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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 13

Free episodes:

New Paper:
Causation and Information: Where is Biological Meaning to be Found?
pw: 3musketeers

@Pharoah, I'm still having problems accessing this paper. I'm using the pw you supplied. Eager to read it.

ETA, also cannot access the second paper, "Advancements in the Evolution of Human Capacities to Know." Equally eager to read this one.

ps, also love your Bach G minor performance. :)
 
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@Pharoah Something I would like to clear-up in my mind about your paper is when you say the following:
  1. The qualitative ascription to the physical is fundamentally biochemical not neurological in foundation.
  2. And is present in the very simplest of life forms.
Phrases like "qualitative ascription" suggest an imparting of subjective values by a third party onto the subject ( the "life form" in question ). So yes, the simplest life forms can have "ascribed qualities" because we as more complex beings have ascribed them. But that is an entirely separate context from asserting that by virtue of an organism's existence, it has its own qualitative experience. Can you please help me clear this up?

Also, the claim that "The qualitative ascription to the physical is fundamentally biochemical and not neurological in foundation" seems to suggest that a neurological foundation is not biochemical, when in point of fact, it is. Yes there is also an electrical component, but it is bioelectrochemical. So this part needs to be smoothed out.

I might take it that you meant to separate neurological processes from non-neurological processes. If that's what you were getting at, then it might be better stated as: "The qualitative ascription to the physical is non-neurological."

However that still doesn't resolve the issue of who or what is doing the "ascribing" of the "qualitative". Again, that seems to be a notion that is being imparted upon the subject by a third party who experiences the "qualitative".

Can you help me clear these issues up?
 
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Why not just upload it here as an attachment? Much simpler all 'round.

Randall, these are new papers by @Pharoah not yet offered to journals for publication. Like other accomplished scholars, Pharoah does not want to distribute them online until they appear online through links to the journals that publish them.
 
Randall, these are new papers by @Pharoah not yet offered to journals for publication. Like other accomplished scholars, Pharoah does not want to distribute them online until they appear online through links to the journals that publish them.
If @Pharoah wants to share them with anyone here privately, he could simply start a private conversation, upload it there, and only invite who he wanted into the conversation. Just trying to simplify the process. It's not like they're classified rocket blueprints, and he always retains copyright. Besides, if he wants into some elite philosophical club ( I can't imagine why anyone would actually want that ), I'm not so sure this is the place to be looking :p
 
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If @Pharoah wants to share them with anyone here privately, he could simply start a private conversation, upload it there, and only invite who he wanted into the conversation. Just trying to simplify the process. It's not like they're classified rocket blueprints, and he always retains copyright. Besides, if he wants into some elite philosophical club ( I can't imagine why anyone would actually want that ), I'm not so sure this is the place to be looking :p

Having a bad day there, were you, Randall? :D
 
Nature: Can lab-grown brains become conscious?

A handful of experiments are raising questions about whether clumps of cells and disembodied brains could be sentient, and how scientists would know if they were. By Sara Reardon

Extract: ". . .The concerns over lab-grown brains have also highlighted a blind spot: neuroscientists have no agreed way to define and measure consciousness. Without a working definition, ethicists worry that it will be impossible to stop an experiment before it crosses a line."

https://media.nature.com/original/magazine-assets/d41586-020-02986-y/d41586-020-02986-y.pdf
 
Having a bad day there, were you, Randall? :D
Actually, I've had a few challenges lately, but nothing to do with the forum. For the file downloads, I was just offering an easy and private sharing solution for forum members. But if they prefer something more involved, that's their choice.
 

Attachments

Take a break from the election and the pandemic with this delightful paper by Galen Strawson having his fun-loving rhetorical way with the giants of early modern Analytic Philosophy --

PhilGuide-01a.jpg
What I find most amazing is that people can become intellectual icons for their position on the above.
This makes me wonder: Do UFO witnesses directly perceive objects?
Or are they only perceiving an idea?​
 
Here is late paper by David Bohm that I've just come across and post because it can add, in its clarity, to our discussions of a wide range of theories of consciousness we have discussed these last four years.




A new theory of the relationship of mind and matter
DAVID BOHM
[Reprinted From: PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL. 3, NO. 2, 1990, pp. 271-286.]
small_bohm.gif

Department of Theoretical Physics, Birkbeck College, University of London, Malet St, London WC1E 7HX, United Kingdom


ABSTRACT: The relationship of mind and matter is approached in a new way in this article. This approach is based on the causal interpretation of the quantum theory, in which an electron, for example, is regarded as an inseparable union of a particle and afield. This field has, however, some new properties that can be seen to be the main sources of the differences between the quantum theory and the classical (Newtonian) theory. These new properties suggest that the field may be regarded as containing objective and active information, and that the activity of this information is similar in certain key ways to the activity of information in our ordinary subjective experience. The analogy between mind and matter is thus fairly close. This analogy leads to the proposal of the general outlines of a new theory of mind, matter, and their relationship, in which the basic notion is participation rather than interaction. Although the theory, can be developed mathematically in more detail the main emphasis here is to show qualitatively how it provides a way of thinking that does not divide mind from matter, and thus leads to a more coherent understanding of such questions than is possible in the common dualistic and reductionistic approaches. These ideas may be relevant to connectionist theories and might perhaps suggest new directions for their development.





"1 Introduction

This article discusses some ideas aimed at bringing together the physical and mental sides of reality. It is concerned mainly with giving the general outlines of a new way of thinking, consistent with modern physics, which does not divide mind from matter, the observer from the observed, the subject from the object. What is described here is, however, only the beginning of such a way of thinking which, it is hoped, can be developed a great deal further.

The problem of the relationship of mental and physical sides of reality has long been a key one, especially in Western philosophy. Descartes gave a particularly clear formulation of the essential difficulties when he considered matter as extended substance (i.e. as occupying space) while mind was regarded as thinking substance (which clearly does not occupy space). He pointed out that in mind, there can be clear and distinct thoughts that correspond in content to distinct objects that are separated in space. But these thoughts are not in themselves actually located in separate regions of space, nor do they seem to be anything like separate material objects in other ways. It appears that the natures of mind and matter are so different that one can see no basis for a relationship between them. This point was put very clearly by Descartes (see Cottingham, 1986) when he said that there is nothing included in the concept of body that belongs to mind, and nothing in that of mind that belongs to body. Yet, experience shows that they are closely related.

Descartes solved the problem by assuming that God, who created both mind and matter is able to relate them by putting into the minds of human beings the clear and distinct thoughts that are needed to deal with matter as extended substance. It was of course also implied by Descartes that the aims contained in thoughts had somehow to be carried out by the body, even though he asserted that thought and the body had no domain in common. It would seem (as was indeed suggested at the time by Malebranche) that nothing is left but to appeal to God to arrange the desired action somehow. However, since that time, such an appeal to the action of God has generally ceased to be accepted as a valid philosophical argument. But this leaves us with no explanation of how mind and matter are related.

This article aims at the development of a different approach to this question, which permits of an intelligible relationship between mind and matter without reducing one to nothing but a function or aspect of the other (such reduction commonly takes the forms of materialism which reduces mind, for example, to an 'epiphenomenon' having no real effect on matter, and of idealism, which reduces matter to some kind of thought, for example, in the mind of God).

The new approach described in this article is made possible from the side of matter by the quantum theory, which is currently the most basic theory of the nature of matter that we have. Certain philosophers of mind (see, e.g. Haugeland, 1981, ch. 1) would criticize bringing physics into the study of mind. In this way, because they assume mind to be of such a different (and perhaps emergent) quality that physics is not relevant to it (even though they also assume that mind has a material base in the brain). Such criticisms are inspired, in large part, by the belief that physics is restricted to a classical Newtonian form, which in essence ultimately reduces everything to a mechanism of some kind. However, as will be explained in more detail later, the quantum theory, which is now basic, implies that the particles of physics have certain primitive mind-like qualities which are not possible in terms of Newtonian concepts (though, of course, they do not have consciousness). This means that on the basis of modern physics even inanimate matter cannot be fully understood in terms of Descartes' notion that it is nothing but a substance occupying space and constituted of separate objects. Vice versa, It will be argued that mind can be seen to have always a physical aspect, though this may be very subtle. Thus, we are led to the possibility of a real relationship between the two, because they never have the absolute distinction of basic qualities, that was assumed by Descartes and by others, such as the emergent materialists.

The way is thus now opened to see the possible relevance of physics in this context. This is because the quantum theory denies the mechanistic (Newtonian) conceptual framework which has thus far implicitly justified the notion that mind is of such a nature that it can have absolutely nothing to do with the laws of matter. Moreover, though those new qualities of matter have been established at the fundamental level of particle physics, we shall indicate in a later section how it may be possible for them to become operative at higher levels of organization such as that of brain and nervous system.

2 The implicate order and the quantum theory . . . ."

http://www.peterdebruin.net/BOHM/BOHM.htm
 
@Pharoah Something I would like to clear-up in my mind about your paper is when you say the following:
  1. The qualitative ascription to the physical is fundamentally biochemical not neurological in foundation.
  2. And is present in the very simplest of life forms.
Phrases like "qualitative ascription" suggest an imparting of subjective values by a third party onto the subject ( the "life form" in question ). So yes, the simplest life forms can have "ascribed qualities" because we as more complex beings have ascribed them. But that is an entirely separate context from asserting that by virtue of an organism's existence, it has its own qualitative experience. Can you please help me clear this up?

Also, the claim that "The qualitative ascription to the physical is fundamentally biochemical and not neurological in foundation" seems to suggest that a neurological foundation is not biochemical, when in point of fact, it is. Yes there is also an electrical component, but it is bioelectrochemical. So this part needs to be smoothed out.

I might take it that you meant to separate neurological processes from non-neurological processes. If that's what you were getting at, then it might be better stated as: "The qualitative ascription to the physical is non-neurological."

However that still doesn't resolve the issue of who or what is doing the "ascribing" of the "qualitative". Again, that seems to be a notion that is being imparted upon the subject by a third party who experiences the "qualitative".

Can you help me clear these issues up?
@Randall
Sorry I haven't got back to this sooner...
I think that the section on qualitative assimilation is the hardest to groke. I am thinking of drafting a paper exclusively on this.
1. Qualitative ascription is not a third party ascription. Rather, what I am saying is that an organism (even of the very simplest of form) ascribes to its physical world qualitative differentiation: it does the ascription and behaviours accordingly.
There is ample evidence that this happens in unicellular organisms that have no nervous system. Most notably consider the presence and function of ocelloids in Warnowiids:
Molecular phylogeny of ocelloid-bearing dinoflagellates… Hoppenrath, Bachavroff, Hand, Delwiche, Leander
Reflective Properties of Different Eyespot Types in Dinoflagellates: Kreimer
2. Yes: Neural mechanisms are biochemical. But what I am saying is that qualitative assimilation is not reliant on the 'computational' function that you get from neural networks. The concept behind the question, what is the 'neural correlate of consciousness'?, is erroneous because it presupposes that the neural network, in some way, is the foundational mechanism underlying consciousness. What I am saying alternatively is that the foundation of qualitative ascription is biochemical; the neural network then works off this foundation (after all consciousness is fundamentally qualitative, so they say). The paper I have linked above makes this seem more obvious and intuitively correct, I think.
 
It's a copyright thing... until it gets published, I would rather it remain among a select group.
Like I was saying to @Constance, you can create a select group here by starting a conversation, inviting select members, and attaching files in messages there. Just hover over the avatar of who you want to start the conversation with, and then select the "Start Conversation" link. Super easy.
 
@Randall
Sorry I haven't got back to this sooner...
I think that the section on qualitative assimilation is the hardest to groke.
I'm not so sure it's necessarily hard to grok. It seems to be more a matter of being sure what you mean when you use the words "qualitative" and "ascribe". For example, unless you have your own particular definition for the word "ascribe", ascribing is done through attribution as opposed to simply being something intrinsic. In other words, the attribution ( ascription ) of hardness for stone is not ascribed by the stone. It is ascribed by those who study stones.
I am thinking of drafting a paper exclusively on this.
That might be a good idea. Or at least, if we cannot clarify it here using other terminology, then a preamble or orientation on your specialized version might be helpful. In the meantime, let's explore this a little further so that we can get on the same page.
1. Qualitative ascription is not a third party ascription. Rather, what I am saying is that an organism (even of the very simplest of form) ascribes to its physical world qualitative differentiation: it does the ascription and behaviours accordingly.
Now were complicating the concept of ascription by adding the state of being qualitative. So not only do we need to clarify what is meant by "ascription", we also need to clarify what is meant by "qualitative". Using the example of stones again, the attribution ( ascription ) of hardness ( a qualitative property ) is not ascribed by stones, because stones have no means by which their qualitative property can be detected, let alone appreciated enough to ascribe it any meaning. It can only be ascribed by those who study stones.

Similarly, unless an organism can detect and appreciate the concept of the "qualitative" property in question, it has no means by which it can ascribe it a "qualitative" property or value.
There is ample evidence that this happens in unicellular organisms that have no nervous system. Most notably consider the presence and function of ocelloids in Warnowiids:
Molecular phylogeny of ocelloid-bearing dinoflagellates… Hoppenrath, Bachavroff, Hand, Delwiche, Leander
Reflective Properties of Different Eyespot Types in Dinoflagellates: Kreimer
In the example of phytoplankton, there may be a means of detection for light, but even using the word "detect" may be going too far. It may only be a simple reception-reaction situation. Either way, there is no evidence that phytoplankton can assign ( ascribe ) any "qualitative" properties or meaning to their situation or themselves, just like a solar cell receives light, but it doesn't "ascribe" any "qualitative" properties to itself.

Qualitative properties are by their nature abstract, and therefore only entities capable of abstract thought are capable of ascribing qualitative properties. Given that all evidence suggests that abstract thought requires a sufficiently complex brain, logically, only life forms with complex brains are capable of ascribing qualitative properties.

So the situation with phytoplankton is most probably more like little nanobots ( clockwork oranges ) than sentient life forms capable of ascribing "qualitative" content to themselves or their situation.
2. Yes: Neural mechanisms are biochemical. But what I am saying is that qualitative assimilation is not reliant on the 'computational' function that you get from neural networks.
That is a very good point of distinction, and I tend to agree that computational power has nothing to do with the presence of consciousness. However it would certainly be of relevance to any network that were conscious. The question is how can we know any network is self-aware?


The concept behind the question, what is the 'neural correlate of consciousness'?, is erroneous because it presupposes that the neural network, in some way, is the foundational mechanism underlying consciousness.
To get to the heart of that issue we'd need to define what we mean by, "the foundational mechanism underlying consciousness". There is more than one way to interpret and answer that question, and therefore, without being precise about its meaning, the answer we might give might not be in context with the intent of the question.
What I am saying alternatively is that the foundation of qualitative ascription is biochemical; the neural network then works off this foundation (after all consciousness is fundamentally qualitative, so they say). The paper I have linked above makes this seem more obvious and intuitively correct, I think.
Hmm. Let's distill things further. If we use typical dictionary definitions of the words used, then it would be more accurate to say that the foundation for qualitative ascription is consciousness itself. This is essentially the same as saying that consciousness is the foundation for qualia, which is a widely accepted philosophical position.

The problem with saying that "the foundation of qualitative ascription is biochemical" is that it is simply using another material correlate. How this situation distills down, is that whether the correlate is a neuron or a molecule, an atom, or a particle, whatever the case may be, we are always left with the question of what and how the property of consciousness is imparted upon, or associated with, the material in question.

This situation is the essence of the HPC, and why I keep coming back to the idea that there can be no answer, and by extension, any theory that attempts to solve the HPC only reflects a lack of insight about the question itself. I know that this is a contentious view, but I have yet to see anyone offer counterpoint sufficient to compel a change in my position.

And to be clear, those who are critical of my position ( you know who you are out there ) - need to do better than simply declaring that I'm wrong or don't understand the problem.
 
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This situation is the essence of the HPC, and why I keep coming back to the idea that there can be no answer, and by extension, any theory that attempts to solve the HPC only reflects a lack of insight about the question itself. I know that this is a contentious view, but I have yet to see anyone offer counterpoint sufficient to compel a change in my position.

And to be clear, those who are critical of my position ( you know who you are out there ) - need to do better than simply declaring that I'm wrong or don't understand the problem.
Randall, I don’t even know what your position is. And I bet you don’t either. It has evolved so many times in this discussion. Which by the way is fine. But also the reason why you needn’t be so abrasive when you argue your points. Some humility goes a long way.

No, the HP is not meant to be a riddle or prove some point. It’s merely pointing out that explaining how matter (mechanistic processes) might cause consciousness is a uniquely hard problem.

I don’t think people are dopes for trying to explain how consciousness might be mechanistic. Taking the HP head on.

However I have been persuaded by the HP to pursue other “resolutions” of the HP. Something I don’t believe you have done.

That is, unless I’m mistaken (and you can certainly enlighten me) you DO believe that matter (mechanistic processes) causes consciousness.

I do NOT believe that matter causes consciousness.

I believe that phenomenal consciousness and matter do have an intimate relationship but that it is NOT a causal relationship.

Re @Pharoah ‘s work: the issue you identifying is the same that @smcder and I identified some years ago. Which is to take nothing away from Pharoah’s work. However it simply highlights what was said above: providing a mechanistic explain of phenomenal consciousness is “hard.”
 
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