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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

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There appears to be a question why we need the brain to translate sensory input into information at all if Pharoah is correct in his conclusion that Mary can learn nothing new by leaving her black and white room and entering a world characterized by color.




By some coincidence I also read that article, yesterday (I thought about posting it here and maybe I did, but that's irrelevant). I know a man who suffers from phantom limb pain and have often wondered what causes it. Perhaps the medical scientist is correct, that the pain originates in scar tissue on the severed nerves. If so, it's one of Mother Nature's dirty tricks that someone who loses his leg at 21 should also have to suffer agonizing pain for the rest of his life. In any case, I'm not sure that a purely physical explanation can explain the pain.



I don't see how the distance of spacetime matters: one encounters (in this case sees) a phenomenon when one encounters it. Your last sentence seems to refer to one of Libet's experiments, which Libet himself interpreted very diffently from the way it was interpreted in the popular scientific press.



I know that's your point of view, very similar to Pharoah's. Can you identify the similarities and differences between his approach and yours?

My idea of information is quite different to Soupie's.

Soupie says:
Rather, I think these events produce physical effects that our bodies receive and translate into information that our bodies (brain and nervous system) use to generate/facilitate the mind.

Information is not some kind of data store 'that is accessed'. There are significant flaws with this notion - of information being structured and accessed from without.
Instead, what I say of information, is that a construct is informed by the nature of its dynamics - it is the information. So there is no accessing of information to be done. One can regard anything that has temporal existance as being informed of its environment by virtue of the fact that its interactions with the environment do not lead to its immediate demise. It is showing that its dynamic structure is informed about the environment by virtue of its ability to survive interaction and maintain its temporal dynamic existence. Thus evolution is the process by which dynamic constructs becoming increasingly sophisticated in their informed construction and therefore in the way they interact and relate with environment. There are hierarchical layers of informed construct emmanating (emerging and evolving) from matter, up to human awareness of these very principles of physicality.
 
I'm at a loss re the Mindless Babylonian Theory. What is the provenance of this theory?

I slogged through that Oesterdiekhoff paper and was dismayed by it. I was curious about his other publications and came across the one at the first link, in a journal apparently published by a reactionary think tank in Washington D.C. The second link goes to the organization's description of its goals and intentions in this journal

http://www.mankindquarterly.org/samples/MQLIV3_4_Oesterdiekhoff.pdf

http://www.mankindquarterly.org/about.html

It reminds me a little of The Bell Curve - by Herrnstein and Murray, 1994. You may remember there were some rather unpleasant implications of this work - claims that IQ reflected real, biological differences between groups of people.

Stephen J Gould challenged the book's logic in this essay:

Curveball

Gould's book The Mismeasure of Man came out in 1994 and was updated in 1996:

"The revised and expanded, second edition of the Mismeasure of Man (1996) analyzes and challenges the methodological accuracy of The Bell Curve (1994), by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, which re-presented the arguments of what Gould terms biological determinism, which he defines as "the abstraction of intelligence as a single entity, its location within the brain, its quantification as one number for each individual, and the use of these numbers to rank people in a single series of worthiness, invariably to find that oppressed and disadvantaged groups—races, classes, or sexes—are innately inferior and deserve their status."[4]"

The MBT is just my name for the idea that some ancient people didn't have a sense of self ... I've not been able to find a clear statement of this idea, just bits and pieces -

I'll try to find Soupie's original post and repost it. He had mentioned that some ancient peoples may have been child-like.
 
I'm at a loss re the Mindless Babylonian Theory. What is the provenance of this theory?

I slogged through that Oesterdiekhoff paper and was dismayed by it. I was curious about his other publications and came across the one at the first link, in a journal apparently published by a reactionary think tank in Washington D.C. The second link goes to the organization's description of its goals and intentions in this journal

http://www.mankindquarterly.org/samples/MQLIV3_4_Oesterdiekhoff.pdf

http://www.mankindquarterly.org/about.html

As I expected ... from the second link:

"The Mankind Quarterly is not and never has been afraid to publish articles in controversial areas, including behavioral group differences and the importance of mental ability for individual outcomes and group differences.

During the "Bell Curve wars" of the 1990s, it received more than its fair share of criticism when opponents realized that many of the works cited by Herrnstein and Murray had first been published in The Mankind Quarterly. However, this science has stood the test of time, and MQ is still prepared to publish controversial findings and theories."
 
Ive gotten plenty of things confused in this thread. :D

Regarding the idea of emptiness/nothingness; one way that I have conceptualized it for myself is, again, my idea that when we experience green or love or pain... It's really not a mental subject/self having these experiences, but rather we are the green, the love, the pain.

I recall again the quote by W. James that consciousness is like a container. (@Constance, I saw that quote in one of the SEP entries on monism. I'll try to find soon.) Unless there is an experience, there is no mind. The mind = experience. There is no self apart from experience.

To me, that is the nothingness they "we" are; we are whatever we experience. We are everything.

Re the mindless Babylonians

Another thought is that their different experience of subjective experience might be related to their relationship with nature. So they may have conceived as their inner dialogue as coming from god or ancestors, or perhaps nature itself (but I don't think they would have thought of it that way).

I don't think they thought of themselves as free-willed individuals in the same way as modern humans do.

In some ways, they may have been childish; children can say, do, and think incredible brilliant things, but at the very same time lack insight and the ability to self-reflect (to the extent that a modern adult can).

@Constance - this was the original post ...
 
@Pharoah

It seems your argument is similar enough to Flanagan's (based on "metaphysical" vs "linguistic" physicalism) to raise the same objection:

"It may be argued against this view that it becomes hard to understand what it is for a property or a fact to be physical once we drop the assumption that physical properties and physical facts are just those properties and facts that can be expressed in physical terminology."

It seems to me this just pushes the hard problem into conceptually unknowable structures ...

so you can't, by definition, prove this is where phenomenal experience arises ...

it's just the only physical place left for it to be, but that doesn't prove physicalism.

it also seems this might be a form of Mysterianism?

Physicalism is not something one proves. Physicalism is something to be argued false.
Put another way, To be found not guilty is not to be found innocent.

you say, "It seems to me this just pushes the hard problem into conceptually unknowable structures "
It does push the hard problem into another place that seems conceptually unknowble - but I like to think this may not be the case. I address this in my noumenon paper. I also have another take on the unknowable that I have not yet published which I am rather excited about - it is just a notion with no substance really... like my noumenon thoughts. I would like to run the idea past everyone here - It's on my to do list.
 
As I said earlier today: :), and I want to add ;). I wanted to respond in words to the next part of your post but couldn't because my keypad had breathed its last and I was reduced to being able only to cut and paste links. So . . .




I think it's definitely Stevens's difficulty and accounts for various aspects of the poetry that would take a long time to point out with examples. But I think it's also the difficulty of any thinker or artist who reflects on his or her experience in the world more than superficially (i.e., in terms of what Husserl referred to as 'the natural attitude'). This is of course the position of naive dualism: "I" am inside myself and "the world" is out there, separate from me. Individuals who spend time in 'reflective consciousness', analyzing their experiences in terms of that which is presented in the environment and that which ensues in the form of feeling and thought, recognize the first level of their unavoidable interconnection with the sensually palpable world. They also begin to realize the various ways in which they respond to what presents itself in their perception of things and the behavior of others in the world, many instances of which cannot be perceived without immediately involving emotions along a broad spectrum of possible responses from felt affirmation to felt revulsion and rejection. If we look at the responses of even very young children to witnessing certain things (e.g., the abuse of animals or other children, or the helplessness of wild creatures such as young birds on the ground that cannot fly) we understand that these feelings do not depend on conceptual reasoning or attitudes picked up from their parents but on an instinctive sense of values -- rightness and wrongness in things, beings, and their behavior -- in other words felt meaning in the world and also one's felt involvement in it.

What is perceived in the world calls forth responses before it is understood, in children and also in primordial consciousness according to Heidegger, MP, and other phenomenologists. I think the sense of a 'self', of one's having an individual continuous and unified presence in the world, arises in our prehistory and history from the very ground of our sense of being in relation to the 'world', of Dasein (being-in-the-world), which is a distinct sense of presence to, with, and in the world that precedes systematic thinking. I think it is precisely this active sense of presence as 'compresence' that modern humans have increasingly lost in the dominant reductive ideas and ideologies of the modern world. Our planetary ecological crisis is the most vivid expression of this loss. Before I write all night (on my wonderfully functional new keyboard), I'll recommend this excellent book again:


Amazon.com Review
David Abram's writing casts a spell of its own as he weaves the reader through a meticulously researched work that gently addresses such seemingly daunting topics as where the past and future exist, the relationship between space and time, and how the written word serves to sever humans from their primordial source of sustenance: the earth.

"Only as the written text began to speak would the voices of the forest, and of the river, begin to fade. And only then would language loosen its ancient associations with the invisible breath, the spirit sever itself from the wind, the psyche dissociate itself from the environing air," writes Abram of the separation caused by the proliferation of the written word.

In writing The Spell of the Sensuous, Abram consulted an engaging collection of peoples and works. He uses aboriginal song lines, stories from the Koyukon people of northwestern Alaska, the philosophy of phenomenology, and the speeches of Socrates to paint a poetic landscape that explains how we became separated from the earth in the first place. With minimal environmental doomsaying, Abram discusses how we can begin to recover a sustainable relationship with the earth and the nonhuman beings who live among us--in the more-than-human world. --Kathryn True


From Publishers Weekly
How did Western civilization become so estranged from nonhuman nature that we condone the ongoing destruction of forests, rivers, valleys, species and ecosystems? Santa Fe ecologist/philosopher Abram's search for an answer to this dilemma led him to mingle with shamans in Nepal and sorcerers in Indonesia, where he studied how traditional healers monitor relations between the human community and the animate environment. In this stimulating inquiry, he also delves into the philosophy of phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who replaced the conventional view of a single, wholly determinable reality with a fluid picture of the mind/body as a participatory organism that reciprocally interacts with its surroundings. Abram blames the invention of the phonetic alphabet for triggering a trend toward increasing abstraction and alienation from nature. He gleans insights into how to heal the rift from Australian aborigines' concept of the Dreamtime (the perpetual emerging of the world from chaos), the Navajo concept of a Holy Wind and the importance of breath in Jewish mysticism.

Put down your books; learn to read the world around you. . .
By Ruth Henriquez Lyon VINE VOICE on January 15, 2001

The Spell of the Sensuous reveals how our Western worldview has evolved to be based on literacy, abstract thought, and separation from the body. By "the body" I mean not just our individual, animal bodies, but the body of the earth and the material cosmos. By removing ourselves from this sensuous realm, we have lost the connection to "the living dream that we share with the soaring hawk, the spider, and the stone silently sprouting lichens on its coarse surface."

There is a paradox here, because Abrams' book exposes the drawbacks of literacy and abstract, logical thinking. But it is itself a piece of very well-argued written discourse. However, it works, and not just because Abrams' arguments are so convincing. Part of their power stems from the fact that Abrams is an artist; he has the gift of using words and imagery that can reach below the logical brain to inspire a more direct way of perceiving the world. The result is a book which is a moving combination of philosophical writing and pure poetry.

Abrams works from a phenomenological standpoint, and the book begins with a discussion of phenomenology's history and major ideas.* This is a readable and unintimidating introduction to the subject. Abrams then proceeds to show how, starting at the time of alphabetization, the Western mind began to grow away from direct physical knowing of the world and toward abstract, conceptual representations. Our language became removed from nature, and helped us to remove ourselves from it and to inhabit an almost entirely human-centered world.

As a counterpoint to the Western use of language, Abrams goes on to show how people in non-literate cultures use language as a way to connect with the body and the physical realm. In these oral cultures language "is experienced not as the exclusive property of humankind, but as a property of the sensuous life-world." In other words, the world--the animals, plants, stones, wind--speaks a language that most of us can no longer hear. Abrams explores indigenous oral poetry and stories to illustrate this entirely other way of experiencing language.

My first reading of this book triggered a conversion of sorts. It spun me 180 degrees, from the world of concepts to the world of immediate perception. I'm on my third reading now and still incorporating teachings passed over previously. I am finding that returning my gaze to the uninterpreted physical world is a difficult practice, as I have been conditioned (like most Westerners) to run my experience through a filter of concepts and judgments. But, like meditation, this practice can help to loosen one's psyche from its "mind-forg'd manacles." For this reason, The Spell of the Sensuous is really a manual for liberating one's inner and outer vision.

*Phenomenology is the study of how we experience consciousness. Unlike many branches of philosophy which rely on arguments built in logical steps, phenomenology is more about how we perceive and feel the immediate play of events around and within ourselves. Thus it is less abstract and more experiential than many branches of philosophy.

Have you thought any about a blog?

The book and it's ideas about language remind me again of The Master and His Emissary by McGilChrist ...

A brief description of The Master and his Emissary by Iain McGilchrist

... he feels the left hemisphere has become dominant in Western society and this connects with the argument in your post about language and becoming abstracted from the environment.

He also argues that the division between the hemispheres (corpus collosum) has grown thinner over time, allowing the Master less control over the Emissary:

"This book argues that the differences lie not, as has been supposed, in the 'what' - which skills each hemisphere possesses - but in the 'how', the way in which each uses them, and to what end. But, like the brain itself, the relationship between the hemispheres is not symmetrical.

The left hemisphere, though unaware of its dependence, could be thought of as an 'emissary' of the right hemisphere, valuable for taking on a role that the right hemisphere - the 'Master' - cannot itself afford to undertake. However it turns out that the emissary has his own will, and secretly believes himself to be superior to the Master. And he has the means to betray him. What he doesn't realize is that in doing so he will also betray himself.

The book begins by looking at the structure and function of the brain, and at the differences between the hemispheres, not only in attention and flexibility, but in attitudes to the implicit, the unique, and the personal, as well as the body, time, depth, music, metaphor, empathy, morality, certainty and the self.

It suggests that the drive to language was not principally to do with communication or thought, but manipulation, the main aim of the left hemisphere, which manipulates the right hand.

It shows the hemispheres as no mere machines with functions, but underwriting whole, self-consistent, versions of the world.

Through an examination of Western philosophy, art and literature, it reveals the uneasy relationship of the hemispheres being played out in the history of ideas, from ancient times until the present. It ends by suggesting that we may be about to witness the final triumph of the left hemisphere – at the expense of us all. "
 
@Constance


2:00

"Only when the alphabet comes into a culture ... the phonetic alphabet, only then does that culture get this odd notion that language is an exclusively human property or possession and the rest of the land falls mute."

He says this is less the case with idiographic forms of writing ...

I have his book on my wish list.
 
My idea of information is quite different to Soupie's.

Soupie says: "Rather, I think these events produce physical effects that our bodies receive and translate into information that our bodies (brain and nervous system) use to generate/facilitate the mind."

Information is not some kind of data store 'that is accessed'. There are significant flaws with this notion - of information being structured and accessed from without.
Hm, I'm not sure where this concept is being picked up in my writing... @Constance seems to have understood that I was suggesting this as well, when she writes:
Constance said:
Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2 | Page 25 | The Paracast Community Forums

I'm trying to point out that the evolution of brains and CNSs is not the linear unfolding of predetermined 'information' in each species, but a process involving the experiential conditions impinging on the lives of animals and their evolution through adaptations to changing conditions.
To be clear, I'm not suggesting the mind (of any organism) comes from "external" or "predetermined" information.

I'm saying the mind of an organism is information. This information is produced by the brain on the fly, i.e. continuously and dynamically.

As Dr. Ramachandren says:
Why Do Amputees Feel the Ache of Nothingness? - Facts So Romantic - Nautilus

[W]e should consider an amputee’s perception of a twinge in his missing leg as akin to his perception of the red color of a fire engine. In color vision, the cone cells in the retina respond to the wavelengths of light, but “the final perception of color depends on the brain.”
I've tried to give countless examples of how I believe (conceptually) the brain generates (or facilitates) the mind. I have focused mostly on the phenomenal, sensual aspects of mind so far, but note that I don't think the mind consists only of phenomenal aspects.

Here's another example (you'll note that it's very similar to my falling tree example):
1) An organism exists. A thunder cloud exists. The thunder cloud is above the organism. A physical event we call lighting and a physical event we call thunder occur.

2) The physical light waves and sound waves physically move through space and time and arrive at the organism.

3) The organism receives the physical light and sound waves with its sensory organs, its eyes and ears.

4) These sense organs being the process of -- on the fly -- translating these physical events into information (possibly neuronal spikes or some other mechanism). This information is processed, shaped, and integrated into a temporal structure we recognize as the phenomenal experience of light and sound.
Contrast this with the following:
1) A thunder cloud exists. A physical event we call lighting and a physical event we call thunder occur.

2) The physical light waves and sound waves physically move through space and time. They are not received by anything.

3) There is no phenomenal experience of light and sound.
Re: Pharoah's ideas and my ideas:

Pharoah's ideas are vastly more developed than mine. He is also extremely more well-read regarding philosophy of mind, etc. So, I wouldn't presume to compare any of my yammering to anything he has written, haha. And, other than his essay on emergent processes versus properties, I haven't read any of his works. I do plan to though.

So, I can't really say whether my ideas about consciousness are compatible with his. However, it does appear, perhaps, that he disagrees with my conception of the role information has in consciousness.
 
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Hm, I'm not sure where this concept is being picked up in my writing... @Constance seems to have understood that I was suggesting this as well, when she writes:
To be clear, I'm not suggesting the mind (of any organism) comes from "external" or "predetermined" information.

I'm saying the mind of an organism is information. This information is produced by the brain on the fly, i.e. continuously and dynamically.

As Dr. Ramachandren says:
I've tried to give countless examples of how I believe (conceptually) the brain generates (or facilitates) the mind. I have focused mostly on the phenomenal, sensual aspects of mind so far, but note that I don't think the mind consists only of phenomenal aspects.

Here's another example (you'll note that it's very similar to my falling tree example):
Contrast this with the following:
Re: Pharoah's ideas and my ideas:

Pharoah's ideas are vastly more developed than mine. He is also extremely more well-read regarding philosophy of mind, etc. So, I wouldn't presume to compare any of my yammering to anything he has written, haha. And, other than his essay on emergent processes versus properties, I haven't read any of his works. I do plan to though.

So, I can't really say whether my ideas about consciousness are compatible with his. However, it does appear, perhaps, that he disagrees with my conception of the role information has in consciousness.

Soupie: I stand corrected. I was responding to Constance's interpretation of your stance on information.
Information is a difficult subject to address and to be articulate about, especially when one tries to relate it to subjective characteristics associated with mental phenomena. Both Chalmers and Dennett have said that it is a key component for a coherent theory of consciousness. I agree with them. The difficulty is putting the jigsaw together.
 
@Constance


2:00

"Only when the alphabet comes into a culture ... the phonetic alphabet, only then does that culture get this odd notion that language is an exclusively human property or possession and the rest of the land falls mute."

He says this is less the case with idiographic forms of writing ...

I have his book on my wish list.
Fascinating.

It's often noted that children and adults see the world differently. Indeed, it could be said that children do see the world as animate. I wonder how much of this difference is developmental, and how much may be due to this phenomenon Dr. Abram identifies.

I'll have to read more about this. I'm curious how the alphabet (words?) can shape ones thinking. I don't doubt that it can, but I'm not sure how the alphabet does this...

When I think, I don't think via letters, I think via words (concepts). I'm not sure how someone using an idiographic writing system would think differently... Do they not think via words? Do they think via images alone?

Letters and words are definitely more abstract than images.

We've talked before about how conceptual/language thinking (Keller) has profoundly effected humans. Perhaps the alphabet raises this conceptual thinking to an higher level of abstraction.
 
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@Constance


2:00

"Only when the alphabet comes into a culture ... the phonetic alphabet, only then does that culture get this odd notion that language is an exclusively human property or possession and the rest of the land falls mute."

He says this is less the case with idiographic forms of writing ...

I have his book on my wish list.
Whitehead pointed to the limitations of language as one of the main culprits in maintaining a materialistic way of thinking, and acknowledged that it may be difficult to ever wholly move past such ideas in everyday speech.[110] After all, each moment of each person's life can hardly be given a different proper name, and it is easy and convenient to think of people and objects as remaining fundamentally the same things, rather than constantly keeping in mind that each thing is a different thing from what it was a moment ago. Yet the limitations of everyday living and everyday speech should not prevent people from realizing that "material substances" or "essences" are a convenient generalized description of a continuum of particular, concrete processes. No one questions that a ten-year-old person is quite different by the time he or she turns thirty years old, and in many ways is not the same person at all; Whitehead points out that it is not philosophically or ontologically sound to think that a person is the same from one second to the next.
 
Followup q&a to the posting between Pharoah and me on page ten of this thread:

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2


Reading several posts that followed the above, I find myself wondering why, given that you conceive of 'intentionality' existing in physical systems -- ostensibly for the purpose of maintaining their own integrity or inner order against chaos intruding from outside of them -- you cannot conceive of intentionality operating in the phenomenal consciousness of humans interacting with the local world in which they find themselves existing. As we know from chaos theory, dissipative physical systems coming into contact with other such systems experience a period of chaos following which a newly integrated order emerges from their interaction. This process apparently involves phenomenal awareness {a 'prehension' in Whitehead's term} by System A of the proximity and difference of System B. The exchange of information takes place, generates chaos, then generates a shared/integrated order. How is this significantly different from what takes place between the human subject and phenomena encountered in the physical world which the subject comes into contact with by virtue of his/her own intentionality? I use the word 'significantly' to signal that in both cases a semiotic exchange (an exchange of information if you like) takes place. Both exchanges can be understood as "occasions of experience," events in the evolution of the world (Whitehead again). Human thinking through phenomenal experience is a high-water mark in the evolution of life to date. Yet you wish to divide thinking by humans from phenomenal experience of humans. How have philosophers who see phenomenal experience as involving conceptual thought responded to your theory?

Constance, you ask me why I can't "conceive of intentionality operating in the phenomenal consciousness of humans interacting with the local world in which they find themselves existing."
I can and do. There is a misunderstanding if you are of the impression that I think otherwise. Is there a particular passage of my writing that gives this idea?

"This process apparently involves phenomenal awareness"
I would not use the term "phenomenal awareness". I regard phenomenal awareness as a high-order feature - otherwise one ends up with panpsychism. Alternatively, HCT identifies emergent transcendent distinctions. Nevertheless, I think I understand how you are using the term in the context of what you are saying - and in this assumed contextual meaning only, I agree with your train of thought.

"How is this significantly different from what takes place between the human subject and phenomena encountered in the physical world which the subject comes into contact with by virtue of his/her own intentionality?... in both cases a semiotic exchange (an exchange of information if you like) takes place."

It is not significantly different, in so far as there is an exchange of information (but notably, only with true systems-constructs). But let me address this query as follows:

Non-human animals think in so far as their neural mechanisms assimilate sensory experience, evaluate its relevancy and prioritise thought processing and action. This 'thinking' leads to the phenomenon, of 'feeling' motivated to thought, action, and enact emotive gestures and utterances. But for such animals this is their limitation, for they possess no other inclinations. The situation for humans, needless to say, is markedly different. 3.5 million years ago a new capability emerged as the cognitive processing of experience became increasingly sophisticated. This capability is an extension above and beyond phenomenal experience and all the thought, behaviour, and communication that comes with it. This is a transcendent capability that leads to creative thought, language, self realisation and so on. The emergent change was in essence, from one of evaluating experience, to that of questioning experience. Bear in mind however, that you don't need language skills to have concepts in the mind from which a question can be realised in thought. But notably, with the thought, follows the inclination - the inclination to form those questions about the objects of one's observation and their relation to other objects and consequences; and to do this, ultimately does demand - indeed compel - the formation of the formal structures of languages.
 
My idea of information is quite different to Soupie's.

Soupie says:
Rather, I think these events produce physical effects that our bodies receive and translate into information that our bodies (brain and nervous system) use to generate/facilitate the mind.

Information is not some kind of data store 'that is accessed'. There are significant flaws with this notion - of information being structured and accessed from without.
Instead, what I say of information, is that a construct is informed by the nature of its dynamics - it is the information.


What you're saying about informational 'constructs' developing hierarchically in the evolution of nature including life is clear enough in itself. And I don't think it's equivalent to the kinds of statements Soupie makes concerning his own view of information as generating (producing) both experiences and mind. But my impression is that both of your ideas are similar enough that they could be fruitfully compared and distinguished from one another by the two of you. In both of your theories, most of what is described as happening in consciousness and mind seems to take place beneath the waterline of 'awareness', for lack of a better word. This seems to be the case in Tononi's theory as well. I see you've just this moment posted a response to another post of mine concerning the subject of awareness, which I'll respond to next.

{A further note I meant to add here: Soupie is an advocate of Tononi's Integrated Information Theory. I haven't yet seen anything you've written on IIT, but perhaps a comparison of Soupie's and your responses to it would be helpful in distinguishing your ideas. I also want to repost below the rest of the post from you that I've been responding to.}


So there is no accessing of information to be done. One can regard anything that has temporal existance as being informed of its environment by virtue of the fact that its interactions with the environment do not lead to its immediate demise. It is showing that its dynamic structure is informed about the environment by virtue of its ability to survive interaction and maintain its temporal dynamic existence. Thus evolution is the process by which dynamic constructs becoming increasingly sophisticated in their informed construction and therefore in the way they interact and relate with environment. There are hierarchical layers of informed construct emmanating (emerging and evolving) from matter, up to human awareness of these very principles of physicality.
 
Constance, you ask me why I can't "conceive of intentionality operating in the phenomenal consciousness of humans interacting with the local world in which they find themselves existing."
I can and do. There is a misunderstanding if you are of the impression that I think otherwise. Is there a particular passage of my writing that gives this idea?

I haven't (by far) read everything you've written, Pharoah. I confess that I usually find reading you to be difficult and ultimately tiring because you remain continuously at very high levels of abstractness. Not so in what follows in your most recent post. You noted in another post since yesterday that 'information' is a very difficult concept in need of much further clarification. I think that is the core of the problem I have with your, Soupie's, and Tononi's informational systems theories in general -- they remain at high levels of abstraction from 'reality as it is lived' by humans and other animals..

"This process apparently involves phenomenal awareness"
I would not use the term "phenomenal awareness". I regard phenomenal awareness as a high-order feature - otherwise one ends up with panpsychism.

Is it fatal to end up with panpsychism, panprotopsychism, or panexperientialism? Fatal to whom, or to what philosophical presuppositions? (or indeed to what linguistic presuppositions?)

Alternatively, HCT identifies emergent transcendent distinctions. Nevertheless, I think I understand how you are using the term in the context of what you are saying - and in this assumed contextual meaning only, I agree with your train of thought.

You mean "in this assumed contextual meaning of 'awareness'"? Does that mean that you recognize the question of awareness of 'self' and 'environment' in the evolution of consciousness from below the waterline to above it? {is something lost to the ground of consciousness in remaining above the waterline?}

I had written and you quote the following:

"How is this [interaction and integration of information in the quantum substrate] significantly different from what takes place between the human subject and phenomena encountered in the physical world which the subject comes into contact with by virtue of his/her own intentionality?... in both cases a semiotic exchange (an exchange of information if you like) takes place."


It is not significantly different, in so far as there is an exchange of information (but notably, only with true systems-constructs). But let me address this query as follows:

Non-human animals think in so far as their neural mechanisms assimilate sensory experience, evaluate its relevancy and prioritise thought processing and action. This 'thinking' leads to the phenomenon, of 'feeling' motivated to thought, action, and enact[ing of] [?} emotive gestures and utterances. But for such animals this is their limitation, for they possess no other inclinations. The situation for humans, needless to say, is markedly different. 3.5 million years ago a new capability emerged [began? took root?] as the cognitive processing of experience became increasingly sophisticated. This capability is an extension above and beyond phenomenal experience and all the thought, behaviour, and communication that comes with it. This is a transcendent capability that leads to creative thought, language, self realisation and so on. The emergent change was in essence, from one of evaluating experience, to that of questioning experience. Bear in mind however, that you don't need language skills to have concepts in the mind from which a question can be realised in thought. But notably, with the thought, follows the inclination - the inclination to form those questions about the objects of one's observation and their relation to other objects and consequences; and to do this, ultimately does demand - indeed compel - the formation of the formal structures of languages.


That's a fascinating paragraph in the extent to which you seem to be providing grounds for panpsychism. I'm especially interested in the conclusion of the paragraph which begins with the statement that "you don't need language skills to have concepts in the mind from which a question can be realised in thought." I think it's time that we as a group of discussants might fruitfully turn to the subject of language, the linguistic turn in philosophy, and the confusions that have resulted in it.
 
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What you're saying about informational 'constructs' developing hierarchically in the evolution of nature including life is clear enough in itself. And I don't think it's equivalent to the kinds of statements Soupie makes concerning his own view of information as generating (producing) both experiences and mind. But my impression is that both of your ideas are similar enough that they could be fruitfully compared and distinguished from one another by the two of you. In both of your theories, most of what is described as happening in consciousness and mind seems to take place beneath the waterline of 'awareness', for lack of a better word. This seems to be the case in Tononi's theory as well. I see you've just this moment posted a response to another post of mine concerning the subject of awareness, which I'll respond to next.

{A further note I meant to add here: Soupie is an advocate of Tononi's Integrated Information Theory. I haven't yet seen anything you've written on IIT, but perhaps a comparison of Soupie's and your responses to it would be helpful in distinguishing your ideas. I also want to repost below the rest of the post from you that I've been responding to.}
IIT is regressive. I see no merit in it. How about u Soupie? Tell me what I'm missing
 
"This process apparently involves phenomenal awareness"
I would not use the term "phenomenal awareness". I regard phenomenal awareness as a high-order feature - otherwise one ends up with panpsychism.

Is it fatal to end up with panpsychism, panprotopsychism, or panexperientialism? Fatal to whom, or to what philosophical presuppositions? (or indeed to what linguistic presuppositions?)


So who's up on Chomsky?
 
Physicalism is not something one proves. Physicalism is something to be argued false.
Put another way, To be found not guilty is not to be found innocent.

Pithy, but less than words could say to help others understand your essential claim.

Steve wrote: "It seems your argument is similar enough to Flanagan's (based on "metaphysical" vs "linguistic" physicalism) to raise the same objection:

"It may be argued against this view that it becomes hard to understand what it is for a property or a fact to be physical once we drop the assumption that physical properties and physical facts are just those properties and facts that can be expressed in physical terminology."

It seems to me this just pushes the hard problem into conceptually unknowable structures ...
so you can't, by definition, prove this is where phenomenal experience arises ...
it's just the only physical place left for it to be, but that doesn't prove physicalism.


it also seems this might be a form of Mysterianism?"

I agree.

It does push the hard problem into another place that seems conceptually unknowble - but I like to think this may not be the case. I address this in my noumenon paper. I also have another take on the unknowable that I have not yet published which I am rather excited about - it is just a notion with no substance really... like my noumenon thoughts. I would like to run the idea past everyone here - It's on my to do list.

That would/will be interesting.
 
Pithy, but less than words could say to help others understand your essential claim.

Steve wrote: "It seems your argument is similar enough to Flanagan's (based on "metaphysical" vs "linguistic" physicalism) to raise the same objection:

It seems to me this just pushes the hard problem into conceptually unknowable structures ...
so you can't, by definition, prove this is where phenomenal experience arises ...
it's just the only physical place left for it to be, but that doesn't prove physicalism.


it also seems this might be a form of Mysterianism?"

I agree.

That would/will be interesting.

Pithy? Is that good or bad pithy? - I don't like to be verbose! :)
If you prove something isn't physical, physicalism is disproved.
If you prove something is physical, physicalism is not proved.
So... you can't prove physicalism, because not everything can be proved physical. But theoretically, you could disprove physicalism, by proving that something is not physical.
It is like a court of law. You can prove someone is guilty (beyond reasonable doubt) but you can't prove someone innocent by virtue of them being found not guilty.
Is that better?

re: Constance thread 557, "That would be interesting".
In a nutshell this is the germ of the idea:
1. All systems-constructs have properties - often unexpressed. I appreciate that 'properties' is an abstract notion, so I would have to explain that.
2. The characteristics of a system's properties are revealed only to higher level constructs during systems interaction. For example, by way of de-abstraction... NaCl has certain properties. It does not recognise these properties in itself. But a higher level construct (such as a human) does recognise some of them. One such property humans call "salty".
3. The experience we understand to be consciousness, is a systems-construct.
4. Therefore consciousness must have properties.
5. These properties cannot be revealed to the conscious self.
6. The properties can only be revealed to a higher level construct.
7. The higher level construct does not exist yet, as far as I know.
8. We can assume that consciousness has properties which are knowable only to a higher level construct of physical nature that does not yet exist.
9. The question is, which of us are sweet and which of us are salty?
)))

thread 554: Constance said,
"That's a fascinating paragraph in the extent to which you seem to be providing grounds for panpsychism."
re. me saying:
"Non-human animals think in so far as their neural mechanisms assimilate sensory experience, evaluate its relevancy and prioritise thought processing and action. This 'thinking' leads to the phenomenon, of 'feeling' motivated to thought, action, and enacting of emotive gestures and utterances. But for such animals this is their limitation, for they possess no other inclinations. The situation for humans, needless to say, is markedly different. 3.5 million years ago a new capability emerged as the cognitive processing of experience became increasingly sophisticated. This capability is an extension above and beyond phenomenal experience and all the thought, behaviour, and communication that comes with it. This is a transcendent capability that leads to creative thought, language, self realisation and so on. The emergent change was in essence, from one of evaluating experience, to that of questioning experience. Bear in mind however, that you don't need language skills to have concepts in the mind from which a question can be realised in thought. But notably, with the thought, follows the inclination - the inclination to form those questions about the objects of one's observation and their relation to other objects and consequences; and to do this, ultimately does demand - indeed compel - the formation of the formal structures of languages."

Tell me you not trying to wind me up Constance - Where I come from people point and giggle at the talk of panpsychism... Why do you think Galen left the country for the US? (actually, it might have got something to do with getting paid)
 
My idea of information is quite different to Soupie's.

Soupie says:
Rather, I think these events produce physical effects that our bodies receive and translate into information that our bodies (brain and nervous system) use to generate/facilitate the mind.

Information is not some kind of data store 'that is accessed'. There are significant flaws with this notion - of information being structured and accessed from without.

Instead, what I say of information, is that a construct is informed by the nature of its dynamics - it is the information. So there is no accessing of information to be done. One can regard anything that has temporal existance as being informed of its environment by virtue of the fact that its interactions with the environment do not lead to its immediate demise. It is showing that its dynamic structure is informed about the environment by virtue of its ability to survive interaction and maintain its temporal dynamic existence. Thus evolution is the process by which dynamic constructs becoming increasingly sophisticated in their informed construction and therefore in the way they interact and relate with environment. There are hierarchical layers of informed construct emmanating (emerging and evolving) from matter, up to human awareness of these very principles of physicality.

Repeated with emphasis and questions added:

"It [the evolving organism?] is showing that its dynamic structure is informed about the environment by virtue of its ability to survive interaction and maintain its temporal dynamic existence. Thus evolution is the process by which dynamic constructs becoming [become] increasingly sophisticated in their informed construction and therefore in the way they interact and relate with environment. {The constructs interact with the environment?} There are hierarchical layers of informed construct emmanating (emerging and evolving) from matter, up to human awareness of these very principles of physicality."

As you see from what I've highlighted in blue there is ambiguity in what you appear to be saying about what evolves and how it evolves. At the level of abstract surmises about the evolution of purely physical systems, it's reasonable to say that those systems of interaction and integration of information evolve from the quantum substrate up to the level of classical reality. But a [suppressed] problem arises as soon as life, living organisms, arrive on the scene. Thus between your first statement (where it appears that you are describing 'informed' organisms) and your second statement {where your subject becomes the evolution of informational 'constructs' contained in the physical level of being itself, that which phenomenologists refer to as 'brute being'}, a lacuna opens up between the subjective and objective poles of reality that are integrated in phenomena -- bodied forth in experience. Neither we nor other animals need abstract conceptual thought to know that we have experience in the phenomenal world and to act in accordance with it. Perhaps I'm incorrect in this observation (and in that case you can further enlighten me), but it seems to me that your theory distances -- by mechanizing as wholly objective and beneath awareness -- the phenomenal processes of evolution that are expressed in the biological evolution of species of life, consciousness, and mind.

Perhaps the answer is as simple as this: evolving creatures are 'informed' by processes in nature -- interactions and integrations of information beginning in the quantum substrate and producing increasing complexity* -- but at each stage of development they increase by increments in their appreciation (awareness, sense) of their own being and that of the environment in which they maintain their existence and gradually come into purposeful interaction with the surrounding world [ecological niche] available to them. Exchanges of information in a fuller, more experiential, sense evidently take place in the phenomenal experience of evolving animals; they are not automatons any more than we are.
 
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Pithy? Is that good or bad pithy? - I don't like to be verbose! :)
If you prove something isn't physical, physicalism is disproved.
If you prove something is physical, physicalism is not proved.
So... you can't prove physicalism, because not everything can be proved physical. But theoretically, you could disprove physicalism, by proving that something is not physical.


Is that better?

Yes, thanks.
Your original version was too pithy for me, but the point is obvious now that you've added the sentences in blue. If I spent more time interacting with physicalists I might have groked your original statement.



re: Constance thread 557, "That would be interesting".
In a nutshell this is the germ of the idea:
1. All systems-constructs have properties - often unexpressed. I appreciate that 'properties' is an abstract notion, so I would have to explain that.
2. The characteristics of a system's properties are revealed only to higher level constructs during systems interaction. For example, by way of de-abstraction... NaCl has certain properties. It does not recognise these properties in itself. But a higher level construct (such as a human) does recognise some of them. One such property humans call "salty".
3. The experience we understand to be consciousness, is a systems-construct.
4. Therefore consciousness must have properties.
5. These properties cannot be revealed to the conscious self.
6. The properties can only be revealed to a higher level construct.
7. The higher level construct does not exist yet, as far as I know.
8. We can assume that consciousness has properties which are knowable only to a higher level construct of physical nature that does not yet exist.
9. The question is, which of us are sweet and which of us are salty?
)))

Points 3 and 8 are especially interesting. Your eight claims appear to be quite orderly as a sequence of propositions, but what is your evidence for the critical third point, that consciousness can be explained by systems theory? I realize that you carefully worded the noun phrase as "the experience we understand to be consciousness," but obviously not everyone agrees with what 'you understand to be consciousness'.


thread 554: Constance said,
"That's a fascinating paragraph in the extent to which you seem to be providing grounds for panpsychism."
re. me saying:
"Non-human animals think in so far as their neural mechanisms assimilate sensory experience, evaluate its relevancy and prioritise thought processing and action. This 'thinking' leads to the phenomenon, of 'feeling' motivated to thought, action, and enacting of emotive gestures and utterances. But for such animals this is their limitation, for they possess no other inclinations. The situation for humans, needless to say, is markedly different. 3.5 million years ago a new capability emerged as the cognitive processing of experience became increasingly sophisticated. This capability is an extension above and beyond phenomenal experience and all the thought, behaviour, and communication that comes with it. This is a transcendent capability that leads to creative thought, language, self realisation and so on. The emergent change was in essence, from one of evaluating experience, to that of questioning experience. Bear in mind however, that you don't need language skills to have concepts in the mind from which a question can be realised in thought. But notably, with the thought, follows the inclination - the inclination to form those questions about the objects of one's observation and their relation to other objects and consequences; and to do this, ultimately does demand - indeed compel - the formation of the formal structures of languages."

I've responded to that paragraph in a cross-post, which will be available to you now. I would say that what you have written in the underscored lines in that paragraph does suggest grounds for contemplating panpsychism.

Tell me you not trying to wind me up Constance - Where I come from people point and giggle at the talk of panpsychism... Why do you think Galen left the country for the US? (actually, it might have got something to do with getting paid)[/QUOTE]

Do they? You should probably get out of that country/culture more.
 
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