Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3

[Soupie]

If awareness did not exist in its own right there would be no `I'. There would be `me', my personhood, my social and emotional identity — but no `I', no transparent centre of being.

Distinguishing awareness from that which one is aware, is a conception imo. A powerful one. The self concept.

I am distinct from that which I am aware. But awareness of being distinct is awareness of something. It's content.

 

[Pharoah]

Yes, youve expressed that many times. Well have to disagree on that.

Because the objective and subjective are so different, its hard to find analogies. But one might be the relationship between water molecules and rippling.

Rippling is technically constituted of water molecules, but saying rippling is identical to water molecules is inaccurate. Rippling isnt even unique to water molecules. Rippling can occur in a number of substrates, even the earth's crust.

Rippling isn't a "thing." If there were rippling occuring in a substance, and we were to somehow freeze time, there would be no rippling... But the substance would still exist.

Rippling /= any material substrate.

Again, this is not a perfect analogy because the subjective is different from the objective. We can see physical material, and we can see physical material "rippling."

My point is that consciousness — like rippling — exists via physical processes but need not be considered a (physical) thing. But they are processes constituted by the dynamic interactions of physical things.

Along with the concept of "5," we might say the same of "green." Look as we might, we won't see green in the brain or in any physical radiation.

Percepts, concepts, and sensations exist only in the immaterial mind.

Well surely, matter itself is not a rigid thing. Water and water molecules are not a rigid thing but obtain their identifiable characteristics due to a changing subatomic process too. Nothing is rigid. So everything, technically, is immaterial.

 

[Pharoah]

@Soupie @smcder
The Lycan paper is relevant to this information is immaterial thing:
PerspWeb
"The existence of nonphysical, subjective, intrinsically perspectival etc.informationmay or may not be of metaphysical interest. But for purposes of philosophy of mind, here are two key ways in which it is not interesting: (i) The phenomenon is not specifically about the mind; it is everywhere. No amount of chemistry contains the information thatwateris splashing. No amount of economic etc. information contains the information that I am overpaid. And so forth. And/but (ii) it does not follow in any of these cases that the object or stuff in question—water, or WGL--has a nonphysical or immaterial property. I believe Jackson tacitly makes this inference, from nonphysical (piece of) information to nonphysical property, and so commits a fallacy; otherwise, he has no argument for the existence of epiphenomenal qualia." (section 3.)

 

[Constance]

"The existence of nonphysical, subjective, intrinsically perspectival etc.information may or may not be of metaphysical interest. But for purposes of philosophy of mind, here are two key ways in which it is not interesting . . . .

Are there any ways in which subjectivity and consciousness are interesting "for purposes of 'analytical' philosophy of mind"?

 

[Constance]

Also, Pharoah, you write in your knowledge argument paper that

“Tye’s externalist account [see also Dretske 1995] fails to identify the underlying nature of representation itself and of the determinants of phenomenally qualitative content. Ultimately, some kind of connective account must be made in either naturalistic, evolutionary, emergent, or mechanistic terms.”

How do you yourself define or describe 'the underlying nature of representation itself'?

 

[Constance]

Also, re this statement:

"some kind of connective account must be made in either naturalistic, evolutionary, emergent, or mechanistic terms,"

wouldn't it be reasonable to preface it with a phrase such as 'Presuming that physicalism is valid, . . ."

 

[Soupie]

So if a concept is not non-physical nor immaterial, what is it?

 

[Pharoah]

So if a concept is not non-physical nor immaterial, what is it?

I think of material a different to physical.
Matter is only material by definition. It is not really rigid. In a way, you could say that the material does not exist. Everything is like a "ripple" of some kind - a changing landscape at whatever level one analyses it at. Matter, concepts, information... they are changing and relational/or relative to things.
Alternatively, everything is physical (if you are a physicalist). Atoms and concepts are physical. They have causal impact and ultimately, for a cause to happen requires a physical exchange to happen.

 

[Pharoah]

Also, re this statement:

"some kind of connective account must be made in either naturalistic, evolutionary, emergent, or mechanistic terms,"

wouldn't it be reasonable to preface it with a phrase such as 'Presuming that physicalism is valid, . . ."

Yes it would... but I am referring to all the theories which attempt to provide an explanatory account but fail to give a connective account. Consequently, they cannot provide the extension-fixing story that Dowell says counts as a reductive explanation.

 

[Pharoah]

Also, Pharoah, you write in your knowledge argument paper that

“Tye’s externalist account [see also Dretske 1995] fails to identify the underlying nature of representation itself and of the determinants of phenomenally qualitative content. Ultimately, some kind of connective account must be made in either naturalistic, evolutionary, emergent, or mechanistic terms.”

How do you yourself define or describe 'the underlying nature of representation itself'?

Well,
"Regress objection. If the second-order representation is to confer consciousness on the first-order state, it must itself be a conscious state; so there must be a third-order representation of it, and so on forever." Lycan
One has to explain representation itself. What is a certain type of representation a representation of and why. HCT does provide a detailed account and the paper that I sent to AJP does give a brief explanation for the different kinds of knowledge and in what manner they are representational and yet cannot be formulated by conceptual representation.

 

[Constance]

If the second-order representation is to confer consciousness on the first-order state

As phenomenology has shown, the first-order state is also conscious, identified as prereflective consciousness, the core we need to drill down to if we are to understand the givenness of the relationship of mind to world -- revealed from the bottom up as consciousness, which Merleau-Ponty called "a gift of nature." By skipping over the core phenomenon of prereflective consciousness that leads to reflective consciousness -- as explained with stunning clarity in Sartre's introduction to Being and Nothingness -- one sets up representations upon representations -- all conceptual -- rather than beginning with that which requires analysis -- that which presents rather than [represents] the connection between consciousness and world.

 

[Constance]

Yes it would... but I am referring to all the theories which attempt to provide an explanatory account but fail to give a connective account. Consequently, they cannot provide the extension-fixing story that Dowell says counts as a reductive explanation.

The "extensive-fixing story" that supposedly supports physicalist accounts of 'what-is' on the basis that future physicalist science might develop the evidence needed to support them?

 

[Soupie]

I think of material a different to physical.
Matter is only material by definition. It is not really rigid. In a way, you could say that the material does not exist. Everything is like a "ripple" of some kind - a changing landscape at whatever level one analyses it at. Matter, concepts, information... they are changing and relational/or relative to things.
Alternatively, everything is physical (if you are a physicalist). Atoms and concepts are physical. They have causal impact and ultimately, for a cause to happen requires a physical exchange to happen.

Wikipedia entry on information: "At its most fundamental, information is any propagation of cause and effect within a system."

I'm fine with not referring to information as non-physical and/or immaterial. The point I don't want to lose though, is that information is different from, say, the tree in my neighbor's yard.

As Deutsch said, information, while physical, is substrate independent. Information is like a wave propagating through various mediums.

The wikipedia entry also had this to say about data and knowledge as they relate to information: "Information (shortened as info or info.) is that which informs, i.e. an answer to a question, as well as that from which knowledge and data can be derived (as data represents values attributed to parameters, and knowledge signifies understanding of real things or abstract concepts). As it regards data, the information's existence is not necessarily coupled to an observer (it exists beyond an event horizon, for example), while in the case of knowledge, information requires a cognitive observer."

Information - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I know that conceptually, it's hard to imagine what it's like to be information. However, I think consciousness as information is a viable potential solution to the Hard Problem.

Why can’t the world’s greatest minds solve the mystery of consciousness? | Oliver Burkeman | Science | The Guardian

One spring morning in Tucson, Arizona, in 1994, an unknown philosopher named David Chalmers got up to give a talk on consciousness, by which he meant the feeling of being inside your head, looking out – or, to use the kind of language that might give a neuroscientist an aneurysm, of having a soul. Though he didn’t realise it at the time, the young Australian academic was about to ignite a war between philosophers and scientists, by drawing attention to a central mystery of human life – perhaps the central mystery of human life – and revealing how embarrassingly far they were from solving it.

The scholars gathered at the University of Arizona – for what would later go down as a landmark conference on the subject – knew they were doing something edgy: in many quarters, consciousness was still taboo, too weird and new agey to take seriously, and some of the scientists in the audience were risking their reputations by attending. Yet the first two talks that day, before Chalmers’s, hadn’t proved thrilling. “Quite honestly, they were totally unintelligible and boring – I had no idea what anyone was talking about,” recalled Stuart Hameroff, the Arizona professor responsible for the event. “As the organiser, I’m looking around, and people are falling asleep, or getting restless.” He grew worried. “But then the third talk, right before the coffee break – that was Dave.” With his long, straggly hair and fondness for all-body denim, the 27-year-old Chalmers looked like he’d got lost en route to a Metallica concert. “He comes on stage, hair down to his butt, he’s prancing around like Mick Jagger,” Hameroff said. “But then he speaks. And that’s when everyone wakes up.” ...​

 

[smcder]

Distinguishing awareness from that which one is aware, is a conception imo. A powerful one. The self concept.

I am distinct from that which I am aware. But awareness of being distinct is awareness of something. It's content.

Read the article again - try the exercise and then we'll talk.

I had a remarkable experience with it today, several times and even now ... as I type.

 

[Constance]

Loved the Guardian article. Thanks for posting it, Soupie.

 

[smcder]

Yes, youve expressed that many times. Well have to disagree on that.

Because the objective and subjective are so different, its hard to find analogies. But one might be the relationship between water molecules and rippling.

Rippling is technically constituted of water molecules, but saying rippling is identical to water molecules is inaccurate. Rippling isnt even unique to water molecules. Rippling can occur in a number of substrates, even the earth's crust.

Rippling isn't a "thing." If there were rippling occuring in a substance, and we were to somehow freeze time, there would be no rippling... But the substance would still exist.

Rippling /= any material substrate.

Again, this is not a perfect analogy because the subjective is different from the objective. We can see physical material, and we can see physical material "rippling."

My point is that consciousness — like rippling — exists via physical processes but need not be considered a (physical) thing. But they are processes constituted by the dynamic interactions of physical things.

Along with the concept of "5," we might say the same of "green." Look as we might, we won't see green in the brain or in any physical radiation.

Percepts, concepts, and sensations exist only in the immaterial mind.

"I'm fine with not referring to information as non-physical and/or immaterial."

So now we don't have to disagree?

 

[smcder]

Wikipedia entry on information: "At its most fundamental, information is any propagation of cause and effect within a system."

I'm fine with not referring to information as non-physical and/or immaterial. The point I don't want to lose though, is that information is different from, say, the tree in my neighbor's yard.

As Deutsch said, information, while physical, is substrate independent. Information is like a wave propagating through various mediums.

The wikipedia entry also had this to say about data and knowledge as they relate to information: "Information (shortened as info or info.) is that which informs, i.e. an answer to a question, as well as that from which knowledge and data can be derived (as data represents values attributed to parameters, and knowledge signifies understanding of real things or abstract concepts). As it regards data, the information's existence is not necessarily coupled to an observer (it exists beyond an event horizon, for example), while in the case of knowledge, information requires a cognitive observer."

Information - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I know that conceptually, it's hard to imagine what it's like to be information. However, I think consciousness as information is a viable potential solution to the Hard Problem.

Why can’t the world’s greatest minds solve the mystery of consciousness? | Oliver Burkeman | Science | The Guardian

One spring morning in Tucson, Arizona, in 1994, an unknown philosopher named David Chalmers got up to give a talk on consciousness, by which he meant the feeling of being inside your head, looking out – or, to use the kind of language that might give a neuroscientist an aneurysm, of having a soul. Though he didn’t realise it at the time, the young Australian academic was about to ignite a war between philosophers and scientists, by drawing attention to a central mystery of human life – perhaps the central mystery of human life – and revealing how embarrassingly far they were from solving it.

The scholars gathered at the University of Arizona – for what would later go down as a landmark conference on the subject – knew they were doing something edgy: in many quarters, consciousness was still taboo, too weird and new agey to take seriously, and some of the scientists in the audience were risking their reputations by attending. Yet the first two talks that day, before Chalmers’s, hadn’t proved thrilling. “Quite honestly, they were totally unintelligible and boring – I had no idea what anyone was talking about,” recalled Stuart Hameroff, the Arizona professor responsible for the event. “As the organiser, I’m looking around, and people are falling asleep, or getting restless.” He grew worried. “But then the third talk, right before the coffee break – that was Dave.” With his long, straggly hair and fondness for all-body denim, the 27-year-old Chalmers looked like he’d got lost en route to a Metallica concert. “He comes on stage, hair down to his butt, he’s prancing around like Mick Jagger,” Hameroff said. “But then he speaks. And that’s when everyone wakes up.” ...​

@Pharoah... maybe information isn't so different from Soupie's neighbor's tree?

What kind of tree is it anyway?


"I'm fine with not referring to information as non-physical and/or immaterial. The point I don't want to lose though, is that information is different from, say, the tree in my neighbor's yard."

 

[Constance]

Would y'all read this poem, maybe several times, and post your impressions of what you think it means concerning the relationship between the singer and the world in which she sings? Thanks.

The Idea of Order at Key West

She sang beyond the genius of the sea.
The water never formed to mind or voice,
Like a body wholly body, fluttering
Its empty sleeves; and yet its mimic motion
Made constant cry, caused constantly a cry,
That was not ours although we understood,
Inhuman, of the veritable ocean.

The sea was not a mask. No more was she.
The song and water were not medleyed sound
Even if what she sang was what she heard.
Since what she sang was uttered word by word.
It may be that in all her phrases stirred
The grinding water and the gasping wind;
But it was she and not the sea we heard.

For she was the maker of the song she sang.
The ever-hooded, tragic-gestured sea
Was merely a place by which she walked to sing.
Whose spirit is this? we said, because we knew
It was the spirit that we sought and knew
That we should ask this often as she sang.

If it was only the dark voice of the sea
That rose, or even colored by many waves;
If it was only the outer voice of sky
And cloud, of the sunken coral water-walled,
However clear, it would have been deep air,
The heaving speech of air, a summer sound
Repeated in a summer without end
And sound alone. But it was more than that,
More even than her voice, and ours, among
The meaningless plungings of water and the wind,
Theatrical distances, bronze shadows heaped
On high horizons, mountainous atmospheres
Of sky and sea.
It was her voice that made
The sky acutest at its vanishing.
She measured to the hour its solitude.
She was the single artificer of the world
In which she sang. And when she sang, the sea,
Whatever self it had, became the self
That was her song, for she was the maker. Then we,
As we beheld her striding there alone,
Knew that there never was a world for her
Except the one she sang and, singing, made.

Ramon Fernandez, tell me, if you know,
Why, when the singing ended and we turned
Toward the town, tell why the glassy lights,
The lights in the fishing boats at anchor there,
As night descended, tilting in the air,
Mastered the night and portioned out the sea,
Fixing emblazoned zones and fiery poles,
Arranging, deepening, enchanting night.

Oh! Blessed rage for order, pale Ramon,
The maker’s rage to order words of the sea,
Words of the fragrant portals, dimly-starred,
And of ourselves and of our origins,
In ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds.

Wallace Stevens

 

[Soupie]

"I'm fine with not referring to information as non-physical and/or immaterial."

So now we don't have to disagree?

Nope. It wasn't getting us anywhere. I'm more worried about concepts than what we label the concepts. However, as noted, physical information — substrate independent patterns of causation — are different from trees and rocks (substrate dependent patterns of causation). If I can't call these substrate independent patterns of causation immaterial, what can I call them! I need a fancy name, dammit!

@smcder

From the comments following the Guardian article I just posted, our Mindless Babylonians?

There is a condition called Depersonalisation Disorder - or DPD.

This entails,inter alia, a feeling of either inner or outer separation from the body. Most people experience depersonalisation at some point, whether they notice it or not (or find it unpleasant) is another matter.

Inasmuch as it is understood by psychiatrists, it is conjectured that it is an evolved form of dissociation, useful when some primeval ancestors were confronted with, say, an earthquake, something terrible and inexplicable - as opposed,say, to an angry and hungry lion, which you can see.

In the DPD sufferer, some sort of loop has closed in the brain, so the utility of the dissociative 'flight' becomes pathological.

For some individuals, the condition exists in protracted bouts or even endlessly: making one feel quite the 'zombie'- in fact, one sees the rest of the world as hopelessly determined and delusionally locked into the weird sense of 'self' and the accompanying delusion, free will.

This will sound ridiculous to anyone who has not experienced it - just as above, the ridicule of one camp for the other's position.

The Maudsley has a centre for the study of this condition (sadly, much-reduced because of cuts) - but, of course, if we can't even agree on what consciousness is it becomes rather tricky to deal with altered states of consciousness.

I have had incessant DPD since I was about 16: trust me, I've tried to explain what if feels like to a great many people, a great many times...I have a nice iatrogenic benzodiazapine addiction as a result of experimantal prescription (but no complaints; I was thrilled to find the Maudsley and would have allowed any sort of drug to be administered, whatever the possible consequences, just to get back to that feeling of being 'real').

On the other hand, I may actually be right.

A key and natural problem seems to be that if you can actually empthise and grasp its nature you probably are in the club too! Otherwise it seems like some sixth-former overwhelmed by Sartre and Camus.
​

And:

I've experienced the world like that for about 5 years. I don't really consider myself to be an "entity" as such, but a collection of reactions to external and internal stimuli that interact with each other. I don't notice there to be a coherent "self" anywhere involved, though I act like there were one. I sometimes look at other people who do experience this feeling of self as having successfully created an imaginary friend to live in their own heads. That's certainly how I look at my past self before I started disassociating.

I suspect that the "self" is in many ways as much a cultural ideology we act out internally than an actual universal fact of human biology.

The debate described above seems a little strange. intellectually, there is really no problem thinking the self is just a product of chemical reactions in a jelly blob, but that clearly doesn't necessarily prove it to be the case.​

 

[Constance]

This is interesting -- a new theory of consciousness built upon the integration of phenomenological and neuroscientific data. The section on meditation is especially good.

Frontiers | The consciousness state space (CSS)—a unifying model for consciousness and self | Perception Science