Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

[Constance]

Okay. I agree with this. But where we apparently disagree (but I don't see how) is that I would say the reason protoconsciousness developed into consciousness in various species is directly related to the evolution of their brains and central nervous systems.

Do you not think that the pressures of reality, in terms of the experienced environment, lead to development and changes in the brain? For a brief overview of brain plasticity see
Brain Plasticity: How Experience Changes the Brain

It has also been demonstrated in neuroscientific experiments that skilled meditators' brains change significantly during meditation, and that such changes become more pronounced over time. The genes of animals have also been shown to change in response to changing living conditions including food supply. Naturally so, evolution is filled with adaptation, the effects of numerous environmental effects on the development of various species, subspecies, etc.

You don't agree. You're still searching for the reason some species have consciousness and some only protoconsciousness. You do not believe brains are the answer. Okay.

?? I do agree with the statement above with which you think I disagree -- i.e., that "the reason protoconsciousness developed into consciousness in various species is directly related to the evolution of their brains and central nervous systems." I'm trying to point out that the evolution of brains and CNSs is not the linear unfolding of predetermined 'information' in each species, but a process involving the experiential conditions impinging on the lives of animals and their evolution through adaptations to changing conditions. No doubt developments from protoconscious to consciousness in all lines of evolution of species took innumerable paths which cannot all be charted. The general trend, though, was obviously up through protoconsciousness to consciousness.

So while you don't believe the "mental-self" is non-local, you do believe "aspects" of consciousness are non-local.

I would say that human consciousness is open to non-local information and influences, moreso in some humans as psi investigations have shown. How are these connections made? It seems to me that nonlocal quantum entanglement might enable the pathways between one individual consciousness/mind and another at distances from one another. Then there are Rupert Sheldrake's theories and experiments to consider in relation to 'resonance' phenomena among members of a single species, which seem to carry new adaptations -- of something learned or achieved by one flock or group -- over great distances to points well beyond the location of that group. It seems to be a form of telepathy.

So some aspects of an organism's consciousness are deeply embedded in and directly dependent in their physical environment (but not their brains), while other aspects of an organism's consciousness are (sometimes or always) non-local.

I would say that one's consciousness is deeply involved and integrated with one's physical environment, close human environment, and sociocultural environment, and that the individual subconscious and collective unconsciousness also carry memory from far back in our evolution. I think these deeper levels of memory unite us a species (likewise other species) and inform us at levels beneath consciousness of what human experience has been and continues to be existentially. You've seen the image of the iceberg, 90 percent of its bulk beneath the waterline, used to represent the relative scope of the subconscious and conscious mind?

The brain is essential to the physical functioning of any embodied animal and no doubt it facilitates consciousness, but I believe that it does not contain consciousness, which is opened out onto the world and also seeps out into the world, affects others and is affected by others, and receives endless impressions from the physical world, avenues of possibility for action and agency, and also obstacles.

Here are more links related to the influence of conscious (and subconscious) experience on the structure and functioning of the brain:

Experiences Build Brain Architecture

 - The Future of Children -

Experience Leads to the Growth of New Brain Cells | Max Planck Institute for Human Development

 

[Constance]

We should also read Benjamin Libet, "Can Conscious Experience Affect Brain Activity?"

http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/Libet.pdf

 

[Soupie]

Do you not think that the pressures of reality, in terms of the experienced environment, lead to development and changes in the brain?

Absolutely.

I do agree with with the statement ... that "the reason protoconsciousness developed into consciousness in various species is directly related to the evolution of their brains and central nervous systems."

Okay...

I'm trying to point out that the evolution of brains and CNSs is not the linear unfolding of predetermined 'information' in each species, but a process involving the experiential conditions impinging on the lives of animals and their evolution through adaptations to changing conditions. No doubt developments from protoconscious to consciousness in all lines of evolution of species took innumerable paths which cannot all be charted. The general trend, though, was obviously up through protoconsciousness to consciousness.

Absolutely. I am in total agreement.

I would say that human consciousness is open to non-local information and influences, more so in some humans as psi investigations have shown. How are these connections made? It seems to me that nonlocal quantum entanglement might enable the pathways between one individual consciousness/mind and another at distances from one another. Then there are Rupert Sheldrake's theories and experiments to consider in relation to 'resonance' phenomena among members of a single species, which seem to carry new adaptations -- of something learned or achieved by one flock or group -- over great distances to points well beyond the location of that group. It seems to be a form of telepathy.

I find this potential explanation for the psi phenomena compelling as well, and my understanding of consciousness is compatible with this possibility.

I would say that one's consciousness is deeply involved and integrated with one's physical environment, close human environment, and sociocultural environment, and that the individual subconscious and collective unconsciousness also carry memory from far back in our evolution. I think these deeper levels of memory unite us a species (likewise other species) and inform us at levels beneath consciousness of what human experience has been and continues to be existentially. You've seen the image of the iceberg, 90 percent of its bulk beneath the waterline, used to represent the relative scope of the subconscious and conscious mind?

I completely agree with this, and it is compatible with my understanding of consciousness. (Keep in mind that the collective unconscious is information encoded in DNA and/or the morphological structure of the brain itself accessible to the subconscious, and that the subconscious arises from the brain not unlike the conscious.)

The brain is essential to the physical functioning of any embodied animal and no doubt it facilitates consciousness...

With this I completely agree as well; and "facilitates" may be a better word than "generates" to describe how I believe brains give rise to consciousness.

...but I believe that it does not contain consciousness, which is opened out onto the world and also seeps out into the world, affects others and is affected by others, and receives endless impressions from the physical world, avenues of possibility for action and agency, and also obstacles.

This is too abstract for me to follow.

I would only say that the raw material of consciousness permeates reality, just as matter/energy permeate reality. I believe that reality is a dynamic, evolving nexus within which form both material and informational structures. These temporal structures, while composed from two sides of the same coin, nonetheless exert ongoing influence on each other. That is to say, the brain affects the mind, and the mind affects the brain. Or, more specifically, material structures affect informational structures, and informational structures affect material structures. (As I've noted before, there may be other informational structures in our reality that are not minds. What they are and how they formed, I wouldn't know.)

 

[Pharoah]

Can you locate your argument among the objections here?

Qualia: The Knowledge Argument (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

4.3?

4.6 offers the view that genuine information is gained ...

4.2 linguistic vs metaphysical physicalism is especially interesting ...

smcder:

Specifically in answer to your question
a) I like the idea of Flanagan's "linguistic vs metaphysical physicalism" to express a necessary distinction although I would voice it differently. To be more explicit in my response, I would have to read Flanagan 1992.
b) re Information: my view on what information is would take some explaining. Having read your forum, I am prioritising a lengthy post devoted to information.
c) re. 4.3 "Mary does not acquire any new propositional knowledge after release..."
yes this is correct, but I make a more fundamental distinction: all introspective thought, language, and interpretation of physical mechanism is founded on conceptually constructed relations i.e. conceptual knowledge. Phenomenal experience has its qualitative nature because of innately acquired physiologically constructed relations i.e. physiological knowledge, which is inaccessible to conceptual reasoning. Both are physical, but only conceptual knowledge is what Mary can acquire through study, prior to her seeing color for the first time.
"...but only a bundle of abilities."
no this is wrong. The "Ability Hypothesis" is incorrect: 4.3

further to your query smcder, in regard the Stanford entry on the Knowledge Argument.
1. "It is therefore safe to predict that the discussion about the knowledge argument will not come to an end in the near future."
As far as i am concerned, Hierarchical Construct Theory solves the knowledge argument.
2. "It is certainly not easy to formulate a precise, adequate and non question-begging account of “physical knowledge” and “physical facts” suited for the discussion of the knowledge argument. It is, however, quite common to assume that our intuitive understanding of “physical knowledge” in the broad sense at issue is clear enough for the purposes of the debate, though some argue that talk of “physical facts” needs clarification (see Alter 1998)"
The problem is fundamentally challenged by the intuitive assumptions, so I am with Alter here. As far as I am concerned, none of the premises stand because of the reliance on intuitions that are inaccurate.
3. "Alter (1998) points out that the knowledge argument needs the premise that all physical facts can be learned discursively and argues that this assumption has not been established."
Alter hits the nail on the head.
4. "Gertler (1999)... argues that the property dualist can explain why the most direct way to get familiar with a quale is by having an experience of the relevant kind while the physicalist does not have any explanation for this particular feature of qualia."
Hierarchical Construct Theory provides this explanation, as I have tried to explain in my post about Mary for Constance.
5. "Tye (1995)... proposes a representationalist account of phenomenal character. For a state to have phenomenal character is to represent internal or external physical items in an ‘abstract’ and nonconceptual way"
I am with Tye on this, although I have gone some way to dismantling Tye's particular stance in my critique of "Ten Problems of Consciousness" (c.f. my website)

 

[smcder]

There are definitely strong parallels with my view, especially regarding experience without a subject and the fundamental nature of mental. However, there are other elements that don't parallel my view. I'll have to read more about it.

Ok let us know when you can distinguish your view.

 

[Constance]

. . .
4. "Gertler (1999)... argues that the property dualist can explain why the most direct way to get familiar with a quale is by having an experience of the relevant kind while the physicalist does not have any explanation for this particular feature of qualia."
Hierarchical Construct Theory provides this explanation, as I have tried to explain in my post about Mary for Constance.

5. "Tye (1995)... proposes a representationalist account of phenomenal character. For a state to have phenomenal character is to represent internal or external physical items in an ‘abstract’ and nonconceptual way"
I am with Tye on this, although I have gone some way to dismantling Tye's particular stance in my critique of "Ten Problems of Consciousness" (c.f. my website)

I've just received copies of Tye's books Ten Problems of Consciousness and the more recent Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. After I read them I'll read your critique of the first book and anything you've written in response to the 2011 book (please link if there is something I should read). Re your new Mary paper, I'm still not persuaded by your approach and conclusion. By the way, have you responded anywhere to Conee's acquaintance theory? Thanks for your contributions here.

For other readers, here is the Stanford article's reference to Conee:

"Earl Conee (1994) proposes another variant of the No Propositional Knowledge-View. According to Conee acquaintance constitutes a third category of knowledge that is neither reducible to factual knowledge nor to knowing-how and he argues that Mary acquires after release only acquaintance knowledge. According to Conee knowing something by acquaintance “requires the person to be familiar with the known entity in the most direct way that it is possible for a person to be aware of that thing” (Conee 1994, 144). Since “experiencing a quality is the most direct way to apprehend a quality” (Conee 1994, 144), Mary gains acquaintance with color qualia only after release. According to the view proposed by Conee the physicalist can defend himself against the knowledge argument in the following way: (1) Qualia are physical properties of experiences (and experiences are physical processes). Let Q be such a property. (2) Mary can know all about Q and she can know that a given experience has Q before release, although—before release—she is not acquainted with Q. (3) After release Mary gets acquainted with Q, but she does not acquire any new item of propositional knowledge by getting acquainted with Q (in particular she already knew under what conditions normal perceivers have experiences with the property Q). More recently Michael Tye (2009) defends the acquaintance hypothesis as the right answer to the knowledge argument thereby abandoning his original response (see below 4.7).[/quote]

 

[smcder]

Why I became a Panexperientialist

"Agar went on to give a picture of cosmic evolution and the evolution of mind. The majority of biologists picture mind as emerging at some stage in the evolution of animals. Before that time there was no mind. From no mind comes mind. Agar proposed the alternative that there has been no moment in evolution when mind made its first appearance. Minds and bodies evolved together even though that body be only a proton or an atom. It is more reasonable to suppose that both objective and subjective have existed as long as anything has existed than to suppose that the subjective has emerged from the nonsubjective or that it does not exist at all."

I thought it was a goldmine ... I've been reading some articles by David Ray Griffin as a result.

 

[smcder]

David Ray Griffin, "The Rationality of Belief in God: A Response to Hans
Kueng"

"At the core of Whitehead’s thought is his doctrine that there are no “vacuous actualities.” This means, positively, that all individual actualities are “occasions of experience.” This does not mean that they necessarily have consciousness or sense experience. Most occasions of experience do not. But it does mean that they internally take account of the actualities in their environment. This “taking account of Whitehead calls “prehension.” It is, in Francis Bacon’s words, a form of perception more subtle than sense. This prehension, or non-sensory perception, is enjoyed by all individuals, whether they have sensory organs or not. In individuals without sensory organs, this prehension is the only form of perception they have. In individuals with sensory organs, this prehension is more fundamental than sensory perception; in fact, sensory perception presupposes it."

 

[smcder]

An excellent article by David Ray Griffin on Whitehead's Panexperientialism - like the Birch article, it's rich and touches on a lot of things we've discussed on this thread - almost a summary thus far and a touchstone for us on terminology and ideas ...

David Ray Griffin "Consciousness as a Subjective Form: Whitehead’s
Nonreductionist Naturalism"

Consciousness as a Subjective Form: Whitehead’s Nonreductionist Naturalism

"Whitehead’s doctrine is that consciousness is the subjective form of an intellectual feeling, which arises, if at all, only in a late phase of a moment of experience. It will be the purpose of this essay to explain this idea and show how it enables us to solve a number of philosophical problems associated with consciousness."

( paraphrased)

1. Whitehead’s position on consciousness differs from Cartesian dualism and reductionist materialism but it can combine ideas that seemed irreconcilable

2. Whitehead is with the dualists that conscious-ness belongs to an entity distinct from the brain, and that genuine freedom can be attributed to conscious experience

3. Whitehead shares the materialist's naturalistic sensibility - no supernaturalistic solution to philosophical problems, rejecting any dualism between two kinds of actualities, affirming a pluralistic monism ...
consciousness is a function of something more fundamental.

4. Whitehead rejects the reductionism involved in functionalism as understood by material-ists.

An adequate theory of consciousness, minimally, addresses these four "overpowering notions"

1. That conscious experience exists
2. that it exerts influence upon the body
3. That it has a degree of self-determining freedom,
4. that it can act in accord with various norms.

Dualism and materialism have difficulty addressing these notions without appealing to supernatural assistance.

Griffin then discusses these difficulties and you'll see some familiar names (eg McGinn and Nagel) .. then goes on to discuss Whitehead's theory of Panexperientialism:

"Such a radically different worldview was proffered by Whitehead. Part of this difference involves the fact that Whitehead became a theist of sorts, in order to explain various features of our world that seemed otherwise inexplicable. But this adoption of a theistic perspective did not involve any recursion to super-naturalism. He rejected the earlier “appeal to a deus ex machina who was capable of rising superior to the difficulties of metaphysics” (SMW 156). In line with his complete eschewal of supernaturalism, he reject-ed any doctrine that implied a dualism between two types of actualities.46 Positively, this rejection took the form of the acceptance of panexperientialism, according to which all actualities have experience. Accepting this view implied the rejection of what he called “vacuous actualities,” meaning things that are fully actual and yet wholly devoid of experience (PR 29, 167)."

 

[smcder]

There are definitely strong parallels with my view, especially regarding experience without a subject and the fundamental nature of mental. However, there are other elements that don't parallel my view. I'll have to read more about it.

David Ray Griffin "Consciousness as a Subjective Form: Whitehead’s
Nonreductionist Naturalism"

See especially section 5

 

[smcder]

The Placebo Effect: What Is It?

Do you think this is the explanation for terminal lucidity?

 

[Constance]

Do you think this is the explanation for terminal lucidity?

I don't see a connection. Terminal lucidity is the recovery of lucidity after a period of nonlucidity in near-death persons. Unless nonlucid near-death persons were told they were receiving a 'wake-up' drug, I can't see a possible causal effect. Nor have I heard of such a practice in care of the dying.
I think the recovery of lucidity in patients with deeply disorganized minds (e.g., Alzheimers) or patients long unconscious must have a much deeper explanation. This is borne out by the phenomenon observed by Pim von Lommel in his book on NDEs in cases in which EKGs were hooked up to long-comatose -- and considered brain-dead -- patients before their life-support machine was turned off. Doctors and nurses observing these practices (experiments?) reported sudden increases in brain activity at the 'turn-off' point, from extremely minimal brain activity to levels increased by as much as 90 percent, maintained for several minutes, as I recall, until death followed. This research is described in the last chapter of von Lommel's book on NDEs.

 

[flipper]

Scientist should be studying the placebo effect rather than finding new drugs. It is the mind healing the body. Is the mind different than the soul? Is what we call the energy of a person the spirit of a person? (i.e.) that person has good energy.

 

[smcder]

From the Wikipedia article on Dualism - one example of a dualistic system that avoids the problems of causation:

"In Samkhya and Yoga schools of Indian philosophy, "there are two irreducible, innate and independent realities 1) consciousness itself (Purusha) 2) primordial materiality (Prakriti)".

The unconscious primordial materiality, Prakriti, contains 23 components including intellect (buddhi,mahat), ego (ahamkara) and mind (manas).

Therefore, the intellect, mind and ego are all seen as forms of unconscious matter.[21]

Thought processes and mental events are conscious only to the extent they receive illumination from Purusha. Consciousness is compared to light which illuminates the material configurations or 'shapes' assumed by the mind.

So intellect after receiving cognitive structures form the mind and illumination from pure consciousness creates thought structures that appear to be conscious.[22]

Ahamkara, the ego or the phenomenal self, appropriates all mental experiences to itself and thus, personalizes the objective activities of mind and intellect by assuming possession of them.[23] But consciousness is itself independent of the thought structures it illuminates.[22]

By including mind in the realm of matter, Samkhya-Yoga avoids one of the most serious pitfalls of Cartesian dualism, the violation of physical conservation laws. Because mind is an evolute of matter, mental events are granted causal efficacy and are therefore able to initiate bodily motions.[24]"

 

[Soupie]

Ok let us know when you can distinguish your view.

My view is very basic and undeveloped.

I've read more about Process Philosophy and I would say that yes, it does resonate deeply with the ideas I've expressed here and been drawn to from other sources; for example, I see that Langan has been heavily influenced by Whitehead and Process Philosophy.

Whiteheadian concept:

The primordial nature he described as "the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality.

This concept is paralleled by Langan's idea of Unbound Telesis. This can be described, perhaps, as the idea that the primal substance - so to speak - is simply pure, unrestricted potential. But for reality to persist once it arises from this potential, it must be self-sustaining, which indicates that reality is social at its core. The Buddhist idea of Codependent Arising dovetails in here too.

The core idea that reality is an unfolding, dynamic process composed of temporal structures (sub-processes) resonates with me. And thus all the ideas that flow from it.

There is no mind-matter duality in this ontology, because "mind" is simply seen as an abstraction from an occasion of experience which has also a material aspect, which is of course simply another abstraction from it; thus the mental aspect and the material aspect are abstractions from one and the same concrete occasion of experience. The brain is part of the body, both being abstractions of a kind known as persistent physical objects, neither being actual entities.

Initially, I wasn't sure what was implied by "panexperientialism;" I don't believe that simple conglomerates of matter have experiences. However, that was clarified somewhat here:

Since Whitehead's metaphysics described a universe in which all entities experience, he needed a new way of describing perception that was not limited to living, self-conscious beings. The term he coined was "prehension", which comes from the Latin prehensio, meaning "to seize."[120] The term is meant to indicate a kind of perception that can be conscious or unconscious, applying to people as well as electrons. It is also intended to make clear Whitehead's rejection of the theory of representative perception, in which the mind only has private ideas about other entities.[120] For Whitehead, the term "prehension" indicates that the perceiver actually incorporates aspects of the perceived thing into itself.[120] In this way, entities are constituted by their perceptions and relations, rather than being independent of them. Further, Whitehead regards perception as occurring in two modes, causal efficacy (or "physical prehension") and presentational immediacy (or "conceptual prehension").[117]

Whitehead describes causal efficacy as "the experience dominating the primitive living organisms, which have a sense for the fate from which they have emerged, and the fate towards which they go."[121] It is, in other words, the sense of causal relations between entities, a feeling of being influenced and affected by the surrounding environment, unmediated by the senses. Presentational immediacy, on the other hand, is what is usually referred to as "pure sense perception", unmediated by any causal or symbolic interpretation, even unconscious interpretation. In other words, it is pure appearance, which may or may not be delusive (e.g. mistaking an image in a mirror for "the real thing").[122]

These distinctions are important, in my opinion. I find the idea of prehension very interesting, and if this concept is reflective of reality, than it may be the mechanism for psi. (Note: Regarding presentational immediacy: I'm not sure it can be completely unmediated. I believe what neuroscience has shown is that the brain begins shaping incoming data in a top down process right from the get-go. For example, once you "see something" you can't "unsee" it. However, I agree that this isn't a conceptual, conscious process.)

I'll have to read more about Process Philosophy. I find it interesting and intuitive. The following also resonates with me:

Present-day contributions to analytical process philosophy are no longer driven by an attempt of making sense of evolution. However, they are often still motivated by the view that there are certain results in science that philosophy simply must come to grips with, and if that involves a fundamental revision of the standard tools of philosophy, then this is an area upon which philosophy must focus, following in the train of science.

Source for the quotes:

Alfred North Whitehead - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Process Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

 

[Soupie]

Do you think this is the explanation for terminal lucidity?

No.

 

[smcder]

I knew someone had made a connection!

http://www.ctr4process.org/publications/SeminarPapers/233howe.rtf

"Nietzsche and Whitehead on the Decadent Desire for Static Being"

Musings related to recent discussion of process and becoming vs being ... Makings of a Sunday morning sermon at the Church of What's Happening Now:

"To interpret reality with the categories of static Being is to presuppose that that which is really real is that which does not change.

Meaningfulness is equated with static, unchanging Being; transience is thought either to be unreal, having no effect on the substance or essence of an entity or is a quality only of those entities that are hierarchically very low on the scale of what is real. Furthermore, when Being is given ontological priority, finitude is thought to be one of the primary problems of human existence.

The finite is lacking and holds us back from that which really matters. This scheme has been present in many of the dominant strands of philosophy, Christian theology, and scientific materialism. Both Nietzsche and Whitehead are “philosophers of process,” by which I mean that for each the categories of process – such as, Becoming and change – are primary. I would like to discuss in some detail the manner in which Nietzsche and Whitehead see the effort at achieving a worldview that privileges static Being as decadent."

(I think of advertising in America as the art of constantly selling something new to those who don't want anything to change.)

Heraclitus and Buddhism both anticipate this view - Nietzsche gave Heraclitus at least props:

"... In whose proximity I feel altogether warmer and better than anywhere else"

The disease Nietzsche says Socrates suffers from is the same one the Buddha diagnosed mankind at large with - suffering as a result of clinging to what is constantly changing - his discovery of Dependent Origination and Nirvana was the solution.

Now the critique of Buddhism is that it's nihilistic and life denying ...

(Nietzsche was also accused of Nihilism but this article shows otherwise - and the Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is an almost rabid embrace of life as it is)

... In "Without Buddha I could not be a Christian"

First twenty or so pages available here:

http://www.columbia.edu/cu/tract/projects/inter-religious-dialogue/excerpt_from_without_buddha.pdf

Paul F Knitter argues that what Nirvana is, is the whole thing - thats the only unconditioned thing there could be and compassion is the result of this sense of the whole. This veers a little toward the Romantic interpretation of Buddhism but the emphasis is properly on the whole and on becoming.

What is static is the becomingness of the world - nirvana is samsara and vice versa.

"For Nietzsche, the ambiguous nature of the world of Becoming, with its lack of static Truth, grants the person a life of play, child-likeness, and dance.

Socrates required a certain defensive stance for life in the world. Only by saying No to appearance, the body, and Dionysus, thought Socrates, is one in a position to find Truth.

All of this, Nietzsche argues, weakens and impoverishes the person. The defensive stance of Socrates is unnecessary.

Nietzsche wants to show that “having quills is a waste of time, even a double luxury, when one can choose not to have quills, but open hands” (EH, “Why I am so Clever,” 8)."

The Buddha rejected asceticism but did call for renunciation of the world ... however he did advocate the Jhanna states of deep concentration as means to enlightenment and these are held to be deeply pleasurable but they are self limiting and do lead to equanimity and then to Nirvana and the absence of clinging and thus suffering.

Nietzsche in contrast offers the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence (a very old idea) as a grim test of life-affirmation (with an ultimately static conception of being)

Aphorism 341 of The Gay Science

"The Heaviest Burden. What if a demon crept after you into your loneliest loneliness some day or night, and said to you:

"This life, as you live it at present, and have lived it, you must live it once more, and also innumerable times; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh, and all the unspeakably small and great in thy life must come to you again, and all in the same series and sequence - and similarly this spider and this moonlight among the trees, and similarly this moment, and I myself. The eternal sand-glass of existence will ever be turned once more, and you with it, you speck of dust!" - Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth, and curse the demon that so spoke?

Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment in which you would answer him:

"You are a God, and never did I hear anything so divine!" If that thought acquired power over you as you are, it would transform you, and perhaps crush you; the question with regard to all and everything:

"Do you want this once more, and also for innumerable times?" would lie as the heaviest burden upon your activity! Or, how would you have to become favourably inclined to yourself and to life, so as to long for nothing more ardently than for this last eternal sanctioning and sealing?"

 

[smcder]

No.

So ... ?

 

[smcder]

Scientist should be studying the placebo effect rather than finding new drugs. It is the mind healing the body. Is the mind different than the soul? Is what we call the energy of a person the spirit of a person? (i.e.) that person has good energy.

The placebo and nocebo effects are fascinating and work even when you know what's going on ...

A couple of thoughts:

1. There is an interesting relationship with affective disorders - medication seems to treat the symptoms of depression that prevent one from regularly making one's office visits to the psychiatrist ;-)

(here, think Ritalin as a drug for teachers and parents)

What they don't treat is the subjective experience of depression - at best they allow one to get on with it while feeling lousy - depression is utterly subjective and anti-depressants tend to objectify it - no wonder compliance is low for these drugs.

CBT fares better but I often think we've overemphasized happiness anyway and what is most commonly treated as depression (a horrific experience) is nothing of the sort:

Against Happiness: In Praise of Melancholy:Amazon:Books

... As if it were a personal failing to have other than brief lapses of mood ...

2. What about the growing problem of placebo addiction? Will we have a war on placebos or should we legalize and make them widely available?

 

[smcder]

Mental illness and other conceptions of madness (psychiatry almost eliminated that term, ironically some who see themselves as survivors - reclaimed it) tie in with the paranormal but also present in themselves challenges to the problem of consciousness - but are rarely dealt with ... fear I think abd stigma but also we don't seem to ultimately know what to do with depression, suicide multiple personalities etc ...

These phenomena, like the paranormal, involve narrative (Jeff Kripal) and won't stay put. Genius too ...

Suicide implies self awareness - (so animals that seem capable of self destruction are as interesting as the Mirror Test) and either a certainty that it ends conscious experience for the individual - the calm suicide, or a way out in extreme distress but no certainty as to where, in more desperate cases.

It can be a reasonable decision and yet mental health authorities claim it's associated with mental illness in an overwhelming majority of cases ... even if the suicide itself is the only symptom of illness.

Finally, suicide and mental illness are distressingly common although statistics vary widely ... Is this an argument that evolution set itself a high goal in producing the human intellect? And if so what pressure drove development of the brain with such a high rate of "failure"?

Or is it an inevitable characteristic of intelligence and self awareness - the ability to question the supreme value of this life in this body?

On this view, does Ray Kurzweil seeks a type of suicide in uploading his consciousness to a machine? I remember the first part of Robocop 2 where each new candidate awakens in his cyborg body and immediately goes mad or commits suicide - will Kurzweill feel so horribly alienated "inside" his new machine body that he can't stand it? If he has robot arms he could end it all ... But if he is first uploaded to a virtual world, his handlers could leave him to suffer indefinitely.

Which, by the way, could be the fate for any particular AI contained in a virtual world we create ... Are we responsible for the mental health of what we create?

Suppose we decide to run a simulation of the Holocaust in this virtual world to quantify suffering or to learn from it or worse, as a video game widely distributed, each copy containing six million suffering entities ...

On current conceptions of consciousness this is all not only possible but the direct result of goals we see as desirable. Humans have proven that whatever they can do, they will do and it will be hard to regulate how people treat their virtual entities ... We can't even get good animal cruelty laws in place.