Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

[Soupie]

@smcder

You say "close" but you do realize I'm using your words ...?

The following is your words: "So that means pain exists in the absence of awareness ... ?"

Try this:

A man is involved in a situation. A rock smashes his foot. His body (body-self) is feeling extreme pain in its foot. His mental awareness (mental-self) is focused on the foot. Someone in the distance yells "fire!" He turns his awareness away from his foot and scans the surroundings for fire. While he is scanning for the fire, he is not focused on the pain in his foot. As a result, he is momentarily unaware of the pain in his foot.

Question: Does the qualitative pain cease existing when his awareness is focused on the fire? Or is it only his awareness of the qualitative pain that ceases?

 

[smcder]

No, it doesn't help with the hard problem.

When did you change your name?

"The quest for the physical underpinnings of consciousness is still an unresolved one (Koch 2007; Tallis 2010; van Boxtel and de Regy 2010). When one perceives a red patch, what is the necessary and sufficient physical basis of such a phenomenal experience? Indeed what is the physical phenomenon that is one’s phenomenal experience of a red patch? Such questions single out the hard-problem (Chalmers 1996): "From all the low-level facts about physical configurations and causation, we can in principle derive all sorts of high-level facts about macroscopic systems, their organization, and the causation among them. One could determine all the facts about biological function, and about human behavior and the brain mechanisms by which it is caused. But nothing in this vast causal story would lead one who had not experienced it directly to believe that there should be any consciousness. The very idea would be unreasonable; almost mystical, perhaps" (Chalmers 1996, p. 102). More recently, Christof Koch wrote that "How brain processes translate to consciousness is one of the greatest unsolved questions in science. The scientific method […] has utterly failed to satisfactorily explain how subjective experience is created" (Koch 2007)."

AND

" It is sometimes assumed that the physical world does not have the same properties attributed to phenomenal experience – this is indeed one of the assumption of the abovementioned hard problem (Chalmers 1996). Philosophers stress properties that do not seem to match between the physical and the phenomenal domain such as quality, perspectivalness, and unity – among the others."

 

[Soupie]

When did you change your name?

I don't follow? I think the information philosophy of mind answers the hard question, i.e., that mental/information is fundamental. Of course, IPTM can't say why/how the primal stuff exists exists at all. I suppose that would be the Really Hard Problem. (And unbound telesis, as you know, is my answer to that one.)

Have you thought about this one yet:

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

Also, to add some clarity to what I've been saying; I've talked about awareness and meta-awareness. I consider qualitative experience to be awareness. And when we say "I was consciously aware that I was seeing the color green," I consider this meta-awareness. Awareness of being aware. (I did add confusion above by failing to add the "meta" to one use of awareness.)

I can't find it now, but I recall finding and posting here a quote by Chalmer's in which he says something to the effect of: One of the other mysteries (besides the hard problem) is how the cognitive mind has access to the phenomenal mind.

I take that to mean: How can we even be aware of our bodies qualitative experiences? (I've said I think it's possible because both forms of "mind" are fundamentally constituted of information. But how "awareness" becomes aware of itself is fascinating.)

As @marduk has said, it must involve some form of strange loop.

 

[smcder]

@smcder



The following is your words: "So that means pain exists in the absence of awareness ... ?"

Try this:


Question: Does the qualitative pain cease existing when his awareness is focused on the fire? Or is it only his awareness of the qualitative pain that ceases?

Can I go back and remember the pain that I wasn't aware of when I was distracted?

What is "qualitative pain"?

 

[smcder]

I don't follow? I think the information philosophy of mind answers the hard question, i.e., that mental/information is fundamental. Of course, IPTM can't say why/how the primal stuff exists exists at all. I suppose that would be the Really Hard Problem. (And unbound telesis, as you know, is my answer to that one.)

Have you thought about this one yet:

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

Also, to add some clarity to what I've been saying; I've talked about awareness and meta-awareness. I consider qualitative experience to be awareness. And when we say "I was consciously aware that I was seeing the color green," I consider this meta-awareness. Awareness of being aware. (I did add confusion above by failing to add the "meta" to one use of awareness.)

I can't find it now, but I recall finding and posting here a quote by Chalmer's in which he says something to the effect of: One of the other mysteries (besides the hard problem) is how the cognitive mind has access to the phenomenal mind.

I take that to mean: How can we even be aware of our bodies qualitative experiences? (I've said I think it's possible because both forms of "mind" are fundamentally constituted of information. But how "awareness" becomes aware of itself is fascinating.)

As @marduk has said, it must involve some form of strange loop.

Yes the loops are very strange around here ...

 

[smcder]

I think I am going to start collecting descriptions of the hard problem, here is another good one:

The "hard problem" is to give a physicalistic account of phenomenal consciousness. What makes it hard is that it's not even clear how to begin. Phenomenal consciousness doesn't seem to have a functional characterization. (As soon as we try to characterize it functionally, we end up with a "psychological" notion which it seems in principle possible that we could have without having any qualia.)

Consciousness

So ... a non "physicalistic" account of phenomenal consciousness doesn't solve the hard problem.

 

[smcder]

To clarify my view and distinguish from @smcder a little more:

I believe there is:

(1) Qualitative layer of mind, and,

(2) Self-Aware layer of mind.

Smcder seems to believe these two layers are one:

(1) Qualitative Self-Aware layer of mind.

On my view, a physical cat could experience qualitative mental pain, but lack the meta mental awareness that it is a physical cat experiencing qualitative mental pain.

Physical Organism > Qualitative Pain

On smcder's view - if I understand it - a physical cat would only experience qualitative mental pain if it was also meta mentally aware that it was a physical organism experiencing qualitative mental pain. That is, the physical organism does not experience mental pain unless it is mentally aware that it is a physical organism experiencing mental pain.

Physical Organism > Proto-Qualitative Pain(?) > Meta Awareness of Proto-Qualitative Pain (homunculus) > Qualitative Pain

I'm fine for the cat to feel pain ...

Ok, how about this ... use your model to discuss DID.

 

[Soupie]

Can I go back and remember the pain that I wasn't aware of when I was distracted?

What is "qualitative pain"?

It's redundant, but I added the "qualitative" so we didn't gloss over the fact that pain is a mental phenomena.

 

[Soupie]

I think I am going to start collecting descriptions of the hard problem, here is another good one:

The "hard problem" is to give a physicalistic account of phenomenal consciousness. What makes it hard is that it's not even clear how to begin. Phenomenal consciousness doesn't seem to have a functional characterization. (As soon as we try to characterize it functionally, we end up with a "psychological" notion which it seems in principle possible that we could have without having any qualia.)

Consciousness

So ... a non "physicalistic" account of phenomenal consciousness doesn't solve the hard problem.

So if phenomenal consciousness isn't physical, the hard problem is a red herring, right.

Btw the information philosophy of mind is a physicalist account of phenomenal conscious. To me, it's a form of CRP3, which is a physical account by way of property dualism.

 

[smcder]

It's redundant, but I added the "qualitative" so we didn't gloss over the fact that pain in a mental phenomena.

You didn't answer the question:

"Can I go back and remember the pain that I wasn't aware of when I was distracted?"

I think this is your original sentence ...

Question: Does the qualitative pain cease existing when his awareness is focused on the fire? Or is it only his awareness of the qualitative pain that ceases?

Plugging in "pain is a mental phenomena" we get:

Question: Does the mental phenomena pain cease existing when his awareness is focused on the fire? Or is it only his awareness of the mental phenomena of pain that ceases?

Does that make sense?

 

[Soupie]

Can I go back and remember the pain that I wasn't aware of when I was distracted?

Pain is actually hard to "remember" under any circumstances. But yes, I think you can.

I once had 2nd degree steam burns. It was very painful. Although I was able to pull my awareness away from the pain for small moments, the pain was always there (as I recall).

 

[Soupie]

You didn't answer the question:

"Can I go back and remember the pain that I wasn't aware of when I was distracted?"

I think this is your original sentence ...

Question: Does the qualitative pain cease existing when his awareness is focused on the fire? Or is it only his awareness of the qualitative pain that ceases?

Plugging in "pain is a mental phenomena" we get:

Question: Does the mental phenomena pain cease existing when his awareness is focused on the fire? Or is it only his awareness of the mental phenomena of pain that ceases?

Does that make sense?

Yes, that's perfect.

 

[Soupie]

You didn't answer the question:

"Can I go back and remember the pain that I wasn't aware of when I was distracted?"

I think this is your original sentence ...

Question: Does the qualitative pain cease existing when his awareness is focused on the fire? Or is it only his awareness of the qualitative pain that ceases?

Plugging in "pain is a mental phenomena" we get:

Question: Does the mental phenomena pain cease existing when his awareness is focused on the fire? Or is it only his awareness of the mental phenomena of pain that ceases?

Does that make sense?

So you think when he's not aware of the pain, there is no pain?

 

[smcder]

So if phenomenal consciousness isn't physical, the hard problem is a red herring, right.

Btw the information philosophy of mind is a physicalist account of phenomenal conscious. To me, it's a form of CRP3, which is a physical account by way of property dualism.

No, it's not intended to be misleading ... it's only presented as a problem to a physicalist account.

I think Chalmers categorizes Russellian monism as F-type monism, about which he says:

This view has elements in common with both materialism and dualism. From one perspective, it can be seen as a sort of materialism. If one holds that physical terms refer not to dispositional properties but the underlying intrinsic properties, then the protophenomenal properties can be seen as physical properties, thus preserving a sort of materialism.

From another perspective, it can be seen as a sort of dualism. The view acknowledges phenomenal or protophenomenal properties as ontologically fundamental, and it retains an underlying duality between structural-dispositional properties (those directly characterized in physical theory) and intrinsic protophenomenal properties (those responsible for consciousness).

One might suggest that while the view arguably fits the letter of materialism, it shares the spirit of antimaterialism.

In his paper Consciousness and Its Place in Nature
Consciousness and its Place in Nature

.... he writes of it:

"Overall, type-F monism promises a deeply integrated and elegant view of nature. No-one has yet developed any sort of detailed theory in this class, and it is not yet clear whether such a theory can be developed. But at the same time, there appear to be no strong reasons to reject the view. As such, type-F monism is likely to provide fertile grounds for further investigation, and it may ultimately provide the best integration of the physical and the phenomenal within the natural world."

 

[smcder]

Pain is actually hard to "remember" under any circumstances. But yes, I think you can.

I once had 2nd degree steam burns. It was very painful. Although I was able to pull my awareness away from the pain for small moments, the pain was always there (as I recall).

I bet you wish someone had been there to yell "Fire!"

 

[Soupie]

Here's another example:

A one year old finds a small, battery operated fan. An adult spins the fan in the child's face. After a few seconds, the child smiles. We can assume the child is experiencing happiness evidenced by the unconscious physical response. Is the child (meta) aware that she is experiencing happiness?

 

[Soupie]

I bet you wish someone had been there to yell "Fire!"

There was a very hot nurse applying cold compresses.

 

[smcder]

Here's another example:

A one year old finds a small, battery operated fan. An adult spins the fan in the child's face. After a few seconds, the child smiles. We can assume the child is experiencing happiness evidenced by the unconscious physical response. Is the child (meta) aware that she is experiencing happiness?

What the hell happened to the cat?

 

[smcder]

So you think when he's not aware of the pain, there is no pain?

If when he's not aware of the pain, there is still pain ... then what word do we use to discriminate the conscious awareness of an unpleasant sensation from an unpleasant sensation that you are not aware of ... ?

(get ready ... you're going to have to come up with a lot of these new words)

 

[Soupie]

What the hell happened to the cat?

I think it's hard for (some) humans to recognize that animals - such as cats - are having qualitative experiences because we don't recognize the physiological cues.

So, seeing a happy child smile or someone in pain grimace is easier to grok.

If you noticed, I said I thought I could recall having been experiencing pain even when it wasn't in my conscious awareness.

I say this because my physiological response to pain continued even when I wasn't consciously aware if it.

Speaking of, how funny is it when very angry (but unaware) people angrily shout: I'm not angry!