Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 6

[Soupie]

What then, is the phenomenon of experience, an experience of?

I believe that in normal, waking states, phenomenal consciousness is "about" environmental/bodily stimuli. However, I don't at this point see that HCT explains how/why this might be.

I don't say this, so...

I'm not trying to put words in your mouth. I'm just trying to determine what you are saying. I'm just dropping rocks down the well listening for splashes.

And the burning wood thing is just silly.

Sometimes large rocks just to be sure...

you say in (3) "Both the evaluating of stimuli and deciding of which to respond will require physical processes. Indeed, it's easy to conceive of purely physical processes by which an organism might do both."

And... your point is...? That a solution to phen consc requires non-physical processes??

No, just that at this point I don't see that HCT explains how/why p consciousness exists.

Point 4 is,

"(4) Organisms must physically differentiate a massive amount of physical environmental stimuli, physically evaluate them, and physically (mechanistically) choose (amplify/attenuate) which to respond to."

An organism does not evaluate the physical stimulus (itself)—I never say that—but rather, the qualitatively represented (as agreed) character instantiated by those physical stimuli... If an organism continually evaluates those qualitatively represented characteristics instantiated by environment (on a continual basis)... soupie, you say "that organism is not experiencing qualitatively: there is no phenomenal experience" . So, what is it experiencing: what is phenomenal experience?"

SPLASH!

Woah. Slow down!

(1) "An organism does not evaluate the physical stimulus (itself)—I never say that—but rather, the qualitatively represented (as agreed) character instantiated by those physical stimuli..."

As agreed? I don't recall agreeing to this.

By what process does a physical stimulus instantiate a "qualitatively represented character!?

That's what I'm asking here, haha! How does an EM wave of a particular wave length (physical stimulus) get perceived as, say, red (qualitative character) by an organism?

Before an organism can evaluate phenomenal red, phenomenal red must exist! How does phenomenal red exist!?

You haven't yet established/explained the existence of phenomenal qualities, therefore to describe a process of evaluating them is premature.

(2) "If an organism continually evaluates those qualitatively represented characteristics instantiated by environment (on a continual basis)... soupie, you say "that organism is not experiencing qualitatively: there is no phenomenal experience""

No, Soupie does not say that. I do beliefe that phenomenal experience is differentiated into many qualities.

What I am saying is that HCT does not explain how or why phenomenal qualities exist. And thus, it is a conceptual leap to begin talking about phenomenal consciousness.

 

[Gene Steinberg]

This thread is a continuation of the thread "Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5" originally posted by Gene Steinberg.

Please remember to watch this thread if you were watching the previous one.

 

[Constance]

Further from Doyon:

"Whenever one perceives, judges, imagines or thinks about something, the object of that experience invariably shows up to consciousness with a certain context and in a particular meaningful manner. This is because intentional objects are always presented under a certain conception, through a particular description or from a given perspective. . . . Crucially, this is true of both perceptual and thinking experiences. In perception, there is a notable difference, however, as intentional objects usually appear in their practical or pragmatic meaning. The objects that make up the furniture of our everyday lives manifest themselves originally as affording this or that possibility of action: I perceive the glass as something to drink from, and the pen as something to write with. Any such perception refers to a learned set of social conventions and institutional practices, thanks to which worldly entities appear with a particular contextual significance. This is an idea that Martin Heidegger first developed in his early lecture-courses in Marburg and then again in Being and Time. Specifically, Heidegger's basic insight is that the objects of our surrounding world are experienced in a totality of involvements (Bewandtnisganzheit), where they appear in their usefulness or practical utility. Seeing something amounts to grasping (practically) how this thing functions in what Heidegger (1962, ¤12, p. 167) calls a 'referential context of significance' (Verweisungs-zusammenhang der Bedeutsamkeit) where it reveals itself as that which it is for.

One important, albeit often overlooked feature of Heidegger's analysis is his insistence that the intentional structure of our prepredicative experience of worldly objects still does not
significantly differ from how the content of that experience is thought or expressed in predicative judgments. This is because in Heidegger's view, even before I express my judgment about how things are in an assertoric claim, the tools that are ready-to-hand (zuhanden) making up our environment (Umwelt) are already intentionally experienced as such, that is to say, as meaningful. They have, as Heidegger (ibid., ¤32, p. 189) puts it, 'the structure something as something (Etwas als Etwas)'. This feature of intentional experience led Heidegger to argue that judgment, which is the dominant form of conceptual thinking, if not of philosophical thinking tout court, is in fact a derivative mode of experience, whose possibility is grounded in our original intercourse or acquaintance with things.6 One of the great lessons to learn from Being and Time is that the phenomenological 'as such' just is the structure of manifestation of intentional objects, the true shape of object-directed consciousness, regardless of the specific modality in which this relation is realized."


'Etwas als Etwas.' See tool-use by crows, ants, etc.

 

[smcder]

Further from Doyon:

"Whenever one perceives, judges, imagines or thinks about something, the object of that experience invariably shows up to consciousness with a certain context and in a particular meaningful manner. This is because intentional objects are always presented under a certain conception, through a particular description or from a given perspective. . . . Crucially, this is true of both perceptual and thinking experiences. In perception, there is a notable difference, however, as intentional objects usually appear in their practical or pragmatic meaning. The objects that make up the furniture of our everyday lives manifest themselves originally as affording this or that possibility of action: I perceive the glass as something to drink from, and the pen as something to write with. Any such perception refers to a learned set of social conventions and institutional practices, thanks to which worldly entities appear with a particular contextual significance. This is an idea that Martin Heidegger first developed in his early lecture-courses in Marburg and then again in Being and Time. Specifically, Heidegger's basic insight is that the objects of our surrounding world are experienced in a totality of involvements (Bewandtnisganzheit), where they appear in their usefulness or practical utility. Seeing something amounts to grasping (practically) how this thing functions in what Heidegger (1962, ¤12, p. 167) calls a 'referential context of significance' (Verweisungs-zusammenhang der Bedeutsamkeit) where it reveals itself as that which it is for.

One important, albeit often overlooked feature of Heidegger's analysis is his insistence that the intentional structure of our prepredicative experience of worldly objects still does not
significantly differ from how the content of that experience is thought or expressed in predicative judgments. This is because in Heidegger's view, even before I express my judgment about how things are in an assertoric claim, the tools that are ready-to-hand (zuhanden) making up our environment (Umwelt) are already intentionally experienced as such, that is to say, as meaningful. They have, as Heidegger (ibid., ¤32, p. 189) puts it, 'the structure something as something (Etwas als Etwas)'. This feature of intentional experience led Heidegger to argue that judgment, which is the dominant form of conceptual thinking, if not of philosophical thinking tout court, is in fact a derivative mode of experience, whose possibility is grounded in our original intercourse or acquaintance with things.6 One of the great lessons to learn from Being and Time is that the phenomenological 'as such' just is the structure of manifestation of intentional objects, the true shape of object-directed consciousness, regardless of the specific modality in which this relation is realized."


'Etwas als Etwas.' See tool-use by crows, ants, etc.

One thing that I struggle with is when I read (and I have read very little, so the solution may be reading more - but it may also be the problem) What I have read of eastern phenomenological analysis is different but coherent - and it doesn't seem to be something we can fully reconcile, we may learn to think like an eastern phenomenologist and then a western one, but I'm not sure it would mean anything to merge both except to see the world in another way. So I may read something from phenomenology and think "that's not what it's like at all" but I could see that being congenial to someone else, on the other hand I get that eastern philosophy doesn't resonate ... now this isn't me being a relativist, I think there's an underlying reality we are relating to and relating to directly - as I relate directly but differently to different people in my life and I feel that different people get me, but in very different ways, so I can be close to very different kinds of people and feel I understand them, not as they understand themselves and they understand me but not as I understand myself and further there isn't some ultimate model out there that brings this all together, the people who get me, get me - I also think some people don't use a model (remember the German philosopher who says philosophy is doing science without models) if I read more phenomenology I think it will resonate with me and I will have a new way to directly relate to the world as it is but it won't replace my current understanding or be melded in with it, rather it will be another way I can see the world.

separate problem I think in the post above where you recommend reading Thompson's book (dreaming is in the title) I agree - but I think this may be in response to a position I took in responding to @Pharoah - so when I look at what I think HCT responds to, I try to take it on its own terms (my unlimited understanding) not from my position - so I think consciousness is more than just that immediate awareness but it's still problematic for a physicalist position (which I understand HCT argues from, though @Pharoah, as I understand him to say, it not a physicalist because of the "harder problem" of individual identity - why I am me) so I can stop at the problem of showing the necessity of immediate, phenomenal consciousness for a physical theory - without going on to dealing with all aspects of consciousness.

 

[smcder]

@Soupie

smcder
"when the water boils you can see the sense that you made it happen form, you could say this is how people get superstitious..."

soupie
Or that the same process is at play when the sense of free will arises?

I hadn't made that connection ... brilliant and interesting ... it could be, but for either reason, if there is free will, it would be weird if we didn't have a sense of it - (the tonsils of the mind?) - and it there isn't this could be some of why we do have that sense that there is. (why do I always want to draw curving lines and arrows through my words?)

if------------->there isn't
..\.............../
....\.........../
.....there is

But I also don't rule out that we can have that sense because there are real, physical causes from our intentions and will, I think it is the case that we lift our fingers in part because we want to life them, we will it - and if I pay close attention to the course of my life (and this usually take some days or weeks of constant intention) I do see that will play out - there is no science of biography but if you read a lot of biographies, many of them show a consistent thread of intention and will ... someone asked me if there is psychic power why don't people use it to build a psychic mahine and get rich? It would be hard to say people don't and you will find this among business people who talk about "magic" people being preternaturally lucky or right all the time ... there's not a machine (that I know of) but all anyone has to do is be lucky 51% of the time to come out rich or winning (on the other hand as the video on probability shows, long stretches of staying ahead are to be expected statistically, no magic ... so maybe someone is lucky and becomes superstitious) ...

I think we'll never know and that it's a good thing we all have different opinions about this because mixed strategues work best in the face of uncertainty and much of divination is randomization, if you have NO idea where to go hunt for the deer, the best thing is some type of divination that has a random generator at the heart - but too, I have a more than sneaking suspicion our intuition about the way it works also plays into how it works for us.

Who knows I believe a lot of weird stuff and it hasn't hurt me yet. ;-) (knock on would)

 

[Constance]

I have to zero in once more on what Doyon writes in note 5:

"This does not mean that all forms of experience are object-directed. As is well known, phenomenologists distinguish between a narrow and a broad concept of intentionality: whereas the former is object-directed in the conventional sense of the word, the latter is more broadly conceived as openness towards alterity and includes all the various non-objectifying forms of conscious experience."

We could almost say that the sense of 'self-being' arises first from the sense of alterity -- of that which is 'other' to the organism -- already inchoately known in the affectiveness of primordial life forms.

 

[Constance]

Steve, it's hard to respond to your last two posts since I can't find a gravitational tendency or core in the succession of points of view you present. Maybe that's what you wanted to convey

I can respond briefly to your references to Eastern phenomenology and Western phenomenology not according with one another. Do you have a paper in which 'Eastern phenomenology' is contrasted with Western? I remember linking some comparative papers by Eastern philosophers interested in Western phenomenology, but that was way back in Part 1 or 2 of this thread as I recall. The only foundational reason I can think of for a divergence between Eastern and Western phenomenologies would be in the Eastern concept of Maya [as I understand it, the idea that all that we experience here is illusion]. Western phenomenology approaches consciousness and mind as they develop in contact with an actual world -- the natural world and varying historical 'worlds' shaped by human cultures and societies on earth. The dimensions and core conditions of human existence are understood to be shared in common among humans despite the differences obtained in our taking various perspectives on it. Given our individually and historically/culturally situated perspectives on this same actual world, our ideas about it will take different directions, but given a global multiplication of perspectives that can be understood and shared, we can (and should) build a world in which the maximum good can be approached and possibly, with enough intelligence, achieved.

I'd like to learn more about 'Eastern phenomenology'. Do you have a text you can recommend?

 

[Pharoah]

@Soupie you said
"It's one thing to say (objectively) that via evolution a qualitative correspondence between organisms and environmental stimuli is established; it's quite another to say that organisms qualitatively experience environmental stimuli. In my opinion, you've done the former but haven't established the latter..."
then, when I say,
"the qualitatively represented (as agreed) character instantiated by those physical stimuli..."
you say
"As agreed? I don't recall agreeing to this"

I consider these points to be of equivalence one of which you agree with, the other that you do not.

As @Constance has pointed out. I try to formalise a series of propositions to guarantee certain conclusions how and why phen cons exists. The trouble seems to me, that in one instatnce you may accept a proposition. Then when you move onto the next, you stop accepting the former .... and so it goes, round and round in circles.

 

[Soupie]

@Soupie you said
"It's one thing to say (objectively) that via evolution a qualitative correspondence between organisms and environmental stimuli is established; it's quite another to say that organisms qualitatively experience environmental stimuli. In my opinion, you've done the former but haven't established the latter..."
then, when I say,
"the qualitatively represented (as agreed) character instantiated by those physical stimuli..."
you say
"As agreed? I don't recall agreeing to this"

I consider these points to be of equivalence one of which you agree with, the other that you do not.

As @Constance has pointed out. I try to formalise a series of propositions to guarantee certain conclusions how and why phen cons exists. The trouble seems to me, that in one instatnce you may accept a proposition. Then when you move onto the next, you stop accepting the former .... and so it goes, round and round in circles.

An objective, qualitative correspondence between an environmental stimuli and an organism /= an instantiation of qualitative character.

Ex the example of fire and wood

Just because there is a qualitative correspondence between fire and wood, does not mean that the quality of heat is instantiated.

 

[smcder]

Steve, it's hard to respond to your last two posts since I can't find a gravitational tendency or core in the succession of points of view you present. Maybe that's what you wanted to convey

I can respond briefly to your references to Eastern phenomenology and Western phenomenology not according with one another. Do you have a paper in which 'Eastern phenomenology' is contrasted with Western? I remember linking some comparative papers by Eastern philosophers interested in Western phenomenology, but that was way back in Part 1 or 2 of this thread as I recall. The only foundational reason I can think of for a divergence between Eastern and Western phenomenologies would be in the Eastern concept of Maya [as I understand it, the idea that all that we experience here is illusion]. Western phenomenology approaches consciousness and mind as they develop in contact with an actual world -- the natural world and varying historical 'worlds' shaped by human cultures and societies on earth. The dimensions and core conditions of human existence are understood to be shared in common among humans despite the differences obtained in our taking various perspectives on it. Given our individually and historically/culturally situated perspectives on this same actual world, our ideas about it will take different directions, but given a global multiplication of perspectives that can be understood and shared, we can (and should) build a world in which the maximum good can be approached and possibly, with enough intelligence, achieved.

I'd like to learn more about 'Eastern phenomenology'. Do you have a text you can recommend?

OK, I just re-read what i was responding to in your post and made better sense of it this morning, I see my misuderstanding.

and I found this today:

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=...nology&usg=AFQjCNE7-xdZYaHiYYNDCDQoC5mJzeaH2g

This part was helpful for me, what do you think?

Fink writes in his/Husserl's 6th, phenomenology has to be experienced, not read. He goes on to emphasize that reading rather experiencing leads to the bewildering feeling of looking at a bedazzling text written queer language that does not yield any clarity or understanding.

Furthermore, Husserl's body of work represents a process of experimenting with phenomenological thinking rather than a coherent system of thought and this might be proved as confusing even more. Here are my $.02 on how to start, they represent my own experience and yours is likely to be different and reflective of your natural attitude and lifeworld.

smcder the underlined was very helpful - and seems to agree with what you say above

Husserl's starting point was mathematics and the origin of logic and he devoted most of his energy to dissect the roots of logical thought. Since you are most interested in the methodological aspects of phenomenology (which Fink considers as the theory of method) I recommend that you start with Husserl's 5th, continue with Heidegger's basic problems of phenomenology and then move to Fink's 6th. Fink attempted to close the gaps in Heidegger's and Husserl's views of phenomenology and built a better (my personal view) platform combining both. As a companion text, I would look at Bruzina's excellent research on Husserl and Fink and peek at Schutz's investigations of the lifeworld.

*In any case, my recommendation is start your own reduction as soon as possible and as you read the texts so that you will be thinking and swimming at the same time. The longer path in the natural realm is the shortest in the transcendental. Pending on your level of interest and dedication, this might take longer than you think so take a deep breath and prepare for a marathon.

 

[Pharoah]

@Soupie
1. My point still stands... i.e.you cannot critique effectively if you cannot hold down one proposition to evaluate another (it's a ceteris paribus thing), and when you flit from one stance to another to suit your bias

2. In what way is there a qualitative correspondence between fire and wood?

 

[smcder]

@Soupie you said
"It's one thing to say (objectively) that via evolution a qualitative correspondence between organisms and environmental stimuli is established; it's quite another to say that organisms qualitatively experience environmental stimuli. In my opinion, you've done the former but haven't established the latter..."
then, when I say,
"the qualitatively represented (as agreed) character instantiated by those physical stimuli..."
you say
"As agreed? I don't recall agreeing to this"

I consider these points to be of equivalence one of which you agree with, the other that you do not.

As @Constance has pointed out. I try to formalise a series of propositions to guarantee certain conclusions how and why phen cons exists. The trouble seems to me, that in one instatnce you may accept a proposition. Then when you move onto the next, you stop accepting the former .... and so it goes, round and round in circles.

@Pharoah writes:

@Soupie In the post that preceded this one that I have responded to, you say,
"While the neural processes would be complex and sophisticated, it is very conceivable and indeed likely that all of what you describe above could be accomplished neurophysiologically—that is, physically and objectively... I'm not seeing why phenomenal experience, affectivity, and thinking must enter the picture."
Indeed, in relation to points 1 to 3, neural processes can be very complex without phenomenal experience entering the picture.
Point 4 is,
"(4) Organisms must physically differentiate a massive amount of physical environmental stimuli, physically evaluate them, and physically (mechanistically) choose (amplify/attenuate) which to respond to."
An organism does not evaluate the physical stimulus (itself)—I never say that—but rather, the qualitatively represented (as agreed) character instantiated by those physical stimuli... If an organism continually evaluates those qualitatively represented characteristics instantiated by environment (on a continual basis)... soupie, you say "that organism is not experiencing qualitatively: there is no phenomenal experience" . So, what is it experiencing: what is phenomenal experience?"

But that evaluation assumes the experience in the first place! As the stimuli grow more complex and rapid ... an experience of them "emerges" in order to sort them all out - but what is the reason that that evaluation has to occur at the level of phenomenal experience? That seems an extra step ... as stimuli grow more complex, why wouldn't the neural architecture to evaluate them just grow more complex, why does expereience show up and then is a more efficient way to deal with them? That's the missing step - the one you admit has to be sorted out by neurophysiologists (but that is the whole problem!)

Let me back up,

your position is an emergentist one, correct?

"qualitatively represented character" emerges from neurophysiological mechanisms (somehow) - so here, you are talking about phenomenal experience as having emerged from neurophysiological events - but then you say the organism evaluates what has emerged (the experience), how does that evaulation take place if not by other neurophysiological events? That's the whole hard problem of emergentism - in the case of birds flocking, to say the birds respond to the flock behavior is circular because the birds are the flock - we can see that, but consciousness isn't like a flock of birds, we can immediately see the birds in the flock and their behavior, experience is unlike nerves firing.

If I misunderstand you here, I am excited because I may have a new understanding of HCT if I get that misunderstanding straightened out - but the way I see it is phenomenal experience arises from nerves firing and the organism then somehow responds to that emergent quality, but that all can be done without the emergent quality being there or with it just being epiphenomenal, having no causality - nerves fire and other nerve firings "evaluate" those firings ... that is the most widely understood idea of consciousness on a physicalist model. No one knows why consciousness is there, to me you haven't shown that - this is I think @Soupie's point, I think, given that consciousness is there, it makes sense the organism would do something with it because that seems to be the case and because it must give evolutionary advantage - but you have to assume that in the first place ...

So this specific misunderstanding between @Pharoah and @Soupie, here is how I read that:

"It's one thing to say (objectively) that via evolution a qualitative correspondence between organisms and environmental stimuli is established; it's quite another to say that organisms qualitatively experience environmental stimuli. In my opinion, you've done the former but haven't established the latter..."
then, when I say,
"the qualitatively represented (as agreed) character instantiated by those physical stimuli..."
you say
"As agreed? I don't recall agreeing to this"

------------------
What I read @Soupie to be saying is this:

given phenomenal experience, evolutionary theory establishes a correspondence between that phenomenal experience and environmental stimuli, it's quite another thing to say why organisms qualitatively experience environmental stimuli in the first place or how that experience can be responded to (without assuming causal efficacy for that which is emergent)

then @Pharoah you say:

"the qualitatively represented (as agreed) character instantiated by those physical stimuli

This says physical stimuli instantiate qualitative represenations - to me, that is emergence and again its not explained how physical processes instantiate it - so @Soupie can't agree that's established, he is in fact agreeing with you that if you just assume it, of course there should be a correspondence with the environment but it may not be a direct correspondence with the experience - but rather the nerves firing - he's just saying and I understand you to agree that you haven't said how that happens - how nerves firing gives rise to there being something it is like, to phenomenal experience - you are just saying that is phenomenal experience, an assertion of brute fact

Here's another way to think of it - emergence is kind of the reverse of reduction, something different anyway shows up from some kind of process ... so nerves fire and consciousness emerges, but then how do nerves respond to what has emerged from them and not from their own physcial activity (thats causal closure)

these things happen at the same time

nerves fire --->conscious experience (I will my hand to move)
nerves fire ------------------------------------------------------------->the hand moves

but the physicalist is happy to say its the nerves firing, not the conscious experience, not the "I will my hand to move" that causes the hand to move, otherwise you'd have to have a kind of de-emergence for the experience to cause something,

I know we've been over it all before, but it seems to me HCT doesn't move this argument forward at all, it just makes assumptions and moves ahead on those assumptions.

 

[smcder]

@Soupie
1. My point still stands... i.e.you cannot critique effectively if you cannot hold down one proposition to evaluate another (it's a ceteris paribus thing), and when you flit from one stance to another to suit your bias

2. In what way is there a qualitative correspondence between fire and wood?

See my post above - I dont think thats what @Soupie is doing at all, I think he doesn't see (and I dont either) that you have shown how qualitative experience instantiates phenomenal experience.

The fire and wood example made sense to me, I think its a rhetorical move to show what @Soupie thinks is missing in your argument.

 

[smcder]

Steve, it's hard to respond to your last two posts since I can't find a gravitational tendency or core in the succession of points of view you present. Maybe that's what you wanted to convey

I can respond briefly to your references to Eastern phenomenology and Western phenomenology not according with one another. Do you have a paper in which 'Eastern phenomenology' is contrasted with Western? I remember linking some comparative papers by Eastern philosophers interested in Western phenomenology, but that was way back in Part 1 or 2 of this thread as I recall. The only foundational reason I can think of for a divergence between Eastern and Western phenomenologies would be in the Eastern concept of Maya [as I understand it, the idea that all that we experience here is illusion]. Western phenomenology approaches consciousness and mind as they develop in contact with an actual world -- the natural world and varying historical 'worlds' shaped by human cultures and societies on earth. The dimensions and core conditions of human existence are understood to be shared in common among humans despite the differences obtained in our taking various perspectives on it. Given our individually and historically/culturally situated perspectives on this same actual world, our ideas about it will take different directions, but given a global multiplication of perspectives that can be understood and shared, we can (and should) build a world in which the maximum good can be approached and possibly, with enough intelligence, achieved.

I'd like to learn more about 'Eastern phenomenology'. Do you have a text you can recommend?

I think I should learn to do some phenomenology.

 

[smcder]

@Soupie
@Pharoah

I will try to keep up with the HCT posts as I can ... but I am going to switch over and try to do some phenomenology.

 

[Pharoah]

How frustrating this all is... and a little depressing
@smcder I think I have a better understanding of where you are not getting HCT.
The first thing, is that you are thinking of phen exp from the human perspective. This is problematic because the human does not solely experience the qualitative nature of environmental features. You, as a human, frame or couch your experiences into a introspective, analysed, conceptual world-view. This is more than pure phen exp.

Second you say,
"But that evaluation assumes the experience in the first place! As the stimuli grow more complex and rapid ... an experience of them "emerges" in order to sort them all out - but what is the reason that that evaluation has to occur at the level of phenomenal experience?"
The phrase, "in order to sort them all out" is putting the horse and the cart the wrong way round. Experience doesn't emerge to sort out anything. Rather, it is what comes into being because of the sorting: it is individuated and qualitative and chaanging on a moment by moment basis... that is what experiencing the world is. That is the condition that Humans have given the 'phenomenal expeirence' label to, namely the thing that we are in that is individuated and qualitative... and then we humans label everything in this world-view as that thing with that quale, or this thing with this quale. I am saying phen consc is that process

 

[Pharoah]

@Soupie
@Pharoah

I will try to keep up with the HCT posts as I can ... but I am going to switch over and try to do some phenomenology.

That's the defense mechanism par excellence.

 

[smcder]

How frustrating this all is... and a little depressing
@smcder I think I have a better understanding of where you are not getting HCT.
The first thing, is that you are thinking of phen exp from the human perspective. This is problematic because the human does not solely experience the qualitative nature of environmental features. You, as a human, frame or couch your experiences into a introspective, analysed, conceptual world-view. This is more than pure phen exp.

Second you say,
"But that evaluation assumes the experience in the first place! As the stimuli grow more complex and rapid ... an experience of them "emerges" in order to sort them all out - but what is the reason that that evaluation has to occur at the level of phenomenal experience?"
The phrase, "in order to sort them all out" is putting the horse and the cart the wrong way round. Experience doesn't emerge to sort out anything. Rather, it is what comes into being because of the sorting: it is individuated and qualitative and chaanging on a moment by moment basis... that is what experiencing the world is. That is the condition that Humans have given the 'phenomenal expeirence' label to, namely the thing that we are in that is individuated and qualitative... and then we humans label everything in this world-view as that thing with that quale, or this thing with this quale. I am saying phen consc is that process

You aren't operating over my head. I understand what you are saying.

The first thing, is that you are thinking of phen exp from the human perspective. This is problematic because the human does not solely experience the qualitative nature of environmental features. You, as a human, frame or couch your experiences into a introspective, analysed, conceptual world-view. This is more than pure phen exp.

No ... I'm not. I disagree that the human experience is that separate from say my dogs experience - I think we have very ordinary, everyday access to pure phenomenal experience - I dont always couch or frame my experiences into an introspective, analysed, conceptual world-view - that is a very cerebral way of operating and I think some people do spend all or most of their time in this mode -

I can go back and look, I think in part 5, you made a stronger version of this - that humans couldn't relate to that kind of experience, but I disagree, I think we experience what other animals experience, I recently posted that I think "what it is like to be a bat" may not be all that different than I thought, although I think it still makes Nagel's point - we have a lot of non-conceptual experience, just every day - when we move around and do things and respond to our needs, we don't always live in our heads the way you describe. As I understand it, dasein is this kind of human way of being animal.

"But that evaluation assumes the experience in the first place! As the stimuli grow more complex and rapid ... an experience of them "emerges" in order to sort them all out - but what is the reason that that evaluation has to occur at the level of phenomenal experience?"
The phrase, "in order to sort them all out" is putting the horse and the cart the wrong way round. Experience doesn't emerge to sort out anything. Rather, it is what comes into being because of the sorting: it is individuated and qualitative and chaanging on a moment by moment basis... that is what experiencing the world is. That is the condition that Humans have given the 'phenomenal expeirence' label to, namely the thing that we are in that is individuated and qualitative... and then we humans label everything in this world-view as that thing with that quale, or this thing with this quale. I am saying phen consc is that process

OK, I got that wrong way around - but I get what you are saying here -

Experience doesn't emerge to sort out anything. Rather, it is what comes into being because of the sorting: it is individuated and qualitative and chaanging on a moment by moment basis... that is what experiencing the world is. That is the condition that Humans have given the 'phenomenal expeirence' label to, namely the thing that we are in that is individuated and qualitative... and then we humans label everything in this world-view as that thing with that
quale, or this thing with this quale. I am saying phen consc is that process

First off, I would say - then just say that in the first place! I read two different modes of communication from you - when you are on the forum you write very clearly, when you write formally, you are difficult to read. I want to say "affected" but not in an insulting way - there is a lot in what you say about philosophers writing to be difficult, if you wrote somewhere between the forum style (including the passion) and the formal stlye, I think you would hit it dead on - for me.

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Now isn't the above just an identity theory? When you say "it is what comes into being" that is saying "emerges" right? And then you say that (it (what comes into being because of the sorting) is individuated and qualitative and changing on a moment by moment basis)) -

phen consc is that process, ie nerves firing is phen consc? thats identity theory

that process, that sorting, is the neurophysiological processes or operations and you are saying when all that sorting reaches a certain point, phenomenal experience comes into being, "what it is like" emerges? and or just is a brute fact? that is just what it is like to have all that processing going on? is that correct?

 

[smcder]

That's the defense mechanism par excellence.

I find that insulting and I ask for and expect an apology.

It actually occured to me as I posted that (because of recent remarks to @Soupie (that he would be a good reviewer for JCS and that he "flits" around - which, from what I can see, that is your misunderstanding, not his flitting), that you might make some kind of remark in response.

Also, you've made remarks like this in the past when you get frustrated.

It is your job to communicate clearly to the reader and to take infinite pains, if necessary, to do so. This is your idea and if you want anyone else to pay attention to it, you need to very clearly tell them why they should.

I've spent hours on your paper in a sincere effort to understand it and help you with it, if I can. Sometimes my approach is confrontational but that is partly my temperament and partly my law school training. It does not mean that I don't want to see you succeed. And that is true whether I understand it or not and whether or not I agree with it.

In my own notes I have converted a good bit of the first few parts of your short paper into something like a sequential argument, 1 - 2 - 3, with each step following as immediately and self-evidently as I can, so as to see the argument as a whole and so as to find any jumps in the logic or any propositions that may not be self-evident to me. It seems to me that this would be a useful thing for you to construct as a summary - so the reader can go back and look at a bare bones argument and see if it holds up.

I have also asked my father as a personal favor to spend his time on it and to let me know what he thinks. If he thinks it is good, in turn he will ask someone, as a personal favor to him, to spend their time looking at it - one or more persons who may be able to help you get your work published. That process is going on now as he reads your paper daily.

For my part, I have finished the short HCT paper and feel I have a better understanding of it and I have made remarks relevant to it, this is the best I know how to do to help you for the time being. If there is anything more that I can do at the moment, please let me know and I will see what I can do.

As I said, I will try to keep up with the posts as I can and I just responded to your previous post in detail.

However, I do have other interests to pursue and I am now going to spend some time on them.

 

[Pharoah]

I find that insulting and I ask for and expect an apology.

It actually occured to me as I posted that (because of recent remarks to @Soupie (that he would be a good reviewer for JCS and that he "flits" around - which, from what I can see, that is your misunderstanding, not his flitting), that you might make some kind of remark in response.

Also, you've made remarks like this in the past when you get frustrated.

It is your job to communicate clearly to the reader and to take infinite pains, if necessary, to do so. This is your idea and if you want anyone else to pay attention to it, you need to very clearly tell them why they should.

I've spent hours on your paper in a sincere effort to understand it and help you with it, if I can. Sometimes my approach is confrontational but that is partly my temperament and partly my law school training. It does not mean that I don't want to see you succeed. And that is true whether I understand it or not and whether or not I agree with it.

In my own notes I have converted a good bit of the first few parts of your short paper into something like a sequential argument, 1 - 2 - 3, with each step following as immediately and self-evidently as I can, so as to see the argument as a whole and so as to find any jumps in the logic or any propositions that may not be self-evident to me. It seems to me that this would be a useful thing for you to construct as a summary - so the reader can go back and look at a bare bones argument and see if it holds up.
I have also asked my father as a personal favor to spend his time on it and to let me know what he thinks. If he thinks it is good, in turn he will ask someone, as a personal favor to him, to spend their time looking at it - one or more persons who may be able to help you get your work published. That process is going on now as he reads your paper daily.
For my part, I have finished the short HCT paper and feel I have a better understanding of it and I have made remarks relevant to it, this is the best I know how to do to help you.

As I said, I will try to keep up with the posts as I can and I just responded to your previous post in detail.

However, I do have other interests to pursue and I am now going to spend some time on them.

It wasn't intended to be an insult, but I understand that it was insulting. I can be a bit dumb like that. I am very sorry.
I'm in aggreement with your dog comments.
"that prcoess, that sorting, is the neurophysiological processes or operations and you are saying when all that sorting reaches a certain point, phenomenal experience comes into being, "what it is like" emerges? as a brute fact? that is just what it is like to have all that processing going on? is that correct?"
I wouldn't say that.. and mine is not a computational theory.
You don't strike me as controntational.

Re my remarks to Soupie. I feel insulted when what I say is misrepresented. I get just as peed off when people misstate what Chalmers says is the HP. There are about 8 published reformulations of Jaxksons knowledge argument and that irritates me too. Regurgitation is seldom savoury. I said the wood and fire thing was silly. It's not silly... it is absurd. That is not an insult. It simply bears no relation to anything that I say in my theory.

I have probably over stepped the mark again. I am notoriously bad at judging these things—I usually keep to myself. I will take a passive role in the forum for a bit now because I am liable to put my foot in it more if I comment.

Thanks a lot for all the support and contributions.