Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 6

[Constance]

However, currently, we have no good theories about how conscious, phenomenal experience might be physically "caused."

Then why adhere so strenuously to the reductiveness of IIT and standard neuroscience at this point?

However, that doesn't mean we won't be able to create physical systems that are conscious.

You mean we might fortuitously discover at some point that sufficiently integrated computer software becomes conscious? And then we can stop wondering about our own consciousness and assessing our own behavior and accept that we too are computational machines?

Btw, how would we know that those machine 'intelligences' are conscious in the same way we are?

However, the notion that conceptualizing consciousness as a type of information doesnt get us further down the road is wrong.

It gets us farther down the road to understanding how the brain works, but not farther down the road to understanding what human consciousness and mind are ontologically -- and thus to recognizing the significance of the meanings to be derived about our own existence, and other humans' and animals' existence, and the obligations laid upon us toward them all by our natural evolution.

 

[Randall]

Important Retraction ... With respect to what I said here:

... Our bodies already do it automatically when we reproduce ... No non-physical mystical ( whatever the case may be ) extra ingredient required ...

Reproduction of humans requires a healthy female. I can't think of anything more mystical .

 

[Pharoah]

@Soupie As far as I am concerned, this discussion on IIT is dead. Until you can address Searle's critique (which is the same as mine) then IIT remains incoherent If you find it difficult interpreting Searle and his criticism, as with mine, answer his criticism of panpsychism.
"Consciousness comes in units. The qualitative state of drinking beer is different from finding the money in your wallet to pay for it. But a consequence of its subjectivity is its unity. So for example, I am conscious and you are conscious but each consciousness is separate from the other;; they do not smear into each other like adjoining puddles of mud. Consciousness cannot be spread over the universe like a thin veneer of jam;; there has to be a point where my consciousness ends and yours begins. For people who accept panpsychism, who attribute consciousness, as Koch does, to the iPhone, the question is: Why the iPhone? Why not each part of it? Each microprocessor? Why not each molecule? Why not the whole communication system of which the iPhone is a part? The problem with panpsychism is not that it is false;; it does not get up to the level of being false. It is strictly speaking meaningless because no clear notion has been given to the claim. Consciousness comes in units and panpsychism cannot specify the units. " (section 3)
Isn't IIT a bit monochromatic?

 

[Soupie]

Hmm ... so you seem to be differentiating between the "what" and the "how" as qualifiers. If you accept the what, then answering the how question requires an "It does it by ( insert process here )." type answer. With the brain-body system, that answer is the domain of physicians, who can describe at some extended length the processes by which the brain-body system functions.

Correct. Unless we have a model (how) then all we've got is a correlation. Which is definitely something, but correlation is not causation.

The physicians in this case are the neuroscientists and the consensus is that there is no model for how neurophysiological processes "give rise" or "cause" consciousness. If you know of neuroscientists who do say they are close to a model, go ahead and share here.

I've read quite a bit of literature over the past 2-3 years. All I've noted are neuroscientists who have identified neurological structures that mediate (but do not cause/create) consciousness.

You seem to believe—a la your field theory—that consciousness is a physical substance created by or secreted by neurophysiological processes. I reject that view. Not until—or if—science adopts an expansionist view of reality can scientific models incorporate consciousness.

 

[Soupie]

@SoupieIf you find it difficult interpreting Searle and his criticism, as with mine, answer his criticism of panpsychism.
"Consciousness comes in units. The qualitative state of drinking beer is different from finding the money in your wallet to pay for it. But a consequence of its subjectivity is its unity.

An analogy (imperfect as all analogies are, especially those involving objective and subjective processes):

Not all matter is living; however, systems of matter which are living are not said to have created their substrate (matter) ex nihlo.

In fact, life can be seen as a continuum. At the same time, it's clear that an elephant is different than an electron. We could argue that electrons are proto-life.

Not all matter is conscious; however, systems of matter which are conscious—it seems, for lack of any cause-effect model scientific or philosophical—do not seem to have created consciousness ex nihlo.

Consciousness can be seen as a continuum. A human might be a "fully" conscious system whereas an electron, cell, or crab may possess proto-consciousness.

If you or Searle would suggest that consciousness is caused to exist and/or secreted by physical processes, I would ask you to present an explanatory model.

If on the other hand you posit that consciousness is neurophysiological processes (as I have understood you to say in the past), then I submit that this is a Continuous view of consciousness.

Re Searle's observer. If we assume a mental observer which observes conscious experiences, than we have a two-fold hard problem.

Not only do we have to ontologically account for the existence of quali, we must ontologically account for the existence of this observer.

As deftly explicated in the "killing the observer" essay, the notion of observing consciousness is mistaken.

I think this problem is best approached via HOT/R models and the study of self-referential systems.

 

[Randall]

... You seem to believe—a la your field theory—that consciousness is a physical substance created by or secreted by neurophysiological processes. I reject that view. Not until—or if—science adopts an expansionist view of reality can scientific models incorporate consciousness.

I would think that rather than outright rejecting the view that consciousness is an emergent property of brain-body function, you would at least consider it a strong contender. Essentially we can use your same argument to say that because physicists don't know how an electromagnet produces an electromagnetic field, that it is merely a "correlation" and therefore we can't be sure electromagnets actually produce electromagnetic fields. That's a rather thin and misleading argument, and exactly the same logic applies to the brain-body system and consciousness. We don't have to know how something does something in order to be certain that it does it, at least to the extent that we can be certain of anything on a purely ontological level.

There are more than 7 billion living examples where in every case consciousness accompanies a functioning brain-body system, and countless examples showing that when that system ceases to function, there is no real-time evidence of the consciousness that previously accompanied it. We also know that consciousness and brain matter are two entirely separate types of things, just like we know that electromagnets and EM fields are two entirely separate types of things. So unless you come to accept that consciousness isn't going to be observed by looking at physical microstructures in the brain, you're going to remain stuck looking at it from a purely mechanical perspective, and there's no way that gets us any farther down the road toward answers.

The physicians in this case are the neuroscientists and the consensus is that there is no model for how neurophysiological processes "give rise" or "cause" consciousness. If you know of neuroscientists who do say they are close to a model, go ahead and share here.

I've mentioned a couple already. Ramachandran for example. He rejects the idea of "qualia neurons" and endorses the idea that consciousness is an emergent property. He is eminently well credentialed. For convenience skip to 58:00:00.

Ramachandran Interview

 

[Pharoah]

An analogy (imperfect as all analogies are, especially those involving objective and subjective processes):

Not all matter is living; however, systems of matter which are living are not said to have created their substrate (matter) ex nihlo.

In fact, life can be seen as a continuum. At the same time, it's clear that an elephant is different than an electron. We could argue that electrons are proto-life.

Not all matter is conscious; however, systems of matter which are conscious—it seems, for lack of any cause-effect model scientific or philosophical—do not seem to have created consciousness ex nihlo.

Consciousness can be seen as a continuum. A human might be a "fully" conscious system whereas an electron, cell, or crab may possess proto-consciousness.

If you or Searle would suggest that consciousness is caused to exist and/or secreted by physical processes, I would ask you to present an explanatory model.

If on the other hand you posit that consciousness is neurophysiological processes (as I have understood you to say in the past), then I submit that this is a Continuous view of consciousness.

Re Searle's observer. If we assume a mental observer which observes conscious experiences, than we have a two-fold hard problem.

Not only do we have to ontologically account for the existence of quali, we must ontologically account for the existence of this observer.

As deftly explicated in the "killing the observer" essay, the notion of observing consciousness is mistaken.

I think this problem is best approached via HOT/R models and the study of self-referential systems.

@ufology
In my view, soupie cannot admit to an explanation that has consciousness emerge as a function of physical mechanism. Ultimately, such explanations cannot explain his particular subjective world perspective. That is, such explanation is epistemological whilst he demands an ontological description... I think... if that makes sense. Consequently, he must be drawn to a parallelism or equivalent and will not compute derivative explanations, which you favour. I am, by and large, on the same wavelength as you.

@Soupie
"...to say of anything, X, [e.g. phenomenal experience] and anything, Y, [e.g. information] that X and Y are identical, or that they are really one and the same thing, one must be willing to assert of X anything whatever that asserts of Y, and vice versa. This is a simple consequence of their identity., for if there is anything whatever that can be truly asserted of any object X but cannot be asserted of object Y, then it logically follows that X and Y are two different things, and not the same thing...." (Taylor intro to metaphysics p.12)
So... is phenomenal experience identical to information or not? If not why not?

Soupie:
"life can be seen as a continuum... We could argue that electrons are proto-life. "
"Consciousness can be seen as a continuum.... an electron... may possess proto-consciousness."
[it may... so might a galaxy. Anything and everything might have consciousness. And everything may be "alive", from the molecules in my chair to the chair itself... where is this thought process going to take us? Soupie I am not sure that yu want to adopt this stance or not. The "proto" bit makes me wonder which side of the fence you are putting yourself.]

If you or Searle would suggest that consciousness is caused to exist and/or secreted by physical processes, I would ask you to present an explanatory model.
[ahe hem. I think we have... or has this all been just a horrible dream?]

Re Searle's observer. If we assume a mental observer which observes conscious experiences, than we have a two-fold hard problem.
[Are you saying, that in no way are you, yourself, an observer? If so, how do you know if you exist or not? Alternatively, if you are saying that you do not observe, but experience instead, what is the object of your experienc-ing? Alternatively, if you are not observing, but conscious instead, what is it that you are conscious of? As I see it soupie, you are steeped in duality confusion because you are looking for an explanation of the mind body problem through and explanation of consciousness. Alternatively, I maintain that consciousness and its qualitative nature (its subjective ontology) can be explained epistemically without engaging the mind body problem directly.]

 

[Soupie]

Essentially we can use your same argument to say that because physicists don't know how an electromagnet produces an electromagnetic field, that it is merely a "correlation" and therefore we can't be sure electromagnets actually produce electromagnetic fields. That's a rather thin and misleading argument

Actually—and I've been wanting to point this out—that is what many physicists believe; the notion of a "force" is not an explanation in any sense. The notion of "force" is a placeholder until a true cause-effect explanation is given. More on that later.

 

[Soupie]

@ufologyIn my view, soupie cannot admit to an explanation that has consciousness emerge as a function of physical mechanism.

I can live with the notion that consciousness "emerges" but understand that this is a Continuous model, not a Discontinuous model.

For example, waves are an emergent phenomena. If we have two or three molecules, there will be no waves. However, as the number of molecules increases into the dozens, the phenomenon that is waves emerges. However, the substrate of waves--molecules--do not suddenly pop into existence with the phenomenon of waves. I suggest it is the same with consciousness (and information).

So... is phenomenal experience identical to information or not? If not why not?

Is life identical to matter or not? If not why not?

Information is the substrate of consciousness, just as matter/energy is the substrate of life.

Anything and everything might have consciousness. And everything may be "alive", from the molecules in my chair to the chair itself... where is this thought process going to take us?

Rather than looking for physical, mechanistic causes of consciousness, the effort should be to understand how physical, mechanistic processes mediate consciousness. And so far, that's what our scientific investigations of consciousness have given us.

LSD changes consciousness by reorganizing human brain networks

"LSD is known to cause changes in consciousness, including "ego-dissolution", or a loss of the sense of self. Despite a detailed knowledge of the action of LSD at specific serotonin receptors, it has not been understood how this these pharmacological effects can translate into such a profound effect on consciousness Today, a new report presented at the annual meeting of the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology in Hollywood, Florida, provides evidence to show that LSD reduces connectivity within brain networks, or the extent to which nerve cells or neurons within a network fire in synchrony. LSD also seems to reduce the extent to which separate brain networks remain distinct in their patterns or synchronization of firing. Overall, LSD interferes with the patterns of activation in the different brain networks that underlie human thought and behavior.

In this new study, Dr. Robin Carhart-Harris and his colleagues at Imperial College London did sequential brain scans of 20 healthy volunteers over 6 hours, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which maps brain activity by detecting changes in blood flow, and magnetoencephalography (MEG), a technique that images brain function by recording magnetic fields produced by electrical currents occurring in the brain. Using fMRI, the investigators showed that LSD led to a more chaotic brain state not entirely dissimilar to what is seen in the prodromal phase of psychosis. Specifically, neurons that were supposed to fire together within a network fell out of synchrony, while networks that are normally distinct started to overlap in their connectivity patterns. Dr. Carhart-Harris also found increases in blood flow in the visual cortex at the back of the brain, which might explain the visual hallucinations and distortions so common in LSD intoxication. MEG also showed a change in natural brain oscillations, specifically a decrease in alpha waves across the brain. The MEG changes were highly correlated with visual hallucinations, suggesting that under the influence of LSD, the visual system is tethered more to the internal than to the external world.

Dr. Carhart-Harris suggests that "with better assessment tools available today than in the 1950's and 1960's, it may be possible to evaluate potential uses of LSD as a treatment for addiction and other disorders, such as treatment-resistant depression - which we are currently investigating with a similar drug to LSD". LSD also may provide a useful human model of psychosis, as it leads to changes in brain network behavior that shows overlap with the early phase of psychosis."​

Neuroscientists (including neurophenomenologists) have determined that consciousness and its myriad qualities are correlated with neurons firing in synchrony. The various patterns of synchrony are correlated with various qualities of consciousness. When different neurons are in synch, different qualities of consciousness emerge; alternatively, when there are different synchrony (wave) frequencies, there are different qualities of consciousness.

In other words, we know that the process of neurons firing in sync is correlated with consciousness, and that changes to the firing patterns and/or firing rates is correlated with the quality (feel) of consciousness.

However, this is not an explanation of why/how consciousness is caused by neurons firing in sync.

I think we have [presented an explanatory model of how physical processes cause consciousness].

We? Has Searle offered a model?

And I'm sorry, Pharoah, but I do not see at all how HCT:

1) Identifies which neurophysical processes cause consciousness.

2) Why/how these particular neurophysical processes (and not others) cause consciousness.

3) Why/how these particular neurophysiological processes cause the various qualities of consciousness.

[Soupie:] Re Searle's observer. If we assume a mental observer which observes conscious experiences, than we have a two-fold hard problem.

Are you saying, that in no way are you, yourself, an observer? If so, how do you know if you exist or not?

My physical body is the observer (experiencer); my phenomenal self and all other qualities of consciousness are the observations (experiences).

If you are saying that you do not observe, but experience instead, what is the object of your experienc-ing? Alternatively, if you are not observing, but conscious instead, what is it that you are conscious of?

I am observing; I am experiencing. However, it's my body--the neurophysiological system--that is the observer/experiencer. It is my body, the organism, that is a conscious, observing, experiencing system.

What is my body experiencing? What is my body observing? Physical reality.

However, there is a sense in which I (the phenomenal self, the ego) can reflect back--recursively--upon myself. That's because, I believe, humans (and potentially other organisms/systems) are self-referential, self-aware systems. However, this ability to phenomenally self-reflect need not involve a third party.

 

[Randall]

Actually—and I've been wanting to point this out—that is what many physicists believe; the notion of a "force" is not an explanation in any sense. The notion of "force" is a placeholder until a true cause-effect explanation is given. More on that later.

Right, but what I'm getting at, is that that's also beside the point. What we're after is the causal mechanism and a way to measure the effect. A complete explanation for the cause and effect isn't necessary in order to know what the cause and effect are, e.g. an electromagnet is the cause of an EM field or the brain-body system is the cause of consciousness in humans. Beyond that and as mentioned before, we're into the land of metaphysics, which is cool, but not needed in a practical sense within the context of this discussion.

 

[Randall]

I can live with the notion that consciousness "emerges" but understand that this is a Continuous model, not a Discontinuous model.
For example, waves are an emergent phenomena. If we have two or three molecules, there will be no waves. However, as the number of molecules increases into the dozens, the phenomenon that is waves emerges. However, the substrate of waves--molecules--do not suddenly pop into existence with the phenomenon of waves. I suggest it is the same with consciousness (and information).

OK. If I understand you correctly then, we don't seem to be in any disagreement. We have the substrate ( brain-body material ), and we have consciousness ( the emergent property ), and it only seems to happen when a sufficient amount of brain-body material dedicated to consciousness is in operation, and as mentioned before, this is controlled by the Thalamocortical system. Once we have consciousness, then we also have a flow of information because it is consciousness that acts as the subjective interpreter.

 

[Pharoah]

I can live with the notion that consciousness "emerges" but understand that this is a Continuous model, not a Discontinuous model.
For example, waves are an emergent phenomena. If we have two or three molecules, there will be no waves. However, as the number of molecules increases into the dozens, the phenomenon that is waves emerges. However, the substrate of waves--molecules--do not suddenly pop into existence with the phenomenon of waves. I suggest it is the same with consciousness (and information).

The idea of "Continuous model" suggests what I would call, 'a complexity greyscale' [incidentally, as an aside, I thought that continuity/discontinuity was a reference to the level of sophistication of lifeforms in so far as one might say either continuity wise, that all creatures might have some level of consciousness, or discontinuity wise, that there is a point in evolutionary creature-sophistication where consciousness pops into existence]. Dennett sees a complexity greyscale: The more complex, the greater the consciousness (specifically, Dennett says, The more complexity, the greater the intentionality (tongue in cheek) and representation).
Curiously, defining complexity is problematic. For example, I think of an electron as extremely complex. Consequently, to my way of thinking, a complexity greyscale is meaningless as a proposition for consciousness. Otherwise, one might ask for example, what is the physical substrate and what is the necessary complexity that is important, and how much of the substrate it is critical?
Alternatively, I think that what is important is the dynamic nature of complexities. The brain is not a homogenous jelly, but discontinuous in form and structure. The structure and its dynamic mechanism surely is critical.

Information is the substrate of consciousness, just as matter/energy is the substrate of life.

Substrate: a material on or from which something lives, grows, or obtains its nourishment.
"matter/energy is the substrate of life."? Again undifferentiated (continuous) matter does not "appear" to be sufficient for life. Again it is the nature of the complexity of matter involved that is critical, not simply that matter be there 'in any kind of complex quantitative' way.
Applied to consciousness then, "information is the substrate of consciousness" is vacuous. What is critical is the nature of the construction of information (to work with the terminology given here), not some abstract notion of its quantity or greyscale degrees of its complexity.

we know that the process of neurons firing in sync is correlated with consciousness, and that changes to the firing patterns and/or firing rates is correlated with the quality (feel) of consciousness.

Soupie, you underline:
"Specifically, neurons that were supposed to fire together within a network fell out of synchrony, while networks that are normally distinct started to overlap in their connectivity patterns"
This is basically saying that LSD causes unexpected synchronous and dyssynchronous activity. It seems unsurprising to me that disrupted neural activity will affect consciousness.

Has Searle offered a model?

I don't know whether his stance counts as a theory as such. But he argues from a solid metaphysical position.
HCT does not 1) Identify which neurophysical processes cause consciousness.
and therefore does not address 2) Why/how these particular neurophysical processes (and not others) cause consciousness.
nor 3) Why/how these particular neurophysiological processes cause the various qualities of consciousness.
But you said,
"If you or Searle would suggest that consciousness is caused to exist and/or secreted by physical processes, I would ask you to present an explanatory model."
We are talking therefore, of a theory explaining why/how physical processes are necessary for consciousness, not what particular neurophysical processes are necessary. And you need to re-read HCT if you think that it stipulates that neural processes alone explain the qualitative nature of consciousness. It explicitly states otherwise!

To condense your words,
"My physical body = the observer (experiencer);
my phenomenal self and qualities of consciousness = the observations (experiences).
I am observing;
I am experiencing.
my body is conscious, observing, experiencing.
What is my body experiencing? What is my body observing? Physical reality." [italics added]
As you say,
"I am observing",
and
"my body is observing", [refer to italics]
therefore,
I am my body, my body is observing, I am observing. apropos I, my body, am observing reality and this is consciousness.
Conclusion, something that is not capable of observing reality is not conscious.
Furthermore, when something is conscious of reality, the world necessarily has dual aspects: The subjective (as observer) and the objective (as observed).

Glad we sorted that one. Not sure why you need IIT or panpsychism.
I suppose, it all depends on what one might mean by "observing" e.g. electrons proto-observe reality maybe (Go along that route and you might end up with HCT.)

 

[Constance]

Pharoah asked Soupie:

“Isn’t ITT a bit monochromatic?”

Soupie responded:

"Correct. Unless we have a model (how) then all we've got is a correlation. Which is definitely something, but correlation is not causation," and then added that
"However, the notion that conceptualizing consciousness as a type of information doesnt get us further down the road is wrong."

I replied, in part:

"It gets us farther down the road to understanding how the brain works, but not farther down the road to understanding what human consciousness and mind are ontologically . . . . .”
and should have added: ". . . in their relationship with physical being."


Reading your postings since then, Soupie, I'm still convinced that you confuse the purposes and goals of epistemology and ontology as branches of philosophy and science. So far, indeed, “all we’ve got is a correlation” so long as we restrict our thinking to the question of the relationship between neuroscience/information on one side and consciousness/mind on the other. Neuroscientific/informational approaches come laden with promissory notes of ontological significance (taken by some people to be usable currency in advance of the establishment of its value) -- promises that phenomenal experience and thought itself can and will ultimately be explained reductively, as effects of entirely physical causes.

We can sit and wait to find out if that approach will ultimately pay out and pay off the need for further investigation of consciousness – in which case we might as well give up this dialogue and close the thread. Or we can continue our investigation of consciousness without clinging to current presuppositions and approach consciousness from more fully explored pluralistic perspectives, both epistemologically and ontologically.

The problem with ‘models’ is that they incline, and increasingly motivate, researchers to attempt to verify them. They short-circuit the full range of what we are able to think concerning the larger question we are attempting to answer -- the connection and relationship of mind to the physical aspects of the world. When we restrict ourselves to any proposed 'model' we become less able to think outside that model. This problem is illustrated (and potentially overcome) in the writing of David Ludwig, first in the paper linked below, available online at academia.edu, and more fully in his just-published book linked next (at both the amazon and Springer links below).


The paper, entitled “New Wave Pluralism,” is available here:

(2014) "New Wave Pluralism" - Dialectica


The book, A Pluralist Theory of Mind, can be browsed at the following two links:

A Pluralist Theory of the Mind (European Studies in Philosophy of Science) - Kindle edition by David Ludwig. Politics & Social Sciences Kindle eBooks @ Amazon.com.

A Pluralist Theory of the Mind | David Ludwig | Springer


The book and ebook at both sites are both exhorbitantly overpriced, but fortunately we all have libraries.

Here is an extract from the sample of the book provided at amazon:


Extract from section 1.3:

“Engagement with the diversity of ontologies in scientific practice suggests a pluralism that is considerably stronger than a merely epistemological pluralism but does not imply a traditional dualist picture of metaphysically distinct realms of reality. Instead, I will argue that conceptual pluralism implies a plurality of ontologies that are shaped by our diverse conceptual resources. This conceptual pluralism differs from a merely epistemological pluralism by rejecting the idea of one fundamental ontology and differs from an overly strong metaphysical pluralism by interpreting ontological diversity in terms of diverse conceptual resources instead of metaphysically distinct realms of reality. . . . .”

Scroll down to section 1.4 for further development of Ludwig's theory.


The Springer link provides introductory pages to each of the book’s chapters, enough to provide orientation to what follows in the chapters.

 

[Constance]

The following amazon description of Ludwig's book summarizes his approach more clearly:

"This book challenges common debates in philosophy of mind by questioning the framework of placement problems in contemporary metaphysics. The author argues that placement problems arise when exactly one fundamental ontology serves as the base for all entities, and will propose a pluralist alternative that takes the diversity of our conceptual resources and ontologies seriously. This general pluralist account is applied to issues in philosophy of mind to argue that contemporary debates about the mind-body problem are built on this problematic framework of placement problems.

The starting point is the plurality of ontologies in scientific practice. Not only can we describe the world in terms of physical, biological, or psychological ontologies, but any serious engagement with scientific ontologies will identify more specific ontologies in each domain. For example, there is not one unified ontology for biology, but rather a diversity of scientific specializations with different ontological needs. Based on this account of scientific practice the author argues that there is no reason to assume that ontological unification must be possible everywhere. Without this ideal, the scope of ontological unification turns out to be an open empirical question and there is no need to present unification failures as philosophically puzzling “placement problems”.

 

[Constance]

David Ludwig has 16 papers described and linked at philpapers.org. Here are several that might help out in our discussion here:

David Ludwig (2014). Extended Cognition and the Explosion of Knowledge. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-14.

David Ludwig (2014). Extended Cognition in Science Communication. Public Understanding of Science 23 (8):982-995.

David Ludwig (2013). Disagreement in Scientific Ontologies. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie (1):1-13.

Profile for David Ludwig - PhilPapers

 

[Soupie]

Applied to consciousness then, "information is the substrate of consciousness" is vacuous. What is critical is the nature of the construction of information (to work with the terminology given here), not some abstract notion of its quantity or greyscale degrees of its complexity.

I agree.

It seems unsurprising to me that disrupted neural activity will affect consciousness.

Why is that unsurprising to you?

And you need to re-read HCT if you think that it stipulates that neural processes alone explain the qualitative nature of consciousness. It explicitly states otherwise!

As noted, HCT does not make sense to me. When I questioned you at length a few months ago, you corrected every statement I made and otherwise struggled to answer my straightforward questions.

Here's my understanding of HCT in a nutshell:

(1) Evolution has a direction toward increasing complexity (teleology)

(2) Structures evolve

(3) Evolved structures embody information about their environment (representation)

(4) Eventually, structures evolve dynamic neurophysiological mechanisms that evaluate on the fly the changing dynamics of the environment (phenomenal consciousness)

I'm sure this is wrong, haha, but on this interpretation it would seem that it's the neurophysiological mechanisms that determine the qualitative nature of consciousness.

As you've noted (and I agree with) the "information" isnt "out there" in the environment but rather internal to the system. (I call this "intentional information.")

I am my body, my body is observing, I am observing. apropos I, my body, am observing reality and this is consciousness.

Conclusion, something that is not capable of observing reality is not conscious.

Furthermore, when something is conscious of reality, the world necessarily has dual aspects: The subjective (as observer) and the objective (as observed).

I confused things above by referring to my body as "I" and my phenomenal self as "I." (Although, as a monist, I do consider both to be "I.")

I'm not sure what that does to your "formula" above, but we may have uncovered a huge, important confusion going on in this discussion.

The mainstream view (which I adhere to) is that conciousness is not distinct from its qualities. Its qualities include: affectivity (emotions), phenomenality (pain, colors, sense of self), and cognition (thinking, concepts).

Consciousness, being subjective, is distinct from objective physical reality.

It seems to me that the 3 of you (@Pharoah, @Constance, and @ufology ) conceptualize a trialism. (It seems Searle does as well.)

Whereas I believe there is only mind (consciousness) and body (matter);

The three of you seem to hold some view in which there is observer (consciousness), phenomenal qualities (ontology?), and body (matter).

 

[Soupie]

Here is my understanding of how all of you conceptualize the problem:

electromagnetic waves (matter) --> color (experience) --> observer (consciousness)

That is a truality (if you will) not a duality.

My conceptualization is as follows:

electromagnetic waves (matter) --> I am experiencing color (consciousness)

That is a duality.

Although a more accurate explication of my view (and the neurophenomenological view):

patterns of synchronized neural firings (matter) --> I am experiencing color (consciousness)

 

[Pharoah]

I agree.


Why is that unsurprising to you?


As noted, HCT does not make sense to me. When I questioned you at length a few months ago, you corrected every statement I made and otherwise struggled to answer my straightforward questions.

Here's my understanding of HCT in a nutshell:

(1) Evolution has a direction toward increasing complexity (teleology)

(2) Structures evolve

(3) Evolved structures embody information about their environment (representation)

(4) Eventually, structures evolve dynamic neurophysiological mechanisms that evaluate on the fly the changing dynamics of the environment (phenomenal consciousness)

I'm sure this is wrong, haha, but on this interpretation it would seem that it's the neurophysiological mechanisms that determine the qualitative nature of consciousness.

As you've noted (and I agree with) the "information" isnt "out there" in the environment but rather internal to the system. (I call this "intentional information.")


I confused things above by referring to my body as "I" and my phenomenal self as "I." (Although, as a monist, I do consider both to be "I.")

I'm not sure what that does to your "formula" above, but we may have uncovered a huge, important confusion going on in this discussion.

The mainstream view (which I adhere to) is that conciousness is not distinct from its qualities. Its qualities include: affectivity (emotions), phenomenality (pain, colors, sense of self), and cognition (thinking, concepts).

Consciousness, being subjective, is distinct from objective physical reality.

It seems to me that the 3 of you (@Pharoah, @Constance, and @ufology ) conceptualize a trialism. (It seems Searle does as well.)

Whereas I believe there is only mind (consciousness) and body (matter);

The three of you seem to hold some view in which there is observer (consciousness), phenomenal qualities (ontology?), and body (matter).

Hi @Soupie
1.
me: Applied to consciousness then, "information is the substrate of consciousness" is vacuous. What is critical is the nature of the construction of information (to work with the terminology given here), not some abstract notion of its quantity or greyscale degrees of its complexity.
you: I agree.
me: how does this agreement sit with IIT? namely, it is the nature of the construction that is important not what the substrate is.
Actually, this reminds me that I forgot to pursue my 'identical' query (re: X being identical to Y, consciousness identical to information). You rejected the notion of identical, and used the notion of substrate instead: "information is the substrate of consciousness". I looked up the term substrate to try to understand this relation (no longer being identical). I get the sense that, instead of 'substrate', one could use the term, 'building block': "information is the building block of consciousness". And to take this further, the shape of the building is determined not by how many building blocks there are, but by how they are positioned relative to one another within the environment. So rather than think of the relation between information and consciousness as homogenous (like jam—Searle), it should be thought of as a dynamic purposeful construction. The nature of the construction is critical; which is why it only happens in brains i.e. it is not in all things (as of panpsychism and IIT). The question is then, how and why the informational construction evolves into existence the way it does/has.
2.
me: It seems unsurprising to me that disrupted neural activity will affect consciousness.
you: Why is that unsurprising to you?
me: because if the brain is responsible for consciousness, which is a fair assumption I think, then it is unsurprising. If I stick a knife in my head, consciousness is affected (I might have convulsive impulses to the muscles and a scattered EEG pattern).
3.
you stating HCT:
(1) Evolution has a direction toward increasing complexity (teleology). This is explained by the nomological component which I have not broached in this forum.
I would change (3) slightly.. but what you say is basically ok. So far so good.
However, there is a missing bit between (3) and (4). Namely,
(3b) physiologies (biochemical mechanisms) evolve that are qualitatively relevant, where "qualitative" relates to their degree of merit in survival terms, and "relevant" relates to their correspondence with environmental features. Consequently, biochemical mechanisms evolve a qualitative correspondence with environment in a way that is shaped by their survival impact on the species.
All of these biochemical mechanisms can function 'without' consciousness 'happening', because they are innate mechanisms that are only species specific (not individual-specific).
(3c) neural mechanisms have the capacity to individuate qualitative biochemical assimilations. This individuation is qualitative (as dictated by its biochemistry) and spatially and temporally differentiated. This thereby qualifies the nature of an individual's phenomenal experience. This, we call 'being conscious of reality'.

4.
you: "As you've noted (and I agree with) the "information" isnt "out there" in the environment but rather internal to the system. (I call this "intentional information.")"
me: cool. That's three of us. You me and Searle

5.
me: "I am my body, my body is observing, I am observing. apropos I, my body, am observing reality and this is consciousness. Conclusion, something that is not capable of observing reality is not conscious. Furthermore, when something is conscious of reality, the world necessarily has dual aspects: The subjective (as observer) and the objective (as observed).
you: I confused things above by referring to my body as "I" and my phenomenal self as "I."
I fully expected you to take issue with what I said which was a bit bull-in-a-china-shop. What I am trying to get from you is a clearer articulation of the relation between these terms. The reason why I think this is vital, is because I think that you sometimes sidestep the conclusions to your own arguments and ideas: @Constance intimates this in her most recent comment. Point 1. above is another attempt at me trying to determine from you a clear and consistent notion of the relation between information and consciousness.

6.
I am not a trialist.

 

[Pharoah]

@Soupie incidentally, I don't think of matter the way you do. Matter is thought of as spatial, temporal, and substantial because of the nature of our mental construct's relation to it. If I were a neutrino, I would pass through matter as if it did not exist spatially, temporally, or substantially. Similarly, glass has the property of being transparent to me, but not to an echolocating bat: I might run into a pane of glass thinking it immaterial, while a bat will avoid flying into it, understanding it to be material.
Similarly, we think of consciousness as not material because it lacks substantiality and is elusive to analysis. Once you accept HCT, you see both consciousness and matter as equivalent in so far as they are informational constructs which have spatial and temporal presence. One appears to be transient because of the way we relate informationally to it, whilst the other appears solid and foundational because of the way we relate to it. Essentially, they are both dynamic physical constructs, where the observer-dependent relations to each differ.

 

[Constance]

@Pharoah, I think you might find HCT to be compatible with Ludwig's thought, and it might be good to cite and perhaps quote from his published works in your introductory paper on HCT. Here is the conclusion of Ludwig's paper "Disagreement in Scientific Ontologies" :

"There is an obvious but instructive tension between my discussion of ‘‘normative ontological realism’’ and the use of the label ‘‘ontological realism’’ in contemporary metaontology (e.g. Sider 2009). Ontological realism in the latter sense is often understood as the claim that there is exactly one correct way to ‘‘carve nature at its joints’’ while any kind of conceptual relativity is taken to imply an ‘‘anti-realist’’ stance (compare e.g. Jenkins 2010; Bennett 2009). Given this use of the label ‘‘ontological realism’’, this article proposes a hardline antirealism regarding scientific ontologies. I do not want to start a verbal dispute about conflicting uses of ‘‘ontological realism,’’ but I think that the discussion of scientific ontologies provides some interesting challenges for contemporary metaontology. More specifically, I want to argue that an adequate understanding of scientific ontologies challenges the underlying motivation of the absolutist interpretation of ontological realism that rejects any kind of conceptual relativity as untenable anti-realism.

Maybe the most important motivation for an absolutist interpretation of ontological realism is the worry that anything less will ultimately fail to provide any stable realism. This attitude is clearly expressed in Ted Sider’s thought-provoking Writing the Book of the World: ‘‘The realist picture requires the ‘ready made world’ Goodman (1978) ridiculed; it requires the world to really be as physics says; it requires objectivity; it requires distinguished structure. To give up on structure’s objectivity would be to concede far too much to those who view inquiry as being merely the investigation of our own minds’’ (Sider 2012, 65–66). Everything less will lead us to what Sider nicely summarizes as ‘‘Goodmania:’’ if there is no ready made world, then ontologies will turn out to be relative to our conceptual decisions and we’ll make the existence of even the most fundamental entities a matter of our own minds.

The discussion of actual ontological disputes in the empirical sciences proves this choice between a ready made world and Goodmania as too simple. Biological and psychological ontologies also depend on explanatory interests and even non-epistemic values of scientists but that does not mean that they only depend on these factors. Debates about scientific ontologies are clearly not merely ‘‘investigations of our own minds’’— even identities such as species exist relative to conceptual choices [they > that] exist in virtue of a biological reality that is independent of our conceptualizations. For example, members of a species such as T. officinale share properties such as being asexual, genetically identical or almost identical to its parent plant, a ruderal species no matter how we describe them and no matter what scientists are interested in.

Conceptual relativity in scientific ontologies does not imply Goodmania. The result is challenging for contemporary metaontology as it undermines a crucial motivation for absolutist interpretations of ontological realism that exclude conceptual relativity and insist on exactly one fundamental way of carving nature at its joints. Although it is logically consistent to accept conceptual relativity in the case of biological or psychological ontologies and to reject conceptual relativity in the case of philosophical ontologies, the possibility of a normative
ontological realism in the empirical sciences raises the question why we should stick with an absolutist conception of ontological realism in the case of philosophical ontologies. We would need a very good reason to believe that philosophers can achieve the goal of exactly one fundamental and objectively correct ontology while empirical scientists have to accept the existence of different but equally acceptable ontologies. The fear of Goodmania does not provide such an argument."


[EDITED TO ADD] Ludwig seems to be saying that we are prone to making a category error when we import philosophical conceptions of possible universal/cosmic ontologies into scientific investigations of the parts of nature that we are able to investigate. And his critical thinking guides us away from making that category error in my opinion. Any agreements or disagreements?


That whole paper is available here:

(2013) Disagreement in Scientific Ontologies - Journal for General Philosophy of Science

In addition to what we can learn from the papers by Ludwig that I linked last night, we can gain further insight into the development of his book A Plurality of Minds at the Springer link I provided. Unfortunately that page does not provide the opening pages of all chapters of the book, but it does provide the opening pages of the following chapters, and reading these portions does/can flesh out the bones of Ludwig's theory:

Chapter 3: Conceptual Relativity in Philosophy
Chapter 4: Conceptual Relativity in Science
Chapter 7: The Argument from Ontological Non-fundamentalism
Chapter 8: Consciousness
Chapter 11: Epilogue: Metaphysics in a Complex World

A Pluralist Theory of the Mind | David Ludwig | Springer