Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3

[smcder]

RIPintroNagel

Hinderlich intro to the Nagel paper you recommend - I want to read

 

[Pharoah]

yamime = why am I me (and not you)



@Pharoah will you accomodate the above for the purposes of 21 questions?

re. Q2:
replication does the trick I think. Do we really have to define what replication means in order to distinguish it from cultural replication, mental replication, political replication and anything else that evolves?
Anyway, the sentence in Q2 connects "physiological mechanisms" to "replication" by way of the term "evolved". It does not deny that there are other kinds of evolution, just that we are talking about physiological mechanism and replication as a contingent rule (I think this is correct use of contingent).

 

[smcder]

yamime

Bookmarking some links while I can ... Snowpopcalypse here ... snowmaggedon? Snowmagedddon ma sled!

Scientific materialism and the hard problem of consciousness | randombio.com

"The hard problem is completely distinct from issues of perception, pattern recognition, awareness, attention, and other brain functions. It's possible that some researchers use a different definition, but most seem to be following David Chalmers's general idea, which can be stated thus:The hard problem of consciousness is the question that is asked when one asks “Why am I (conscious as) me and not you?” In other words, ‘consciousness’ in this context is not specifically a question of how the brain works, but why the apparent inner being of an individual is centered in one individual, and why there appears to be an inner world unique to each person."

@Comstance Husserl and Heidegger referenced here

"Before Being can be studied from a scientific point of view, we need to understand what is and what is not part of it. Sleep/wakefulness, perceptions of colors and shapes, and qualia are not part of this question. They are, at least in principle, understandable as neuronal states, emotional and physical associations, and memory complexes. But Being itself is separate. Its existence is irrefutable: without it, there would only be “other people” in the universe. You would not be there. It would always be somebody else—pure objective reality—a historical world with no preferred moment of time and no preferred point in space."

 

[smcder]

re. Q2:
replication does the trick I think. Do we really have to define what replication means in order to distinguish it from cultural replication, mental replication, political replication and anything else that evolves?
Anyway, the sentence in Q2 connects "physiological mechanisms" to "replication" by way of the term "evolved". It does not deny that there are other kinds of evolution, just that we are talking about physiological mechanism and replication as a contingent rule (I think this is correct use of contingent).

Q3?

 

[smcder]

Perhaps it comes down to my interpretation of the term subjective.
I think of "subject" as referring to the form of an existing being, whilst subjectivity is the content.
so,
"the subjective character of experience" refers to the content of experience, which does require a subject, but is not subject specific (bat subjective experience in general versus a specific bat's experience). So, explaining the subjective character of content does not entail explaining the subject "itself".

Nagel's phrase, (according to wiki) "An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something that it is like for the organism to be itself."
is problematic to me. The first half of the sentence "it is like" refers to 'content' in my interpretation, the second half "it is like" refers to 'subject'. So they should not be separated by a dashhyphen (whatever – is called)
In the original paper, as per my post #884, there is a constant flitting from one to the other as if there is no distinction. I have to assume that he believes no distinction needs be articulated, but I find that very hard to believe. But... I can't second guess what Nagel thinks.

why I am me and not David Chalmers ...

Google (variations on the following terms): "hard problem" "why i am me" "david chalmers" "thomas nagel" - turns up a lot of blogs attributing this formulation (why am i me) of the hard problem to David Chalmers or Thomas Nagel but I haven't found anyone yet to say where they saw this or with a direct quote ... or a logical explanation of how they connect the two ideas - it seems to me one follows from the other, but I can't "build a bridge" from the one idea to the other either.

I'd like a clear quote from one or the other with this phrase and the hard problem in the same sentence.

One interesting sounding paper from Nagel came up (I have not read it yet) - the linker said it was about "personal identity".

http://www.oswego.edu/~delancey/100_DIR/Nagel.BBUC.pdf

keywords: yamime HCT Chalmers hard problem finagel

 

[smcder]

On another note ...

Public Education and Intelligent Design - Thomas Nagel

http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1172/papa_132.pdf

keywords teleology finnagel

 

[Pharoah]

@smcder
Thanks for the links.
"Brain bisection and the unity of consicousness" Paper 1971 is explicitly about the individuated nature of consciousness - my idea of noumenon.
As I said previously, the Nagel WIILTBAB paper is about mind-body. However, he does not make it clear at all that he draws a distinction between the phenomenon of experience as a general characteristic as experienced, or specifically about the individuated aspect of being, which is necessarily phenomenal.

 

[Constance]

Scientific materialism and the hard problem of consciousness | randombio.com

"The hard problem is completely distinct from issues of perception, pattern recognition, awareness, attention, and other brain functions. It's possible that some researchers use a different definition, but most seem to be following David Chalmers's general idea, which can be stated thus:The hard problem of consciousness is the question that is asked when one asks “Why am I (conscious as) me and not you?” In other words, ‘consciousness’ in this context is not specifically a question of how the brain works, but why the apparent inner being of an individual is centered in one individual, and why there appears to be an inner world unique to each person."

The bolded statement is perhaps the clearest expression yet offered of the hard problem of consciousness, which still appears to be one problem that includes the problem of individuality Pharoah argues to be the real hard problem. In other words, consciousness as a complex whole is the hard problem, for science and philosophy. The paper Steve links is useful at this point, though it takes us in the direction of a doubling-back on parts of the problem we've already taken up in the C&P forum from part 1 to the present. We should also read at this point the essay linked at the top right on that page: "Quantum Consciousness, Quantum Information, and Subjectivity," by the same author

Quantum Consciousness, Quantum Information, and Subjectivity

Extract: "From the foregoing it should be clear that both Stapp and Edelman are discussing a different aspect of consciousness from what is being discussed here. For both Stapp and Edelman, "consciousness" refers to the mechanics of cognitive activity in the brain. To me, it seems that, as important as the brain is for consciousness, the brain is only the tool that allows us to experience consciousness. Whatever the biological mechanism by which the brain recognizes patterns and constructs its own internal representation of reality, there is an additional step that is necessary to describe human consciousness. What is it that allows consciousness, uniquely in all the aspects of nature studied so far, to create a preferred reference point? Why does the universe appear to be focused at one point for one individual and at another point for another individual? This is what Kant called "immanence", and attempts to explain it philosophically have led to dualism (a concept that seems to be widely misunderstood by many scientist-philosophers). Despite Herculean efforts, no amount of reductionism has so far been able to explain away the reality of our everyday lives that is subjectivity."

@Comstance Husserl and Heidegger referenced here

"Before Being can be studied from a scientific point of view, we need to understand what is and what is not part of it. Sleep/wakefulness, perceptions of colors and shapes, and qualia are not part of this question. They are, at least in principle, understandable as neuronal states, emotional and physical associations, and memory complexes. But Being itself is separate. Its existence is irrefutable: without it, there would only be “other people” in the universe. You would not be there. It would always be somebody else—pure objective reality—a historical world with no preferred moment of time and no preferred point in space."

This chap needs to read Heidegger before he talks about "Being."

@smcder
"Brain bisection and the unity of consicousness" Paper 1971 is explicitly about the individuated nature of consciousness - my idea of noumenon.

That's another paper we should add to our current reading list for this discussion. I am very interested to see your eventual full argument that 'the individuated nature of consciousness' is noumenal consciousness.

As I said previously, the Nagel WIILTBAB paper is about mind-body. However, he does not make it clear at all that he draws a distinction between the phenomenon of experience as a general characteristic as experienced, or specifically about the individuated aspect of being, which is necessarily phenomenal.

I think he does {i.e., thinks it but does not express it} but it is not an explicit focus of that paper. I'm not seeing the purpose of the continuing effort here to argue against the Chalmers and Nagel papers as complete demonstrations of the subjectivity of experience and consciousness. Those were steps along the way, and we are not dependent on those steps as more than partial steps along our way -->pursuing additional expressions of the problem of consciousness, including quantum, informational, and neurological as well as philosophical contributions to groking what consciousness is. I'd say it's time to drop Chalmers and Nagel as sufficient to our inquiry, the inquiry of all consciousness studies.

 

[Soupie]

To me, it seems that, as important as the brain is for consciousness, the brain is only the tool that allows us to experience consciousness. Whatever the biological mechanism by which the brain recognizes patterns and constructs its own internal representation of reality, there is an additional step that is necessary to describe human consciousness. What is it that allows consciousness, uniquely in all the aspects of nature studied so far, to create a preferred reference point? Why does the universe appear to be focused at one point for one individual and at another point for another individual?

This author seems to believe that "consciousness" is some stuff or thing that is out there in the world that our brains somehow "experience" like colors, sounds, and smells.

And the author seems puzzled as to why different humans have different points of view.

Very curious, foreign conceptions and questions for me.

@Constance, do you think consciousness is experience or something that we experience?

 

[Constance]

This author seems to believe that "consciousness" is some stuff or thing that is out there in the world that our brains somehow "experience" like colors, sounds, and smells.

And the author seems puzzled as to why different humans have different points of view.

Very curious, foreign conceptions and questions for me.

The text you quoted from my post earlier today is the portion of a paper Steve had quoted. Perhaps Steve can estimate precisely what the author's beliefs and conceptions are. I read the paper quickly and posted before leaving the house and am just back now. I'll reread that paper and also think we should read and discuss the paper from that site that I linked, concerning quantum related interpretations of consciousness. (note: that second paper is incomplete and was said to be in process of completion, but I'm not sure it ever was completed.) We should also see the links to others' work in this area listed on the right side of the page, especially the Stapp paper.)

@Constance, do you think consciousness is experience or something that we experience?

I think consciousness and experience arise and exist together by nature, in nature. We can and do speak of them separately, but in lived reality they require one another in order to generate the persistence of temporal -- existential -- being and selfhood.

 

[smcder]

@Constance

Alva Noe blogs for NPR and here comments on Nagels "Mind and Life" - comparing the explanatory gaps of matter to life and matter to consciousness ... he refers the reader to Thompson's s "Mind in Life" for a discussion of the parallels.

Mind And Life In The Cosmos : 13.7: Cosmos And Culture : NPR

Here are a few paragraphs from this article on "Mind and Cosmos "

"It's one thing to say we haven't explained life and mind yet; it's another to say that we can't do so in principle, at least not if we confine ourselves to the concepts of modern science. Nagel has a lot to say to support this stronger idea. One particular point stands out.

The scientific revolution took its impulse from what the philosopher Bernard Williams called the Absolute Conception of Reality. This is a conception of the world as "it really is" entirely apart from how it appears to us: a colorless, odorless value-free domain of particles and complexes moving in accordance with timeless and immutable mathematical laws. The world so conceived has no place for mind in it. No intention. No purpose. If there is mind — and of course the great scientific revolutionaries such as Descartes and Newton would not deny that there is mind — it exists apart from and unconnected to the material world as this was conceived of by the New Science.

If modern science begins by shaping a conception of the cosmos, its subject matter, in such a way as to exclude mind and life, then it shouldn't come as a surprise that we can't seem to find a place for them in the natural order so conceived.

This is why Nagel observes, at the beginning of his book, that the mind-body problem isn't just a local problem concerning brains, behavior and the mind; correctly understood it invades our understanding of the cosmos itself and its history. The mind/body problem is the problem of framing an account of the natural order, but one which doesn't leave us out the picture.

 

[smcder]

"
Some reviewers (for example, Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg, writing in The Nation) seem glad to dismiss Nagel's call to arms. This may be because they find it implausible that either philosophy or the practice of science is committed today to anything like the Absolute Conception of Reality, or to the related idea that, theoretically at least, reality is physical and that physics therefore is the fundamental science of reality. Very few thinkers today seek to reduce neuroscience to biology, biology to chemistry, and chemistry in its turn to physics. In practice, these are recognized to be autonomous domains.

This is right, but it is a superficial and unsatisfying observation. For there is no stable or deeply understood account of how these autonomous domains fit together. The fact that we are getting along with business as if there were such an account is, well, a political or sociological fact about us that should do little to reassure. And anyway, as Nagel urges, the fact remains that where mind is concerned, not to mention society and economics, we lack sciences that are well-established, well-grounded and successful, loud pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding. We haven't explained life and mind."

 

[smcder]

The text you quoted from my post earlier today is the portion of a paper Steve had quoted. Perhaps Steve can estimate precisely what the author's beliefs and conceptions are. I read the paper quickly and posted before leaving the house and am just back now. I'll reread that paper and also think we should read and discuss the paper from that site that I linked, concerning quantum related interpretations of consciousness. (note: that second paper is incomplete and was said to be in process of completion, but I'm not sure it ever was completed.) We should also see the links to others' work in this area listed on the right side of the page, especially the Stapp paper.)




I think consciousness and experience arise and exist together by nature, in nature. We can and do speak of them separately, but in lived reality they require one another in order to generate the persistence of temporal -- existential -- being and selfhood.

I was looking for the idea of the hard problem as "why am I me and not you?" for my discussion with Pharoah. Lots of bloggers attribute this to Chalmers without citation and I can't find where Chalmers says this but we've found some support that this is Nagels view. Anyway that's why I posted it.

- as for the rest of the article ... I'm not so so sure ... He called Nagel a theologically oriented philosopher!

 

[Constance]

He called Nagel a theologically oriented philosopher

Simple-mindedly, suggesting that he hasn't read enough of Nagel. Or he has and hasn't understood what Nagel is saying. In any event, it's a cheap shot intended to dismiss Nagel for atheists who claim to be sure about something they plainly cannot be sure about.

I'm well and truly bored with this attempt we're still engaging here to answer fundamental questions about the nature of consciousness on the basis of what Chalmers and Nagel have written. Chalmers, at least, is overrated.

 

[smcder]

Yes. ... Time to move to other things .

 

[smcder]

The bolded statement is perhaps the clearest expression yet offered of the hard problem of consciousness, which still appears to be one problem that includes the problem of individuality Pharoah argues to be the real hard problem. In other words, consciousness as a complex whole is the hard problem, for science and philosophy. The paper Steve links is useful at this point, though it takes us in the direction of a doubling-back on parts of the problem we've already taken up in the C&P forum from part 1 to the present. We should also read at this point the essay linked at the top right on that page: "Quantum Consciousness, Quantum Information, and Subjectivity," by the same author

Quantum Consciousness, Quantum Information, and Subjectivity

Extract: "From the foregoing it should be clear that both Stapp and Edelman are discussing a different aspect of consciousness from what is being discussed here. For both Stapp and Edelman, "consciousness" refers to the mechanics of cognitive activity in the brain. To me, it seems that, as important as the brain is for consciousness, the brain is only the tool that allows us to experience consciousness. Whatever the biological mechanism by which the brain recognizes patterns and constructs its own internal representation of reality, there is an additional step that is necessary to describe human consciousness. What is it that allows consciousness, uniquely in all the aspects of nature studied so far, to create a preferred reference point? Why does the universe appear to be focused at one point for one individual and at another point for another individual? This is what Kant called "immanence", and attempts to explain it philosophically have led to dualism (a concept that seems to be widely misunderstood by many scientist-philosophers). Despite Herculean efforts, no amount of reductionism has so far been able to explain away the reality of our everyday lives that is subjectivity."



This chap needs to read Heidegger before he talks about "Being."




That's another paper we should add to our current reading list for this discussion. I am very interested to see your eventual full argument that 'the individuated nature of consciousness' is noumenal consciousness.



I think he does {i.e., thinks it but does not express it} but it is not an explicit focus of that paper. I'm not seeing the purpose of the continuing effort here to argue against the Chalmers and Nagel papers as complete demonstrations of the subjectivity of experience and consciousness. Those were steps along the way, and we are not dependent on those steps as more than partial steps along our way -->pursuing additional expressions of the problem of consciousness, including quantum, informational, and neurological as well as philosophical contributions to groking what consciousness is. I'd say it's time to drop Chalmers and Nagel as sufficient to our inquiry, the inquiry of all consciousness studies.

The Quantum CS paper does a good job of explaining the problem of yamime:

"So it is not surprising that some scientists have adopted the more reductionistic approach and are seemingly obsessed with attempts to eliminate the absolute point of view in consciousness. Unfortunately, this may not be possible: the absolute point of view is precisely what defines consciousness."

Thanks for posting.

 

[smcder]

"Similarly, when we talk about "qualia", a term that refers to our sensation of "warmth", or "pain", or "blueness" for the image above, we are really again discussing perceptual issues and not consciousness per se. The psychological value of "blueness" is created by the ocean of associations, along with various learned cultural associations that we have acquired concerning things that are blue. The ability to appreciate blueness does not change much when it is some other person who is perceiving it, and hence it does little to help us understand the differences in information flow under the conditions of subject and object--which is really what we're concerned about in this article."

 

[smcder]

"Note that we have two diametrically opposite points of view here: Penrose takes a more conservative position, saying that an individual microtubule undergoes some conformational change which decoheres a superposed state. Stapp takes a much more radical view, saying that the entire brain performs a quantum measurement and somehow adopts its overall configuration in response to a single quantum measurement. The question is, is such a thing possible, and how could this produce consciousness?"

 

[Constance]

"Similarly, when we talk about "qualia", a term that refers to our sensation of "warmth", or "pain", or "blueness" for the image above, we are really again discussing perceptual issues and not consciousness per se. [/U][/COLOR]

I need to read both essays by this author again, but I'm suspicious of his apparent attempt to separate perception from consciousness, a tack frequently taken by reductivists and the only cure for which is reading MP's Phenomenology of Perception.

The psychological value of "blueness" is created by the ocean of associations, along with various learned cultural associations that we have acquired concerning things that are blue. The ability to appreciate blueness does not change much when it is some other person who is perceiving it, and hence it does little to help us understand the differences in information flow under the conditions of subject and object--which is really what we're concerned about in this article."

I don't think the underscored is valid. I'll look for how this author unpacks the sentence that follows, and hope you will too.

 

[Constance]

"Note that we have two diametrically opposite points of view here: Penrose takes a more conservative position, saying that an individual microtubule undergoes some conformational change which decoheres a superposed state. Stapp takes a much more radical view, saying that the entire brain performs a quantum measurement and somehow adopts its overall configuration in response to a single quantum measurement. The question is, is such a thing possible, and how could this produce consciousness?"

I don't think Stapp means to say that quantum collapse 'produces' consciousness but that it is/can be brought about by consciousness.