One more extract, from note 3 in Doyon's paper concerning Husserl's thought:
"As lived-experiences, sensations are conscious, but they are not intentional inasmuch as they have no content (they are about
nothing); they still contribute to establish the intentional moment of experience, however, since they are said to found the intentional apprehension. For a detailed analysis of Husserl's foundational model of perception, see Doyon (2011)."
Note that sensations nevertheless become available to intentional consciousness as soon as/when we react/respond to them. ETA: How soon does that passage begin to occur in the experienced, lived, reality of primordial organisms? Isn't that a question we need to ponder in the attempt to understand what consciousness is, including what protoconsciousness is? Is intentionality borne through evolution out of an inchoate intentionality in the affectivity and responsiveness of primordial organisms?
ETA: So we need to ask 'what is the content of experience -- prereflectively and reflectively?', as Doyon does.
"As lived-experiences, sensations are conscious, but they are not intentional inasmuch as they have no content (they are about
nothing); they still contribute to establish the intentional moment of experience, however, since they are said to found the intentional apprehension. For a detailed analysis of Husserl's foundational model of perception, see Doyon (2011)."
Note that sensations nevertheless become available to intentional consciousness as soon as/when we react/respond to them. ETA: How soon does that passage begin to occur in the experienced, lived, reality of primordial organisms? Isn't that a question we need to ponder in the attempt to understand what consciousness is, including what protoconsciousness is? Is intentionality borne through evolution out of an inchoate intentionality in the affectivity and responsiveness of primordial organisms?
ETA: So we need to ask 'what is the content of experience -- prereflectively and reflectively?', as Doyon does.
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