Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

[flipper]

14 Degrees – A Paranormal Documentary
Embark on a journey of discovery and delve into the fascinating, mysterious and, at times, controversial world of paranormal investigation. Based mainly in New England, New Gravity Media touches base with some of the regions most respected paranormal researchers, mediums, scientists, skeptics, and of course… ghosts. NGM brings you an in depth "behind the scenes" look at the subject that has the world afraid to sleep alone.

 

[Soupie]

"Perhaps someday reality will smack me with an experience that appears to transcend the physical/informational paradigm."

This occurred to me in the middle of the night:

You theory, any theory of consciousness, still needs to account for the thousands and thousands of people who have reported these experiences, whether or not you personally have.

You either have to say they are illusory, in which case you have to deal with veridical accounts and witnesses, etc. or the theory has to account for them in some other way, I don't see where CRPp does this - but it might?

In my opinion, based on what I've learned and experienced, the human brain generates the human mind. To me there is no question that prior to having a brain, an organism does not have a mind; and as an organism's brain develops, so too does the mind. Furthermore, as one's brain deteriorates so too does their mind; and/or if the brain is damaged, so too is the mind. Furthermore, when the brain ceases to function "normally" such as when one is in a coma, knocked out, sleeping, or using drugs, the mind ceases to function normally as well.

So for me, this is primary: the brain realizes the mind. As goes the brain, so goes the mind. While they are distinct, they are directly linked.

On the other hand, I take NDEs and OBEs very seriously. Past lives as well. However, descriptions of these experiences in no way cause me to believe that human minds are actually discarnate and non-local i.e. not generated by the human brain.

Thus, I think there are other explanations for these phenomena; explanations that we would currently consider paranormal. Perhaps when we have a better understanding of how the brain realizes consciousness, the relation between physical structures and informational structures, and (quantum) physics, NDEs and OBEs will no longer be paranormal but only normal phenomena.

It seems to me that your position is the opposite of mine: You take OBEs, NDEs, and past lives to be primary, and thus try to understand consciousness secondarily.

 

[Soupie]

Additionally, Tye notes that the object of a feeling is non-conceptual: we have different feelings for different shades of red even if we don't have different concepts for those shades of red, we are capable of many more feelings than concepts.

While I'm uncertain about several of Tye's ideas regarding consciousness, I thought this was insightful.

This might serve as a good descriptor of a transcendent experience: when the phenomenal stream of consciousness transcends the reflexive, conceptual stream of consciousness's ability to conceptualize it. Put simply: When there are no words (concepts) to describe what one is experiencing.

Many paranormal, UAP/UHI, and dream/hallucinatory states seem to be like this.

Tye concludes that "phenomenal states lie at the interface of the nonconceptual and conceptual domains", at the border between the sensory modules and the cognitive system.

This is a good nugget as well: Stop thinking and just be.

As I've argued before, I believe many organisms experience only at the nonconceptual level — what I imagine to be a state in which one experiences a oneness with reality — and not the conceptual level; and if they do, it is a proto or primitive conceptual level.

I imagine the state of "flow" to be at the non-conceptual level and perhaps some meditative states?

 

[Soupie]

Additionally, Tye notes that the object of a feeling is non-conceptual: we have different feelings for different shades of red even if we don't have different concepts for those shades of red, we are capable of many more feelings than concepts.

I think this distinction is real and comes into play as I noted above in DMT experiences. McKenna noted that while the phenomenological landscape (i.e. the nonconceptual landscape) is completely foreign, indeed 4D, that "we are still there." What does he mean by that?

I think he believes either literally or metaphorically that ones mind/consciousness is transported to or at least presented with an alternate reality.

But what I think may be happening is that the nonconceptual stream of consciousness is for a time so exotic due to the action of the drug that it transcends the capacity of the conceptual stream of consciousness — which is apparently unaffected by the drug.

That is, as I've been maintaining, we seem to identify the self with the conceptual stream of consciousness and not the nonconceptual stream of consciousness.

This was touched on by Tye above when he asked why we have our own phenomenal consciousness and not the phenomenal consciousness of others.

This is akin to asking: why does a trumpet make a trumpet sound and not a flute sound?

Again, it's the fundamental misconception that the mental-self is somehow distinct from the phenomenal experiences one has. We ARE phenomenal experiences.

But I think Tye captures why there is confusion, that is, because we are ALSO our concepts; in other words, our mental-self consists of both our nonconceptual stream of experiences and our conceptual, reflexive stream of concepts.

DMT seems to act on the brain regions related to the nonconceptual stream and leave the brain regions related to the conceptual stream unaltered. Yet more reason for the scientific study of DMT and other hallucinogens.

 

[Soupie]

I think this distinction is real and comes into play as I noted above in DMT experiences. McKenna noted that while the phenomenological landscape (i.e. the nonconceptual landscape) is completely foreign, indeed 4D, that "we are still there." What does he mean by that?

I think he believes either literally or metaphorically that ones mind/consciousness is transported to or at least presented with an alternate reality.

But what I think may be happening is that the nonconceptual stream of consciousness is for a time so exotic due to the action of the drug that it transcends the capacity of the conceptual stream of consciousness — which is apparently unaffected by the drug.

DMT: You Cannot Imagine a Stranger Drug or a Stranger Experience | VICE United States

Below is my composite of McKenna’s three composites, arranged chronologically, with approximate amounts of time, in minutes and seconds, elapsed since the initial toke of DMT, vaporized in a glass pipe:

0:00. First toke. Colors brighten, edges sharpen, distant things gain clarity—”there is a sense as though all the air in the room has been sucked out.”

0:10. Second toke. You close your eyes and “colors begin racing together, and it forms this mandalic, floral, slowly rotating thing”—”usually yellow-orange”—which McKenna called “the chrysanthemum.” Then “you either break through it, or you require one more toke.” (“The leather-lunged hash smokers among us have a leg up in this department.”)

0:20. Third toke. The chrysanthemum parts. There’s a sound of “a plastic bread wrapper, or the crackling of flame,” and “an impression of transition.” Then ”it’s as though there were a series of tunnels or chambers that you are tumbling down.”

0:40. You burst into this “place.”

In one composite, at this point, McKenna said: “And language cannot describe it—accurately. Therefore I will inaccurately describe it. The rest is now lies.” And later: “I mean you have to understand: these are metaphors in the truest sense, meaning that they're lies!” McKenna’s awareness of and engagement with this aspect of DMT increases my interest in his DMT accounts. In one lecture, he said:

The reason it’s so confounding is because its impact is on the language-forming capacity itself. So the reason it’s so confounding is because the thing that is trying to look at the DMT is infected by it—by the process of inspection. So DMT does not provide an experience that you analyze. Nothing so tidy goes on. The syntactical machinery of description undergoes some sort of hyper-dimensional inflation instantly, and then, you know, you cannot tell yourself what it is that you understand. In other words, what DMT does can’t be downloaded into as low-dimensional a language as English.

The place, or space, you’ve burst into—called “the dome” by some—seems to be underground, and is softly, indirectly lit. The walls are “crawling with geometric hallucinations, very brightly colored, very iridescent with deep sheens and very high, reflective surfaces—everything is machine-like and polished and throbbing with energy.” McKenna said:

But that is not what immediately arrests my attention. What arrests my attention is the fact that this space is inhabited—that the immediate impression as you break into it is there’s a cheer. [...] You break into this space and are immediately swarmed by squeaking, self-transforming elf-machines...made of light and grammar and sound that come chirping and squealing and tumbling toward you. And they say, “Hooray! Welcome! You’re here!” And in my case, “You send so many and you come so rarely!”

0:50. You’re “appalled.” You’re thinking “Jesus H. Fucking Christ, what is this? What is it?” McKenna observed:

And the weird thing about DMT is it does not affect what we ordinarily call the mind. The part that you call you—nothing happens to it. You're just like you were before, but the world has been radically replaced—100 percent—it's all gone, and you're sitting there, and you're saying, "Jesus, a minute ago I was in a room with some people, and they were pushing some weird drug on me, and, and now, what's happened? Is this the drug? Did we do it? Is this it?"
​

...

I recommend reading the entire article as the elf-machines - possible non-human intelligences - are discussed more.

 

[smcder]

In my opinion, based on what I've learned and experienced, the human brain generates the human mind. To me there is no question that prior to having a brain, an organism does not have a mind; and as an organism's brain develops, so too does the mind. Furthermore, as one's brain deteriorates so too does their mind; and/or if the brain is damaged, so too is the mind. Furthermore, when the brain ceases to function "normally" such as when one is in a coma, knocked out, sleeping, or using drugs, the mind ceases to function normally as well.

So for me, this is primary: the brain realizes the mind. As goes the brain, so goes the mind. While they are distinct, they are directly linked.

On the other hand, I take NDEs and OBEs very seriously. Past lives as well. However, descriptions of these experiences in no way cause me to believe that human minds are actually discarnate and non-local i.e. not generated by the human brain.

Thus, I think there are other explanations for these phenomena; explanations that we would currently consider paranormal. Perhaps when we have a better understanding of how the brain realizes consciousness, the relation between physical structures and informational structures, and (quantum) physics, NDEs and OBEs will no longer be paranormal but only normal phenomena.

It seems to me that your position is the opposite of mine: You take OBEs, NDEs, and past lives to be primary, and thus try to understand consciousness secondarily.

"It seems to me that your position is the opposite of mine: You take OBEs, NDEs, and past lives to be primary, and thus try to understand consciousness secondarily."

No. Let me lay it out again:

1. I am agnostic as to the major theories of consciousness - from what I've seen, they are all inadequate and even their strong proponents seem to admit this. As to the hard problem - and I've said this before - Chalmers and Nagel and others still tell us we don't even know what an answer would look like. If you want to dueling quotes - we can.

2. My best instincts (and they aren't worth any more than anyone else's - so let's call them personal beliefs) tell me the hard problem, free will, causality - certain aspects of morality - are aporia, things humans will never fully resolve with the mind brain whatever we currently have. That said, our views will continue to change and aporia I think are rich sources of philosophical creativity ... They are a kind of " emptiness " a kind of potential, an event horizon out of which we make philosophy. For example there is a book of collected essays dealing with the question "why is there something rather than nothing?" - which I think is the ultimate aporia.

As to NDEs OBEs etc ... First let me evaluate your opinion and ask what accounts have you read? How familiar with the literature are you? It's hard for me to believe someone can be as certain as you are here:

"However, descriptions of these experiences in no way cause me to believe that human minds are actually discarnate and non-local i.e. not generated by the human brain."

If they have read dozens of the best cases of these phenomena. Not one of the (how many) accounts you've read left your confidence unshaken?

Two sources, if you're not familiar with them, are Irreducible Mind and the SPR literature Linked to in the thread ... I'll link these again in a separate post.

"Thus, I think there are other explanations for these phenomena; explanations that we would currently consider paranormal. Perhaps when we have a better understanding of how the brain realizes consciousness, the relation between physical structures and informational structures, and (quantum) physics, NDEs and OBEs will no longer be paranormal but only normal phenomena."

May be ... But this made me think .., when was the last time any major category of paranormal phenomena moved to "Normal"?

For that matter, since the scientific revolution - when consciousness was removed from physics - when did any consciousness related phenomena move to this category? Remember the Greeks identified epilepsy "the divine illness " as physiological ... So I'm not talking about that.

 

[smcder]

I think this distinction is real and comes into play as I noted above in DMT experiences. McKenna noted that while the phenomenological landscape (i.e. the nonconceptual landscape) is completely foreign, indeed 4D, that "we are still there." What does he mean by that?

I think he believes either literally or metaphorically that ones mind/consciousness is transported to or at least presented with an alternate reality.

But what I think may be happening is that the nonconceptual stream of consciousness is for a time so exotic due to the action of the drug that it transcends the capacity of the conceptual stream of consciousness — which is apparently unaffected by the drug.

That is, as I've been maintaining, we seem to identify the self with the conceptual stream of consciousness and not the nonconceptual stream of consciousness.

This was touched on by Tye above when he asked why we have our own phenomenal consciousness and not the phenomenal consciousness of others.

This is akin to asking: why does a trumpet make a trumpet sound and not a flute sound?

Again, it's the fundamental misconception that the mental-self is somehow distinct from the phenomenal experiences one has. We ARE phenomenal experiences.

But I think Tye captures why there is confusion, that is, because we are ALSO our concepts; in other words, our mental-self consists of both our nonconceptual stream of experiences and our conceptual, reflexive stream of concepts.

DMT seems to act on the brain regions related to the nonconceptual stream and leave the brain regions related to the conceptual stream unaltered. Yet more reason for the scientific study of DMT and other hallucinogens.

"Again, it's the fundamental misconception that the mental-self is somehow distinct from the phenomenal experiences one has. We ARE phenomenal experiences."

Meditate: not me ... Not mine ... Not who I am ... Learn to anticipate your thoughts, what kind of thought or experience you'll have before it arises, then learn to choose whether you'll have it or not. When you can separate the experience from the having of it - ask who has this experience and who is watching them have it ... Then come back to your statement/declaration:

We ARE phenomenal experiences ...

But put it in the form of a question and meditate on it ... And see if you are still as certain.

 

[smcder]

While I'm uncertain about several of Tye's ideas regarding consciousness, I thought this was insightful.

This might serve as a good descriptor of a transcendent experience: when the phenomenal stream of consciousness transcends the reflexive, conceptual stream of consciousness's ability to conceptualize it. Put simply: When there are no words (concepts) to describe what one is experiencing.

Many paranormal, UAP/UHI, and dream/hallucinatory states seem to be like this.

This is a good nugget as well: Stop thinking and just be.

As I've argued before, I believe many organisms experience only at the nonconceptual level — what I imagine to be a state in which one experiences a oneness with reality — and not the conceptual level; and if they do, it is a proto or primitive conceptual level.

I imagine the state of "flow" to be at the non-conceptual level and perhaps some meditative states?

These are empirical questions ... Examine them for yourself or spend the rest of your life in a comfortable state of theory. All the easy statements you are making about self, experiences, etc I think will dissolve when you look directly at them. Meditation breaks up these hard nuggets, habitual ways of looking at things because you realize how many perspectives (from what I can tell, an infinite number) there are ... You have more choices about your thinking and give up many of your certainties ... You get a freedom and spaciousness but you may feel unmoored - come back to the breath, to the body and you'll be fine - meditation can be very pleasant but it can be intense and frightening, it will re-write who you are ... Whatever that means! ;-)

The body and the breath always are here and now, no matter where the mind goes.

 

[Soupie]

"Again, it's the fundamental misconception that the mental-self is somehow distinct from the phenomenal experiences one has. We ARE phenomenal experiences."

Meditate: not me ... Not mine ... Not who I am ... Learn to anticipate your thoughts, what kind of thought or experience you'll have before it arises, then learn to choose whether you'll have it or not. When you can separate the experience from the having of it - ask who has this experience and who is watching them have it ... Then come back to your statement/declaration:

We ARE phenomenal experiences ...

But put it in the form of a question and meditate on it ... And see if you are still as certain.

Well, my guess would be that your pov would be from your conceptual stream of consciousness; it would be actively suppressing the phenomenal stream.

Likewise, when one is in, say, the state of fight or flight or perhaps a flow state, their pov would be from their phenomenal stream of consciousness, and the conceptual, analytical stream would be suppressed.

 

[smcder]

For those lacking a background in phenomenological philosophy, Shaun Gallagher's Phenomenology provides a clear and expert grounding in its history and explains its applications to the major issues and problems pursued in current Consciousness Studies.


Description:

This new introduction by Shaun Gallagher gives students and philosophers not only an excellent concise overview of the state of the field and contemporary debates, but a novel way of addressing the subject by looking at the ways in which phenomenology is useful to the disciplines it applies to. Gallagher retrieves the central insights made by the classic phenomenological philosophers (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and others), updates some of these insights in innovative ways, and shows how they directly relate to ongoing debates in philosophy and psychology. Accounts of phenomenological methods, and the concepts of intentionality, temporality, embodiment, action, self, and our ability to understand other people are integrated into a coherent contemporary statement that shows why phenomenology is still an active and vital philosophical approach.

Each chapter begins with a discussion of the classic analyses and then goes on to show their relevance to contemporary debates in philosophy about embodied, enactive and extended approaches to our understanding of human experience. Along the way Gallagher introduces some novel interpretations that suggest how phenomenology can both inform and be informed by the terms of these debates.

The university of Memphis is just up the road from me ... And I have family in that town, thus conference looks very interesting:

The 33rd Spindel Conference

 

[smcder]

Well, my guess would be that your pov would be from your conceptual stream of consciousness; it would be actively suppressing the phenomenal stream.

Likewise, when one is in, say, the state of fight or flight or perhaps a flow state, their pov would be from their phenomenal stream of consciousness, and the conceptual, analytical stream would be suppressed.

Yes ... A guess ...

 

[Constance]

Well, my guess would be that your pov would be from your conceptual stream of consciousness; it would be actively suppressing the phenomenal stream.

Likewise, when one is in, say, the state of fight or flight or perhaps a flow state, their pov would be from their phenomenal stream of consciousness, and the conceptual, analytical stream would be suppressed.

I'm just catching up in this discussion of the last day or so. I question your theory that there are two streams of consciousness in each individual {we're talking normal persons, not split brain patients or people with multiple personality disorder, right?}. Two streams of consciousness, then, only one of which is 'conceptual', by which I take it you mean capable of reflecting on its embodied experience, asking questions about it, forming ideas about it and the world in which it exists? The other stream experiencing phenomena but without reflection or thought? I can't make sense of that based on my own experience. I don't know that anyone could make sense of that, but if someone has would you cite their most detailed and persuasive description of this second 'stream'?

 

[Constance]

The university of Memphis is just up the road from me ... And I have family in that town, thus conference looks very interesting:

The 33rd Spindel Conference

Great conference, excellent speakers, interesting program, plus one evening on Beale Street and another on a Mississippi riverboat cruise. I want to go to this one. There's no conference fee and there are no conflicts because of simultaneous sessions. Shaun Gallagher is organizing it, Evan Thompson, Dan Zahavi, and Andy Clark will be there. All apparently in one comfortable conference center. The spirit of Francisco Varela will also be there.

 

[smcder]

Several links posted in Part One of this thread - re-posting as basic resources for a discussion of consciousness and the paranormal:

FWH Myers
Human Personality and It's Survival of Bodily Death
Human personality and its survival of bodily death; : Myers, F. W. H. (Frederic William Henry), 1843-1901 : Free Download & Streaming : Internet Archive

Here's a review of Irreducible Mind:

Irreducible Mind | IONS Library | Institute of Noetic Sciences

Dean Radin's evidence page:
http://deanradin.com/evidence/evidence.htm

George P Hansen's Trickster and the Paranormal:
The Trickster and the Paranormal -- Home Page
Chapter 15 covers Institutions and the Paranormal - essential reading, some of this would seem to have changed as publication has moved online ... But online is a liminal space and I think this chapter still holds true - further I think the study of consciousness itself (outside of the CTM) is a paranormal activity and much of what Hansen describes and predicts about the liminal seems to my experience to hold true.

 

[Constance]

Constance quoted the following: ↑
"Additionally, Tye notes that the object of a feeling is non-conceptual: we have different feelings for different shades of red even if we don't have different concepts for those shades of red, we are capable of many more feelings than concepts."

I think this distinction is real and comes into play as I noted above in DMT experiences. McKenna noted that while the phenomenological landscape (i.e. the nonconceptual landscape) is completely foreign, indeed 4D, that "we are still there." What does he mean by that?

It seems to me he means that the individual under the influence of DMT is still aware of his/her consciousness being precisely his or hers.

I think he believes either literally or metaphorically that ones mind/consciousness is transported to or at least presented with an alternate reality.

But what I think may be happening is that the nonconceptual stream of consciousness is for a time so exotic due to the action of the drug that it transcends the capacity of the conceptual stream of consciousness — which is apparently unaffected by the drug.

The use of mind-altering drugs is far from the only way in which humans have experiences of alternate realities. Psi experiences, remote viewing, meditation, and spiritual experiences are among the other situations in which consciousness is altered and another reality is manifested. While some of the phenomena experienced in those states are difficult to describe {'ineffable'}, individuals having those experiences often are in a state of hyperawareness of the fact that they are having them and they remember them. I don't see how any of this, including DMT visions, can be thought of as occurring in nonconceptual consciousness. A paper I linked recently argues persuasively that no phenomenal experience (in other words: no experience) is completely nonconceptual.

That is, as I've been maintaining, we seem to identify the self with the conceptual stream of consciousness and not the nonconceptual stream of consciousness.

It still needs to be demonstrated that there is such a thing as "the nonconceptual stream of conscious." Even dream states are conceptual.

This was touched on by Tye above when he asked why we have our own phenomenal consciousness and not the phenomenal consciousness of others.

'Why' remains a good question [indeed a key question], but the fact is that (outside of several severe psychological disorders and brain injuries) we do each have our own functioning consciousness, temporally based in our own experiences, and it is from that that the sense of our individual 'self' derives.

This is akin to asking: why does a trumpet make a trumpet sound and not a flute sound?

? The analogy is not clarifying anything for me.

Again, it's the fundamental misconception that the mental-self is somehow distinct from the phenomenal experiences one has. We ARE phenomenal experiences.

In the first sentence there you seem to be arguing against what you've said before. I also can't agree with the statement that "We ARE phenomenal experiences." Who we are as human individuals, at any point in our lived experience, is built out of our phenomenal experiences of and in the world and the minds with which we work upon those experiences through reflection and learning.

But I think Tye captures why there is confusion, that is, because we are ALSO our concepts; in other words, our mental-self consists of both our nonconceptual stream of experiences and our conceptual, reflexive stream of concepts.

That seems right, but the question remains "what nonconceptual stream of experiences"? Babies are not philosophers of mind, but they quickly develop what could be called concepts -- e.g., of what and who in their environment feels good to them, helps them to feel better. (Usually Mom.) Child psychologists have come to recognize a 'theory of mind' operational in two and three year olds. We need to study "prereflective consciousness" as it has been identified by the phenomenological philosophers. It is not a separate stream of consciousness, isolated from mind. It is the general orientation in, the preverbal sense of, the environment within which we find ourselves, and within which we find ourselves drawn toward particular elements/things we perceive, toward which we move, with which we interact, and out of which interaction we navigate the world, physically and mentally.

DMT seems to act on the brain regions related to the nonconceptual stream and leave the brain regions related to the conceptual stream unaltered. Yet more reason for the scientific study of DMT and other hallucinogens.

For some reason my computer refuses to underline the word 'nonconceptual' in that quote. Could it be that my Microsoft Word program is taking its own point of view in this discussion, or following my lead? More seriously, the DMT experiences seem to be anything but nonconceptual, and more interestingly to maintain that part of consciousness that experiences them in the form of the reflective cogito that accompanies us through life. I certainly agree that as much scientific investigation as is possible should be carried out with DMT and other psychoactive substances.

 

[Soupie]

I'm just catching up in this discussion of the last day or so. I question your theory that there are two streams of consciousness in each individual {we're talking normal persons, not split brain patients or people with multiple personality disorder, right?}. Two streams of consciousness, then, only one of which is 'conceptual', by which I take it you mean capable of reflecting on its embodied experience, asking questions about it, forming ideas about it and the world in which it exists? The other stream experiencing phenomena but without reflection or thought? I can't make sense of that based on my own experience. I don't know that anyone could make sense of that, but if someone has would you cite their most detailed and persuasive description of this second 'stream'?

To describe it as two distinct streams is really a gross simplification, but the point remains. I didn't mention one being primary and one secondary, but from an evolutionary perspective, one might assume the nonconceptual stream came first followed by the conceptual.

I've already given several examples of this concept throughout this discussion; as I recall, you rejected the idea then as well. Recall that I believe most animals only have a nonconceptual stream (and perhaps a comparatively primitive conceptual stream) while only some, such as humans, possess a rich conceptual stream as well. Recall our discussion of Keller and the role of language.

Finally, I gave the example of being on a walk and watching people play basketball when a fight broke out. While watching the fight intently i might say my nonconceptual stream was primary and it was only afterward when I was processing conceptually what I had seen that my conceptual stream was primary. Most of the time both streams are front and center, but I do think they are distinct.

 

[Constance]

To describe it as two distinct streams is really a gross simplification, but the point remains. I didn't mention one being primary and one secondary, but from an evolutionary perspective, one might assume the nonconceptual stream came first followed by the conceptual.

I've already given several examples of this concept throughout this discussion; as I recall, you rejected the idea then as well. Recall that I believe most animals only have a nonconceptual stream and only some, such as humans, possess a conceptual stream as well. Recall our discussion of Keller and the role of language.

Finally, I gave the example of being on a walk and watching people play basketball when a fight broke out. While watching the fight intently i might say my nonconceptual stream was primary and it was only afterward when I was processing conceptually what I had seen that my conceptual stream was primary. Most of the time both streams are front and center, but I don't think they are distinct.

I can see why this issue is an important one for you as a supporter of Tononi's integrated information theory. We know from Varela and Thompson that even the most primitive single-celled organisms demonstrate autopoiesis, maintaining themselves in relation to a permeable membrane separating them from their environment (through which they obtain food from the environment and also protect themselves from the intrusion of other substances into their interiors). Varela saw protoconsciousness at this level of life. Somehow 'information' is operating at this level of life. Information is also exchanged in quantum interactions at the base (so far as we know) of the constitution of the universe/multiverse, etc. Where along the many lines of evolution of life on our planet does information become conceptual? It's an enormous question, and one Tononi will need, I think, to deal with in the development of his theory. Another question is: what is a concept? How many protoconcepts will we need to discover in varieties of evolving life before we come to the level of concepts at which we humans operate? How many other animals living on this planet now possess protoconcepts similar to those developed in the evolution of our species? How will we find out? One thing seems certain to me: animals are not unconscious; many are highly intelligent; the ones I've known clearly make choices and decisions on the basis of their phenomenal experiences in the world and on what the animal at some level understands the signification of those experiences to be. I recommend this book in cognitive ethology:

 

[smcder]

To describe it as two distinct streams is really a gross simplification, but the point remains. I didn't mention one being primary and one secondary, but from an evolutionary perspective, one might assume the nonconceptual stream came first followed by the conceptual.

I've already given several examples of this concept throughout this discussion; as I recall, you rejected the idea then as well. Recall that I believe most animals only have a nonconceptual stream (and perhaps a comparatively primitive conceptual stream) while only some, such as humans, possess a rich conceptual stream as well. Recall our discussion of Keller and the role of language.

Finally, I gave the example of being on a walk and watching people play basketball when a fight broke out. While watching the fight intently i might say my nonconceptual stream was primary and it was only afterward when I was processing conceptually what I had seen that my conceptual stream was primary. Most of the time both streams are front and center, but I do think they are distinct.

As defined by Stanford EP:

"The central idea behind the theory of nonconceptual mental content is that some mental states can represent the world even though the bearer of those mental states need not possess the concepts required to specify their content."

To me, that's ambiguous in terms of your basketball example.

Here:
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/concepts/Stalnaker.htm

The author says:

"It is controversial among those who talk of nonconceptual content whether there is such a thing, and whether perceptual states have a kind of content that is different from the kind that characterizes belief states and speech acts. But Evans gives us no direct and explicit characterization of the notion of nonconceptual content that he introduces - at least none that I can find. And it is not clear to me that the different philosophers using this term mean the same thing by it. Without some account of what nonconceptual and conceptual contents might be, it is difficult to have more than a general impression of what this controversy is about."

So how would you describe the basketball incident without the term conceptual/non? And how do you control for the experience vs the memory of the experience? What you relate is your latest memory of the incident - how do you know it's not different from the actual experience you describe as non conceptual? For example, maybe you believe intense moments are remembered in this way and so you end up forgetting aspects of the experience that conflict with that belief?

 

[Constance]

Here's another book I think will be necessary reading for students of consciousness:

 

[smcder]

In my opinion, based on what I've learned and experienced, the human brain generates the human mind. To me there is no question that prior to having a brain, an organism does not have a mind; and as an organism's brain develops, so too does the mind. Furthermore, as one's brain deteriorates so too does their mind; and/or if the brain is damaged, so too is the mind. Furthermore, when the brain ceases to function "normally" such as when one is in a coma, knocked out, sleeping, or using drugs, the mind ceases to function normally as well.

So for me, this is primary: the brain realizes the mind. As goes the brain, so goes the mind. While they are distinct, they are directly linked.

On the other hand, I take NDEs and OBEs very seriously. Past lives as well. However, descriptions of these experiences in no way cause me to believe that human minds are actually discarnate and non-local i.e. not generated by the human brain.

Thus, I think there are other explanations for these phenomena; explanations that we would currently consider paranormal. Perhaps when we have a better understanding of how the brain realizes consciousness, the relation between physical structures and informational structures, and (quantum) physics, NDEs and OBEs will no longer be paranormal but only normal phenomena.

It seems to me that your position is the opposite of mine: You take OBEs, NDEs, and past lives to be primary, and thus try to understand consciousness secondarily.

1. First paragraph - correlation vs causation
2. Coma - memory vs consciousness, an example is a patient wakes remembering nothing, then gradually or suddenly remembers many things ... This happens for me when I wake up what seems to be an instant later and an hour has passed, then later I remember a dream I had during that time ... Or do I? Memory isn't proof of consciousness ... Etc
3. Second paragraph is just an assertion - but raises an interesting question? Is this assertion falsifiable ? If so, how? What proof would you require that some aspects of consciousness may be non local or disc senate? Have you checked to see if that proof exists ? Is your standard different from the standards you applied to your current beliefs? Is that standard what you have experienced and learned? If so, don't we have to give equal weight to those who have experienced and learned otherwise or will they need to be reconstituted into the terms of your existing beliefs? If so, it doesn't seem possible that any experience you could have would change these beliefs, because the physicalist/materialist framework demands an explanation in these terms and that doesn't seem to exist - so if mind is fundamental, there won't be physical proof of it (by definition) only enormous amounts of experience, persistent intuition and studies to be explained away or ignored - which is a good description of the current situation.
4. Normal / para normal as you define them mean only explained and not yet unexplained, I suggest there are other categories. Also note again the primary word is "normal" and. "Natural " - " para" and "super" prefix these , so paranormal can only be defined in terms of the normal, even though what we don't know and can't explain exceeds what we can.