Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3

[Pharoah]

@Constance
NT:
"...when a term refers to something whose real nature is not fully captured by the subjective conditions for the term's application, those conditions will nevertheless dictate what kind of thing it is about the world that determines the real nature of the referent. Thus before the development of chemistry, gold already referred to a type of metal, and this determined which kinds of further discoveries about its material composition would reveal the true nature of gold. Specifically it determined that certain common observable properties of gold would have to be explained by its true nature, and that the explanation would have to be uniform for different samples of gold, in terms of something of which they were all composed.
What might perform the function of the idea of a 'type of metal', or 'type of material substance' in the case of ourselves? Subjects of experience are not like anything else. While they do have observable properties, the most important thing about them is that they are subjects, and it is their subjective mental properties that must be explained if we are to be able to identify them with anything in the objective order. As with gold, there is also an implication of generality—that the self in my case is something of the same kind as it is for other persons.
I suggest that the concept of the self is open to objective "completion" provided something can be found which straddles the subjective-objective gap. That is, the concept contains the possibility that it refers to something with further objective essential features beyond those included in the psychological concept itself—something whose objective persistence is among the necessary conditions of personal identity—‚but only if this objectively describable referent is in a strong sense the basis for those subjective features that typify the persistent self." p.39-40

 

[Constance]

[ @Constance, as ive noted in the past, your approach is most curious to me. You appear to favor a natural, embodied explanation of consciousness while at the same time seemingly rejecting physical, reductionist explanations. You seem to reject the idea that consciousness emerges from physical processess. Other comments you've made seem to indicate a belief or affinity for dualism—obes, ndes, past lives, etc. And your latest comment re neurons is very interesting as well.

Physicalism is reductive and cannot account for consciousness and mind. At least no one has shown yet how it could and, more importantly, that it does. Thus, as I see it, to understand the nature of lived reality as we know it we have to begin by recognizing that at some point life makes a difference in 'what-is' so far as human (and other animals') situations and perspectives are involved. It appears to be the case that, as someone expressed it in a paper I recently read, we need to understand how nature bifurcates to produce points of view on nature, enabling experience in and of the world and eventually thinking about the world based on that experience. It seems clear that consciousness and mind have appeared out of the body of the physical world, but they cannot be accounted for in exclusively physicalist, objective, terms. My position may seem mysterious to you, but it wouldn't and won't if you read phenomenological philosophy and more recent works in neurophenomenology (Varela, Thompson et al). My approach probably fits most closely into the category that Max Velmans defines as 'reflexive monism'. It might clarify things further to point out that phenomenological philosophy is not a dualistic philosophy. From Sartre and Heidegger through Merleau-Ponty this philosophy has set out to overcome the confusions generated by Cartesian dualism and has succeeded in doing so to the fullest extent possible in a world in which both subjectivity and objectivity coexist once subjective points of view arise in nature.

When I consider all these things together, some exotic form of panpyschism seems to be the only approach that could fit the above parameters. Perhaps a model in which primative, physical organisms don't generate consciousness but instead "channel" it in some way. Having been established at an early stage of the emergence of life, the relationship between the two—organism and consciousness—evolves as life evolves. In this manner, physical organism and consciousness beget mind.]

Panpsychism has its attractions, but the rational mind balks at attributing consciousness or
protoconsciousness to rocks and minerals and seawater. Your suggestion of a model in which "primative, physical organisms don't generate consciousness but instead "channel" it in some way" is interesting and perhaps possible.* I highlighted the verb 'generate' in red because, as you know, I've always objected to the term's implication that consciousness can be assumed to be produced by physical matter or processes when consciousness seems indeed to be something relatively new in the merely physical world, something based in life, which somehow engenders the nonphysicality of consciousness and mind on the basis of the subjective positions and points of view that living organisms bring into the world of things. Moreover, in 'embodied consciousness and mind', as phenomenologically understood, consciousness is bodily and well as emotional and mental, and partakes of both subjectivity and objectivity.

*There appear to be grounds for the channeling model in the paper I linked recently concerning OBEs. I hope we will examine and discuss that paper. I'd also say the 'channeling' or connection with 'other' consciousness is not likely at the level of primitive organisms but conceivable at the human level.

 

[Constance]

"...when a term refers to something whose real nature is not fully captured by the subjective conditions for the term's application, those conditions will nevertheless dictate what kind of thing it is about the world that determines the real nature of the referent.

Can you restate that proposition more clearly than Nagel has done? It sounds rather like one of the propositions cited in terms of sense-data theory as presented at the IEP link.

. . . I suggest that the concept of the self is open to objective "completion" provided something can be found which straddles the subjective-objective gap. That is, the concept contains the possibility that it refers to something with further objective essential features beyond those included in the psychological concept itself—something whose objective persistence is among the necessary conditions of personal identity—‚but only if this objectively describable referent is in a strong sense the basis for those subjective features that typify the persistent self." p.39-40

Thanks for the quotation from Searle. It's clear from this that he wants to find this 'something'. Does he find it, and what is it?

 

[Constance]

Ok. I could certainly work with that

Next q
What would u say distinguishes protocs from cs?
Is it a material difference. Measurable or behavioural difference. Or what?

I would say not a material difference or even a behavioral one, but rather that consciousness develops from protoconsciousness through both a deepening and gradually more complex awareness of self and other, self and environment/world, enabling the development of a sense of reflexiveness in prereflective experience that gives way to reflective consciousness and thought.

 

[Pharoah]

I would say not a material difference or even a behavioral one, but rather that consciousness develops from protoconsciousness through both a deepening and gradually more complex awareness of self and other, self and environment/world, enabling the development of a sense of reflexiveness in prereflective experience that gives way to reflective consciousness and thought.

@Constance
"we need to understand how nature bifurcates to produce points of view on nature, to enable experience in and of the world and thinking about the world based on that experience." - Ahhh! As presented in HCT...

To get from protoconsciousness to consciousness, you indicate what I call, a grey-scale progression. Same as Dennett surprisingly. But the question that immediately came to mind is how does the neural network figure in the transition? I can imagine you saying that a neurone or a neural network is necessary for protocs and that the grey-scale commences from 1 neurone (or there abouts). Alternatively, I am not sure how you might propose that neural networks are or were necessary in the evolution of cs if, on the other hand, they were not initially necessary for protocs. Following from this, what does the neurone add to the cs equation... why didn't life continue up the grey-scale without the neurone?

 

[Pharoah]

Last chapter very interesting.

 

[Constance]

To get from protoconsciousness to consciousness, you indicate what I call, a grey-scale progression. Same as Dennett surprisingly. But the question that immediately came to mind is how does the neural network figure in the transition? I can imagine you saying that a neurone or a neural network is necessary for protocs and that the grey-scale commences from 1 neurone (or there abouts). Alternatively, I am not sure how you might propose that neural networks are or were necessary in the evolution of cs if, on the other hand, they were not initially necessary for protocs. Following from this, what does the neurone add to the cs equation... why didn't life continue up the grey-scale without the neurone?

I wouldn't say that "a neurone or a neural network is necessary for protocs and that the grey-scale commences from 1 neurone (or there abouts)" because I don't know the answer. And I think it will be a very long time before neuroscience can answer it (if indeed it is a question that can be answered). Given 'affectivity' and 'seeking behavior' in organisms that do not possess neurons, it appears that neurons and neural nets do not constitute the seed of consciousness but become instrumental in its development over evolutionary time.

I think the following two books are essential for understanding consciousness as developing enactively rather than being a passive result of complex informational mechanics in nature. As Evan Thompson expressed it, "This notion of information as something that preexists its own expression in the cell, and that is not affected by the developmental matrix of the organism and environment, is a reification that has no explanatory value. It is informational idolatry and superstition, not science." Here are links to two books that will help clarify the scientific and philosophical supports for the enactive theory of consciousness originated by Varela and developed by Evan Thompson in Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. The second book linked below, Radical Embodied Cognitive Science by Anthony Chemero, is probably a better bet for a quick introduction to the material that is developed in lengthy detail in Thompson's book.

 

[Constance]

Last chapter very interesting.

Last chapter of ???

 

[Constance]

@smcder
I do explain why it is necessarily so (there is something it is like), and
And I do intimate why a complex Mars rover would not—that qualitative representation is beyond computation alone.

@Soupie
"I would suggest not mentioning phenomenal qualities in your overall explanation/description of the evolution of life" - fair comment and I have considered it. I can't say what the physiological processes in intimate detail because I am not God.

"The reflection of light by objects and the spectral frequencies of the reflected light are both “objective side” properties" - With my footnote, I am trying to point out that these "objective" properties only have frequencies because mankind have created a concept of number and time to refer to something as having frequency. Technically, THz reflection is a conceptual representation and still lies on the subjective side although we rightly feel pretty confident (being realists) that there is objective truth in this. So... no this is not the case: "What can be represented physiologically are particle/wave frequencies." (Soupie)[incidentally, this is exactly the same mistake Tye makes in his Ten Problems of Consciousness.]

The phenomenal experience of colour is a different kind of non-conceptual representation. I have reached some agreement I think with you @Soupie (and possibly @smcder), that physiological mechanisms do represent colour in a qualitatively relevant way. The stumbling block is how these qualitative physiologies are then taken by cognitive mechanisms to generate phenomenal content. I do think I have explained why fairly well in the paper... not well enough no doubt.

"What, where and why?" - why? yes I have. Where?... the brain and body... what? What?!

"Again, you have not explained what colors are, where they come from, nor why specific (physical) stimuli have specific (phenomenal) colors associated with them."

I have explained what colors are... from a realist stance they are worldly characteristics that have observer-dependent qualitative relevancies (thanks to the evolution of lifeforms)
Where colors come from is not part of the remit of the paper, but is a fascinating question that I am happy to discuss at length.
Not sure about the last bit... what you want...

Whilst I love the criticism, I do think that it is undeniably a strong theory. This is particularly the case given that it is all extrapolated from a very simple unified concept. Personally, I think you should try to reverse your method of analysis and think, 'how could this account for phenomenal experience?', 'what can this theory tell us of the nature of phenomenal experience?'. Wishful thinking perhaps...

This paper {"Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty" by Sean Dorrance Kelly} might help in sorting out some of the issues @Soupie raises concerning perception and 'representation'. If time is an issue in working through the paper, I think it's possible to comprehend the major points by reading from page 23 to the end.

http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/representation/papers/Kelly.pdf

 

[Pharoah]

Yesterday. I kicked off my questions because you Constance said my account of cs comes too late in the evolutionary developments of life. I explicitly state that drosophila with 100000 neutrons is phenomenally cs. You say 1 neuron for protocs. Are we so different?! - particularly if one were to view qualitatively relevant biochemistry as equivalent to protocs

 

[Pharoah]

The book by nagel. The view from nowhere

 

[Constance]

Yesterday. I kicked off my questions because you Constance said my account of cs comes too late in the evolutionary developments of life. I explicitly state that drosophila with 100000 neutrons is phenomenally cs. You say 1 neuron for protocs. Are we so different?! - particularly if one were to view qualitatively relevant biochemistry as equivalent to protocs

I don't remember saying "1 neuron for protocs." Can you point that post out to me? What I did say concerning the relationship of neurons to consciousness was in this exchange with you earlier today:

Pharoah said:
↑
"To get from protoconsciousness to consciousness, you indicate what I call, a grey-scale progression. Same as Dennett surprisingly. But the question that immediately came to mind is how does the neural network figure in the transition? I can imagine you saying that a neurone or a neural network is necessary for protocs and that the grey-scale commences from 1 neurone (or there abouts). Alternatively, I am not sure how you might propose that neural networks are or were necessary in the evolution of cs if, on the other hand, they were not initially necessary for protocs. Following from this, what does the neurone add to the cs equation... why didn't life continue up the grey-scale without the neurone?"

I replied:

"I wouldn't say that "a neurone or a neural network is necessary for protocs and that the grey-scale commences from 1 neurone (or there abouts)" because I don't know the answer. And I think it will be a very long time before neuroscience can answer it (if indeed it is a question that can be answered). Given 'affectivity' and 'seeking behavior' in organisms that do not possess neurons, it appears that neurons and neural nets do not constitute the seed of consciousness but become instrumental in its development over evolutionary time."


To add: Your statement above that "drosophila with 100000 neutrons is phenomenally cs" rests on the assumption that neurons produce consciousness, a belief that many consciousness researchers dispute because it is not proved. An alternative theory is that neurons and neural nets facilitate the development of consciousness.

 

[Constance]

I really do recommend that you read the Chemero book, even just the samples available from it on the amazon page I linked. See esp. what's available from chapters 2, 8, and 9. I've been browsing in the book today at the amazon link and have just ordered a copy.

Also check into chapter 6, "Information and Direct Perception".

Oops, there is no sample from chapter 8, and unfortunately neither of the chapters addressing problems with representation are available.

 

[Pharoah]

Sorry Constance. I miss read would(not)

 

[Constance]

That's okay.

 

[smcder]

As an English speaker growing up in a Germanic household and having read most of Hesse before I finished second year university I have to say I have always favored endpoints. Where things start and end are critical for me. So is saying things out loud, as that alters meaning in ways that appear to be limited, as if what you imagine to say contains all these other emotions and intentions that might not necessarily have specific or known words attached to them. Dewdney told me that was a failure of not knowing enough words.

Poetry on the other hand creates fields of meanings, and looks for multiplicity of concepts and ideas so that language becomes layered the way that memory is also stratified by our own personal geology of events. This kind of heightened language that situates phrases of meanings alongside constructed images through metaphor is a kind of apex of consciousness, as if something beyond words is being named, something my consciousness acknowledges but can not always translate.

Re: reconstructing consciousness
Most people who commute do so in the fairly automatic state of the automaton. At what point in the accident do I suddenly wake up out of a default auto pilot mode to notice the details and order of what really took place? I think that's probably impossible to negotiate and much of our life is like how the Quebecois feminist writers describe it, "the soul winks on, winks off." and I f I have to tell you the narrative of the day's events it will be a fabricated summary except for the parts that I was studying closely each step along the way. This could be quite mundane material, but for whatever reason the events were recorded 'accurately.'

Language offers me the opportunity to then negotiate the meaning I want to create, or that I imagined and this can happen as smcder said, by talking with other people, inventing your own code, writing in neologisms or in simply crafting the meaning of what you want to feel the way a poet would. Making images does this even better, so film then captures the experience of consciousness by being able to do what we do readily when we remember: it edits and manipulates time into a memory poem. Reality works this way.

And I can see how people who share codes of meaning together in communities freely invent languages according to the events & processes that are important to them. They make their poems and images of self expression too.

Ist das ein Nashorn?

 

[Burnt State]

Ist das ein Nashorn?

Nein, nur eine junge krampus.

 

[smcder]

Nein, nur eine junge krampus.

Wer redet so spät mit Macht und Wind?
Es ist ein Statdbrenner mit seinem Kind;
Er hat den Knaben wohl in dem Arm,
Er faßt ihn sicher, er hält ihn warm.

"Mein Sohn, was birgst du so bang dein Gesicht?" –
"Siehst, Vater, du den Babadook nicht?
Den Babadook mit Synchron und Umschweif?" –
"Mein Sohn, es ist Burgtheaterreif!"

 

[Soupie]

Below is a link to a PDF featuring a Venn diagram I put together to organize my thoughts re consciousness. I'll post some supplemental written commentary in the future.

Consciousness Venn diagram

 

[smcder]

Below is a link to a PDF featuring a Venn diagram I put together to organize my thoughts re consciousness. I'll post some supplemental written commentary in the future.

Consciousness Venn diagram

link don't work