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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

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The following in a short section on Enactive Cognition from the SEP article on Embodied Cognition, all of which is important as a critique of the information-computational theory of consciousness represented by Tononi and Koch.

2.2 Enactive Cognition
The book The Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991) was an attempt to re-direct the cognitive sciences by infusing them with the phenomenological perspective developed in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945). (More ambitiously, and less successfully, it also aimed to integrate cognitive science with Buddhist philosophy; the book also included some passing discussion of psychoanalysis.) Varela, Thompson and Rosch argued that the standard division between pre-given, external features of the world and internal symbolic representations should be dropped, as it is unable to accommodate the feedback from embodied actions to cognition via the actions of a situated cognitive agent. The fundamental differences between their perspective and classical views lies in the answers to the questions of what cognition is, how it works, and when a system functions adequately.

Traditional accounts basically state that there are no computations without representations, and view cognition as successfully functioning when any device can support and manipulate symbols to solve the problem given to the system. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch introduced the concept of enaction to present and develop a framework that places strong emphasis on the idea that the experienced world is portrayed and determined by mutual interactions between the physiology of the organism, its sensorimotor circuit and the environment. Their emphasis on the structural coupling of brain-body-world constitutes the kernel of their program of embodied cognition, building on the classical phenomenological idea that cognitive agents bring forth a world by means of the activity of their situated living bodies. As the metaphor of “bringing forth a world” of meaningful experience implies, on this view knowledge emerges through the primary agent's bodily engagement with the environment, rather than being simply determined by and dependent upon either pre-existent situations or personal construals.

One implication of this view is that only a creature with certain features—e.g., eyes, hands, legs, and skills—can possess certain kinds of cognitive capacities. This is because cognition is a dynamic sensorimotor activity, and the world that is given and experienced is not only conditioned by the neural activity of the subject, but is essentially enacted in that it emerges through the bodily activities of the organism. This general approach encourages a view of enaction as essentially distinct from computation, as it is traditionally conceived. Varela, Thompson, and Rosch's most detailed illustration of their perspective is contained in their discussion of color experience and categorization, a discussion that received much attention in other venues (e.g., Thompson, Palacios, and Varela 1992; Thompson 1995), typically without reference to the more sweeping claims about embodiment, phenomenology, and Buddhism made in The Embodied Mind (see also Thompson 2007).

Embodied Cognition (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
 
@Constance said:
It seems to me that it makes more sense to consider consciousness as we experience it as having evolved through quantum entanglement from microphysical structures of interaction (subject-object interactions at a primitive level) that appear to be present in the quantum substrate from which we currently think the physical universe we inhabit has evolved to its present complexity. A deep sense of these processes and evolving primordial structures might lie almost inchoate in the collective unconscious and the subconscious mind {'subconscious mind' is a subject that we need to develop in our time, beginning with F.W.H. Myers's insights at the end of the 19th century, which are carried forward in Kelly and Kelly et al's major book Irreducible Mind)}. I disagree with Chalmers's recently expressed view that consciousness and mind are 'constituted' by, explained by, microphysical processes or microphenomenal properties alone. I think rather that those processes and/or properties have enabled over immense tracts of time the emergence of life and the development of experiential consciousness and mind. ...



Quantum entanglement and nonlocality are by now well established concepts in physics, taken to describe reality at the microphysical level. As the quantum substrate is also understood to generate the macrophysical level of being and experience on which we have arrived, understanding what is instantiated at the quantum level and how it evolves into the classical reality we inhabit is a, perhaps the, major problem confronting physics. Wolfgang Zurek wrote and rewrote versions of a major paper in physics over a decade or two in which he identified the gap [which he characterized as constituting a 'boundary'] between quantum and classical physics as the major problem for physics. This has also become a major problem to be explored in consciousness studies during its relatively short (25-year) history -- how do consciousness and mind arise in a physical universe? Both science and philosophy are necessary to approach this problem, though most scientists (esp those who do not read philosophy of mind and philosophy of science) do not recognize the need for philosophy's insights. As a result, experimentation in quantum mechanics (under the influence of theories presented by the 'shut up and calculate' school in q physics) has long ignored the ontological significance of what they are investigating, considering what they learn to have only epistemological meaning. But some physicists have disagreed (quantum physicists and theorists such as Penrose, Stapp, Tiller, and others), and neuroscientists, under the influence of phenomenologists in the interdisciplinary field of consciousness studies, have begun to broaden their inquiry into nature to confront consciousness and mind. In short, quantum entanglement and nonlocality appear to be involved in everything we can say about nature, and thus in what we can say about consciousness and mind evolved in nature. That may not be well said, but it's the general picture I've received over the last five years or so and it may be helpful.
I did a brief google search (I know...) looking for articles related to "entanglement and philosophy of mind." I wasn't able to find anything.

I certainly suspect that there are quantum processes going on in brains. Whether entanglement is one of them, I'm not sure.

Typically when I read the term "micro-physical" I assume this term includes any/all quantum processes that may eventually be discovered to play a role in consciousness.

Whether quantum processes play a direct role in macro-level consciousness is something to rule out as well, as opposed to operating at the micro-physical level alone.

I have not said and don't believe what you've summarized there. Given the recognition that quantum entanglement is universal, it is involved in all phenomena. My disagreement was with Chalmers's current {seems to be current}
viewpoint that the microphysical level of reality itself accounts for everything in mind and world, which I think is reductive given the evolution of the physical universe and of life. consciousness, and mind. It would be good to explore the interactions of Russell and Whitehead on this core issue. I wonder if Chalmers has written about it. Does anybody here know?
Hm, that's not what I gather upon reading Chalmers, though I certainly haven't read much. My impression was that — like us — he assumes that there are micro-level processes which underlie our macro-level phenomenal experiences. I think his aknowledgmebt of the combination problem is an admission that there is indeed an epistemic gap between macro and micro level of consciousness. And that's not to imply that we understand either of those levels either, haha.



I agree. But I would at this point delete the 'or' and say "microphysical and phenomenal." If quantum interactions exist and produce entangled information, generating entangled systems of increasing complexity in nature, they must do so on the basis of some primordial exchange of information, which would have to be considered 'phenomenal' -- involving some primitive form of 'subjective-objective' interaction.* We generalize about this but do not yet have [edit:] scientific insight to consult (so far as I have read) on the basis of which to define the particulars of this informational interaction and subsequent evolution of entangled 'information'. I would expect Tononi to attempt some progress in this regard but I have not located it in his online papers. I've asked you before if you have a citation or citations to such an attempt by Tononi.



What does [Russelian panprotopsychism] deal with exactly? Russell might use that term if he were writing today about the microphysical construction of reality. Chalmers certainly needs to do so. Perhaps he has. Does anybody here know? Also, what is 'pure information'?
As I understand it, it's the idea that while the physical nature of reality may be all relational/processes, the (proto) mental/phenomenal may be intrinsic.

That's not to say that this view rejects the role of information in consciousness, but the idea is that the "stuff" of consciousness may be the most fundamental, real stuff in reality.

By "pure information" I meant that Panprotopsychism was not analogous with information theories of consciousness. Again, that's not to say that the views aren't compatible.

One thing we must consider is that there will be multiple levels and processes contributing to the existence of what we call "consciousness."

I liked your comment recently that what we're discussing now constitutes a 'harder' problem than the problem of qualia. I agree.

*Several international conferences pursuing what is called 'endophysics' might prove helpful here. In Part I of this thread I linked to the abstracts of papers presented in the third of these conferences, and I think the papers themselves might now be available as a collection at the Scribd site. Unfortunately, I have to warn against seeking them out at Scribd since my computer was infected with malware after I downloaded several philosophy papers from that site. A number of the papers from that endophysics conference are, however, accessible singly from other online sources.
I was completely unfamiliar with Chalmers and the hard problem when I entered this discussion. There's so much to learn and read!

You and Smcder have recently posted many links/books that I want to pursue!
 
Soupie:

You say, "The phrase "subject of experience" can be equated to "self,"..." and "I think an organism can generate/have experience, but lack awareness that "they" are an entity generating/having experiences."

The identification of 'self' i.e. the realisation that one is a cogent being with a body that experiences feeling, is a conceptual realisation of the phenomenon and characteristics of qualitative conscious experience. This 'awareness' of the conscious experience - and the consequential identification of self-identity - is an entirely different type of informed representational construct about experience.
Very clearly said. Thank you.

I conceive of this as the mind "objectifying" itself. That is, the mind identifying itself as a "thing" amongst all the other phenomenal things it experiences.

Whilst a non-human animal does have a 'self' it has no conceptual realisation to that effect i.e. it does not know it.
Again, well-phrased. (I tried to capture this with a crude drawing of a cat and some apples in Part One of this thread.)

I believe there is a view on which all experiences are accompanied by an awareness that one is experiencing. I reject this and believe that many organisms (including humans at certain times) experience without reflective awareness that they are experiencing.

Perhaps an example might be when one drives a car, arrives at their destination, and realizes that they hadn't been "paying attention" to what they were doing. Perhaps they had been fiddling with the radio or had been deep in thought. One certainly navigated turns and moved with the flow of traffic - all which require at least visual experiences, but there was no reflective awareness of these experiences.

I wonder if this non-reflective consciousness is the type many animals generate most of the time — for many, perhaps always.

I'm not denying that these non-human animals have experiences, only that these experiences lack the additional phenomenal experience of being experiences happening to them, a "self" distinct from the rest of reality.

(I believe @boomerang has expressed this idea and noted that this boundary between the "self" — whether physical or mental — and the rest of reality may be an illusion.)

If this is indeed the case, one really wonders what the functional/evolutionary purpose of qualitative experience might be...
 
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. . . I believe there is a view on which all experiences are accompanied by an awareness that one is experiencing. I reject this and believe that many organisms (including humans at certain times) experience without reflective awareness that they are experiencing.

I think you're right. We seem to be 'aware' of many things in our environment that we aren't attending to until they draw our attention. I also think, for example, that we're moved emotionally and aesthetically in some experiences whose significance, both in itself and for us, occurs to us later, sometimes suddenly and with a shock or with an insight. Also, we can be overwhelmed by the nature or complexity of our circumstances to the point where we stop feeling and reflecting on what we experience {we 'shut down'}. This is particularly onerous in the experience of young children if they are growing up in dysfunctional families in which one or both parents are unable to focus enough on the child's feelings and needs. In cases of abuse, neglect, and even indifference, children suffer deep feelings of grief and shock that they are not yet equipped to reflect on, and those feelings often never get dealt with until much later, and in the worst cases never. It's all still there, though, in the subconscious mind, doing damage until it's released and processed, in the best cases with psychological therapy. One long-lasting effect of such a childhood is that children learn not to think about what has been done to them, even to pretend that it hasn't happened in order to support a fragile 'peace' in the home. Such children do not learn to trust themselves or others, or even life itself, because they cannot develop a stable sense of self in their childhood homes. The longterm effects include a fear of feeling emotion and a sense of isolation that can last a lifetime.

I wonder if this non-reflective consciousness is the type many animals generate most of the time — for many, perhaps always.

I'm still mystified by the concept that we 'generate' our consciousness. It seems to me to be a condition, a natural endowment, of our nature, like the biochemistry we're born with.

I'm not denying that these non-human animals have experiences, only that these experiences lack the additional phenomenal experience of being experiences happening to them, a "self" distinct from the rest of reality.

Having lived for years in a home shared with many different kinds of animals, I don't think we can be sure to what extent different species sense and even recognize the 'own-ness' of their experiences. I would say this capacity goes pretty far down the evolutionary tree. I think we can also further develop a domesticated animal's sense of self by the way we interact with him or her.

(I believe @boomerang has expressed this idea and noted that this boundary between the "self" — whether physical or mental — is an illusion.)

Did he say a boundary "between the self and the world" or between the self and others?

If this is indeed the case, one really wonders what the functional/evolutionary purpose of qualitative experience might be...

There might be no general purpose in evolutionary development. That would be an interesting question for discussion.
 
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I did a brief google search (I know...) looking for articles related to "entanglement and philosophy of mind." I wasn't able to find anything.

Try searching under the phrases quantum mind and quantum consciousness.

I certainly suspect that there are quantum processes going on in brains. Whether entanglement is one of them, I'm not sure.

Entanglement refers to the interconnectedness of all quantum processes.

Typically when I read the term "micro-physical" I assume this term includes any/all quantum processes that may eventually be discovered to play a role in consciousness.

I don't think anyone's gotten far enough yet to try to distinguish between q processes that 'play a role in consciousness' and those that don't. My understanding is that 'micro-physical' refers to all quantum processes.

Hm, that's not what I gather upon reading Chalmers, though I certainly haven't read much. My impression was that — like us — he assumes that there are micro-level processes which underlie our macro-level phenomenal experiences. I think his aknowledgmebt of the combination problem is an admission that there is indeed an epistemic gap between macro and micro level of consciousness. And that's not to imply that we understand either of those levels either, haha
.

'Underlie' is an unfortunately vague term and consciousness theorists have proceeded to more specific ones. Phillip Goff (in a paper I linked recently) uses the term 'emerges' as appropriate to describe the effects of microphysical processes in the macrophysical, over against the Russell/Chalmers term 'constitutes', a relationship which Goff argues cannot be demonstrated.


As I understand it, it's the idea that while the physical nature of reality may be all relational/processes, the (proto) mental/phenomenal may be intrinsic.

Yes, that seems to be the Chalmers-Russell theory but it lacks demonstration. What does 'intrinsic' mean in this formulation"?
 
Constance said:
I'm still mystified by the concept that we 'generate' our consciousness. It seems to me to be a condition, a natural endowment, of our nature, like the biochemistry we're born with.
This has been a source of confusion between us for some time, so I'll try explain what I mean pretty thoroughly. It may be an issue of terminology, or we may simple disagree.

By saying that organisms "generate" conscious experiences, I mean that 1) certain — but not all — organisms* interact with the environment in such a way that 2) phenomenal experiences are directly produced on account of this interaction.

To be clear, in the absence of such organisms, there would be no phenomenal experiences. On my view, phenomenal experiences only exist as a result of certain organisms interacting with the environment. Since phenomenal experiences only exist on account of this interaction between organism and environment, I say that experiences are "generated" by these organisms.

* I'm of the opinion that non-organic systems can potentially generate phenomenal experiences as well. So far, I haven't seen any reason to believe that consciousness can only occur in organic systems/organisms.

I currently follow Chalmers' idea that "mental" must be fundamental. That is, "mental" isn't something that emerges from physical processes, but is fundamental. However, at the sub-organism level, I believe the "mental" is only proto-mental or proto-phenomenal. That is, experiences as we know them only come about via organism-wide processes.

Did he say a boundary "between the self and the world" or between the self and others?
As I recall, it was boundary between self and world.

There might be no general purpose in evolutionary development. That would be an interesting question for discussion.
Indeed. :)
 
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@Soupie

I came across this while looking for a paper by Strawson:

Discarnate Entities and Dimethyltryptamine (DMT): Psychopharmacology, phenomenology and ontology | David Luke - Academia.edu

a taxonomy of discarnate entities? (see highlighted text below)

paper is free for a sign up on academia.edu


The highly psychoactive molecule N,N-dimethyltryptamine (or simply DMT), is found naturally occurring in the brains of humans, mammals, and some other animals, as well as in a broad range of species of the plant kingdom. Although speculative, neurochemical research suggests that DMT may be made in the pineal gland, and it is hypothesised that, as much as melatonin helps activate sleep cycles, DMT activates- dreaming, and may also be implicated in other natural visionary states such as mystical experience, near-death experience (NDE), spontaneous psi and psychosis. Amazonian shamans may have made use of this chemical for its visionary properties for thousands of years, and take it as part of a decoction frequently called ayahuasca, which translates from Quechua as "vine of the spirits"or "vine of the dead". The psychedelic brew is taken because it gives rise to extraordinary mental phenomena that have shamanic and supposed healing qualities, such as synaesthesia, ostensible extra-dimensional percepts, out-of-body experiences, psi experiences and, perhaps most commonly, encounters with discarnate entities. When described by independent and seemingly naïve DMT participants the entities encountered tend to vary in detail hut often belong to one of a very few similar types, with similar behavioural characteristics. For instance, mischievous shapeshifting elves, praying mantis alien brain surgeons and jewel-encrusted reptilian beings, who all seem to appear with baffling predictability. This opens up a wealth of questions as to the ontology of these entities. The discussion of the phenomenology and ontology of these entities mixes research from parapsychology, ethnobotany and psychopharmacology — the fruits of science — with the foamy custard of folklore, anthropology, mythology, cultural studies and related disciplines. Hopefully, however, given the varied readership of this journal, itwon't prove to be a trifie too interdisciplinary
 
@Soupie

I came across this while looking for a paper by Strawson:

Discarnate Entities and Dimethyltryptamine (DMT): Psychopharmacology, phenomenology and ontology | David Luke - Academia.edu

a taxonomy of discarnate entities? (see highlighted text below)

paper is free for a sign up on academia.edu


The highly psychoactive molecule N,N-dimethyltryptamine (or simply DMT), is found naturally occurring in the brains of humans, mammals, and some other animals, as well as in a broad range of species of the plant kingdom. Although speculative, neurochemical research suggests that DMT may be made in the pineal gland, and it is hypothesised that, as much as melatonin helps activate sleep cycles, DMT activates- dreaming, and may also be implicated in other natural visionary states such as mystical experience, near-death experience (NDE), spontaneous psi and psychosis. Amazonian shamans may have made use of this chemical for its visionary properties for thousands of years, and take it as part of a decoction frequently called ayahuasca, which translates from Quechua as "vine of the spirits"or "vine of the dead". The psychedelic brew is taken because it gives rise to extraordinary mental phenomena that have shamanic and supposed healing qualities, such as synaesthesia, ostensible extra-dimensional percepts, out-of-body experiences, psi experiences and, perhaps most commonly, encounters with discarnate entities. When described by independent and seemingly naïve DMT participants the entities encountered tend to vary in detail hut often belong to one of a very few similar types, with similar behavioural characteristics. For instance, mischievous shapeshifting elves, praying mantis alien brain surgeons and jewel-encrusted reptilian beings, who all seem to appear with baffling predictability. This opens up a wealth of questions as to the ontology of these entities. The discussion of the phenomenology and ontology of these entities mixes research from parapsychology, ethnobotany and psychopharmacology — the fruits of science — with the foamy custard of folklore, anthropology, mythology, cultural studies and related disciplines. Hopefully, however, given the varied readership of this journal, itwon't prove to be a trifie too interdisciplinary

I'm so glad you found and posted this link, Steve. I'm ready for 'something completely different' from Chalmers et al's supposed 'nuances'.
 
I'm so glad you found and posted this link, Steve. I'm ready for 'something completely different' from Chalmers et al's supposed 'nuances'.

It was a coincidence ... I think when I logged in to the account to get the Strawson paper, it populated with papers similar to what I was looking at last time I logged in - way back, when we must have been discussing psychedelics on the thread.

Strassman's DMT experiments are fascinating ... The Spirint Molecule ... reading accounts of mantis creatures and alien brain surgeons from people who had never met and may never have had a psychedelic experience ... that there could be a taxonomy of these entities is tantalizing. The key idea above is that entities falling into similar categories and with similar behavior are seen regularly by seemingly naïve subjects. There are of course alternate explanations but any account of reality will have to deal with this sort of thing ... the other completely different avenue is dealing with mathematical and moral truths ... Strawson claimed "naïve realism" about basic moral truths such as purposefully harming another sentient being. He says this is just wrong and compares it to mathematical truths - the existence of which he sees as a challenge to physicalism.
 
One other "something completely different" that may be worth looking at again is Colin McGinn's 1994 paper that earned his position the title of "New Mysterianism" ... the fundamental idea is cognitive closure - that though there is an answer to the hard problem, we don't have the sorts of minds that can understand it - this is often rejected just out of hand (not to mention it would put some folks out of business) but it's worth looking at his reasoning.

Interestingly, he believes other sorts of minds might be able to arrive at a solution and perhaps very easily. In fact, that may be what the alien brain surgeons are up to! ;-)

I hope to post something soon on language, subject/predicate and its relationship to naïve concepts of cause and effect in Strawson's paper on Nietzsche - the connection with McGinn's work is obvious.

http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness97/papers/ProblemOfPhilosophy.html
 
This has been a source of confusion between us for some time, so I'll try explain what I mean pretty thoroughly. It may be an issue of terminology, or we may simple disagree.

By saying that organisms "generate" conscious experiences, I mean that 1) certain — but not all — organisms* interact with the environment in such a way that 2) phenomenal experiences are directly produced on account of this interaction.

Thanks. That's clearly expressed and it accords with your preference for Chalmers's and Tononi's theories. I still disagree 'fundamentally,' however. As I see it, consciousness is not a response to 'interaction' with the environment; rather it is that interaction and is sustained and developed by it, on the basis of it. I can agree that microphysical and even macrophysical protoconscious processes and interactions exist in nature and that over eons of evolution of the physical world they can be thought to enable the development of life and consciousness of the type we experience, but in my (current) view they cannot be confused with consciousness, which minimally can be argued to emerge from them.. .


To be clear, in the absence of such organisms, there would be no phenomenal experiences. On my view, phenomenal experiences only exist as a result of certain organisms interacting with the environment. Since phenomenal experiences only exist on account of this interaction between organism and environment, I say that experiences are "generated" by these organisms.

I think that here you are saying essentially the same thing I have said. Living organisms interact with their environments at a level different from, and much more complex and 'realized' than, the level at which the 'interactions' and exchanges of information instantiated in the quantum substrate operate. Physics and information theory will never explain consciousness fully, at least not given what is understood in either discipline so far.

* I'm of the opinion that non-organic systems can potentially generate phenomenal experiences as well. So far, I haven't seen any reason to believe that consciousness can only occur in organic systems/organisms.

I currently follow Chalmers' idea that "mental" must be fundamental. That is, "mental" isn't something that emerges from physical processes, but is fundamental. However, at the sub-organism level, I believe the "mental" is only proto-mental or proto-phenomenal. That is, experiences as we know them only come about via organism-wide processes.

I think both Chalmers and Tononi lack a grounding in phenomenological philosophy that would enable them to recognize more fully the complexity of consciousness as it is experienced in our and some other 'higher' species. Their approaches are oversimplified and reductive.
 
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One other "something completely different" that may be worth looking at again is Colin McGinn's 1994 paper that earned his position the title of "New Mysterianism" ... the fundamental idea is cognitive closure - that though there is an answer to the hard problem, we don't have the sorts of minds that can understand it - this is often rejected just out of hand (not to mention it would put some folks out of business) but it's worth looking at his reasoning.

I'm increasingly drawn to McGinn's point of view and will be reading more of him.

Interestingly, he believes other sorts of minds might be able to arrive at a solution and perhaps very easily. In fact, that may be what the alien brain surgeons are up to! ;-)

That's a reasonable postulation I think. If they 'look like' praying mantises according to the DMT experiencers, it may be that the form of the entity encountered does 'resemble' the praying mantis. That may be the closest approximation of their appearance available to human minds from the categories of physical forms we're familiar with from our experiences on earth. It seems apparent that human imagination can only work from the basis of that which has been seen, experienced, in earth life.

I hope to post something soon on language, subject/predicate and its relationship to naïve concepts of cause and effect in Strawson's paper on Nietzsche - the connection with McGinn's work is obvious.

I'm looking forward to this. As you know, I've read and understand little of Nietzsche's production.

http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness97/papers/ProblemOfPhilosophy.html[/QUOTE]
 
Wallace Stevens on thought and reality, from "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven."

III
We keep coming back and coming back
To the real: to the hotel instead of the hymns
That fall upon it out of the wind. We seek
The poem of pure reality, untouched
By trope or deviation, straight to the word,
Straight to the transfixing object, to the object
At the exactest point at which it is itself,
Transfixing by being purely what it is,
A view of New Haven, say, through the certain eye,
The eye made clear of uncertainty, with the sight
Of simple seeing, without reflection.
We seek Nothing beyond reality. Within it,
Everything, the spirit’s alchemicana
Included, the spirit that goes roundabout
And through included, not merely the visible,
The solid, but the movable, the moment,
The coming on of feasts and the habits of saints,
The pattern of the heavens and high, night air.

IV
In the metaphysical streets of the physical town
We remember the lion of Juda and we save
The phrase … Say of each lion of the spirit
It is a cat of a sleek transparency
That shines with a nocturnal shine alone.
The great cat must stand potent in the sun.
The phrase grows weak. The fact takes up the strength
Of the phrase. It contrives the self-same evocations
And Juda becomes New Haven or else must.
In the metaphysical streets, the profoundest forms
Go with the walker subtly walking there.
These he destroys with wafts of wakening,
Free from their majesty and yet in need
Of majesty, of an invincible clou,
A minimum of making in the mind,
A verity of the most veracious men,
The propounding of four seasons and twelve months.
The brilliancy at the central of the earth.

V
The poem is the cry of its occasion,
Part of the res itself and not about it.
The poet speaks the poem as it is,
Not as it was: part of the reverberation
Of a windy night as it is, when the marble statues
Are like newspapers blown by the wind. He speaks
By sight and insight as they are. There is no
Tomorrow for him. The wind will have passed by,
The statues will have gone back to be things about.
The mobile and the immobile flickering
In the area between is and was are leaves,
Leaves burnished in autumnal burnished trees
And leaves in whirlings in the gutters, whirlings
Around and away, resembling the presence of thought,
Resembling the presences of thoughts, as if,
In the end, in the whole psychology, the self,
The town, the weather, in a casual litter,
Together, said words of the world are the life of the world.

VI
Among time’s images, there is not one
Of this present, the venerable mask above
The dilapidation of dilapidations.
The oldest-newest day is the newest alone.
The oldest-newest night does not creak by,
With lanterns, like a celestial ancientness.
Silently it heaves its youthful sleep from the sea –
The Oklahoman — the Italian blue
Beyond the horizon with its masculine,
Their eyes closed, in a young palaver of lips.
And yet the wind whimpers oldly of old age
In the western night. The venerable mask,
In this perfection occasionally speaks
And something of death’s poverty is heard,
This should be tragedy’s most moving face.
It is a bough in the electric light
And exhalations in the eaves, so little
To indicate the total leaflessness.

VII
Professor Eucalyptus said, “The search
For reality is as momentous as
The search for god.” It is the philosopher’s search
For an interior made exterior
And the poet’s search for the same exterior made
Interior: breathless things broodingly abreath
With the Inhalations of original cold
And of original earliness. Yet the sense
Of cold and earliness is a daily sense,
Not the predicate of bright origin.
Creation is not renewed by images
Of lone wanderers. To re-create, to use
The cold and earliness and bright origin
Is to search. Likewise to say of the evening star,
The most ancient light in the most ancient sky,
That it is wholly an inner light, that it shines
From the sleepy bosom of the real, re-creates,
Searches a possible for its possibleness.

VIII
If it should be true that reality exists
In the mind: the tin plate, the loaf of bread on it,
The long-bladed knife, the little to drink and her
Misericordia, it follows that
Real and unreal are two in one: New Haven
Before and after one arrives or, say,
Bergamo on a postcard, Rome after dark,
Sweden described, Salzburg with shaded eyes
Or Paris in conversation at a café.
This endlessly elaborating poem
Displays the theory of poetry,
As the life of poetry. A more severe,
More harassing master would extemporize
Subtler, more urgent proof that the theory
Of poetry is the theory of life,
As it is, in the intricate evasions of as,
In things seen and unseen, created from nothingness,
The heavens, the hells, the worlds, the longed-for lands.

IX
The last leaf that is going to fall has fallen.
The robins are là-bas, the squirrels, in tree — caves,
Huddle together in the knowledge of squirrels.
The wind has blown the silence of summer away.
It buzzes beyond the horizon or in the ground:
In mud under ponds, where the sky used to be reflected.
The barrenness that appears is an exposing.
It is not part of what is absent, a halt
For farewells, a sad hanging on for remembrances.
It is a coming on and a coming forth.
The pines that were fans and fragrances emerge,
Staked solidly in a gusty grappling with rocks.
The glass of the air becomes an element –
It was something imagined that has been washed away.
A clearness has returned. It stands restored.
It is not an empty clearness, a bottomless sight.
It is a visibility of thought,
In which hundreds of eyes, in one mind, see at once.

X
The less legible meanings of sounds, the little reds
Not often realized, the lighter words
In the heavy drum of speech, the inner men
Behind the outer shields, the sheets of music
In the strokes of thunder, dead candles at the window
When day comes, fire-foams in the motions of the sea,
Flickings from finikin to fine finikin
And the general fidget from busts of Constantine
To photographs of the late president, Mr. Blank,
These are the edgings and inchings of final form,
The swanning activities of the formulae
Of statement, directly and indirectly getting at,
Like an evening evoking the spectrum of violet,
A philosopher practicing scales on his piano,
A woman writing a note and tearing it up.
It is not in the premise that reality
Is a solid. It may be a shade that traverses
A dust, a force that traverses a shade.
 
I think both Chalmers and Tononi lack a grounding in phenomenological philosophy that would enable them to recognize more fully the complexity of consciousness as it is experienced in our and some other 'higher' species. Their approaches are oversimplified and reductive.
As I understand it, Chalmers's and Tonini's views are quite different, so while you might think both are reductive and oversimplified, they are not equal.

As far as Chalmers' view (type-F) being "reductive," in the strict sense of the word, it's certainly not. That is, the type-F view is that mental/consciousness cannot be reduced to physical processes i.e. consciousness does not and cannot emerge from physical processes.

Here is a crude illustration of how I understand Constitutive Russellian Panprotopsychism:

At the most fundamental level of reality (whatever that is) the mental exists; however this does not mean the same rich/complex qualitative experiences that humans experience exist at the micro level. For (crude) example:

Quark - May have primitive experience, but does not experience greenish

Electron - May have primitive experience, but does not experience greenish

Molecule - May have primitive experiences, but does not experience greenish

Cell - May experience lightness and darkness, but does not experience greenish

Multicellular Organism - May experience greenish

Human - Most experience greenish

On this view, experience goes the whole way down, but the complexity, type, and variety of experience is contingent on the complexity of the physical-mental object.

Re: Tonini and IIT

I'm not sure where his theory stands; however, I believe the transferring and processing of information (states) are fundamental to reality and thus to consciousness. Whether qualititative experiences can be reduced to integrated information, I don't know. I certainly don't think we can dismiss it as being simplistic. Even if we agree that consciousness is "embodied," the physical body interacts with the physical world by essentially exchanging and processing information (albeit non-passively like a computer).

Chalmers himself says that the techniques of phenomenology (combined with neuroscience) are the best tools we have for exploring consciousness.

What can phenomenology teach Chalemrs and Tonini that they may be missing?
 
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As I understand it, Chalmers's and Tonini's views are quite different, so while you might think both are reductive and oversimplified, they are not equal.

As far as Chalmers' view (type-F) being "reductive," in the strict sense of the word, it's certainly not. That is, the type-F view is that mental/consciousness cannot be reduced to physical processes i.e. consciousness does not and cannot emerge from physical processes.

Here is a crude illustration of how I understand Constitutive Russellian Panprotopsychism:

At the most fundamental level of reality (whatever that is) the mental exists; however this does not mean the same rich/complex qualitative experiences that humans experience exist at the micro level. For (crude) example:

Quark - May have primitive experience, but does not experience greenish

Electron - May have primitive experience, but does not experience greenish

Molecule - May have primitive experiences, but does not experience greenish

Cell - May experience lightness and darkness, but does not experience greenish

Multicellular Organism - May experience greenish

Human - Most experience greenish

On this view, experience goes the whole way down, but the complexity, type, and variety of experience is contingent on the complexity of the physical-mental object.

Re: Tonini and IIT

I'm not sure where his theory stands; however, I believe the transferring and processing of information (states) are fundamental to reality and thus to consciousness. Whether qualititative experiences can be reduced to integrated information, I don't know. I certainly don't think we can dismiss it as being simplistic. Even if we agree that consciousness is "embodied," the physical body interacts with the physical world by essentially exchanging and processing information (albeit non-passively like a computer).

Chalmers himself says that the techniques of phenomenology (combined with neuroscience) are the best tools we have for exploring consciousness.

What can phenomenology teach Chalemrs and Tonini that they may be missing?

What can phenomenology teach Chalemrs and Tonini that they may be missing? - maybe to look at something more than "greenish".

Just a couple excerpts from Strawson:
Cognitive Phenomenology: Real Life | Galen Strawson - Academia.edu

"In analytic philosophy there is considerable resistance to the idea that anything rightly called ‘cognitive experience’ or ‘cognitive phenomenology’ exists. This is remarkable for many reasons, one of which is that it’s doubtful that sense/feeling experience ever occurs without cognitive experience in the experience of an ordinary adult human being."
...
"Phenomenology incorporates all-out realism about experience (experience is its whole subject matter). But by ‘realism about experience’ I mean real realism about experience. The pleonasm would be unnecessary if a number of analytic philosophers hadn’t in the last eighty years or so tried, more or less covertly, to ‘reduce’ the experiential to the non-experiential, continuing to speak of the experientialin a seemingly realist way while holding that, really, only the non-experiential exists. A good way to convey what it is to be a real realist about experience is to say that it’s to continue to take colour experience or taste experience, say, or experience of pain, or of an itch, to be what one took it to be wholly unreflectively—what one knew it to be in having it—before one did any philosophy, e.g. when one was five. However many new and surprising facts they learn about experience from scientists, real realists’ basic grasp—knowledge—of what experience is remains exactly the same as it was before they did any philosophy. It remains, in other words, entirely correct, grounded in the fact that to have experience at all is already to know what experience is, however little one reflects about it. I think this way of specifying what I mean by ‘experience’ is helpful because it guarantees that anyone who claims not to know what I mean is being disingenuous."
 
More from Strawson:

"Leaving this dramatic case, consider the overall experiential character of your current experience right now as you read this. It’s not just and wholly a matter of sensation, sense/feeling content, on the experience side, and entirely non-conscious registration of meaning, and corresponding change of dispositional set, on the non-experiential side. Why has this fact become obscure to some philosophers? One reason among many, perhaps, is that it’s very hard to pin down the contribution to the overall character of your experience that is being made by your apprehension (perfect or not) of the semantic content of the proposition expressed by a sentence in such a way as to be able to take it as the object of reflective thought. It seems far easier to do this in the case of the phenomenological character of an experience of green. In fact, when it comes to the attempt to represent fully to oneself the phenomenological character of understanding a sentence like ‘Consider, then, your reading and understanding this very sentence’ it

seems that all one can usefully do is rethink the sentence as a whole, comprehendingly; and the trouble with doing this is that it seems to leave one with no mental room to stand back in such a way as to be able to take the experiential character of one’s understanding of the sentence, redelivered to one by this rethinking, as the principal object of one’s attention. One’s mind is taken up with the sense of the thought in such away that it’s very hard to think about the character of the experience of having the thought."

Nicht wahr?

 
@smcder

Can you illustrate more clearly how Chalmers'/Tonini's conception of consciousness may be different from, say, a phenomenologist?

I'm still unclear on their core differences. :dunce cap:
 
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness97/papers/ProblemOfPhilosophy.html

McGinn is asking about the scope of human knowledge, the limits of our epistemic capacities - specifically whether there is special concern with certain philosophical questions:

"The question of the scope of human knowledge has been a longstanding preoccupation of philosophy. And that question has always had a special intensity where philosophical knowledge itself is concerned. A certain anxiety about the nature and possibility of such knowledge is endemic to the subject. The suspicion is that, in trying to do philosophy, we run up against the limits of our understanding in some deep way. Ignorance seems the natural condition of philosophical endeavour, contributing both to the charm and the frustration of the discipline (if that is the right word)."

McGinn turns to Chomsky -

"According to him, the mind is a biologically given system, organised into discrete (though interacting) subsystems or modules, which function as special-purpose cognitive devices, variously structured and scheduled, and which confer certain epistemic powers and limits on their possessors.

The language faculty is one such module: innately based and specifically structured, it comes into operation early in human life and permits the acquisition, or emergence, of an intricate cognitive system in a spectacularly short time - this being made possible by the antecedent presence of the principles of universal grammar in its initial design.
"

Here I think McGinn makes a vary interesting point:

"As Chomsky observes, the knowledge so generated is no simpler, by any plausible objective standard, than knowledge of advanced mathematics or physics; but the human mind is so adapted that it yields this knowledge with comparative ease - somewhat as we effortlessly develop a complex physiological structure in a pre- programmed way."

I think of Sheldon on The Big Bang Theory whose genius seems to be owed to a kind of alternate wiring in that physics is effortless, but anything other than literal use of language escapes him completely ... in fact, to me, the whole joke of the show is that Penny is actually the "smart" one with Leonard a distant second.

"So when considering whether a certain cognitive system is capable of a given task we need to ask both whether it can acquire mastery of the relevant concepts and whether it has the organisational resources to put these concepts to work in the necessary way. One live possibility is that the mind is not notably lacking at the level of individual concepts but that it lacks the capacity to combine these into systematic explanatory theories of some given class."

From here, McGinn says that we may be classifying hard problems in philosophy (aporia) because they are hard for us

"The ease of accessibility of a knowledge system to our cognitive capacities is no measure of its internal complexity or subtlety or profundity - still less of the ontological fibrillations proper to the subject-matter of the system. Indeed, it is unclear, ultimately, whether there is any (useful) notion of simplicity or complexity that is quite unrelativised to the specific aptitudes of a selected cognitive faculty. That reason is flummoxed by a certain class of problems is thus no proof that those problems possess any inherent refractoriness, nor that there are no other conceivable epistemic systems that might take these problems in stride."

In other words, somewhere in the universe a five year old Tralfamadorian is cutting its teeth on the "hard problem" of consciousness as a pre-requisite to enter grade school ...
 
@smcder

Can you illustrate more clearly how Chalmers'/Tonini's conception of consciousness may be different from, say, a phenomenologist?

I'm still unclear on their core differences. :dunce cap:

Did you read Strawson's article?

Constance will do better on this - but phenomenology starts with how the world comes up for you, what it is like for you - my experience with observing my own mind has been mostly in simple Buddhist meditation, I struggle greatly with attention ... but I am leery of any theory that tries to explain experience based on simple perceptions. Do we even know what we can and can't introspect?

If we create a theory about a shared physical object we can agree on what we are studying .... but my experience of mind, of introspection, of experience is far different from someone who has meditated for thirty years - will I be able to design a theory that accounts for experiences of a kind I've never had?

People can control "involuntary muscles" with biofeedback training/meditation - they can even learn to generate more of a certain type of brainwave, persons with OCD can re-wire their own brains (physically) by becoming aware of their obsessions, labeling them as such and enduring the ensuing anxiety without performing a particular compulsion. I have first hand experience of this.

So theories of free will that are based on experiments involving detecting a neural impulse before a person reports consciously deciding ... lets reverse that and see if, given feedback, the person can learn to be aware of that impulse even before the machine detects it.

I have had experiences in meditation of knowing when a thought was about to arise and what general kind of thought it was going to be before I knew the content of the thought ... after I learned that, I then learned how to choose not to think that thought.
 
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