Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 13

[Constance]

I'm still seeing a lot of "how", "why" and fully "account" or "explain" type questions when by now it should be evident that none of those types of questions or lines of inquiry can be answered more than superficially for any subject, including consciousness. We may not be able to provide verifiably accurate descriptions of consciousness either, but at least developing a descriptive model that fits the apparent situation is more practical than dwelling on unanswerable or only superficially answerable "why" or "how" type questions.

Then again, who needs to be practical all the time. We can remain as children who ask, "Why is the sky blue" and continue asking why for every answer given, ad infinitum. If the meta-problem of consciousness is valid, so is the meta-meta-problem, and the meta-meta-meta-problem, and the meta-meta-meta-meta ... etc. If that's the sort of thing that brings us some sense of joy or satisfaction, does it really matter whether or not it's also pointless? The HPC is equally as pointless ( as I've said from the start ), at least with the respect to the question it poses, but it has also been motivational.

So pursuit of the hard questions and hard problems is juvenile?

 

[smcder]

Then again, who needs to be practical all the time. We can remain as children who ask, "Why is the sky blue" and continue asking why for every answer given, ad infinitum. If the meta-problem of consciousness is valid, so is the meta-meta-problem, and the meta-meta-meta-problem, and the meta-meta-meta-meta ... etc. If that's the sort of thing that brings us some sense of joy or satisfaction, does it really matter whether or not it's also pointless? The HPC is equally as pointless ( as I've said from the start ), at least with the respect to the question it poses, but it has also been motivational.

Phrase the questions however you like. What we want for any mystery is the same kind of superficial answers for questions about them as we have for questions about less mysterious things.

 

[Constance]

This is where Bach’s little saying comes into play.

Consciousness is an interface. It’s how an organism comprised of billions of cells and dozens of organs and multiple systems and layers of organization acts as a unified whole. Because it’s not a unified whole, but it needs to act like one.

Consciousness might function as an 'interface' between the physical and the mental, but what else is it? What does it enable in terms of creativity in thinking and acting in the world, building in Heidegger's sense, and expression in all the human arts? What has it enabled in the known history of our species and in other species of life preceding us? Why jettison all of that in order to conceive a 'model' that reduces us to automata?

 

[smcder]

I had not seen the paper by Humphries ( or bookmarked it for reading later ). Looks really good.

Re why do we need the experience of pain.

This is where Bach’s little saying comes into play.

Consciousness is an interface. It’s how an organism comprised of billions of cells and dozens of organs and multiple systems and layers of organization acts as a unified whole. Because it’s not a unified whole, but it needs to act like one.

So there is no phenomenal experience inside the organism. We look inside it body Anne brain and we will see no phenomenal consciousness. Is it a zombie?

As the organism has evolved in all its complexity, an organ has evolved that enables the multifaceted organism to perceive the world and itself from the perspective of a single, unified entity, or self/subject.

the organ is the brain and it embodies an interface/model/map/Umwelt of the world and itself.

objectively, we see/know ions, cells, cortices. However, subjectively—to the self/subject being instantiated by the brain—the self is the conscious experience of the world from a unified perspective.

You can’t have a unified self-experience of the world without experience. Phenomenal consciousness is the intrinsic nature of conscious experience. And conscious experience is an interface that evolved bc it allows the organism to navigate the world, it’s adaptive.

Why do you need a unified self-experience? There is presumably a physical connection in terms of the nervous system that produces pain and coordinates the response of the organism. In cases of reflex action, this happens locally before the signal gets to the brain the hand is pulled away. And in any case it seems to be that consciousness is constructed afterward. Now that experience should also be instantiated in the nervous system (so the theory goes) and any learning from past experience can then be worked out neurally with the experience itself being irrelevant. If this is not the case, if experience itself is needed to coordinate the organism then the experience itself has to be causal, not the action of the nerves. The phenomenal feeling of pain has to be causal, not just the action of the nerves. That's a problem for any kind of substance/stuffy view, not just physicalism.

 

[smcder]

Consciousness might function as an 'interface' between the physical and the mental, but what else is it? What does it enable in terms of creativity in thinking and acting in the world, building in Heidegger's sense, and expression in all the human arts? What has it enabled in the known history of our species and in other species of life preceding us? Why jettison all of that in order to conceive a 'model' that reduces us to automata?

Right.

 

[Randall]

Phrase the questions however you like. What we want for any mystery is the same kind of superficial answers for questions about them as we have for questions about less mysterious things.

True. And those answers are the "easy answers".

Q. Why should there be any experience of what it's like to be in the world?
A. There should be an experience of what it's like to be in the world because such experiences aid in our survival as a species.

Now you can go ahead and ask any number of other "why" type questions for that, ultimately getting nowhere, but perhaps having some intellectual fun doing so. Or you could also take an approach that would facilitate a detailed description of experiences in the world as they relate to each other, and other things we have already described. @Constance is already on this path in her fascination with phenomenology.

 

[Randall]

So pursuit of the hard questions and hard problems is juvenile?

See this post: #346 ( above )

 

[smcder]

I had not seen the paper by Humphries ( or bookmarked it for reading later ). Looks really good.

Re why do we need the experience of pain.

This is where Bach’s little saying comes into play.

Consciousness is an interface. It’s how an organism comprised of billions of cells and dozens of organs and multiple systems and layers of organization acts as a unified whole. Because it’s not a unified whole, but it needs to act like one.

So there is no phenomenal experience inside the organism. We look inside it body Anne brain and we will see no phenomenal consciousness. Is it a zombie?

As the organism has evolved in all its complexity, an organ has evolved that enables the multifaceted organism to perceive the world and itself from the perspective of a single, unified entity, or self/subject.

the organ is the brain and it embodies an interface/model/map/Umwelt of the world and itself.

objectively, we see/know ions, cells, cortices. However, subjectively—to the self/subject being instantiated by the brain—the self is the conscious experience of the world from a unified perspective.

You can’t have a unified self-experience of the world without experience. Phenomenal consciousness is the intrinsic nature of conscious experience. And conscious experience is an interface that evolved bc it allows the organism to navigate the world, it’s adaptive.

In a way, this is similar to any argument that says things get so complicated that there is consciousness. So this assumes that consciousness itself is a simpler way of organizing things - that all this complexity coalesces into simple experience ... like a tornado from a complex weather system - then that feeds back into the system ... maybe consciousness is a kind of information compression - but isn't that access consciousness? (not sure)

 

[smcder]

True. And those answers are the "easy answers".

Q. Why should there be any experience of what it's like to be in the world?
A. There should be an experience of what it's like to be in the world because such experiences aid in our survival as a species.

Now you can go ahead and ask any number of other "why" type questions for that, ultimately getting nowhere, but perhaps having some intellectual fun doing so. Or you could also take an approach that would facilitate a detailed description of experiences in the world as they relate to each other, and other things we have already described. @Constance is already on this path in her fascination with phenomenology.

Thank you for your kind permission! ;-)

 

[Randall]

Why do you need a unified self-experience? There is presumably a physical connection in terms of the nervous system that produces pain and coordinates the response of the organism. In cases of reflex action, this happens locally before the signal gets to the brain the hand is pulled away. And in any case it seems to be that consciousness is constructed afterward. Now that experience should also be instantiated in the nervous system (so the theory goes) and any learning from past experience can then be worked out neurally with the experience itself being irrelevant. If this is not the case, if experience itself is needed to coordinate the organism then the experience itself has to be causal, not the action of the nerves. The phenomenal feeling of pain has to be causal, not just the action of the nerves. That's a problem for any kind of substance/stuffy view, not just physicalism.

In your example above, I would say that pain serves as an identifying phenomenon that provides motivation for an organism to avoid damage. It may be the case that it is not strictly necessary because some other non-phenomenal system could handle the task, and I would suggest that in some living things, particularly much more basic systems, that is exactly what is going on.

However nature has obviously found that pain is useful in our avoidance of biological damage, and therefore it is something we have evolved with, because that's how evolution works. It may also be the case that pain is a shortcut for what would otherwise be more complicated non-qualia based biological control systems in species that are more complex. It also facilitates the choice of whether or not we want to ignore it despite the unpleasantness.

 

[Constance]

See this post: #346 ( above )

Here's what you wrote there:

Q. Why should there be any experience of what it's like to be in the world?
A. There should be an experience of what it's like to be in the world because such experiences aid in our survival as a species.

Is that all there is? Do we not seek and find much more in life than means of survival, ways to confirm a sense of security? Securing our survival or a sense of temporary safety (because everything is temporary, temporal, changing, etc.}, do we all then sit on the couch drinking beer while watching mindless sitcoms or sporting events? What else do we do with our awareness and our minds? What else do we aspire to accomplish in our own lives and for the lives of others, for our society, for all societies on earth? These are some of the things that are interesting about our species.

 

[smcder]

In your example above, I would say that pain serves as an identifying phenomenon that provides motivation for an organism to avoid damage. It may be the case that it is not strictly necessary because some other non-phenomenal system could handle the task, and I would suggest that in some living things, that is exactly what is going on.

However nature has obviously found that pain is useful in our avoidance of biological damage, and therefore it is something we have evolved with, because that's how evolution works. It may be the case that pain is a shortcut for what would otherwise be more complicated biological systems. It also facilitates the choice of whether or not we want to ignore it despite the unpleasantness.

"However nature has obviously found that pain is useful in our avoidance of biological damage, and therefore it is something we have evolved with, because that's how evolution works"

Where to start ...

 

[Randall]

"However nature has obviously found that pain is useful in our avoidance of biological damage, and therefore it is something we have evolved with, because that's how evolution works"

Where to start ...

Exactly my point.

 

[smcder]

In your example above, I would say that pain serves as an identifying phenomenon that provides motivation for an organism to avoid damage. It may be the case that it is not strictly necessary because some other non-phenomenal system could handle the task, and I would suggest that in some living things, particularly much more basic systems, that is exactly what is going on.

However nature has obviously found that pain is useful in our avoidance of biological damage, and therefore it is something we have evolved with, because that's how evolution works. It may also be the case that pain is a shortcut for what would otherwise be more complicated non-qualia based biological control systems in species that are more complex. It also facilitates the choice of whether or not we want to ignore it despite the unpleasantness.

What we know of biology comes from studying mysteries or problems. Causal closure/overdetermination and the apparent epiphenomenal nature of consciousness are two such problems. We may learn something new about biology if we study them. If we simply assume, based on what we know ... well, you get the point.

 

[smcder]

Exactly my point.

See my post above.

 

[Randall]

Is that all there is? Do we not seek and find much more in life than means of survival, ways to confirm a sense of security? Securing our survival or a sense of temporary safety (because everything is temporary, temporal, changing, etc.}, do we all then sit on the couch drinking beer while watching mindless sitcoms or sporting events? What else do we do with our awareness and our minds? What else do we aspire to accomplish in our own lives and for the lives of others, for our society, for all societies on earth? These are some of the things that are interesting about our species.

That is why I also included this:

"Or you could also take an approach that would facilitate a detailed description of experiences in the world as they relate to each other, and other things we have already described. @Constance is already on this path in her fascination with phenomenology."​

 

[smcder]

What we know of biology comes from studying mysteries or problems. Causal closure/overdetermination and the apparent epiphenomenal nature of consciousness are two such problems. We may learn something new about biology if we study them. If we simply assume, based on what we know ... well, you get the point.

Evolution carries along a lot of things - roughly, eventually things that are more useful are kept - but less useful things are kept, for example because of their proximity to more useful genes - this happens in some genetic predisposition to genes - presumably less useful. Also, things that seem to be useless, like 200 lb antlers prove to be useful in interesting ways. That could be the case with consciousness.

 

[smcder]

Exactly my point.

See my post above.

 

[Constance]

Here are links to books and papers by Nicholas Humphrey from a search engine:

Nicholas Humphrey, the meta-problem of consciousness - Bing

 

[smcder]

In your example above, I would say that pain serves as an identifying phenomenon that provides motivation for an organism to avoid damage. It may be the case that it is not strictly necessary because some other non-phenomenal system could handle the task, and I would suggest that in some living things, particularly much more basic systems, that is exactly what is going on.

However nature has obviously found that pain is useful in our avoidance of biological damage, and therefore it is something we have evolved with, because that's how evolution works. It may also be the case that pain is a shortcut for what would otherwise be more complicated non-qualia based biological control systems in species that are more complex. It also facilitates the choice of whether or not we want to ignore it despite the unpleasantness.

If you change your answers in a rapid fire exchange, I'm not necessarily going to see it. Better to repost the update.