Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 6

[Soupie]

I think i've just answered that.
Wavelengths don't even have numbers let alone qualitative colour. The numbers are human conceptual constructs about what wavelengths are comparatively, just as their phenomenal feel is a qualitative delineation. In themselves, outside of living representations, that have no quality and no number. They relate to oneanother in a physical way but our understanding of their intrinsic nature is biased by our observer dependent relation to the world

So your answer is "no?"

 

[Pharoah]

@Soupie
There is no phenomenal blue in the absence of conscious perceiving organisms.
But this answer could be misconstrude for it assumes we are in accord in our understanding of what we mean by conscious perceiving organism... I am assuming we are thinking the same thing in my answer.

 

[Soupie]

1. innate physiologies are qualitatively relevant. Section 1

2. There is a representational correspondence between innately acquired biochemical mechanisms and the environment. Section 2

Based on our most recent dialogue, you/HCT posit that:

(1) Phenomenal qualities do not exist in the absence of conscious organisms

(2) When an organism exists that possesses "innately acquired biochemical mechanisms" that correspond to the environment, phenomenal, representational qualities emerge into existence.

(3) However, these phenomenal qualities are not identical to the behavior of innately acquired mechanisms which correspond to the environment.

-----

(1) Do I have that right?

(2) If I do have that right, and phenomenal qualities are not identical to the physical processes/environmental stimuli noted above, and phenomenal qualities do not exist in the absence of these physical processes/stimuli, then what are they?

 

[Constance]

This discussion today is substantially clarifying, not only in the clarification of Pharoah's HCT but in foregrounding the nature of the hard problem of consciousness in more specific terms. @Soupie continues to want to know 'how' the biologically evolved enablements that Pharoah delineates produce protoconsciousness and consciousness in living organisms. [As I see it, this goes to the root of the hard problem, and we do not yet know enough about nature to solve it.] Pharoah makes it clear that biologically evolving enablements do 'instantiate' the development of consciousness out of the early states of yet-preconscious organisms, all the way up to what we prereflectively experience on the basis of what these enablements (to see, to hear, to feel, one's existence and hence eventually to reflect on one's situation) yield -- what they make possible and even inevitable in evolving organisms. The term/concept of 'affordances' seems to me to approach more closely what happens in the nexus of biological enablements and the increasingly felt [and ultimately cognized] nature of experience in the world, which produces a kind of 'preconscious knowing' that is pre-linguistic and pre-reflective, an inchoate understanding of the position of living protoconscious organisms as separate from the environment in which they exist, as 'self-referential' before we can speak of a consciousness of 'self'. This sense of 'situation' within and over-against the environing world becomes more tangible, more obvious, in the interactions of living organisms with one another. Of course W.Stevens has a poem expressing this development, which he placed first in his Collected Poems.

I think that we all, here, recogize that the evolution of consciousness is grounded, even primordially, in an interactive relationship between the living organism and that within which its existence is contained -- a core subject-object relationship that evolves in complexity through the increasing complexity of evolving life and the range of that which each protoconsciousness organism/animal experiences in contact with other forms of life.

 

[Constance]

Here's that poem:

Earthy Anecdote

Every time the bucks went clattering
Over Oklahoma
A firecat bristled in the way.

Wherever they went,
They went clattering,
Until they swerved
In a swift, circular line
To the right,
because of the firecat.

Or until they swerved
in a swift, circular line
To the left,
Because of the firecat.

The bucks clattered.
The firecat went leaping,
to the right, to the left,
And
Bristled in the way.

Later, the firecat closed his bright eyes
And slept.

Wallace Stevens

 

[Constance]

If I do have that right, and phenomenal qualities are not identical to the physical processes/environmental stimuli noted above, and phenomenal qualities do not exist in the absence of these physical processes/stimuli, then what are they?

How could they be identical?

 

[Constance]

I do think we might benefit from looking critically at the various terms we've used, including 'representation', 'emergence', 'instantiation', 'protoconsciousness', 'mechanisms', and 'correspond'. We might begin with this phrase from Soupie's most recent post:

"innately acquired biochemical mechanisms" that correspond to the environment,

My sense of what Pharoah has written is that 'innately acquired biochemical mechanisms' develop in the evolution of life within the evolution of nature, but that these 'mechanisms' do not 'correspond' with the environment [that is, they do not develop in the environment but in living organisms in the environment']. Is this correct, Pharoah?

 

[Pharoah]

This discussion today is substantially clarifying, not only in the clarification of Pharoah's HCT but in foregrounding the nature of the hard problem of consciousness in more specific terms. @Soupie continues to want to know 'how' the biologically evolved enablements that Pharoah delineates produce protoconsciousness and consciousness in living organisms. [As I see it, this goes to the root of the hard problem, and we do not yet know enough about nature to solve it.] Pharoah makes it clear that biologically evolving enablements do 'instantiate' the development of consciousness out of the early states of yet-preconscious organisms, all the way up to what we prereflectively experience on the basis of what these enablements (to see, to hear, to feel, one's existence and hence eventually to reflect on one's situation) yield -- what they make possible and even inevitable in evolving organisms. The term/concept of 'affordances' seems to me to approach more closely what happens in the nexus of biological enablements and the increasingly felt [and ultimately cognized] nature of experience in the world, which produces a kind of 'preconscious knowing' that is pre-linguistic and pre-reflective, an inchoate understanding of the position of living protoconscious organisms as separate from the environment in which they exist, as 'self-referential' before we can speak of a consciousness of 'self'. This sense of 'situation' within and over-against the environing world becomes more tangible, more obvious, in the interactions of living organisms with one another. Of course W.Stevens has a poem expressing this development, which he placed first in his Collected Poems.

I think that we all, here, recogize that the evolution of consciousness is grounded, even primordially, in an interactive relationship between the living organism and that within which its existence is contained -- a core subject-object relationship that evolves in complexity through the increasing complexity of evolving life and the range of that which each protoconsciousness organism/animal experiences in contact with other forms of life.

I really like the way you express this @Constance. I wouldn't dispute anything you have said here.

@Soupie
in point 2, "phenomenal, representational qualities emerge into existence." is not correct to my way of thinking.

Your last question
"(2) If I do have that right, and phenomenal qualities are not identical to the physical processes/environmental stimuli noted above, and phenomenal qualities do not exist in the absence of these physical processes/stimuli, then what are they?"
The offending word is "identical"
I cant be nailed down by that term i dont think.
Recently, i have felt as though you are trying to catch me out by finding paradoxical statements in what i say... i might be wrong about that though. You wont find any if you are. Apparent paradoxes are explained by misunderstanding i think. This would be an example. not sure how to tackle it

 

[Pharoah]

I do think we might benefit from looking critically at the various terms we've used, including 'representation', 'emergence', 'instantiation', 'protoconsciousness', 'mechanisms', and 'correspond'. We might begin with this phrase from Soupie's most recent post:

My sense of what Pharoah has written is that 'innately acquired biochemical mechanisms' develop in the evolution of life within the evolution of nature, but that these 'mechanisms' do not 'correspond' with the environment [that is, they do not develop in the environment but in living organisms in the environment'. Is this correct, Pharoah?

You are right to want to look at terms @Constance
so much seems to stand on the construction of the sentences and the terms used. biut nobody has definitive definitions. they are like amoeba.
perhaps there is a 'representational correspondance' in the physiological makeup of living organisms. i.e. not a direct correspondance...

 

[Soupie]

I'm not trying to catch you out, I'm simply trying to understand your model. I'm reading what you are writing and trying to say it back to you (using your own words and statements as best I can). So far, it seems I haven't understood you.

Let's keep trying.

In point 2, "phenomenal, representational qualities emerge into existence." is not correct to my way of thinking.

Ok, this is not correct. So what is correct?

(1) Phenomenal qualities do not exist before the emergence of an organism with "innate biochemical ... environmental correspondence."

(2) Phenomenal qualities exist after the emergence of organisms with "innate biochemical ... environmental correspondences."

Are those two statements correct according to HCT?

 

[Soupie]

How could they be identical?

Subjectivity and objectivity (if we assume such a thing truly exists) may be two aspects of one reality.

 

[Constance]

Subjectivity and objectivity (if we assume such a thing truly exists) may be two aspects of one reality.

I think it's clear that they are two aspects of one complex reality, but that doesn't mean that objectivity and subjectivity can be reduced to explanation by a single 'cause' -- as, for example, a single system of 'information' that determines what happens in a world in which subjectivity exists.

 

[Pharoah]

I'm not trying to catch you out, I'm simply trying to understand your model. I'm reading what you are writing and trying to say it back to you (using your own words and statements as best I can). So far, it seems I haven't understood you.

Let's keep trying.


Ok, this is not correct. So what is correct?

(1) Phenomenal qualities do not exist before the emergence of an organism with "innate biochemical ... environmental correspondence."

(2) Phenomenal qualities exist after the emergence of organisms with "innate biochemical ... environmental correspondences."

Are those two statements correct according to HCT?

I think we were there earlier today.
Before I go over that, I'm not sure I know what you mean by "phenomenal qualities" because I think of phenomenal experience as a qualitative thing. It's word redundancy, in a way, I think.
So I would rephrase the questions to

Phenomenal experience does not exist before the emergence of organisms with "innate biochemical ... environmental correspondence." or
qualitative representation does not exist before the emergence of organisms with "innate biochemical ... environmental correspondence."
Although yes to both questions, they are both referring to different levels in the hierarchical construction.
In fact we can refine the second statement to
qualitative representation does not exist before the emergence of replicating capabilities
And refine the first statement to
Phenomenal experience does not exist before the emergence of organisms that evaluate their qualitative representations.

So as you can see, getting a yes or no answer requires qualifying the meanings so as to prevent misinterpretation.
i know it must be frustrating when i seem to be slippery like this with your questions

 

[Constance]

'Representation' is still a problematic term from the perspective of phenomenological philosophy. 'Representations' taken to be contained in neurological information and somehow 'realized' {the question being 'how'?} in living organisms are contrasted in phenomenological philosophy and analyses with the evidence that experiences occur in direct presentations of what-is in the organism's environment to which the organism responds bodily, preconsciously, consciously, and eventually at the level of reflective thought -- i.e., thinking that is reflective in encompassing not only the organisms's sense of what-is but also the nature of what-is in a world composed of objective and subjective aspects of Being.

 

[Soupie]

I think we were there earlier today.
Before I go over that, I'm not sure I know what you mean by "phenomenal qualities" because I think of phenomenal experience as a qualitative thing. It's word redundancy, in a way, I think.
So I would rephrase the questions to

Phenomenal experience does not exist before the emergence of organisms with "innate biochemical ... environmental correspondence." or
qualitative representation does not exist before the emergence of organisms with "innate biochemical ... environmental correspondence."
Although yes to both questions, they are both referring to different levels in the hierarchical construction.
In fact we can refine the second statement to
qualitative representation does not exist before the emergence of replicating capabilities
And refine the first statement to
Phenomenal experience does not exist before the emergence of organisms that evaluate their qualitative representations.

So as you can see, getting a yes or no answer requires qualifying the meanings so as to prevent misinterpretation.
i know it must be frustrating when i seem to be slippery like this with your questions

Yes, it's not helpful when you don't answer my straightforward questions. I'm trying very patiently to understand what the $&@# you're saying.

I'll try to re ask it in a bit.

For now:

Do you consider the terms "phenomenal quality" and "qualitative representation" to be equivalent?

You said you weren't sure what I meant by phenomenal qualities; those would be red, blue, green, sweet, sour, etc.

Phenomenal experience would be a "stream" or shifting phenomenal landscape of phenomenal qualities.

 

[Soupie]

@Pharoah

According to HCT, are the following two statements true or false?

(1) Qualitative, phenomenal representations do not exist before the emergence of organisms with "innate biochemical ... environmental correspondence."

(2) Qualitative, phenomenal representations do exist after the emergence of organisms with "innate biochemical ... environmental correspondences."

 

[Pharoah]

'Representation' is still a problematic term from the perspective of phenomenological philosophy. 'Representations' taken to be contained in neurological information and somehow 'realized' {the question being 'how'?} in living organisms are contrasted in phenomenological philosophy and analyses with the evidence that experiences occur in direct presentations of what-is in the organism's environment to which the organism responds bodily, preconsciously, consciously, and eventually at the level of reflective thought -- i.e., thinking that is reflective in encompassing not only the organisms's sense of what-is but also the nature of what-is in a world composed of objective and subjective aspects of Being.

@Constance I agree that the orthodoxy on representation is problematic—"as contained in neurological information and somehow realized". I think the orthodoxy's problem relates to getting meaning into the equation... how to get quality into the representational model and how to negate the dichotomy of the object and the object-as-represented gulf. Of course, I would argue that HCT succeeds in virtue of the hierarchy.
Your desciption of direct presentation reminds me of Searle's naive realist stance. I have argued why his position is problematic.

@Soupie
"Do you consider the terms "phenomenal quality" and "qualitative representation" to be equivalent?"
no.

"According to HCT, are the following two statements true or false?
(1) Qualitative, phenomenal representations do not exist before the emergence of organisms with 'innate biochemical ... environmental correspondence.'
(2) Qualitative, phenomenal representations do exist after the emergence of organisms with 'innate biochemical ... environmental correspondences.' "

1. true
2. qualitative representations... true; phenomenal representations... false
(To qualify, I don't think I have every used the phrase "phenomenal representations" because it is problematic... it might get you thinking in identity terms. The quality is represented. The phenomenon, is the quality as experienced—as a dynamic changing landscape). Interestingly, what does become relatively fixed, in an organism that possesses phenomenal experience, is their "understanding" of the qualitative relevancy of their experience. This I equate to 'that which is learnt' about the qualitative nature of the environment as represented. This 'understanding' that an organism possess of its individuated experience as it relates to the world, is the transcendent feature of phenomenally experiencing organisms.

hope that helps

 

[Soupie]

@Constance I agree that the orthodoxy on representation is problematic—"as contained in neurological information and somehow realized". I think the orthodoxy's problem relates to getting meaning into the equation... how to get quality into the representational model and how to negate the dichotomy of the object and the object-as-represented gulf. Of course, I would argue that HCT succeeds in virtue of the hierarchy.
Your desciption of direct presentation reminds me of Searle's naive realist stance. I have argued why his position is problematic.

@Soupie
"Do you consider the terms "phenomenal quality" and "qualitative representation" to be equivalent?"
no.

"According to HCT, are the following two statements true or false?
(1) Qualitative, phenomenal representations do not exist before the emergence of organisms with 'innate biochemical ... environmental correspondence.'
(2) Qualitative, phenomenal representations do exist after the emergence of organisms with 'innate biochemical ... environmental correspondences.' "

1. true
2. qualitative representations... true; phenomenal representations... false
(To qualify, I don't think I have every used the phrase "phenomenal representations" because it is problematic... it might get you thinking in identity terms. The quality is represented. The phenomenon, is the quality as experienced—as a dynamic changing landscape). Interestingly, what does become relatively fixed, in an organism that possesses phenomenal experience, is their "understanding" of the qualitative relevancy of their experience. This I equate to 'that which is learnt' about the qualitative nature of the environment as represented. This 'understanding' that an organism possess of its individuated experience as it relates to the world, is the transcendent feature of phenomenally experiencing organisms.

hope that helps

Wow...

(1) In my understanding, a "phenomenal representation" is a representation that "feels" like something.

For example, a painting of a flower is a representation of the flower.

On the other hand, phenomenal blue is a "phenomenal representation" of EM waves of a particular length.

So you don't use the phrase "phenomenal representation."

So, if you don't consider phenomenal blue to be a "phenomenal representation," what do you consider it? How would you refer to phenomenal blue in your HCT language?

(2) You say the quality is represented. I don't follow. Can you give a very simply example using EM waves and phenomenal blue to explain what you mean by "the quality is represented?"

(I'm trying, I really am, haha.)

 

[Pharoah]

Wow...

(1) In my understanding, a "phenomenal representation" is a representation that "feels" like something.

For example, a painting of a flower is a representation of the flower.

On the other hand, phenomenal blue is a "phenomenal representation" of EM waves of a particular length.

So you don't use the phrase "phenomenal representation."

So, if you don't consider phenomenal blue to be a "phenomenal representation," what do you consider it? How would you refer to phenomenal blue in your HCT language?

(2) You say the quality is represented. I don't follow. Can you give a very simply example using EM waves and phenomenal blue to explain what you mean by "the quality is represented?"

(I'm trying, I really am, haha.)

I am going to check the archive when I get home to see if I use the term 'phenomenal representation'.
Your questions are confusing me now so that I doubt myself.
Answer the question in point (1): Phenomenal blue is a qualitatively relevant representation (relevant to the particular species in virtue of the physiology).
Don't think I use to the term "phenomenal blue" either.
In answer to point (2) cf. Section 3 of my paper concerning the species of insect by the name of Berrybug.

 

[Soupie]

I'm confusing you, haha!?

You say "phenomenal blue is a qualitatively relevant representation."

I think I understand what you think better than you think I understand what you think.

The question I (and @smcder) are patiently, painstakingly trying to get you to address is how do phenomenal qualities (representations in your terminology) come into existence in the first place.

Before they can be "qualitatively relevant" and before they can be "evaluated" they have to exist.

If they don't exist before sufficiently complex organisms exist, and they do exist after sufficiently complex organisms exist, the question is: by what means/processes/whatever do they exist.

Above you listed a dozen or more postulates that HCT makes. I can't penetrate the first two! That's discouraging.