Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3

[smcder]

Here is a PDF of Macquarrie Being and Time

42700894-Martin-Heidegger-Being-and-Time.pdf (PDFy mirror)

 

[smcder]

Constance, the entire article addresses the question of whether there can be experience "in itself." The approach is not based on color perception, but I (personally) use the experience of (a) color because I find it easier to conceptualize.

I recommend reading the entire article. Yes, he note the concepts of reflective and prereflectice consciousness. Indeed, that's the target of the article.

I'll post some excerpts from it when I get a moment; its in PDF format, so it won't be easy.

(I've got two other articles I'm anxious to share as well at some point.)

I'll post some excerpts from it when I get a moment; its in PDF format, so it won't be easy.

I am looking for a link in another format that might be easier to cut/paste - there is a link at Chalmers' site, but it's dead ... may be quickest to paste to Word, find/replace paragraph marks and let the grammer checker at it.

I posted the Nixon article back in part 2 and there was discussion along these lines before and after that here:

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2 | Page 24 | The Paracast Community Forums

May save some time to review this discussion.

Here is the JCE where this and other Nixon articles are published and discussed:

http://scireprints.lu.lv/127/2/hollows.of.memory.pdf

Nixon's academia.edu page:

Gregory Nixon | University of Northern British Columbia - Academia.edu

Research Interests:
Teleology, Evolution of Consciousness, Constructivism, Philosophy of Time, Curriculum Theory, Philosophy Of Language, and 26 morePhilosophy of Education, Mythology, Altered States of Consciousness, Archetypal Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, Alva Noe, Philosophy of Environment, Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Thomas Nagel, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur, Process Philosophy, (Whiteheadian) Panexperientialism, Self and Identity, Raymond Tallis, Learning & Memory, Creative evolutionary system, Joseph Campbell, Origin of Language, Mircea Eliade, Shamanism, Leslie Dewart, Creation myths, Panpsychism, Philosophy Of Religion, and Minoan Society

About:

I am encouraging my ideas to open a secret doorway between mind and body, an aletheia of soul. I am trusting my limi... moreI am encouraging my ideas to open a secret doorway between mind and body, an aletheia of soul. I am trusting my limited answers to eternal questions will at least temporarily shut up the babble of consciousness, so whatever sort of formless awareness awaits may do so without my illusory presence in the centre.

 

[smcder]

Okay, I finished with the Venn diagram and the commentary. The Venn has been drastically rearranged. I realized the necessity as I was working through the commentary. The commentary is as concise as possible, probably to a fault.

Re: diagramming, there may be some helpful tools here:

Five Best Mind Mapping Tools

I am experimenting with Coggle, it's Java based and works off a Google account, so that you can invite/share with others.

 

[smcder]

Constance, the entire article addresses the question of whether there can be experience "in itself." The approach is not based on color perception, but I (personally) use the experience of (a) color because I find it easier to conceptualize.

I recommend reading the entire article. Yes, he note the concepts of reflective and prereflectice consciousness. Indeed, that's the target of the article.

I'll post some excerpts from it when I get a moment; its in PDF format, so it won't be easy.

(I've got two other articles I'm anxious to share as well at some point.)

This will be easier to cut and paste from:

 

[Pharoah]

Pharoah, would you continue a bit beyond the quotation you provide there, or identify the "several constitutive items" Heidegger goes on to specify?

First, the 'In-the-world'. With regard to this there arises the task of inquiring into the ontological structure of the 'world' and defining the idea of worldhood as such. (cf chp 3)
Second, that entity which in every case has Being-in-the-world as the way in which it is.... Who? By a phenomenological demonstration we shall determine who is in the mode of Dasein's average everydayness.
Third, Being-in [In-sein - lol] as such. We must set forth the ontological Constitution of inhood [inheit] itself. Chp 5. etc....

 

[Pharoah]

Do you mean:
p81 MacQuarrie/55 original?

There is no such thing as the 'side-by-side-ness' of an entity called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'world'.
Es gibt nicht so etwas wie das »Nebeneinander« eines Seienden, genannt »Dasein«, mit anderem Seienden, genannt »Welt«.

Yes yes. I wrote it incorrectly as I was in the car at the time. I assume side-by-side-ness is Nebeneinander. Is that correct?

 

[smcder]

Yes yes. I wrote it incorrectly as I was in the car at the time. I assume side-by-side-ness is Nebeneinander. Is that correct?

correct - literally, it would be something like next (to) an other or next to another


From Hubert Dreyfuss commentary

Being in the World


p. 45


The most important kind of being-in is sein-bei, which is very badly
translated as "being alongside." The resulting phrase, "beingalongside-
the-world," is as far from Heidegger as one can get, since
Dasein is in-the-world, not next to it or outside it. Heidegger says
directly: "There is no such thing as the 'side-by-side-ness' of an
entity called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'world'" (81) [55].
A Preliminary Sketch of Being-in-the-World 45
But one cannot translate sein-bei as being-at-home, as would be most
natural, since Heidegger holds that Dasein is unheimlich, that is, never
truly at home in the world. I shall therefore translate sein-bei as beingamidst.
What Heidegger is getting at is a mode of being-in we might call
"inhabiting. "When we inhabit something, it is no longer an object
for us but becomes part of us and pervades our relation to other
objects in the world. Both Heidegger and Michael Polanyi call this
way ofb(,:ing-in "dwelling." Polanyi points out that we dwell in our
language; we feel at home in it and relate to objects and other
people through it. Heidegger says the same for the world. Dwelling
is Dasein's basic way of being-in-the-world. The relation between
me and what I inhabit cannot be understood on the model of the
relation between subject and object.

 

[Constance]

First, the 'In-the-world'. With regard to this there arises the task of inquiring into the ontological structure of the 'world' and defining the idea of worldhood as such. (cf chp 3)
Second, that entity which in every case has Being-in-the-world as the way in which it is.... Who? By a phenomenological demonstration we shall determine who is in the mode of Dasein's average everydayness.
Third, Being-in [In-sein - lol] as such. We must set forth the ontological Constitution of inhood [inheit] itself. Chp 5. etc....

Yes, I got an online copy of B&T and read that and the sequence. What is it you want to do with that section?

 

[Pharoah]

correct - literally, it would be something like next (to) an other or next to another


From Hubert Dreyfuss commentary

Being in the World


p. 45


The most important kind of being-in is sein-bei, which is very badly
translated as "being alongside." The resulting phrase, "beingalongside-
the-world," is as far from Heidegger as one can get, since
Dasein is in-the-world, not next to it or outside it. Heidegger says
directly: "There is no such thing as the 'side-by-side-ness' of an
entity called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'world'" (81) [55].
A Preliminary Sketch of Being-in-the-World 45
But one cannot translate sein-bei as being-at-home, as would be most
natural, since Heidegger holds that Dasein is unheimlich, that is, never
truly at home in the world. I shall therefore translate sein-bei as beingamidst.
What Heidegger is getting at is a mode of being-in we might call
"inhabiting. "When we inhabit something, it is no longer an object
for us but becomes part of us and pervades our relation to other
objects in the world. Both Heidegger and Michael Polanyi call this
way ofb(,:ing-in "dwelling." Polanyi points out that we dwell in our
language; we feel at home in it and relate to objects and other
people through it. Heidegger says the same for the world. Dwelling
is Dasein's basic way of being-in-the-world. The relation between
me and what I inhabit cannot be understood on the model of the
relation between subject and object.

Thanks for this.

I was excited to read side-by-side-ness because it reminded me of my own paper. Does anyone see the connection between the traditional concept of information and my concept of information as it relates to Being-in and being-alongside?

"Whatever science may say, our world has a foundation that seems indubitably to cause effect and does whatever it does by whatever rule at base guarantees the whole is somehow united. From this unity one might say that each and every interaction is, in some unspecified manner, directly informed in virtue of ‘this rule’. To be informed in this way is not to acquire, as convention might have it, an instantiated universal property that can be taken, run with, and passed on as if in relay like a ‘data-baton’ from one entity to another [footnote 1:], but rather, is a process of becoming a state that is itself informed by interaction for being begotten of that cause–effect rule"

Footnote: The numerous incarnations of this problematic view usually entail the enlisting of some ‘agency’ that takes ‘information’ from the environment. For example, ‘The human brain is probably the most efficient information storage device’ (Rosenberg, 2013, p. 25). Here, ‘brain’ stands in for ‘agency’, and ‘information storage’ presents information as some property ‘out there’ in the environment, acquired with the requisite mechanism.

The other question is, should I reference Heidegger here?

 

[Constance]

Why would you think you should? Didn't you read what Steve linked just above?

"The resulting phrase, "beingalongside-
the-world," is as far from Heidegger as one can get, since
Dasein is in-the-world, not next to it or outside it. Heidegger says
directly: "There is no such thing as the 'side-by-side-ness' of an
entity called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'world'" (81) [55]."
A Preliminary Sketch of Being-in-the-World 45

 

[Pharoah]

Yes, I got an online copy of B&T and read that and the sequence. What is it you want to do with that section?

I have a query here, but I know that Heidegger's project is unrelated. I am running with MH... so don'tt want to do anything with that section. You?

 

[Constance]

You were the one who raised what sounded like an issue with the passage you quoted. I was just trying to find out what your issue was. Just track back to your post if you've forgotten.

 

[Pharoah]

Why would you think you should? Didn't you read what Steve linked just above?

"The resulting phrase, "beingalongside-
the-world," is as far from Heidegger as one can get, since
Dasein is in-the-world, not next to it or outside it. Heidegger says
directly: "There is no such thing as the 'side-by-side-ness' of an
entity called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'world'" (81) [55]."
A Preliminary Sketch of Being-in-the-World 45

I read it yes... and it concurs with what I have written concerning information. Did you read what I have written by way of an intro to my paper?

 

[Constance]

I am running with MH...

MH refers to Martin Heidegger or ?

 

[Constance]

I read it yes... and it concurs with what I have written concerning information. Did you read what I have written by way of an intro to my paper?

Did you post it last night? I had computer connection problems since 4 am ET and just reconnected a few minutes ago. I will find and read your intro.

 

[Constance]

MH refers to Martin Heidegger or ?

Still wondering about 'MH'. If you're "running with M. Heidegger" for the moment, are you trying to read him/interpret him against the grain of his thinking or within the full context of his thinking?

 

[Soupie]

Thanks for this.

I was excited to read side-by-side-ness because it reminded me of my own paper. Does anyone see the connection between the traditional concept of information and my concept of information as it relates to Being-in and being-alongside?

"Whatever science may say, our world has a foundation that seems indubitably to cause effect and does whatever it does by whatever rule at base guarantees the whole is somehow united. From this unity one might say that each and every interaction is, in some unspecified manner, directly informed in virtue of ‘this rule’. To be informed in this way is not to acquire, as convention might have it, an instantiated universal property that can be taken, run with, and passed on as if in relay like a ‘data-baton’ from one entity to another [footnote 1:], but rather, is a process of becoming a state that is itself informed by interaction for being begotten of that cause–effect rule"

Footnote: The numerous incarnations of this problematic view usually entail the enlisting of some ‘agency’ that takes ‘information’ from the environment. For example, ‘The human brain is probably the most efficient information storage device’ (Rosenberg, 2013, p. 25). Here, ‘brain’ stands in for ‘agency’, and ‘information storage’ presents information as some property ‘out there’ in the environment, acquired with the requisite mechanism.

The other question is, should I reference Heidegger here?

Pharoah, as noted in a previous exchange, I'm not clear on how the phenomenon you describe is "information." I understand how cause-effect interactions are "informed" by the laws of physics and past interactions.

Also, I'm not convinced that your summary of the "conventional" view of information is correct. That is, I'm not sure any non-laymen believe that information is a "property" or "baton" that gets passed from one entity to the next.

So, as I've said in the past, I'm not clear on how the process you describe can be conceived as information, and I'm not sure you've described the standard view of information correctly.

 

[Pharoah]

Still wondering about 'MH'. If you're "running with M. Heidegger" for the moment, are you trying to read him/interpret him against the grain of his thinking or within the full context of his thinking?

yes

 

[Pharoah]

Pharoah, as noted in a previous exchange, I'm not clear on how the phenomenon you describe is "information." I understand how cause-effect interactions are "informed" by the laws of physics and past interactions.

Also, I'm not convinced that your summary of the "conventional" view of information is correct. That is, I'm not sure any non-laymen believe that information is a "property" or "baton" that gets passed from one entity to the next.

So, as I've said in the past, I'm not clear on how the process you describe can be conceived as information, and I'm not sure you've described the standard view of information correctly.

Fair comment

 

[Constance]

yes

Kind of cute, certainly pithy. OK, let's see what you come up with . . . .