Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

[smcder]

Neuroanatomical evidence
indicates that the circuitry underlying core affect
(see Figure 1) entrains sensory processing
by virtue of strong reciprocal projections
to the brainstem and basal forebrain systems;
these areas, in turn, have diffuse, unidirectional
afferent projections to the rest of cortex
and can influence the probability that neurons
will fire throughout the entire cortical mantle
(Mesulam 2000, Parvizi & Damasio 2001). In
this way, core affect can enhance local sensory
processing that is stimulus specific, so that a
person can effectively and efficiently assess the
relevance or value of the stimulus. Thus, areas
involved with establishing a core affective
state entrain ongoing processing throughout
the rest of the cortex, selecting for neuronal
assemblies that maximize reward or minimize
threat, thereby influencing which contents are
experienced in the moment and which are
more likely to be stored in long-term memory
(Edelman & Tononi 2000).

. . . as Barrett put it to me, emotion isn’t a simple reflex or a bodily state that’s hard-wired into our DNA, and it’s certainly not universally expressed. It’s a contingent act of perception that makes sense of the information coming in from the world around you, how your body is feeling in the moment, and everything you’ve ever been taught to understand as emotion. Culture to culture, person to person even, it’s never quite the same. What’s felt as sadness in one person might as easily be felt as weariness in another, or frustration in someone else."

That's in keeping with memory and vision too and I think helps answer your question @@Constance about the gap between sensory input and conscious processing capacity (from another thread):

"The brain, it turns out, doesn’t consciously process every single piece of information that comes its way. Think of how impossibly distracting the regular act of blinking would be if it did. Instead, it pays attention to what you need to pay attention to, then raids your memory stores to fill in the blanks."


Are the above quotations^ from the 'Mice and Men' paper?

We are indebted to you, Steve, for bringing forward the issues in the competing hypotheses regarding emotion. I'll try to get access to this paper and report on key elements in it:

It should be in this article:

Lisa Barrett: Facing Down Ekman's Universal Emotions - Neuroanthropology

 

[Constance]

quoting Brassier: "The "speculative realist movement" exists only in the imaginations of a group of bloggers promoting an agenda for which I have no sympathy whatsoever: actor-network theory spiced with pan-psychist metaphysics and morsels of process philosophy. . . . I agree with Deleuze's remark that ultimately the most basic task of philosophy is to impede stupidity, so I see little philosophical merit in a "movement" whose most signal achievement thus far is to have generated an online orgy of stupidity."

Ouch! It reminds me of the Surrealists and Dadaists and well, intellectual anarchists generally.

Ouch! indeed, but valid re: the chaotic and undisciplined way in which this 'movement' has shaken out. Good point about the similarity to Surrealism and Dadaism.

 

[Constance]

It should be in this article:

Lisa Barrett: Facing Down Ekman's Universal Emotions - Neuroanthropology

Thanks for that link. Extract:

"Barrett is a professor of psychology at Northeastern, and for years she’s been troubled by Ekman’s ideas. People don’t display and recognize emotions in universal ways, she believes, and emotions themselves don’t have their own places in the brain or their own patterns in the body. Instead, her research has led her to conclude that each of us constructs them in our own individual ways, from a diversity of sources: our internal sensations, our reactions to the environments we live in, our ever-evolving bodies of experience and learning, our cultures.

This may seem like nothing more than a semantic distinction. But it’s not. It’s a paradigm shift that has put Barrett on the front lines of one of the fiercest debates in the study of emotion today, because if Barrett is correct, we’ll need to rethink how we interpret mental illness, how we understand the mind and self, and even what psychology as a whole should become in the 21st century.

And for the other side, here is a recent Ekman review:
Paul Ekman and Daniel Cordaro (2010), What Is Meant by Calling Emotions Basic. Emotion Review.
Emotions are discrete, automatic responses to universally shared, culture-specific and individual-specific events. The emotion terms, such as anger, fear, etcetera, denote a family of related states sharing at least 12 characteristics, which distinguish one emotion family from another, as well as from other affective states. These affective responses are preprogrammed and involuntary, but are also shaped by life experiences."

Paradigm shift indeed. What took so long, and why did it take so long?

 

[smcder]

Ouch! indeed, but valid re: the chaotic and undisciplined way in which this 'movement' has shaken out. Good point about the similarity to Surrealism and Dadaism.

I was thinking about this from Brassier:

"All this may sound platitudinous: surely existentialists had already realized this? But the difference is that existentialists thought it was still possible for human consciousness to provide the meaning that was absent from nature: existence may be meaningless, but man’s task is to provide it with a meaning.
My contention is that this solution is no longer credible, because a project is now underway to understand and explain human consciousness in terms that are compatible with the natural sciences, such that the meanings generated by consciousness can themselves be understood and explained as the products of purposeless but perfectly intelligible processes, which are at once neurobiological and sociohistorical."

... and it occurred to me the same thing was said about evolution ... Huxley (or maybe Dawkins) said it was now possible to be an intellectually satisfied atheist ... the Darwinians then said the Theologians were in an end game with a strategy of God of the gaps but they themselves staked their hopes on Evolution as an end point, but now it's consciousness ... and so I began to wonder, if we do explain consciousness in terms that are compatible with the natural sciences (or consciousness is found to be fundamental and s0 the natural sciences are expanded) - does Brassier really think that will do it? Everything will be explained? Or in the process of exploring consciousness, will a new endpoint to be explained occur?

That seems to be the kind of idea/speculation that Naturalistic Teleology is ... looking for the fundamental laws that precede the organization of matter and mind.

 

[smcder]

Thanks for that link. Extract:

"Barrett is a professor of psychology at Northeastern, and for years she’s been troubled by Ekman’s ideas. People don’t display and recognize emotions in universal ways, she believes, and emotions themselves don’t have their own places in the brain or their own patterns in the body. Instead, her research has led her to conclude that each of us constructs them in our own individual ways, from a diversity of sources: our internal sensations, our reactions to the environments we live in, our ever-evolving bodies of experience and learning, our cultures.

This may seem like nothing more than a semantic distinction. But it’s not. It’s a paradigm shift that has put Barrett on the front lines of one of the fiercest debates in the study of emotion today, because if Barrett is correct, we’ll need to rethink how we interpret mental illness, how we understand the mind and self, and even what psychology as a whole should become in the 21st century.

And for the other side, here is a recent Ekman review:
Paul Ekman and Daniel Cordaro (2010), What Is Meant by Calling Emotions Basic. Emotion Review.
Emotions are discrete, automatic responses to universally shared, culture-specific and individual-specific events. The emotion terms, such as anger, fear, etcetera, denote a family of related states sharing at least 12 characteristics, which distinguish one emotion family from another, as well as from other affective states. These affective responses are preprogrammed and involuntary, but are also shaped by life experiences."

Paradigm shift indeed. What took so long, and why did it take so long?

Give us time ... sooner or later we psychologists will straighten everything out. Well, except for mathematics.

 

[smcder]

One of the links I sent refers to the One Hundred Year War between Natural Kinds or Psychological Constructions ...

there are divisions between:

constructions // natural kinds

psychology//biology
*human// animal
individual//universal
discrete//continuous (I couldn't quite break it down into digital and analogue, but the seven circuit model might be described as discrete? and the construction model requires something like a parallel processing model ... even computer metaphors have to be upgraded!

*Our solution is that emotion categories live at the level of human perception. Emotions are contents, not systems, in the brain.

Furthermore, homologous emotion circuits of the sort presumed by the natural-kind model are unlikely to exist given what is known about the evolution of the human brain.

When compared with other mammals, the human brain has seen a rapid expansion in the isocortical aspects of affective circuitry along with increasingly dense reciprocal projections to subcortical areas (some of which have evolved in concert with the cortical changes).1

 

[Constance]

I was thinking about this from Brassier:

"All this may sound platitudinous: surely existentialists had already realized this? But the difference is that existentialists thought it was still possible for human consciousness to provide the meaning that was absent from nature: existence may be meaningless, but man’s task is to provide it with a meaning.
My contention is that this solution is no longer credible, because a project is now underway to understand and explain human consciousness in terms that are compatible with the natural sciences, such that the meanings generated by consciousness can themselves be understood and explained as the products of purposeless but perfectly intelligible processes, which are at once neurobiological and sociohistorical."

... and it occurred to me the same thing was said about evolution ... Huxley (or maybe Dawkins) said it was now possible to be an intellectually satisfied atheist ... the Darwinians then said the Theologians were in an end game with a strategy of God of the gaps but they themselves staked their hopes on Evolution as an end point, but now it's consciousness ... and so I began to wonder, if we do explain consciousness in terms that are compatible with the natural sciences (or consciousness is found to be fundamental and s0 the natural sciences are expanded) - does Brassier really think that will do it? Everything will be explained? Or in the process of exploring consciousness, will a new endpoint to be explained occur?

That seems to be the kind of idea/speculation that Naturalistic Teleology is ... looking for the fundamental laws that precede the organization of matter and mind.

Great questions to explore. I've got to go out for the evening but will be back asap to pursue them with y'all.

 

[smcder]

Great questions to explore. I've got to go out for the evening but will be back asap to pursue them with y'all.

Enjoy your time out Constance!

This article talks about how the brain isn't just another pretty organ system and notes that if we do figure out something about the brain it's not immediately generalizable, so perhaps the Hundred Year War is a Tempest in a Teacup?

Our Brains as Alien Technology - Neuroanthropology
Second, unlike other organ systems, the brain does many things at once. The richness of our lives, from the four f’s to learning and language, runs through our brains. These multiple functions developed over evolutionary time, meaning that our evolutionary history has gifted us with an organ of cobbled contingency. The upshot is that even if we figure out something about the brain (per #1), it’s not immediately generalizable. While one can expect evolutionary tinkering – modifications on existing functions – there is also the potential for engineering different solutions to the many problems we need to solve every day.

For interdisciplinary efforts in brain science, including endeavors like neuroanthropology and cultural neuroscience, these two issues highlight an interesting problem. If there is not just one way the brain works, not one code (like DNA) that will unlock the brain’s mystery box, then we are in a situation where many people will develop partial answers. However, those answers are tentative, and there is no clear framework for integrating them. Put differently, we are dealing with a normal academic situation – multiple fields with multiple truths.

...
Well, at least we've reduced the problem to a previously solved case ... and believe it or not, they then use The Elephant Metaphor. @Soupie would be proud!

Except ... not only is the brain not like a computer, it's not like an elephant. (and it's not green either)
...
But in the case of the brain, research points to multiple mammals, not one big grey beast. It as if one touches an elephant, another a rhinoceros, a third a hippopotamus. They might seem the same, but they are quite different animals. And one might even have stumbled across a gorilla that others simply don’t see as they busily pass their science ball hand to hand.

In other words, the elephant in the room isn’t really an elephant, but a whole menagerie."

Now, isn't that just pluperfect?

 

[Soupie]

One of the links I sent refers to the One Hundred Year War between Natural Kinds or Psychological Constructions ...

there are divisions between:

constructions // natural kinds

psychology//biology
*human// animal
individual//universal
discrete//continuous (I couldn't quite break it down into digital and analogue, but the seven circuit model might be described as discrete? and the construction model requires something like a parallel processing model ... even computer metaphors have to be upgraded!

*Our solution is that emotion categories live at the level of human perception. Emotions are contents, not systems, in the brain,

I don't disagree with that last statement above: emotions in our culture are concepts, usually related to social interaction.

As noted, and with which I agree, Panksepp suggests that it isn't a matter of either/or but rather a matter of both.

There are primary, unconditional, biologically based affects as well as secondary conditioned and tertiary cognitive/computational concept-based affects.

As Constance said several posts back, we build our concepts out of our experiences.

A model such as the one proposed by Lovheim can provide the framework for how phenomenal affect could be (1) innately biological and (2) maleable by meta-cognitive concepts at the same time.

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lövheim_cube_of_emotion

That is, phenomenal human affect may be directly related to specific neurochemicals, but from these basic, innate affects might be built more complex emotional, social concepts.

 

[Constance]

"Our solution is that emotion categories live at the level of human perception. Emotions are contents, not systems, in the brain."

I think that's exactly right. Emotion contains and expresses meaning and does not require the 'tertiary level' of the brain, equated to cognition, to do so. Emotion is as meaningful as purposeful thought. Frans de Wahl's books persuade us that this is also true of many animal species, if we haven't already understood it through our own relationships with our domesticated 'pets' or by observing wild animals in nature or in adequate zoo environments that reproduce natural environmental settings like those to which the wild animals in their care have formerly been habituated.

I have to read at least six papers linked by Steve to catch up with this discussion and am too tired to do so now. But in the immortal words of Scarlett O'Hara, 'tomorrow is another day'.

 

[smcder]

I don't disagree with that last statement above: emotions in our culture are concepts, usually related to social interaction.

As noted, and with which I agree, Panksepp suggests that it isn't a matter of either/or but rather a matter of both.

There are primary, unconditional, biologically based affects as well as secondary conditioned and tertiary cognitive/computational concept-based affects.

As Constance said several posts back, we build our concepts out of our experiences.

A model such as the one proposed by Lovheim can provide the framework for how phenomenal affect could be (1) innately biological and (2) maleable by meta-cognitive concepts at the same time.

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lövheim_cube_of_emotion

That is, phenomenal human affect may be directly related to specific neurochemicals, but from these basic, innate affects might be built more complex emotional, social concepts.

@Pharoah - what is your take on Natural Kinds vs Psychological Construction?

(if I need to re-phrase this in the form of a yes/no question just let me know ... ;-)

Natural Kinds points to targeted pharmacological intervention based on universal circuits, whereas Psychological Construction argues that emotion is unique to the individual - what you call fear, I call exhilaration ... so that points toward psychotherapy.

 

[smcder]

I don't disagree with that last statement above: emotions in our culture are concepts, usually related to social interaction.

As noted, and with which I agree, Panksepp suggests that it isn't a matter of either/or but rather a matter of both.

There are primary, unconditional, biologically based affects as well as secondary conditioned and tertiary cognitive/computational concept-based affects.

As Constance said several posts back, we build our concepts out of our experiences.

A model such as the one proposed by Lovheim can provide the framework for how phenomenal affect could be (1) innately biological and (2) maleable by meta-cognitive concepts at the same time.

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lövheim_cube_of_emotion

That is, phenomenal human affect may be directly related to specific neurochemicals, but from these basic, innate affects might be built more complex emotional, social concepts.

See the articles I posted above ... it should include responses from Panksepp and Barrett distinguishing their views.

As I understand it - Natural Kinds says there are seven circuits (see Panksepp ALLCAPS) so emotion is hard wired:

Barrett clearly denies this:

"In other words, as Barrett put it to me, emotion isn’t a simple reflex or a bodily state that’s hard-wired into our DNA, and it’s certainly not universally expressed. It’s a contingent act of perception that makes sense of the information coming in from the world around you, how your body is feeling in the moment, and everything you’ve ever been taught to understand as emotion. Culture to culture, person to person even, it’s never quite the same. What’s felt as sadness in one person might as easily be felt as weariness in another, or frustration in someone else."

Both argue the data supports their position.

This is a classic case of a possible paradigm shift as Thomas Kuhn describes it in "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions".

 

[smcder]

I don't disagree with that last statement above: emotions in our culture are concepts, usually related to social interaction.

As noted, and with which I agree, Panksepp suggests that it isn't a matter of either/or but rather a matter of both.

There are primary, unconditional, biologically based affects as well as secondary conditioned and tertiary cognitive/computational concept-based affects.

As Constance said several posts back, we build our concepts out of our experiences.

A model such as the one proposed by Lovheim can provide the framework for how phenomenal affect could be (1) innately biological and (2) maleable by meta-cognitive concepts at the same time.

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lövheim_cube_of_emotion

That is, phenomenal human affect may be directly related to specific neurochemicals, but from these basic, innate affects might be built more complex emotional, social concepts.

That would be a good project to compare Lovheim to Barrett and Panksepp.

At a glance it would seem closer to Panksepp:

"low-serotonergic side of the Lövheim cube, where only the basic emotions shame/humiliation, distress/anguish, fear/terror and anger/rage are within reach"

But Barrett might argue that the emotions felt by the individual are a matter of individual construction ... an everyday example is someone who is happy in their misery - they are adjusted to low levels of serotonin and a chronically depressed state and have adapted to it ... this may be why people who are put on anti-depressants become suicidal.

 

[smcder]

And there's a bigger question here ... what predictions can each model make about what a person will actually do? What role does what we think about what we feel play in what we do?

Three examples: RET, Greek philosophy and Buddhism.

Rational Emotive Therapy

A. Something happens.
B. You have a belief about the situation.
C. You have an emotional reaction to the belief.

Using this model, the person was taught a self-help technique in which they identified cognitive distortions such as "all or nothing thinking" that form their beliefs about a situation, then the person actually has an argument with themselves to change their view, then they go back in and re-assess how they feel.

So if a person doesn't get a job and they are able to identify their thinking as "I'm no good, I never do well in interviews, I'm just going to have to take whatever someone gives me." and then they look at it objectively, remembering a time when they did do well in their interview, when they did get a job and then based on their new thinking, they may decide they just had a bad day and maybe they will even set up some practice interviews with a friend to get feedback and pretty soon they aren't depressed. See also Martin Selgiman's work on Learned Helplessness/Optimism.

Note that this is not brain plasticity - the moment one identifies errors in their thinking and makes changes in that thinking, they fell better - over time a more optimistic attitude may of course re-wire the brain.

The Greek idea of Eudaimonia recognized a different meaning of happiness in terms of virtue, putting it on a more objective basis than simple hedonism and leading one to a cognitive satisfaction even if one feels miserable. Such a person might not seek help for a low serotonergic state because life is meaningful ... that's why mental health screenings can't be reduced simply to a blood test. A good example is why Lund ended up with Laszlo instead of Rick in Casablanca and everyone felt "good" about it.
Buddhism very specifically concerns itself with the development of equanimity and non-attachment by dropping the stories we tell (constructions) about the thoughts and feelings that arise in the mind. It would be interesting to compare the brain of an advanced meditator with a control group in terms of the theories we are discussing.

 

[smcder]

Kuhn's cycle

"Phase 1- It exists only once and is the pre-paradigm phase, in which there is no consensus on any particular theory, though the research being carried out can be considered scientific in nature. This phase is characterized by several incompatible and incomplete theories. If the actors in the pre-paradigm community eventually gravitate to one of these conceptual frameworks and ultimately to a widespread consensus on the appropriate choice of methods, terminology and on the kinds of experiment that are likely to contribute to increased insights.

This seems to me be where emotion research and certainly consciousness studies are ... the researcher on the ground needs just enough theory to guide him to his next experiment as he keeps an eye on an overall explanation that could become a dominant paradigm.
Phase 2- Normal Science, begins, in which puzzles are solved within the context of the dominant paradigm. As long as there is consensus within the discipline, normal science continues. Over time, progress in normal science may reveal anomalies, facts that are difficult to explain within the context of the existing paradigm. While usually these anomalies are resolved, in some cases they may accumulate to the point where normal science becomes difficult and where weaknesses in the old paradigm are revealed.

This seems to be where the Natural Kinds theorists think emotion research is ... Panksepp in one of his papers said more specific research based on his model could answer the questions Barrett asks ... she argues data that doesn't fit Panksepp's model is being ignored.

Phase 3- This phase is a crisis. Crises are often resolved within the context of normal science. However, after significant efforts of normal science within a paradigm fail, science may enter the next phase.

This is what has to be resolved - can Barrett's concerns be addressed within the bounds of normal science or ... will the Hundred Years War end in:

Phase 4- Scientific revolution is the phase in which the underlying assumptions of the field are reexamined and a new paradigm is established.
Phase 5- Post-Revolution, the new paradigm's dominance is established and so scientists return to normal science, solving puzzles within the new paradigm. [4]
A science may go through these cycles repeatedly, though Kuhn notes that it is a good thing for science that such shifts do not occur often or easily.
Incommensurability
According to Kuhn, the scientific paradigms preceding and succeeding a paradigm shift are so different that their theories are incommensurable — the new paradigm cannot be proven or disproven by the rules of the old paradigm, and vice versa. (A later interpretation by Kuhn of 'commensurable' versus 'incommensurable' was as a distinction between languages, namely, that statements in commensurable languages were translatable fully from one to the other, while in incommensurable languages, strict translation is not possible."

 

[smcder]

Being a dog myself Steve..., I have to say that the biggest difficulty I have in communicating with humans is hitting the right letters on the keyboard with my paws. And Steve... you are doing a pretty good job because I understand about 10% of what you write. I don't like to whine about it, but woofing the wrong dialect - which is probably what you are doing - is like barking at a tree... waste of time.

GOOD BOY! 10% is VERRRRY GOOD - I only understand about half of what I write myself!

Pssst - there's a whole box of dog biscuits in it for you if you can train my dogs to read Heidegger ... I'm have a terrible time of it.

 

[Soupie]

I think that's exactly right. Emotion contains and expresses meaning and does not require the 'tertiary level' of the brain, equated to cognition, to do so. Emotion is as meaningful as purposeful thought.

This seems to be a contradiction though; having the cake and eating it too.

You're saying you agree with the constructivist view -- the idea that emotions are constructed from generic, raw material -- but then you say that emotion contains and expresses meaning without cognition. That is a contradiction.

Either emotion is unconditional (primary) or emotion is conditioned (secondary) or constructed/cognitive (tertiary).

My position is that it's a case of all three.

 

[smcder]

This seems to be a contradiction though; having the cake and eating it too.

You're saying you agree with the constructivist view -- the idea that emotions are constructed from generic, raw material -- but then you say that emotion contains and expresses meaning without cognition. That is a contradiction.

Either emotion is unconditional (primary) or emotion is conditioned (secondary) or constructed/cognitive (tertiary).

My position is that it's a case of all three.

Remember, Barrett argues for something different going on in humans:

Our solution is that emotion categories live at the level of human perception. Emotions are contents, not systems, in the brain.

Furthermore, homologous emotion circuits of the sort presumed by the natural-kind model are unlikely to exist given what is known about the evolution of the human brain.

and especially this:

When compared with other mammals, the human brain has seen a rapid expansion in the isocortical aspects of affective circuitry along with increasingly dense reciprocal projections to subcortical areas (some of which have evolved in concert with the cortical changes).

 

[Soupie]

See the articles I posted above ... it should include responses from Panksepp and Barrett distinguishing their views.

...

Both argue the data supports their position.

This is a classic case of a possible paradigm shift as Thomas Kuhn describes it in "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions".

This is a sub-debate of the global the nature/nurture debate imo. And like the consensus on the nature/nurture debate, the answer is it's a little of both. Panksepp seems to be saying it's both, and Barrett is saying it's all "nurture."

If it's all nurture, why do we even talk about "human" psychology? Shouldn't we just talk about generic psychology? The reason we talk about human psychology versus non-human psychology is because we believe that a human mind is different than a non-human mind.

So why do we believe that a human mind is different than a non-human mind? That's a very honest question! I would love to hear both @smcder's and @Constance's answers to this question. So far Constance has not answered this question. (That's a statement of fact, not meant as a challenge or insult.)

I can think of two leading reasons for the difference between human and non-human minds:

(1) There are disembodied minds possessing phenomenal affect, experiences, cognitions, metacognitions, and memories. These minds are different. Certain of these minds get paired with humans and certain of these minds get paired with non-humans. How and why these minds are different cannot currently be known.

(2) Minds are directly related to organisms. The differences between human minds and non-human minds are directly related to the physical and physiological differences between human organisms and non-human organisms.

Are there other ways to account for the differences between human and non-human psychologies? If so, what are they?

Do the two of you deny that there are differences between human and non-human psychologies?

My view is that: Certain organisms and certain developing, infant organisms have their behavior guided by unconditional, innate affective feelings. However, certain organisms--such as humans--quickly, within mere months, begin to have there affective feelings shaped by secondary and tertiary processes.

If you've spent time with children or even the mental ill, I believe you will see this. Take the example of the mentally ill: If we accept Barrett's position -- that all affect is cognitively constructed -- then we're suggesting that all mental illness is cognitive -- it's all do to faulting thinking. Of course, some mental illness is due to faulty cognition; but to suggest that all mental illness is a result of faulty cognition is wrong imo. In some cases, people have brains that are not neurotypical or are in some ways damaged or impaired.

And what does the constructivist position say about temperament and personality? Are temperament and personality all cognition/computation as well?

Having said all that, I do think the human brain has been shaped via evolution to be the most adaptable, general purpose "processor" in the known universe, allowing humans (and human minds) to be incredible adaptable. We are the most cognitive (tertiary) organisms currently known. However, at our core--I believe--are some innate, biological, primary physical and mental lattice that get us started... but onto this lattice each of us quickly begins actively and passively shaping--via secondary and tertiary processes--our minds.

 

[smcder]

This seems to be a contradiction though; having the cake and eating it too.

You're saying you agree with the constructivist view -- the idea that emotions are constructed from generic, raw material -- but then you say that emotion contains and expresses meaning without cognition. That is a contradiction.

Either emotion is unconditional (primary) or emotion is conditioned (secondary) or constructed/cognitive (tertiary).

My position is that it's a case of all three.

All three would seem to be a contradiction too ... emotion is unconditional and conditioned and (or?) cognitive ... I can't make that work.

Even if you say there are basic circuits that "generate" emotion, once it hits that second level and is conditioned, then you can't really say it's overall unconditioned ... and then if it's constructed, then you can't really say it's conditioned (not for humans) - not the final emotion as we feel it and think about it - that's what distinguishes Barrett from Panksepp, I don't see a resolution about that part. Panksepp isn't saying he and Barrett are both right, he's saying there's not enough data for her position and she's saying he's overlooking data and she's focusing on humans rather than mammal models - she says the wiring is different:

When compared with other mammals, the human brain has seen a rapid expansion in the isocortical aspects of affective circuitry along with increasingly dense reciprocal projections to subcortical areas (some of which have evolved in concert with the cortical changes).

Panksepp says FEAR is FEAR but Barrett says it's not fear until it's constructed ... is the boxer afraid or is the boxer angry or ... it makes a big difference in what the boxer will do ... if the two theories can be distinguished they will make different predictions at this point

Remember Jordan Peterson said that when we face our fears we bring a whole other set of processes into play? That's closer to what Barrett is saying.