Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3

[Pharoah]

After you've read at least this paper on the evolving structure of Varela's insights, tell me if you can find one that does.

c.f. my edit above of #17. A star?

 

[Constance]

Where is #17?

 

[Pharoah]

“It is autopoiesis which defines the cell as a unity endowed with an individuality”
"An autopoietic system is organized... as a network of processes of production... of components that produces the components that: 1) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes... that produce them; and 2) constitute it... as a concrete unity in the space in which they exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network” (Varela, 1979).
What... like a star?
and,
autopoiesis doesn't define anything!

"

 

[Constance]

autopoiesis doesn't define anything!

Lol. I see you're entirely disinterested in learning what Varela, Thompson, and neurophenomenology have to teach us. So be it. Your choice. FYI, autopoiesis refers to one component of the interactive structure of biological systems and processes that produce the 'dynamic core' of a living organism, from the basis of which the organism 'seeks' [Panksepp], learns, and develops in its
lived experience in its environment.

 

[Pharoah]

Lol. I see you're entirely disinterested in learning what Varela, Thompson, and neurophenomenology have to teach us. So be it. Your choice. FYI, autopoiesis refers to one component of the interactive structure of biological systems and processes that produce the 'dynamic core' of a living organism, from the basis of which the organism 'seeks' [Panksepp], learns, and develops in its
lived experience in its environment.

I like Varela! I'm reading aren't I? Just have issues with some of the statements, definitions and contradicitons. But Varela definitely on the right track! I'm also v. curious about Thompson's work... next on list of papers!
I am also acutely aware that I am not reading Varela. I would not want anyone to dump my ideas in response to reading what someone else's interpretation.
thread #17? Where is it? What kind of question is that?
Thompson paper

 

[Constance]

Good. Carry on, then. But try not to take it apart before you absorb the integrated whole of it.

What thread #17? Never mind.

 

[Constance]

Thompson paper

Excellent paper, a more developed version of a paper on the same subjects that I posted sometime recently. Glad you found it.

 

[Pharoah]

What would be the core beliefs and ideas that a pananormalist philosopher would hold?
If you were writing the SEP entry on paranormalism, what would be its history, its subheads, and who would it reference?

 

[Constance]

What would be the core beliefs and ideas that a pananormalist philosopher would hold?
If you were writing the SEP entry on paranormalism, what would be its history, its subheads, and who would it reference?

Interesting question. I personally take an interest in psychical experience, psi aptitudes in general, and the subconscious grounds of phenomenological intersubjectivity. As I see it, too much is included in the category of 'the paranormal' to make it tractable as a category of experience. In any case, it will be interesting to see what responses are made to your question. I might offer a rough draft of topics I would include in an article I would write, but right now I have to get back to bed and finish my night's sleep.

 

[smcder]

@Constance

You asked what a tetralemma was (Part 2)

A tetralemma is composed of four propositions and can be expressed positively or negatively.
x
-x
Both x and -x
Neither x nor -x

So it's pure negation in its effect.

I used it tongue in cheek to say a tetralemma can hold two dilemmas.

Interestingly, it can also be expressed tetralemmerickally ...

There once was a man from Nantucket.
There once was not a man from Nantucket.
Who did and did not keep all his cash in a bucket.
But his daughter, named Nan,
Ran away with a man
And as for the bucket, neither Nan nor not tucket!

 

[smcder]

I am interested in those subjects as they relate to the nature of reality and human nature.

Sure, I could read a book about paranormal phenomena like NDEs, OBEs, psi, etc. and some day I will. (And Buddhism, meditation, UFOs, the trickster, etc.)

However, my main interest right now is simply thinking/reading about consciousness studies, particularly from the information and cognitive neuroscience perspectives. Although I am open to other models.

I've tried to share any and all articles I've found and read with links and brief summaries. Books not so much. Other than Pharoah's excellent book which I'm working through, I've not read any books on consciousness since I started participating in this discussion.

While you and Steve have certainly shared meant great articles, I don't recall many dealing specifically with examples of paranormal aspects of consciousness and models to account for them. Of course, as noted, not much is understood so perhaps there are no models other than the filter/radio model.

The big problem is excluding evidence for which we don't have a model. Saying I won't look at the data that falls outside my model is Procustean not Promethean.

Without models, what would we talk about?

1. what do the anomalous facts have in common? (if anything)
2. what do the current models of consciousness lack? (for starters, an explanation of consciousness)

 

[Soupie]

Furthermore, I have a strong interpretation of 'information' that I consider to be remarkably consistent with observation and what we understand about evolution. If my stance is correct ITT must equate to HCT or be wrong.

But you still havent identified what is wrong with IIT.

I'm 150 pages into your book; I am by no means an expert on your view nor IIT, but I'm not seeing how they are incompatiable, nor have you successfully articulated how they are incompatible.

Im not trying to appeal to authority, but I think its important to point out that Tonini et al base IIT on their work in the lab with humans.

So logical theories such as yours are sorely needed, but empirical data with real conscious humans is paramount and often counterintuitive.

Anyhow, my understanding is that both HCT and IIT are representational approaches.

Thus:

External physical event X

Internal physical representation X1

The question is, how/why does an internal physical representation carry with it a phenomenal feel?

From what I can gather, IIT says that the phenomenal feel arises from the way in which neurons interact (integrate) with one another to create internal physical representations of external physical events. They have several lines of empirical data to support their model; not least of which is that integrated neurons appear to be vastly more effecient to non-integrated neurons.

However, ive been reading several recent hints that internal representations may acquire their feel upon introspection. However, how the capacity for introspection (metacogntion) arises in the first place, I don't know. (How does information become aware of itself? How do representations become aware of themselves?)

At this point, Im not clear how internal physical representation (organisms) acquire their feel in HTC? How/why do the internal physical representations of the external physical environment/landscape give rise to a corresponding (?) phenomenal landscape?

 

[Soupie]

The big problem is excluding evidence for which we don't have a model. Saying I won't look at the data that falls outside my model is Procustean not Promethean.

Are you saying that philosophers, neuroscientists, psychologists, etc. should be factoring NDEs, past life memories, and PSI into their models? (OBEs seem to be incorporated.)

Without models, what would we talk about?

1. what do the anomalous facts have in common? (if anything)
2. what do the current models of consciousness lack? (for starters, an explanation of consciousness)

My suggestion above was that we define consciousness (as best we can) so that we can come to an agreement on what needs explaining, what explanations (models) have so far been offered, and to suggest some models of our own.

I provided a basic definition of consciousness above. What would you add/subtract from it?

 

[smcder]

We have a fresh, new thread but already we are going down all the old paths:

However, ive been reading several recent hints that internal representations may acquire their feel upon introspection. However, how the capacity for introspection (metacogntion) arises in the first place, I don't know. (How does information become aware of itself? How do representations become aware of themselves?)
At this point, Im not clear how internal physical representation (organisms) acquire their feel in HTC? How/why do the internal physical representations of the external physical environment/landscape give rise to a corresponding (?) phenomenal landscape?

These are both basically restatements of the hard problem - which is where we started two hundred pages ago.

I think is a good opportunity to split off discussion of IIT/HTC and related theories into their own thread.

 

[smcder]

Are you saying that philosophers, neuroscientists, psychologists, etc. should be factoring NDEs, past life memories, and PSI into their models? (OBEs seem to be incorporated.)


My suggestion above was that we define consciousness (as best we can) so that we can come to an agreement on what needs explaining, what explanations (models) have so far been offered, and to suggest some models of our own.

I provided a basic definition of consciousness above. What would you add/subtract from it?

Are you saying that philosophers, neuroscientists, psychologists, etc. should be factoring NDEs, past life memories, and PSI into their models? (OBEs seem to be incorporated.)

Not yet - the first step is to look at the evidence. Kuhn explains why this hasn't happened. Either this evidence will remain a fringe activity or it will become part of a paradigm shift.

My suggestion above was that we define consciousness (as best we can) so that we can come to an agreement on what needs explaining, what explanations (models) have so far been offered, and to suggest some models of our own.

I think we should drop the word consciousness. We end up having to explain what we mean any way or defend that definition - plus, if we don't use the word consciousness, we don't take over more territory than our use of the word entitles.

As for your definition, the first sentence in your defintion is the definition of consciousness, but the second sentence defines mind in terms of the first defintion and also makes a claim of possession for the organism. There's nothing wrong with it - I'm just pointing out it's not just a definition of consciousness.

 

[Soupie]

We have a fresh, new thread but already we are going down all the old paths:

However, ive been reading several recent hints that internal representations may acquire their feel upon introspection. However, how the capacity for introspection (metacogntion) arises in the first place, I don't know. (How does information become aware of itself? How do representations become aware of themselves?)
At this point, Im not clear how internal physical representation (organisms) acquire their feel in HTC? How/why do the internal physical representations of the external physical environment/landscape give rise to a corresponding (?) phenomenal landscape?

These are both basically restatements of the hard problem - which is where we started two hundred pages ago.

I think is a good opportunity to split off discussion of IIT/HTC and related theories into their own thread.

What's wrong with continuing to explore IIT and HTC? Do you no longer want to discuss potential solutions to the hard problem, or have you already decided or determined that they don't answer the hard problem? What better models are there?

 

[Soupie]

the second sentence defines mind in terms of the first defintion and also makes a claim of possession for the organism.

And that's why I think this exercise could be fruitful!

I do think "mind" is defined in terms of consciousness. If you and others don't, I'd like to know why.

Likewise with possession: I do think organisms possess their own, unique consciousness (i.e., a mind). All humans possess hair, each person possess an individal head of hair.

Again, if you and others disagree that organisms possess their minds, I'd like to know why.

Imho, I think this could go a LONG way in explaining miscommunications and affinity and disregard for certain ideas and models.

 

[smcder]

What's wrong with continuing to explore IIT and HTC? Do you no longer want to discuss potential solutions to the hard problem, or have you already decided or determined that they don't answer the hard problem? What better models are there?

What's wrong with continuing to explore IIT and HTC?
No thing. I actually think more people would come to a new thread on IIT/HTC

1. because it's a new thread and so it would catch attention
2. it breaks with the C&P (I think people dip in and out of the thread and make assumptions about it instead of appeciating the whole scope) and points to two specific theories (or a class of theories) for which there is I think broad potential interest on the forum (look at the people who have come and gone on the C&P with an interest in these theories)
3. it cleans things up a bit

Do you no longer want to discuss potential solutions to the hard problem, or have you already decided or determined that they don't answer the hard problem?

No, I walk to school and carry my lunch.

What better models are there?

I don't know. There may not be any. I think the original C&P thread started with the intent to answer this question.

I don't seem to be able to convince you that I'm not championing a particular cause. What I am doing is trying to keep the playing field level and keep us cognizant of what we don't know.

I'd like a clean thread to actually discuss Consciousness and the Paranormal and that was where we started, so it makes sense for the new thread to break off on the IIT/HTC side.

 

[Pharoah]

But you still havent identified what is wrong with IIT.

I'm 150 pages into your book; I am by no means an expert on your view nor IIT, but I'm not seeing how they are incompatiable, nor have you successfully articulated how they are incompatible.

Im not trying to appeal to authority, but I think its important to point out that Tonini et al base IIT on their work in the lab with humans.

So logical theories such as yours are sorely needed, but empirical data with real conscious humans is paramount and often counterintuitive.

Anyhow, my understanding is that both HCT and IIT are representational approaches.

Thus:

External physical event X

Internal physical representation X1

The question is, how/why does an internal physical representation carry with it a phenomenal feel?

From what I can gather, IIT says that the phenomenal feel arises from the way in which neurons interact (integrate) with one another to create internal physical representations of external physical events. They have several lines of empirical data to support their model; not least of which is that integrated neurons appear to be vastly more effecient to non-integrated neurons.

However, ive been reading several recent hints that internal representations may acquire their feel upon introspection. However, how the capacity for introspection (metacogntion) arises in the first place, I don't know. (How does information become aware of itself? How do representations become aware of themselves?)

At this point, Im not clear how internal physical representation (organisms) acquire their feel in HTC? How/why do the internal physical representations of the external physical environment/landscape give rise to a corresponding (?) phenomenal landscape?

Soupie you say:
1. "From what I can gather, IIT says that the phenomenal feel arises from the way in which neurons interact (integrate) with one another to create internal physical representations of external physical events. They have several lines of empirical data to support their model; not least of which is that integrated neurons appear to be vastly more effecient to non-integrated neurons."

It's neurons what does it.
Well, I'm glad IIT ticked that box and sorted the problem of phenomenal experience. Next problem please...

2. However, ive been reading several recent hints that internal representations may acquire their feel upon introspection

Introspection does require representation, but representation most certainly does not require introspection. But many would argue otherwise.

3. At this point, Im not clear how internal physical representation (organisms) acquire their feel in HTC? How/why do the internal physical representations of the external physical environment/landscape give rise to a corresponding (?) phenomenal landscape?

Is that a question for me and HCT?

 

[smcder]

And that's why I think this exercise could be fruitful!

I do think "mind" is defined in terms of consciousness. If you and others don't, I'd like to know why.

Likewise with possession: I do think organisms possess their own, unique consciousness (i.e., a mind). All humans possess hair, each person possess an individal head of hair.

Again, if you and others disagree that organisms possess their minds, I'd like to know why.

Imho, I think this could go a LONG way in explaining miscommunications and affinity and disregard for certain ideas and models.

If there is good evidence that subjective states exist apart from organisms (survival) or that subjective information is available at a temporal or physical distance (psi) then the defintion of "possess" would need to accomodate this evidence.

If I could read your mind, would I not be said to violate your possession of it?

This still leaves discussion of possess in terms of orginate. You could generate consciousness and I might still be able to take it from you ... think of the implications for copyright law!

So, if you have determined there isn't good evidence - then that would be another point of delineation for a new thread. You could post at the outset the parameters of what you are wanting to look at - and that other ideas could be looked at on the C&P.

It's just my opinion - I don't own the thread, nobody does - but it might be helpful to keep the two tracks of thought more separate.