Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

[Soupie]

Right. What did you think I was saying?

I had just never visualized it from the "integrated information" perspective before.

 

[smcder]

I had just never visualized it from the "integrated information" perspective before.

Ahhh ... well, it's a good thing I kept bringing it up then.

 

[Constance]

That's just scientific hand waving! ;-)

Seriously, I don't think anyone here is saying that about mystical "stuff " ... as Soupie has said matter is "ethereal" enough on its own and saying everything is made of matter doesn't of itself rule very much out ...

Yes, that recognition that Soupie articulated is most sigificant, a consequence of the quantum revolution still in progress in science. It led to the replacement as often as possible of the term 'material' with the term 'physical' to describe quantum systems deep/foundational in nature. The concept of 'information' as foundational in nature is more recent and the question 'what is information' remains to be asked and adequately answered. The posts here tonight have been excellent and are approaching this question. Steve's question at the end of one of his last posts (the one copied here) points to an ideal entree into having that discussion. I've highlighted it in blue below, at the end of his quoted post..

The hard problem has been the core of this discussion from the beginning and we've looked at a lot of possibilities.

So where your thinking has ended until further evidence comes in is exactly where we've started speculating.

The value of that? Like other philosophical aporia, thinking about it gets you no closer to a solution but it does sharpen Soupie's saw and as we've seen in our readings it's generated a lot of very rich ideas ... you see the same thing in mathematics.

By the way ... mathematics, created or discovered?

I'm hoping that those of you who have the mathematical background to pursue this question will do so.

 

[Constance]

Are you asking me what it's like for the software to be executed?

I would have no idea.

Again, I'm speculating that consciousness is an emergent property of some self-referential highly complex systems that can receive and respond to external stimuli.

Up here on the surface of the planet embodied consciousnesses also respond to their own thoughts and the thinking of others, expressing further complexity than that which you locate in "self-referential highly complex systems that can receive and respond to external stimuli."

It's not like I know this to be true, but at least it's being tested somewhat, and at least it doesn't require some mystical "stuff" that's not part of the material universe to exist.

Do you really think that philosophical ideas are not tested? I doubt that you believe that, and if you do I suggest you read this thread from its beginnings to the present. Your problem seems to be with some ideas that you refer to as 'mystical stuff'. Some reading in Eastern philosophy would help you to expand the boundaries of what you consider to be thinkable by evolved human consciousnesses and minds, and prepare you to respond to the increasing numbers of scientists, esp quantum physicists, who read and recommend Eastern philosophy and specifically meditation. Erwin Schrodinger explored and wrote about Eastern thought on the heels of his recogition of the quantum.

 

[Constance]

There seems to be some mysticism about QM and dualism that compels and distracts people.

Can you cite one or two significant examples? From my own exprience, most nonscientists I know who are interested in qm and especially q holographic entanglement are not dualists.

 

[smcder]

Okay. I wasn't sure if you were suggesting phenomenal experiences/qualia are illusory.

Interesting ... how do we make sense of the statement "qualia are illusory"? What would I be mistaking greenness for?

 

[smcder]

If the sense of free will is a cognitive illusion that exists as a result of determined, evolutionary processes, what adaptive function does it provide?

Can you go ahead and define "the sense of free will" as you are using it here?

If I have your definition right - the sense of free will could have come along with the particular wiring that did evolve, right? ... and not necessarily provide an adaptive function itself.

In the first article you posted, we have:

Owing to this delay, the CM cannot know the unconscious work that precedes awareness, thus the CM erroneously believes it has freely decided the action. Though objectively false, this belief is subjectively perceived as true (FW illusion). It is so persistent and deep-rooted in the mind that the CM is unwilling to abandon it;

So this is a belief in free will ... they are saying that the CM is unwilling to abandon it, but do they, the authors of the study believe ... are they (and you) saying this sense of free will persists even if you don't believe in it? Like a kind of phantom limb pain?

In the meditation example I gave, isn't it possible that the meditator (or just someone paying attention to how their thoughts form, someone even just given this instruction) is more aware of that unconscious work that precedes awareness, if what I sense is an actual thought before it comes into consciousness, if I can tell a thought is coming and what kind of thought it is but then choose not to have that thought ... then why would I (erroneously) believe I had freely, consciously decided actions ... and yet, either we have to double the loop or say I have made a conscious decision about the thought in formation at the subconscious level ... so I wouldn't think I had control over thoughts coming along in the subconscious, but I would think I can make decision about whether or not I fully let it into consciousness. Wouldn't I?

"When performing a voluntary action the agent is firmly convinced that he has freely decided to perform it. This raises two questions: “Is this subjective perception of free will (FW) an illusion?” and “Does it serve a useful purpose?”. The answers are tentatively given by “The “Bignetti Model” (TBM) as follows: (1) The so called “voluntary” action is decided and performed by the agent’s unconscious mind (UM) by means of probabilistic responses to inner and outer stimuli; (2) After a slight delay, the agent becomes aware of the ongoing action through feedback signals (somatosensory, etc.) that are conveyed to the brain as a consequence of its performance. Thus, the agent’s conscious mind (CM) always lags behind unconscious activity; (3) Owing to this delay, the CM cannot know the unconscious work that preceeds awareness, thus the CM erroneously believes it has freely decided the action. Though objectively false, this belief is subjectively perceived as true (FW illusion). It is so persistent and deep-rooted in the mind that the CM is unwilling to abandon it; (4) The FW illusion satisfies a psychological need to secure the arousal of the senses of agency (SoA) and of responsibility (SoR) of the action. Both SoA and SoR inevitably lead the CM to self-attribute reward or blame depending on action performance and outcome; (5) Both reward and blame are motivational incentives which foster learning and memory in the CM; the updating of knowledge will provide new information and the skill required for further action (restart from point 1)."

 

[Tyger]

"When you feel the suffering of every living thing in your own heart, that is consciousness." - Bhagavad Gita

 

[smcder]

@Soupie

I think the article you linked:

The functional role of free-will illusion in cognition: “The Bignetti Model”

... here is worth discussing in depth. First, it seems to be said that the sense of free will is part of human psychology and can't be abandoned:

"The American philosopher John Searle believes that mind and body are not two different entities; that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, and that consciousness is a series of qualitative states (Searle, 1997).

With regard to the old philosophical question of duality and FW, Searle is astonished that the problem of duality has not yet been resolved, and thus asks himself why we find the conviction of our own FW so difficult to abandon."

So my first question as I read this is does John Searle mean that every human being has and always will have that sense of free will? Is that what means by finding the conviction of our own FW so difficult to abandon? Or is that sense more or less cultural moderated or even just constructed? I assume they mean there is some real piece of biology behind it? Just like you can't not feel pain, you can't not feel free will ... is that what you take him to be saying?

"He (Searle) writes: “The persistence of the traditional free will problem in philosophy seems to me something of a scandal”. Nevertheless, many thinkers have studied this issue and many papers have been written, but it appears that little progress has been made. He questions: “Is there some conceptual problem we have simply ignored? Why is it that we have made so little progress compared with our philosophical ancestors?” He is not able to provide a philosophical solution to the question, and rather than adding further proposals, none of which would be convincing, he bypasses the obstacle by stating that

“the philosophical mind–body problem seems to me not very difficult. However, the philosophical solution kicks the problem upstairs to neurobiology, where it leaves us with a very difficult neurobiological problem. How exactly does the brain do it, and how exactly are conscious states realised in the brain? What exactly are the neuronal processes that cause our conscious experience, and how exactly are these conscious experiences realised in brain structures?”

We agree with Searle when he claims to be astonished by this evidence, but we do not agree with him when he suggests that we should “kick the question upstairs to neurobiology” as if FW were not an intriguing issue anymore. This paper will attempt to take a significant step forward on this issue.

So now I think we have three things to look at:

1. why we find the conviction of our own FW so difficult to abandon. ?

2. However, the philosophical solution kicks the problem upstairs to neurobiology, where it leaves us with a very difficult neurobiological problem. How exactly does the brain do it, and how exactly are conscious states realised in the brain? What exactly are the neuronal processes that cause our conscious experience, and how exactly are these conscious experiences realised in brain structures?”

This is another good description of the hard problem to keep handy.

3. we do not agree with him when he suggests that we should “kick the question upstairs to neurobiology” as if FW were not an intriguing issue anymore

... do they get this right and if so, what are the implications? If we can't abandon this sense of free will, does understanding this have any necessary psychological effect ... any necessary conflict?

This isn't the analogy I want, but it will do for now - we can't abandon pain and understanding where pain comes from, that it's "just" the firing of certain nerves, doesn't make it hurt any less ...

It seems to me, going into this that not everyone experiences this sense of free will, so I have to get a real handle on what they mean - what I mean is that I'm not sure everyone feels it just in their every day life and then I think that maybe in states of meditation one comes to break apart experience in such a way that this psychological component, this sense of agency comes apart - I think that may be one of the main goals in meditation, in the concept of "not-self" ... similarly, of course you can hypnotize someone and they can put their hand over an open flame.

I really want to get under the hood on this one.

 

[marduk]

If the sense of free will is a cognitive illusion that exists as a result of determined, evolutionary processes, what adaptive function does it provide?

That's an easy one.

The sense of free will is an integral part of the sense of identity. A sense of identity is tied to learning from ones past, and planning for ones future.

If there's no me and no choice, there's no me to make better decisions to improve my reproductive success.

 

[smcder]

That's an easy one.

The sense of free will is an integral part of the sense of identity. A sense of identity is tied to learning from ones past, and planning for ones future.

If there's no me and no choice, there's no me to make better decisions to improve my reproductive success.

That's a description not an explanation.

... thoughts emerge from neural events which have biological causes, so first it doesn't seem that consciousness is necessary - the whole process of making decisions can go on without awareness and in fact most of it already does according to what I've read ... wee are aware of very little that goes on in the brain ... the impulse shows up on the graph before it enters our conscious awareness.

Even when I look closely at my thoughts they don't bear much relation to what I'm doing. Maybe your experience is different.

And then the ability to make "better" decisions implies a freedom to choose from options but where does that freedom come from? It seems you have to break a causal chain and start a new one to have free will? Couldn't I write a program to make decisions and take all the information and possibilities into account without being conscious? If not, what is the neccessary bit consciousness provides. As it is, consciousness seems to be a view out the rear window.

 

[marduk]

Okay. I wasn't sure if you were suggesting phenomenal experiences/qualia are illusory.

I think they are, in the sense that they're only real to the entity experiencing them.

To me, your qualia are merely patterns in your brain.

 

[marduk]

I could respond that it isn't a result of DEPs ... it's cultural. The Mindless Babylonians didn't even have a sense of self, remember? No self, no free will. Many religions and philosophies have been deterministic - Calvinism? And materialism is probably way older than Democritus.

You've lost me here.

 

[marduk]

That's part of the problem with interpreting experiments of that type - it shouldn't be surprising that we get a spike on an EEG or whatever the device is - before we become aware of a thought - that's how we experience it subjectively too - and we talk about it that way too, thoughts come out of nowhere or pop into our heads. We don't say "now I'm going to have this thought" but as I said with attention we can gain awareness and the brain also re wires itself as a result of how we think ... so it's Sometimes the chicken sometimes the egg for free will.

The experiments I've seen have been for simple intentions or actions so I don't know it would scale up ... but we also talk about our intentions or actions that way too ... We may experience them coming from somewhere "outside" our consciousness (though we can usually shed light on it if we look hard) or as irresistible impulses ... at one time at least the law even recognized this.

In my mind, this could be easily explained by having the sub-processes in your brain signal to your "consciousness" that there's something new to consider.

This may be "odd, I don't seem to be breathing any more, please take a breath soon please" out of your limbic system, or it might be "we haven't had an opportunity to procreate lately, let's go shopping for new clothes" out of both your limbic system and prefrontal cortex, or whatever.

 

[marduk]

That's just scientific hand waving! ;-)

That's an absolutely valid criticism, I was wondering when we'd finally get there!

Look, I don't know for sure how the mind works. What I'm saying is let's look at reality rather than inventing new facets of physics to restate the problem and put it there as a solution. That's just pushing the problem around and poor reasoning in my opinion.

If we can model the mechanism of the mind pretty accurately and still can't create consciousness, then we look elsewhere. But not before.

Seriously, I don't think anyone here is saying that about mystical "stuff " ... as Soupie has said matter is "ethereal" enough on its own and saying everything is made of matter doesn't of itself rule very much out ... many religions have come to terms with it.

Except we are. We can put QM labels on it, but it's still just basic mysticism that we've been talking about for 5K years. What is the nature of "me?"

Descartes has been saying since the 1640s that the mind is non-physical, as did Plato and Aristotle before him. The problem with this position is that it's not supported by what we know about the universe, and you have to create a whole new category of "stuff" that is somehow outside the material universe, and yet can still interact with it by some unknown means of information transfer.

This is the same thing as talking about God.

If God exists, he/she/it is either part of our Universe or not. If God is not, how does God interact with our universe? You have to invent a whole new category of information transfer from outside and inside our Universe.

It's the same problem, and a mystical one.

The hard problem has been the core of this discussion from the beginning and we've looked at a lot of possibilities.

So whee your thinking has ended until further evidence comes in is exactly where we've started speculating.

The value of that? Like other philosophical aporia, thinking about it gets you no closer to a solution but it does sharpen Soupie's saw and as we've seen in our readings it's generated a lot of very rich ideas ... you see the same thing in marhematics.

By the way ... mathematics, created or discovered?

Both.

The axioms of math existed in the natural world since long before we came along. Two rocks were always two rocks, and if you took one away, you got one rock.

Number theory and all the stuff we built on the axioms, we discovered them.

Now, we can go down a huge rabbit hole of how much math describes reality, and how much it is it's own domain separate from reality. The root of -1 is a good example of this.

 

[marduk]

I know I'm on a serious information theory/philosophy of mind kick right now, but bear with me.

I recently heard a very insightful explanation for the subjective experience of "not being able to think straight."

I was told (or read, can't remember) that this subjective experience is one's working memory dropping out. It often happens when one is stressed, nervous, or panicked.

I'm not sure if it is legit, but I think it's interesting.

This shows a real example of the mind being finite and bounded about what we can think about, which sounds a lot like the natural physical universe to me.

Well, that and the fact that it needs to consume energy to fight entropy and do stuff.

 

[marduk]

Do you really think that philosophical ideas are not tested? I doubt that you believe that, and if you do I suggest you read this thread from its beginnings to the present.

Yup, I do.
Prove me wrong. You can say something is intuitively incorrect, or you can attempt to build something off philosophical axioms. Leaving out the math or logic axioms (because nobody here seems to be interested in that stuff) there is exactly one that I am aware of: I think, therefore I am.

So yes, philosophy is not in general tested, except in domains of logic, math, or the intersection of the two known as the philosophy of mathematics.

Show me one philosophical "test" of any claim that is not rampantly subjective and I'll retract my statement.

In my opinion, which is of course heavily biased by my experience of philosophy in modern academia -- it's degenerated to a bunch of verbal masturbation that serves no-one excepts getting some phd's and tenure.

But that's me.

Your problem seems to be with some ideas that you refer to as 'mystical stuff'. Some reading in Eastern philosophy would help you to expand the boundaries of what you consider to be thinkable by evolved human consciousnesses and minds, and prepare you to respond to the increasing numbers of scientists, esp quantum physicists, who read and recommend Eastern philosophy and specifically meditation. Erwin Schrodinger explored and wrote about Eastern thought on the heels of his recogition of the quantum.

I've practiced Zen and Japanese martial arts for 20 years, you're not helping your position.

 

[smcder]

That's an absolutely valid criticism, I was wondering when we'd finally get there!

Look, I don't know for sure how the mind works. What I'm saying is let's look at reality rather than inventing new facets of physics to restate the problem and put it there as a solution. That's just pushing the problem around and poor reasoning in my opinion.

If we can model the mechanism of the mind pretty accurately and still can't create consciousness, then we look elsewhere. But not before.

Except we are. We can put QM labels on it, but it's still just basic mysticism that we've been talking about for 5K years. What is the nature of "me?"

Descartes has been saying since the 1640s that the mind is non-physical, as did Plato and Aristotle before him. The problem with this position is that it's not supported by what we know about the universe, and you have to create a whole new category of "stuff" that is somehow outside the material universe, and yet can still interact with it by some unknown means of information transfer.

This is the same thing as talking about God.

If God exists, he/she/it is either part of our Universe or not. If God is not, how does God interact with our universe? You have to invent a whole new category of information transfer from outside and inside our Universe.

It's the same problem, and a mystical one.


Both.

The axioms of math existed in the natural world since long before we came along. Two rocks were always two rocks, and if you took one away, you got one rock.

Number theory and all the stuff we built on the axioms, we discovered them.

Now, we can go down a huge rabbit hole of how much math describes reality, and how much it is it's own domain separate from reality. The root of -1 is a good example of this.

Euler's identity -


I'm re- reading Lakoff's Where Does Mathematics Come From ... embodied cognition it's in line with your thinking. I think.

I know next to nothing about QM so that's not my line of thought ... my questions are in the last post, your version seems to require free will, at least the freedom to choose ... specifically you seem to say that thoughts have causal efficacy / but thoughts resolve to neural states which are determined ... so now you have two causes, neurons firing and thoughts that have emerged (hand wavingly) to then feedback into the neurons from whence they came ...

the gist is what does my conscious awareness have to do with making a decision or anything at all? Causally I mean.

It seems to me a movie constructed after the fact - so why do we have a movie at all?

 

[smcder]

You've lost me here.

Don't worry about it.

 

[marduk]

Euler's identity -


I'm re- reading Lakoff's Where Does Mathematics Come From ... embodied cognition it's in line with your thinking. I think.

I know next to nothing about QM so that's not my line of thought ... my questions are in the last post, your version seems to require free will, at least the freedom to choose ... specifically you seem to say that thoughts have causal efficacy / but thoughts resolve to neural states which are determined ... so now you have two causes, neurons firing and thoughts that have emerged (hand wavingly) to then feedback into the neurons from whence they came ...

the gist is what does my conscious awareness have to do with making a decision or anything at all? Causally I mean.

It seems to me a movie constructed after the fact - so why do we have a movie at all?

I'm not sure exactly where I come down on free will. It's actually a pretty hard question.

I can see why we would't have it, and I can see why nature would fool us into thinking we have it, but I can't see where it comes from if we do have it.

Dennet argues that free will emerges from complexity in our social interactions -- that it emerged out of our need to rely upon one another for help. I personally don't find it particularly persuasive, but I'm no expert in that stuff.

I really want us to have free will so I guess I think we do. But I can't prove that we don't just think that we do.

Awareness and decision making? Here's what I'm thinking:
- as I sit here, I'm using stuff I've learned my whole life, including when I was 5 and I learned not to interrupt people. Thinking that 5 year old human was me is advantageous, because I'll consider those lessons from when I was 5. In short, I learn.
- as I sit here, I can consider how my stock portfolio is doing, and whether I should go buy a new macbook. I can balance what I want right now, with what I'll need when I retire, because that old dude that retires will still be me, too.

If neither of these were me, as a conscious being, why would I consider what they learned or what they will need in the future? I'd tell them to piss off.