( human ) knowing.

3) Self-Reference. When a knowing/perceiving system turns its powers of knowing /perceiving on itself.
 
@smcder
I am I believe making two moves. They are perhaps subtle ( or confusing ) but they are crucial. ( I don’t know which move to make first, or explain first. You can help me there. )
The mbp is the problem of how two apparent things, the mind and the body are related. Not only do there seem to be two things, mind and body, they seem to be radically different.
One move is to say that they are in fact one thing, and that they only seem to be two radically different things.
How can we make this move?

I think we can do this by recognizing the layering of consciousness in its development from awareness and affectivity in prereflective consciousness toward degrees of reflective consciousness in which living, embodied, beings, animal or human, gradually make 'sense' {informative meaning} out of their prereflectively grounded experience in the world. And because inborn 'instincts' go only so far in enabling young animals to escape being eaten in infancy we see over the evolution of species the increasing teaching and modeling of behavior by the parents. The young, as any of us know from our child-rearing experience, do not automatically sense the dangers in their environing worlds, or indeed know how to find the sources of nutrition they need to survive. The birds, the squirrels, the rabbits, the bears, et al illustrate all of this in widely-observed detail, the parents demonstrating by their own reactions and behaviors which other birds and animals to fear and hide from, and what various sounds and signals signify, e.g., which bird calls signal the terror of an approaching predator, and which calls and songs are the expressions of their own tribe, and how to communicate with them in turn.

. . . how can we say that mind and body are the same thing?
It has to do with the nature of the mind. The mind IS knowing/perceiving. It is the means with which we know and perceive. So the second move is to understand that the mbp is the problem of the process of knowing/perceiving, knowing/perceiving itself.
How can they be the same? Because its a self-referential relationship.
Because knowing/perceiving is fundamentally a subjective process.

Just a cautionary objection that even in prereflection an animal's consciousness is aware of more than itself --i.e., in its awareness and affectivity the animal tacitly knows the self-referentiality of its own experiences, and It is aware simultaneously of the environing world in which it is embedded. I say this, obviously, to challenge the notion that the animal operates out of a 'self-model' existing in its neurons, neural nets, brain as a whole. The reality of the tangible environing world impinges on the living creature bodily as well as mentally in its first inchoate sensing of the things and qualities that touch it, the pleasures, comforts, and risks presented to it within its immediate situation.

I am enjoying your ruminations around the MPB, especially your thinking of a rabbit's 'subjective process' of knowing and perceiving'. You might like this poem by Stevens then. I like the way it evokes for us a sense of the inner awareness of a rabbit, its sensing both of what it must fear during daylight, when all is visible, and of the relief that comes to it in the protective darkness of nightfall, providing a feeling of transcendent release.


A Rabbit as King of the Ghosts
BY WALLACE STEVENS

"The difficulty to think at the end of day,
When the shapeless shadow covers the sun
And nothing is left except light on your fur—

There was the cat slopping its milk all day,
Fat cat, red tongue, green mind, white milk
And August the most peaceful month.

To be, in the grass, in the peacefullest time,
Without that monument of cat,
The cat forgotten in the moon;

And to feel that the light is a rabbit-light,
In which everything is meant for you
And nothing need be explained;

Then there is nothing to think of. It comes of itself;
And east rushes west and west rushes down,
No matter. The grass is full

And full of yourself. The trees around are for you,
The whole of the wideness of night is for you,
A self that touches all edges,

You become a self that fills the four corners of night.
The red cat hides away in the fur-light
And there you are humped high, humped up,

You are humped higher and higher, black as stone—
You sit with your head like a carving in space
And the little green cat is a bug in the grass."


Wallace Stevens, “A Rabbit as the King of Ghosts” from Collected Poems. Copyright 1954 by Wallace Stevens and copyright renewed 1982 by Holly Stevens. Used by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, an imprint of the Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. All rights reserved.
Source: The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens (Alfred A. Knopf, 1990)
  • THIS POEM APPEARS IN
Read Issue
 
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You’re going to have to walk me through apparently. Not getting it.

“at the time of events?”

Are you asking if we move our hand away from the burner bc we feel pain? No, not in that instance. But that doesn’t mean there is a problem of mental causation.

there’s other reasons having a conscious experience of being a person who burns their hand can be adaptive. Again the spatiotemporal window.

if the hand gets burnt but the rest of the body (by way of a conscious memory of a self feeling pain) doesn’t experience it, then the body as a whole might allow it to happen again.

Why does the memory have to be conscious?
 
Published in N. Depraz and D. Zahavi (eds.): Alterity and Facticity.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht,1998, 205-228.

Dan Zahavi, University of Copenhagen
"SELF-AWARENESS AND AFFECTION"

Extract: "...Reflective self-awareness is often taken to be a thematic, articulated and intensified self-awareness,16
and it is normally initiated in order to bring the primary intentional act into focus. However, in order to explain the occurrence of reflection it is necessary that that which is to be disclosed and thematized is (unthematically) conscious. Otherwise there would be nothing to motivate and call forth the act of reflection. This argumentation affirms the founded status of reflection: It presupposes pre-reflective self-awareness. But it also calls for a proper analysis of the very process of motivation.

In Husserl's analysis of the different layers of intentionality, one encounters an important distinction between activity and passivity. According to Husserl, we can find acts in which the subject is actively taking position; acts in which the subject is comparing, differentiating, judging, valuing, wishing or willing something. But, as Husserl points out: Whenever the subject is active, it is also passive, since to be active is to react to something.17
Every kind of active position-taking presupposes a preceding affection...."

https://www.academia.edu/9451298/Self-awareness_and_affection?email_work_card=title
 
Yes. But the mbp is confusing. No getting around it.

I’m not saying there isn’t a reality out there beyond our subjective experience. I haven’t been the one talking about matrices and what not.

if the consciousness arises from the body—as some of is belive—then that mean the process by which it does so will be beyond our subjective terms. Some of us seem to have a problem with talking about consciousness in non-personal terms. We start complaining about matrixes and what not. Can’t be helped. ?‍♂️

"if the consciousness arises from the body—as some of is belive—then that mean the process by which it does so will be beyond our subjective terms." Why? What does "subjective terms" mean? Spell out exactly what we can and can't know and why.
 
But there’s two ways ( perspectives ) for talking about this.

one perspective - Neurons firings

Second perspective - a self feeling pain and moving hand

Correct and it's the second perspective that needs a causal accounting. Also, apparently it takes time for the consciousness of the pain to be constructed, I think it likely that there is evidence that this "construction" isn't done by the pain neurons themselves, therefore there's not an identity between the actions of the pain neurons themeselves and the consciousness of pain - so pain isn't pain neurons firing, it's consciousness constructing neurons firing afterward, that separation raises causality issues.
 
Why does the memory have to be conscious?

A very good question. We know (from psychology and psychiatry) that many people carry troubling memories subconsciously, and that deep and lengthy psychoanalysis is often required to uncover them, bring them forward, so that they can be processed and resolved. This is especially necessary in cases in which an individual's memories are traumatic and repressed and yet have become expressed in troubling dysfunctional behaviors and dysfunctional emotions and ideations, disturbing mental health and life in general for the individual and those living close to him or her.
 
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Correct and it's the second perspective that needs a causal accounting. Also, apparently it takes time for the consciousness of the pain to be constructed, I think it likely that there is evidence that this "construction" isn't done by the pain neurons themselves, therefore there's not an identity between the actions of the pain neurons themeselves and the consciousness of pain - so pain isn't pain neurons firing, it's consciousness constructing neurons firing afterward, that separation raises causality issues.

Yes, exactly. I've actually taken this process further to hypothesize that it is lived experience in animals and ourselves, e.g., of occurrences and situations causing pain or panic or terror etc., that forges the development of neurons in the first place -- that it is the living creature's need to cope with its environing world that produces neural pathways and interconnections that can lay down memory enabling avoidance of risks, damages, etc.
 
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@smcder

I understand that this approach may be wrong. But I can’t add that disclaimer everyone I make a post. Also I understand that I can’t prove this approach is correct. Again with the disclaimer.

I am I believe making two moves. They are perhaps subtle ( or confusing ) but they are crucial. ( I don’t know which move to make first, or explain first. You can help me there. )

The mbp is the problem of how two apparent things, the mind and the body are related. Not only do there seem to be two things, mind and body, they seem to be radically different.

One move is to say that they are in fact one thing, and that they only seem to be two radically different things.

How can we make this move?

Take for instance, a car and a rabbit. Could we say that they seem to be two things but are in fact one thing? No.

so how can we say that mind and body are the same thing?

It has to do with the nature of the mind. The mind IS knowing/perceiving. It is the means with which we know and perceive.

The relation therefore between the mind and anything will be a special relationship, unique. Much different than the relation between a car and a rabbit, or any other physical things.

So the second move is to understand that the mbp is the problem of the process of knowing/perceiving, knowing/perceiving itself.

we don’t get that dynamic with a car and a rabbit.

How can they be the same? Because its a self-referential relationship.

Why do they seem different? Because knowing/perceiving is fundamentally a subjective process.

1. I don't think we can assume the mbp is a natural problem - rather, it's situated in a long intellectual and cultural history. So it's not necessarily apparent that the mind and body are radically different - in fact, that may be less apparent even to younger researchers working today, not to mention other cultures - I think from strictly what we know scientifically, any of a number of views of consciousness could be held.

As we've discussed in this forum, it's not clear that people have always clearly differentiated the subjective and objective - it's fascinating that even with what seem almost alien conceptions of "the interface" (in the case of the Greeks that the gods caused certain unexpected passions and actions) I assume that people went about their everyday lives not mixing up their identities with others, even in cases where the sense of self as we know it, might have been practically non-existent. So, on the one hand that diminishes the internal/external problem (we designate subjective and objective as opposites, but one may just be looking out and the other, looking in) but also dissociates phenomenal experience and cognitive phenomenology (there is something it is like to have an idea) from the "interface" and everyday control of an organism.

It may also be that the consciousness involved in representation and control is fairly rudimentary (biologically cheap) and the rest of it is just extra space - but there again, causality comes into it - because we regularly turn the most abstract of ideas into art, for example.

2. I think something in the concept cloud of consciousness/representation theorists that you refer to has explanatory power. - but conscious experience is still to be justified in biological / evolutionary terms - and that means sorting out if consciousness as representation is in fact an advantage, you could do that perhaps before you knew how it worked - that its simpler to be conscious and feel pain than it is to have some non-conscious network of neurons - but that raises the causality problem, or at the very least it has to be shown that the pain (and joy) themselves, phenomenal consciousness in and of itself, is worth it - and is not just "that's the way it is" because it's very hard to show "that's the way it is". We at least always think we can learn a little more.

3. We also can't assume because it evolved that it is strictly speaking necessary or useful or efficient - in the case of humans, the jury could still be ot - a little consciousness could be enough - or big brains might be sexy, like 200lb antlers a way of saying, look I am burdened with all of this IQ but I can still kick butt ... of course the environment is the other half of that equation, biology produces variants, the environment then determines what is selected (survive and reproduce) so maybe somewhere consciousness has evolved way beyond what it might ever here and some speculate perhaps a human ancestor had more brains than we did ...

4. (and most importantly) I don't know.
 
The mbp is the problem of how two apparent things, the mind and the body are related.
That's one of those nonspecific "how" type questions that without further context can only be answered superficially. For example:

Q. How is the mind and the body related?
A. Wonderfully!

We can dig a little deeper by identifying the specific contexts associated with "how" type questions. There are at least four such contexts:
  1. In what way: In what way are minds and bodies related?
  2. To what extent: To what extent are minds and bodies related?
  3. What something is like: What is the relationship between minds and bodies like?
  4. Exclamatory: e.g. How mysterious minds and bodies are!
But even with some specificity, we are still left with a largely superficial set of possible answers.
How can we say that mind and body are the same thing?
Another "how" type question ( above ). One might answer it by simple declaration:

Q. How can we say that mind and body are the same thing?​
A. We can say that mind and body are the same thing by simply declaring it to be the case.​

These sorts of answers may seem glib, but they are not. They reveal that if want deeper answers then we need to take a more meaningful approach. What seems to be needed here is a refinement of the MBP. Perhaps we might suggest something like this:

The Mind-Body Problem is the task of creating an accurate fine grained description of the association between minds and bodies.​

By framing the "problem" as above, we can generate more meaningful tasks that lead to more meaningful insights e.g.
  1. Define the word "mind" in the context of this discussion.
  2. Define the word "body" in the context of this discussion.
  3. Describe in detail the form and function of each.
  4. Describe in detail the interaction of minds and bodies with each other and the surrounding environment.
This approach might actually get the seeker someplace beyond the dead-ends ( or never-ends ) of "how" and "why" type questions. That of course assumes that the seeker actually wants to get beyond them. Past efforts have not met with much success.
 
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That's one of those nonspecific "how" type questions that without further context can only be answered superficially. For example:

Q. How is the mind and the body related?
A. Wonderfully!

We can dig a little deeper by identifying the specific contexts associated with "how" type questions. There are at least four such contexts:
  1. In what way: In what way are minds and bodies related?
  2. To what extent: To what extent are minds and bodies related?
  3. What something is like: What is the relationship between minds and bodies like?
  4. Exclamatory: e.g. How mysterious minds and bodies are!
But even with some specificity, we are still left with a largely superficial set of possible answers.

Another "how" type question. One might answer it by simple declaration:

Q. How can we say that mind and body are the same thing?​
A. We can say that mind and body are the same thing by simply declaring it to be the case.​

These sorts of answers may seem glib, but they are not. They reveal that if want deeper answers then we need to take a more meaningful approach. In this search for a deeper understanding of the question, precision is of paramount importance. What seems to be needed here is a refinement of the MBP. Perhaps we might suggest something like this:

The Mind-Body Problem is the task of creating an accurate fine grained description of the association between minds and bodies.​

By framing the "problem" as above, we can generate more meaningful tasks that lead to more meaningful insights e.g.
  1. Define the word "mind" in the context of this discussion.
  2. Define the word "body" in the context of this discussion.
  3. Describe in detail the form and function of each.
  4. Describe in detail the interaction of each with each other and the surrounding environment.
This approach might actually get the seeker someplace beyond superficial "how" and "why" type questions.

I think we've been doing that throughout this thread - but I'll bite ... what are your answers to these four questions? I need 500 words on my desk by 8a.m.
 
That's one of those nonspecific "how" type questions that without further context can only be answered superficially. For example:

Q. How is the mind and the body related?
A. Wonderfully!

We can dig a little deeper by identifying the specific contexts associated with "how" type questions. There are at least four such contexts:
  1. In what way: In what way are minds and bodies related?
  2. To what extent: To what extent are minds and bodies related?
  3. What something is like: What is the relationship between minds and bodies like?
  4. Exclamatory: e.g. How mysterious minds and bodies are!
But even with some specificity, we are still left with a largely superficial set of possible answers.

Another "how" type question. One might answer it by simple declaration:

Q. How can we say that mind and body are the same thing?​
A. We can say that mind and body are the same thing by simply declaring it to be the case.​

These sorts of answers may seem glib, but they are not. They reveal that if want deeper answers then we need to take a more meaningful approach. In this search for a deeper understanding of the question, precision is of paramount importance. What seems to be needed here is a refinement of the MBP. Perhaps we might suggest something like this:

The Mind-Body Problem is the task of creating an accurate fine grained description of the association between minds and bodies.​

By framing the "problem" as above, we can generate more meaningful tasks that lead to more meaningful insights e.g.
  1. Define the word "mind" in the context of this discussion.
  2. Define the word "body" in the context of this discussion.
  3. Describe in detail the form and function of each.
  4. Describe in detail the interaction of minds and bodies with each other and the surrounding environment.
This approach might actually get the seeker someplace beyond the dead-ends ( or never-ends ) of "how" and "why" type questions.

I would say it's not non-specific - because it appears in this thread. If we had to set up the context for every post ...
 
That's one of those nonspecific "how" type questions that without further context can only be answered superficially. For example:

Q. How is the mind and the body related?
A. Wonderfully!

We can dig a little deeper by identifying the specific contexts associated with "how" type questions. There are at least four such contexts:
  1. In what way: In what way are minds and bodies related?
  2. To what extent: To what extent are minds and bodies related?
  3. What something is like: What is the relationship between minds and bodies like?
  4. Exclamatory: e.g. How mysterious minds and bodies are!
But even with some specificity, we are still left with a largely superficial set of possible answers.

Another "how" type question ( above ). One might answer it by simple declaration:

Q. How can we say that mind and body are the same thing?​
A. We can say that mind and body are the same thing by simply declaring it to be the case.​

These sorts of answers may seem glib, but they are not. They reveal that if want deeper answers then we need to take a more meaningful approach. What seems to be needed here is a refinement of the MBP. Perhaps we might suggest something like this:

The Mind-Body Problem is the task of creating an accurate fine grained description of the association between minds and bodies.​

By framing the "problem" as above, we can generate more meaningful tasks that lead to more meaningful insights e.g.
  1. Define the word "mind" in the context of this discussion.
  2. Define the word "body" in the context of this discussion.
  3. Describe in detail the form and function of each.
  4. Describe in detail the interaction of minds and bodies with each other and the surrounding environment.
This approach might actually get the seeker someplace beyond the dead-ends ( or never-ends ) of "how" and "why" type questions.

"What seems to be needed here is a refinement of the MBP." one might also look at how the mind body problem has been defined in the literature.
 
"What seems to be needed here is a refinement of the MBP." one might also look at how the mind body problem has been defined in the literature.
One might indeed look at how the mind body problem has been defined in the literature. And I think it's safe to say we've both done that, and so has @Soupie, and that we might all agree that there are a number of ways it has been defined, resulting in potential conflicts in interpretation depending on the way that they have been formulated, leading to the problem at hand, and the proposed solution.

So now we can choose to move backward ( rinse and repeat ad infinitum ) or move forward. Let me know when you guys want to do the latter. Right now we're just spinning our wheels. Thankfully @Constance breaks the monotony with some poetry or music now and then.
 
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