Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 6

[Pharoah]

So on this view, knowledge is distinct from (phenomenal) consciousness?

Thus, there is an ingredient other than knowledge/meaning that separates phenomenal consciousness from the other hierarchical constructs.

Any guesses as to what that ingredient is?

@Soupie. I think I have misled you because I am not saying what you suggest here. I do say, "there is s class of knowledge in phenomenal consciousness"... (?)

Also "knowledge", as a term, is fraught with problems because of the way philosophers define it. Typically, I try to stay clear of using that term.
Each construct class interacts with the environment and, in doing so, determines a particular class of meaning. Phenomenal consciousness derives from a landscape of constantly changing qualitative evaluations and, in this way, determines a phenomenal meaning that is embedded within its environment (as experienced) that characterises subjectivity.

 

[Pharoah]

On knowledge:
Each class is justified through interaction, but only conceptual knowledge's justification is founded on belief. The justification for each class differs according to the nature of their interactive engagement, a engagement that is qualified by the nature of the construct's dynamic constituent parts...

 

[Soupie]

@Soupie. I think I have misled you because I am not saying what you suggest here. I do say, "there is s class of knowledge in phenomenal consciousness"... (?)

So... knowledge and consciousness are not distinct?

 

[Pharoah]

So... knowledge and consciousness are not distinct?

Not sure I understand the question. As I said, knowledge is a problematic term so I try to avoid it. Not sure what "distinct" means in your question. But, moving forward, I will address what might be your query as follows:
Phenomenal consciousness (i.e., a sentience of the changing qualitative feel of experienced reality) is a meaningful engagement that is informed (or qualified) by qualitative evaluations of environmental particulars (particulars that are assimilated by the organism's physiological mechanisms).
I might call 'phenomenal consciousness' a class of knowledge, but it is not founded on any belief so this view is using the term "knowledge" counter to orthodoxy. nevertheless, phenomnal consciousness is justified through its correspondence with reality's qualitatively relevant impact and is of value to the organism, so it is a class of knowledge by one interpretation.
It does evoke a feeling that is generated outside of conceptual thought, and therfore, cannot be analysed directly by introspection, which is why it is mysterious.

 

[Soupie]

Not sure I understand the question. As I said, knowledge is a problematic term so I try to avoid it. Not sure what "distinct" means in your question. But, moving forward, I will address what might be your query as follows:
Phenomenal consciousness (i.e., a sentience of the changing qualitative feel of experienced reality) is a meaningful engagement that is informed (or qualified) by qualitative evaluations of environmental particulars (particulars that are assimilated by the organism's physiological mechanisms).
I might call 'phenomenal consciousness' a class of knowledge, but it is not founded on any belief so this view is using the term "knowledge" counter to orthodoxy. nevertheless, phenomnal consciousness is justified through its correspondence with reality's qualitatively relevant impact and is of value to the organism, so it is a class of knowledge by one interpretation.
It does evoke a feeling that is generated outside of conceptual thought, and therfore, cannot be analysed directly by introspection, which is why it is mysterious.

I still have some sincere questions, but thanks for this excellent reply. I think I follow you.

 

[Soupie]

@Pharoah a thought about HCT that I have tried to express to you, I found in a concise sentence in a paper about conscious and unconscious perception.

Philosophers sometimes point out that theories of consciousness need two parts: an account of qualitative character of conscious states (what kinds of things are we conscious of) and an account of how states become conscious.

I believe that HCT offers an approach to the first part, but does not address—so far as I understand—the latter part.

http://subcortex.com/WhenIsPerceptionConscious_Prinz.pdf

 

[Pharoah]

@Pharoah a thought about HCT that I have tried to express to you, I found in a concise sentence in a paper about conscious and unconscious perception.

Philosophers sometimes point out that theories of consciousness need two parts: an account of qualitative character of conscious states (what kinds of things are we conscious of) and an account of how states become conscious.

I believe that HCT offers an approach to the first part, but does not address—so far as I understand—the latter part.

http://subcortex.com/WhenIsPerceptionConscious_Prinz.pdf

I am curious why the section in brackets counts as a 'paraphrase' of the sentence preceding it. I will read tonight

 

[Soupie]

I am curious why the section in brackets counts as a 'paraphrase' of the sentence preceding it. I will read tonight

I wouldn't bother with the paper unless the topic interests you. What I had hoped you would respond to was the notion that there are (at least) these two "parts" of consciousness that need explained. (I happen to agree with this assertion, and I would add that the HP needs to be addressed by any complete theory as well.)

As far as the phrase in parentheses (brackets), I wouldn't take it too literally. I took the author to mean simply how/why is phenomenal consciousness differentiated in the way that it is. As noted, I think HCT is primarily concerned with this "part" of consciousness.

 

[Constance]

@Soupie wrote:

@Pharoah a thought about HCT that I have tried to express to you, I found in a concise sentence in a paper about conscious and unconscious perception.

Philosophers sometimes point out that theories of consciousness need two parts: an account of qualitative character of conscious states (what kinds of things are we conscious of) and an account of how states become conscious.

I believe that HCT offers an approach to the first part, but does not address—so far as I understand—the latter part.

I am curious why the section in brackets counts as a 'paraphrase' of the sentence preceding it. I will read tonight

By "the section in brackets" are you referring to Soupie's parenthetical restatement of Prinz's phrase "an account of qualitative character of conscious states" as "(what kinds of things are we conscious of)"? If so, can you identify the reasons why the latter does not seem to you to be a paraphrase of the former?

I think your exchange here points us toward issues so far unresolved in our long discussions of and about 'consciousness'.

 

[Pharoah]

I wouldn't bother with the paper unless the topic interests you. What I had hoped you would respond to was the notion that there are (at least) these two "parts" of consciousness that need explained. (I happen to agree with this assertion, and I would add that the HP needs to be addressed by any complete theory as well.)

As far as the phrase in parentheses (brackets), I wouldn't take it too literally. I took the author to mean simply how/why is phenomenal consciousness differentiated in the way that it is. As noted, I think HCT is primarily concerned with this "part" of consciousness.

The author ends his paper, "for now, it looks like we have found the key to consciousness." lol. Excuse me while I pick myself up off the floor.
Seriously... I don't understand what distinction he is trying to highlight in that quote you, @Soupie, provide. I note, the paper does seem to be 'work in progress' considering the number of typos so it would not be a good idea to critique it.
SEP is helpful, (Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)) drawing distinctions between sentience, wakefulness, self consciousness, wiit, subjects of conscious states, transitive conscisness, states one is aware of, qualitstive, phenomenal, access and narrative consciousness.
i think these different aspects to consciousness are difficult to articulate let alone explain. Certainly, you @Soupie want answers to some aspect to cs that you feel HCT does not address; it is not at all clear to me what query(ies) you are pursuing. You do tend to mention the HP quite a bit, but I am well aware that everyone's idea of the HP has subtle (and not so subtle!) differences so I think it is a term best avoided. Alternatively, try and be descriptively clear what you think HCt does not address.
Importantly, I do not pretend that HCT answers all these different aspects of consciousness. However, there does seem to be one in particular that you think HCT needs to answer... (?)

 

[Constance]

@Soupie. I think I have misled you because I am not saying what you suggest here. I do say, "there is s class of knowledge in phenomenal consciousness"... (?)

Also "knowledge", as a term, is fraught with problems because of the way philosophers define it. Typically, I try to stay clear of using that term.

It seems to me that the problematics of the term 'knowledge' come to the foreground in the differences between the way in which analytical and phenomenological philosophers of mind understand the meaning of 'knowing', understanding, what-is. Note Morris's explication of the term 'sens'/sense as developed in Merleau-Ponty in the paper I linked.

Each construct class interacts with the environment and, in doing so, determines a particular class of meaning.

Given that your hierarchy of 'constructs' seems to refer to emerging or increasing levels of conscious interactions between beings and their environments in the processes of evolution, I don't see how a "construct class" can be said to 'interact with the environment', the 'construct class' appearing then to stand outside the interactions that ground consciousness and thus 'mind' in nature. Can you clarify?

Phenomenal consciousness derives from a landscape of constantly changing qualitative evaluations and, in this way, determines a phenomenal meaning that is embedded within its environment (as experienced) that characterises subjectivity.

For me the above lack of clarity continues here. The 'landscape' -- the visible, audible, and otherwise palpable qualities of the natural environment {for humans complicated by the cultural overlays placed upon it by humans} -- does change as all things change in time, but what is the source of "the constantly changing evaluations" you attribute to 'the landscape'? I realize that you write in terms of large ontological categories when you distinguish between the sequence of hierarchical constructs you see as the source of meaning in being, but I disagree that meaning originates in your categorized 'constructs' (the postulation of which requires a view from everywhere, thus nowhere). As phenomenology shows, meaning evolves with the evolution of living species by virtue of their interactions with their environments. I think your hierarchical construct theory would benefit by the addition of a supplement (in the paper or in an appendix) explicating the phenomenological perspective on the evolution of meaning in living species [how and why mind emerges from protoconsciousness and consciousness], though to provide that perspective leaves your reader in the position of choosing between HCT (as a latter development of analytical philosophy) and phenomenological philosophy.

 

[Pharoah]

@Soupie wrote:
By "the section in brackets" are you referring to Soupie's parenthetical restatement of Prinz's phrase "an account of qualitative character of conscious states" as "(what kinds of things are we conscious of)"? If so, can you identify the reasons why the latter does not seem to you to be a paraphrase of the former?

I think your exchange here points us toward issues so far unresolved in our long discussions of and about 'consciousness'.

@Constance the parenthetical restatement is Prinz's not soupie's. And no I can't identify the reason why the lattr does not seem to me to be a paraphrase of the former... they are completely different things,mtomy way of thinking. The sentence baffles me.

 

[Constance]

to @Soupie: You do tend to mention the HP quite a bit, but I am well aware that everyone's idea of the HP has subtle (and not so subtle!) differences so I think it is a term best avoided.

I don't see how the 'hard problem' of consciousness as Chalmers brought it forward in philosophy of mind and in the early stages of consciousness studies can be avoided, but it certainly needs to be clarified beyond the language in which Chalmers left it. In fact, the hard problem itself remains to be explicated. As I've said a number of times earlier in this thread, the phrases "what it is like" or "what it feels like" are inadequate expressions of what Chalmers was trying to point to and he should have developed by now a better account of the hard problem. Some other philosophers of mind we've read in earlier parts of this thread have done much better with this challenge, for one the author of the paper "There are no easy problems of consciousness," whose name escapes me at the moment.

 

[Constance]

@Constance the parenthetical restatement is Prinz's not soupie's. And no I can't identify the reason why the lattr does not seem to me to be a paraphrase of the former... they are completely different things,mtomy way of thinking. The sentence baffles me.

I haven't yet read the Prinz paper S. linked, but I certainly agree that "an account of qualitative character of conscious states" does not equate to answering the question "what kinds of things are we conscious of"? Those questions are only several primary ones that need to be investigated and discussed before any 'theory of consciousness' can legitimately be proposed. We have a lot of work to do here that has been set aside for a long time in this thread in back-and-forth debates concerning information theory and computationalist presuppositions about minds and brains, to say nothing about consciousness.

 

[Constance]

ps, I made note earlier today of two other papers I want to read and that we might all read at this point:

Max Velmans, When Perception Becomes Conscious, http://cogprints.org/838/1/bjp2web.html

Peter Carruthers, The Illusion of Conscious Thought, http://faculty.philosophy.umd.edu/pcarruthers/The illusion of conscious thought.pdf

 

[Pharoah]

It seems to me that the problematics of the term 'knowledge' come to the foreground in the differences between the way in which analytical and phenomenological philosophers of mind understand the meaning of 'knowing', understanding, what-is. Note Morris's explication of the term 'sens'/sense as developed in Merleau-Ponty in the paper I linked.

Given that your hierarchy of 'constructs' seems to refer to emerging or increasing levels of conscious interactions between beings and their environments in the processes of evolution, I don't see how a "construct class" can be said to 'interact with the environment', the 'construct class' appearing then to stand outside the interactions that ground consciousness and thus 'mind' in nature. Can you clarify?

For me the above lack of clarity continues here. The 'landscape' -- the visible, audible, and otherwise palpable qualities of the natural environment {for humans complicated by the cultural overlays placed upon it by humans} -- does change as all things change in time, but what is the source of "the constantly changing evaluations" you attribute to 'the landscape'? I realize that you write in terms of large ontological categories when you distinguish between the sequence of hierarchical constructs you see as the source of meaning in being, but I disagree that meaning originates in your categorized 'constructs' (the postulation of which requires a view from everywhere, thus nowhere). As phenomenology shows, meaning evolves with the evolution of living species by virtue of their interactions with their environments. I think your hierarchical construct theory would benefit by the addition of a supplement (in the paper or in an appendix) explicating the phenomenological perspective on the evolution of meaning in living species [how and why mind emerges from protoconsciousness and consciousness], though to provide that perspective leaves your reader in the position of choosing between HCT (as a latter development of analytical philosophy) and phenomenological philosophy.

@Constance. I like your critical analysis here in your second point. You are correct to highlight this. I think it is me being sloppy with words. You say,
"I don't see how a "construct class" can be said to 'interact with the environment', the 'construct class' appearing then to stand outside the interactions that ground consciousness and thus 'mind' in nature."
All dynamic constructions interact with their environment. The class to which a dynamic construction belongs qualifies the nature of the meaning that the construction determines through interaction... and that meaning qualifies the existential character of constructions of that class. Perhaps that clarifies... ?
Whenever I use the term landscape, I am not referring to the landscape of the environment, but to the qualitative milieu as a changing 'phenomenal landscape'.
I would like to become knowledgeable in phenomenology to the extent that I might articulate a paper about HCT from a phenomenological perspective. I have some way to go. I am on holiday atm and annoyingly forgot to bring MP's PP with me to read... grrr.

 

[Soupie]

The author ends his paper, "for now, it looks like we have found the key to consciousness." lol. Excuse me while I pick myself up off the floor. Seriously... I don't understand what distinction he is trying to highlight in that quote you, @Soupie, provide.

Im not sure you should be laughing so heartily. Perhaps instead you should be wondering why so many scientists and philosophers are trying to resolve this question (and alternatively, why you dont understand the question)? Or maybe explain why asking the question indicates a misunderstanding of the nature of consciousness, if thats what you believe.

@Constance posts a paper by Velmans (which was also in my queue) that coincidentally addresses the very question at issue.

http://cogprints.org/838/1/bjp2web.html

I note, the paper does seem to be 'work in progress' considering the number of typos so it would not be a good idea to critique it.
SEP is helpful, (Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)) drawing distinctions between sentience, wakefulness, self consciousness, wiit, subjects of conscious states, transitive conscisness, states one is aware of, qualitstive, phenomenal, access and narrative consciousness.

Perhaps Velmans paper will help you understand the question/distinction.

You do tend to mention the HP quite a bit, but I am well aware that everyone's idea of the HP has subtle (and not so subtle!) differences so I think it is a term best avoided. Alternatively, try and be descriptively clear what you think HCt does not address.

While there are different formulations of the hard problem, my experience when reading the literature over the past two years is that the HP is pretty straightforward and the problem it explicates pretty straighforward.

The wiki page on the HP encapsulates it well imo.

Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I have in the past tried to ask very succinct, targeted questions about HCT, but you felt that I was misunderstanding large portions of your answers. Just recently I used the term "distinct" in order to clarify something you had written, and you told me you didn't know what I meant by "distinct."

If confusion is created by the use of words such as distinct, is there any wonder you havent been able to answer my questions about HCT?

 

[Pharoah]

Im not sure you should be laughing so heartily. Perhaps instead you should be wondering why so many scientists and philosophers are trying to resolve this question (and alternatively, why you dont understand the question)? Or maybe explain why asking the question indicates a misunderstanding of the nature of consciousness, if thats what you believe.

@Constance posts a paper by Velmans (which was also in my queue) that coincidentally addresses the very question at issue.

http://cogprints.org/838/1/bjp2web.html

Perhaps Velmans paper will help you understand the question/distinction.

While there are different formulations of the hard problem, my experience when reading the literature over the past two years is that the HP is pretty straightforward and the problem it explicates pretty straighforward.

The wiki page on the HP encapsulates it well imo.

Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I have in the past tried to ask very succinct, targeted questions about HCT, but you felt that I was misunderstanding large portions of your answers. Just recently I used the term "distinct" in order to clarify something you had written, and you told me you didn't know what I meant by "distinct."

If confusion is created by the use of words such as distinct, is there any wonder you havent been able to answer my questions about HCT?

You say in your orevious post @Soupie that Velman addresses "the very question at issue". I looked at the Velman and these are the kinds of questions he is raising (not sure which is the very question at issue or which tackles the Hard Problem):

When does perception become conscious?
How can we decide when perception becomes conscious?
In what sense does perception become conscious?
Is it possible for consciousness to do something to or about something that it is not conscious of?
what is the nature of preconscious processing and how does it differ from "conscious" processing?
In what sense... is the analysis of complex stimuli "voluntary, controlled and conscious"?
So how does the brain select the required message from such complex auditory stimuli?
if one's name is mentioned by someone across the room, one's attention might switch, suggesting that, to some extent, even non-attended messages are analyzed - but to what extent?
What is it about attentional processing that relates most closely to consciousness?
IN WHAT SENSE IS INPUT ANALYSIS "CONSCIOUS"?

 

[Soupie]

You say in your orevious post @Soupie that Velman addresses "the very question at issue". I looked at the Velman and these are the kinds of questions he is raising (not sure which is the very question at issue or which tackles the Hard Problem):

When does perception become conscious?
How can we decide when perception becomes conscious?
In what sense does perception become conscious?
Is it possible for consciousness to do something to or about something that it is not conscious of?
what is the nature of preconscious processing and how does it differ from "conscious" processing?
In what sense... is the analysis of complex stimuli "voluntary, controlled and conscious"?
So how does the brain select the required message from such complex auditory stimuli?
if one's name is mentioned by someone across the room, one's attention might switch, suggesting that, to some extent, even non-attended messages are analyzed - but to what extent?
What is it about attentional processing that relates most closely to consciousness?
IN WHAT SENSE IS INPUT ANALYSIS "CONSCIOUS"?

Right. And previously, I had posted the following:

Philosophers sometimes point out that theories of consciousness need two parts: an account of qualitative character of conscious states (what kinds of things are we conscious of) and an account of how states become conscious.

And I asked you to address the second part, to provide an account of how states become conscious.

If you are still confused about the question I am asking, after having asked it multiple times and sharing two papers which address the same question, them I'm afraid I can't help you, haha. (Why do I feel like I'm in a Monty Python skit?)

 

[Pharoah]

Right. And previously, I had posted the following:

Philosophers sometimes point out that theories of consciousness need two parts: an account of qualitative character of conscious states (what kinds of things are we conscious of) and an account of how states become conscious.

And I asked you to address the second part, to provide an account of how states become conscious.

If you are still confused about the question I am asking, after having asked it multiple times and sharing two papers which address the same question, them I'm afraid I can't help you, haha. (Why do I feel like I'm in a Monty Python skit?)

Right!! I've got it.
Well... HCT does not address this question although I could chuck some ideas into the mix.
And for what it is worth, this question is not the Hard Problem as I understand it. Chalmers' list of the easy problems:

• the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
  
  
• the integration of information by a cognitive system;
  
  
• the reportability of mental states;
  
  
• the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
  
  
• the focus of attention;
  
  
• the deliberate control of behavior;
  
  
• the difference between wakefulness and sleep.