Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 7

[smcder]

@smcder @Constance

If we deny that the brain processes information but at the same time, as Constance does, seek a purely naturalistic (materialistic) approach to congnition and consciousness, then you've reduced cognition and consciousness to mechanisms.

No information = no meaning

In the last article I posted which I described as depressing, that's exactly what the author was angling at. Constance lauded the article.

Embodied, situated, and enactive accounts of cognition do not have room for free will or mental causation. These accounts hold that cognition and consciousness are byproducts of the mechanical interaction between the organism and its environment.

Informational accounts on the other hand hold that the organism—utilizing information processing—actively makes meaning of its reciprocal interaction with the world and self-regulates accordingly.

Yes, this is a non-reductive, non-deterministic approach which is why the (depressing) article above labeled it as neo-egocentrism.

Any model that proposes something other than a determined, mechanistic approach to anything will be deemed non-scientific.

I know that the associations often see between different theories of cognition and consciousness often leave you all befuddled, but despite their core ideologies there is overlap between many of them.

Here is the beginnings of an attempt to bride Enactivism and Predicitve Processing:

Does Action-oriented Predictive Processing offer an enactive account of sensory substitution? | iCog

 

[Constance]

Here is the beginnings of an attempt to bride {?} Enactivism and Predicitve Processing:

Does Action-oriented Predictive Processing offer an enactive account of sensory substitution? | iCog

I've now read this paper and want to call your attention to the paragraph extracted below.

But first I want to ask you what you mean by using the word 'bride' as a verb in your introductory sentence above. In searching dictionaries for usage of the word 'bride' as a verb I've come across only one example, identified as obsolete in Wictionary:

. . . Verb[edit]

bride ‎(third-person singular simple present brides, present participle briding, simple past and past participle brided)

1. (obsolete) To make a bride of."

bride - Wiktionary

It seems that you want to suggest a 'marriage' of the phenomenological concept of 'enactivism' -- part of the trio of concepts embedded in the phenomenological approach to consciousness as "embodied, embedded, enactive" set forth by Varela and Thompson et al.
But as the following extract from the paper you cited indicates [and as Anil Seth also demonstrates], such a proposed marriage is only broached in the techno-neuro 'interface' hypothesis [for some reason] but then dismissed as a real possibility. Why? My impression is that cognitivists and computationalists supporting the techno-neuro 'interface' hypothesis have in recent years been nudged forward in their thinking by phenomenology's 'embodied/embedded/enactivist' analysis of consciousness and want to co-opt its insights to their own 'interface' hypothesis but without going all the way to accepting the prodigious insights of phenomenology and neurophenomenology, which would be necessary before an actual marriage could be consummated. This paragraph from your last linked paper is an example:

"Despite these similarities, one should be careful about casting PP as subscribing to an enactive understanding of perception and sensory substitution. Though the views in question do overlap in their explanatory ambitions, they are built on diametrically opposing assumptions. In the previous paragraph I tried to speak about ‘the system’ rather than the brain or agent as a whole. This is because PP is usually understood as a neurocentric view (Hohwy, 2014), while enactivism instead stresses the situated and embodied nature of cognition (Noë, 2005). Moreover, PP is based on an inferential architecture, often associated with rich representational contents – something widely eschewed by enactivists."

The problem with the 'interface' theory you attempt to propagate is that it wants to mimic the mutual attractions and interactions of consciousness and world as fleshed out in phenomenology and to eat them too, reducing them from experiential presentations in the mutual disclosure of mind and world to mere 'representations' on the basis of which the brain is claimed to construct all feeling and thinking, all experience in and of the palpable actual world we live in, which, as phenomenology reveals, founds all thinking, including our thinking about what consciousness is. What advocates of the informational techno-neuro interface hypothesis need to do -- and I do hope someone in that group has at least attempted to do it -- is to overcome and destroy, part by part, the components of phenomenology's embodied/embedded/enactive description of consciousness before attempting to replace it, or disappear it.

Have you come across a paper or a book in which that work is done? If so, would you link it for us? Thanks.

 

[Randall]

Maybe this is a good time to clarify the place that a reductionist approach should have in this discussion. The first is that in a general sense, reducing problems to their constituent components is a tried and true way of gaining a fuller understanding of problems. It may not always result in a solution to the problem, but that doesn't mean that it has no value. In the case of consciousness, I often liken it to the case of magnetism. We cannot reduce consciousness to the components of the brain any more than we can reduce a magnetic field to the components of an electromagnet.

In both cases we also get a similar type of correlation. Magnetic fields are correlated to magnets and consciousness is correlated to brain activity. In both cases we're also lacking a complete explanation for the phenomena. For magnetism, virtual photons are hypothesized. For consciousness, maybe there's something similar. We don't know. But what we do know, is that immense benefit has come from applying what we've learned about the correlations between magnets and magnetism. The correlations between the brain and consciousness could very well be of similar importance, particularly in the fields of mental health and artificial intelligence.

Therefore dismissing the value of a reductionist approach to consciousness could be a very serious mistake. That being said, until the correlations between brains and consciousness are as well defined as those between magnets and magnetism, we don't have sufficient cause to assume that we know what we're doing. Therefore we cannot assume that a microchip approach to consciousness will work. In our analogy to electromagnetism, constructing brains from microchips may not produce consciousness any more than constructing magnets from bubble gum will produce magnetism.

 

[Soupie]

What advocates of the informational techno-neuro interface hypothesis need to do -- and I do hope someone in that group has done it -- is to overcome and destroy, part by part, the components of phenomenology's embodied/embedded/enactive description of consciousness before attempting to replace it.

Have you come across a paper or a book in which that work is done? If so, would you link it for us? Thanks.

Constance there is no "embodied/embedded/enactive description of consciousness" because one does not exist.

Yes, there are "embodied/embedded/enactive description" of cognition but those are fridge theories at best.

There are no physical theories of consciousness. None.

There are no computational not informational ones either.

Even in the excellent Aeon article I posted a few posts back about philosophers making consciousness too complex, the author expands on the exciting and emerging paradigm of predicitve processing.

Not even this powerful "new" paradigm can touch the hard problem.

Consciousness in the predictive mind

"The prediction error minimization (PEM) account of brain function may explain perception, learning, action, attention and understanding. That at least is what its proponents claim, and I suggested in an earlier post that perhaps the brain does nothing but minimize its prediction error. So far I haven’t talked explicitly about consciousness. Yet, if PEM is true, and if consciousness is based in brain activity, then PEM should explain consciousness too. In this post I therefore speculate about what PEM might have to say about consciousness.

We talk about consciousness in many different ways: metaphysical, neurological, psychological, colloquial. Accordingly, there are many different ways a theory like PEM could engage with consciousness.

Starting at the top, could PEM deal with the hard problem of consciousness? No. It is easy to conceive of a system that minimizes prediction error yet has no phenomenal consciousness. So consciousness does not supervene on prediction error minimization."

You have to love the no bullshit approach.

The hard problem makes it pretty clear that consciousness does not supervene on anything within the physical domain. That is why I have found Hoffmans interface theory to be so exciting; it explains why looking to the physical for the origin of consciousness will never bear fruit.

 

[smcder]

Maybe this is a good time to clarify the place that a reductionist approach should have in this discussion. The first is that in a general sense, reducing problems to their constituent components is a tried and true way of gaining a fuller understanding of problems. It may not always result in a solution to the problem, but that doesn't mean that it has no value. In the case of consciousness, I often liken it to the case of magnetism. We cannot reduce consciousness to the components of the brain any more than we can reduce a magnetic field to the components of an electromagnet.

In both cases we also get a similar type of correlation. Magnetic fields are correlated to magnets and consciousness is correlated to brain activity. In both cases we're also lacking a complete explanation for the phenomena. For magnetism, virtual photons are hypothesized. For consciousness, maybe there's something similar. We don't know. But what we do know, is that immense benefit has come from applying what we've learned about the correlations between magnets and magnetism. The correlations between the brain and consciousness could very well be of similar importance, particularly in the fields of mental health and artificial intelligence.

Therefore dismissing the value of a reductionist approach to consciousness could be a very serious mistake. That being said, until the correlations between brains and consciousness are as well defined as those between magnets and magnetism, we don't have sufficient cause to assume that we know what we're doing. Therefore we cannot assume that a microchip approach to consciousness will work. In our analogy to electromagnetism, constructing brains from microchips may not produce consciousness any more than constructing magnets from bubble gum will produce magnetism.

"Would ya believe ... ferromagnetic bubble-gum?"

 

[Randall]

The hard problem makes it pretty clear that consciousness does not supervene on anything within the physical domain.

That doesn't seem defensible. Because there are direct correlations between consciousness and the brain, the concept of supervenience seems to apply.

That is why I have found Hoffmans interface theory to be so exciting; it explains why looking to the physical for the origin of consciousness will never bear fruit.

I have yet to see where Hoffman offers any explanation for consciousness. So far as I can tell from what I I've read, his ideas assume consciousness as extant to begin with, and then he draws relationships between conscious agents.

 

[Soupie]

Maybe this is a good time to clarify the place that a reductionist approach should have in this discussion. The first is that in a general sense, reducing problems to their constituent components is a tried and true way of gaining a fuller understanding of problems. It may not always result in a solution to the problem, but that doesn't mean that it has no value. In the case of consciousness, I often liken it to the case of magnetism. We cannot reduce consciousness to the components of the brain any more than we can reduce a magnetic field to the components of an electromagnet.

In both cases we also get a similar type of correlation. Magnetic fields are correlated to magnets and consciousness is correlated to brain activity. In both cases we're also lacking a complete explanation for the phenomena. For magnetism, virtual photons are hypothesized. For consciousness, maybe there's something similar. We don't know. But what we do know, is that immense benefit has come from applying what we've learned about the correlations between magnets and magnetism. The correlations between the brain and consciousness could very well be of similar importance, particularly in the fields of mental health and artificial intelligence.

Therefore dismissing the value of a reductionist approach to consciousness could be a very serious mistake. That being said, until the correlations between brains and consciousness are as well defined as those between magnets and magnetism, we don't have sufficient cause to assume that we know what we're doing. Therefore we cannot assume that a microchip approach to consciousness will work. In our analogy to electromagnetism, constructing brains from microchips may not produce consciousness any more than constructing magnets from bubble gum will produce magnetism.

I agree. Which is why—even though the predicitve processing paradigm can't answer the hp—it is nonetheless interesting to note that what we are conscious of is the predictions and not the errors.

So I agree that this reductive approach is helpful.

However you know I disagree with the comparison between consciousness and magnetism.

Consciousness (what it's like) has no identified objective function and/or influence on the physical world.

There is no way to demonstrate, objectively, consciousness having an influence on the physical world.

This is not the case with magnetic fields. While we currently cannot "see" them with the naked eye nor with other devices, it's easy to objectively see their influence on the physical world.

Also, there are fluid dynamic models of magnetism. What follows is that any fluid can display magnetic field-like properties.

My point is that while the reductive approach to consciousness is a worthy endeavor we have to recognize that consciousness is a phenomenon unlike any other.

 

[Soupie]

That doesn't seem defensible.

Consciousness seems to supervene on the human brain because there are direct correlations between the two, and this fits perfectly with the concept of supervenience.

This is a very good point. It's one thing to say that when the physical brain changes, the contents of consciousness change.

But even more importantly, perhaps, consciousness can be stopped altogether when anesthesia is applied to the brain.

I agree with you that there is a nexus between consciousness and the brain.

I have yet to see where Hoffman offers any explanation for consciousness. So far as I can tell from what I I've read, his ideas assume consciousness as extant to begin with, and then draw relationships between conscious agents.

You're correct. Hoffman does not offer any explanation for consciousness, physical/functional or otherwise.

However, his user interface theory explains why (perhaps) we don't find a physical cause for consciousness.

Everything we phenomenally experience of the physical world comes to us via consciousness. We have no experience of the physical world that doesn't come via consciousness.

Consciousness is therefore primary and the physical derivative.

This explains why the hard problem is hard. Since the physical is secondary and consciousness primary, the latter cannot be explained causally via the former.

 

[Constance]

Constance there is no "embodied/embedded/enactive description of consciousness" because one does not exist.

Yes, there are "embodied/embedded/enactive description" of cognition but those are fridge theories at best.

There are no physical theories of consciousness. None.

There are no computational not informational ones either.

Even in the excellent Aeon article I posted a few posts back about philosophers making consciousness too complex, the author expands on the exciting and emerging paradigm of predicitve processing.

Not even this powerful "new" paradigm can touch the hard problem.

Consciousness in the predictive mind

"The prediction error minimization (PEM) account of brain function may explain perception, learning, action, attention and understanding. That at least is what its proponents claim, and I suggested in an earlier post that perhaps the brain does nothing but minimize its prediction error. So far I haven’t talked explicitly about consciousness. Yet, if PEM is true, and if consciousness is based in brain activity, then PEM should explain consciousness too. In this post I therefore speculate about what PEM might have to say about consciousness.

We talk about consciousness in many different ways: metaphysical, neurological, psychological, colloquial. Accordingly, there are many different ways a theory like PEM could engage with consciousness.

Starting at the top, could PEM deal with the hard problem of consciousness? No. It is easy to conceive of a system that minimizes prediction error yet has no phenomenal consciousness. So consciousness does not supervene on prediction error minimization."

You have to love the no bullshit approach.

The hard problem makes it pretty clear that consciousness does not supervene on anything within the physical domain. That is why I have found Hoffmans interface theory to be so exciting; it explains why looking to the physical for the origin of consciousness will never bear fruit.

Wow. Do you change your mind six times before breakfast every day or just some days? What 'no bullshit' approach are you claiming to represent as you deny the existence of a library filled with discoveries and interpretations of the capacities and activities of consciousness by virtue of which we are able to think about and discuss anything at all?

I read the blog you linked in that post [whose author does, btw, recognize that various theories about consciousness do exist] and extract the following two paragraphs for the contemplation of whoever is reading this thread:

"There is a proposal like this around. Hobson and Friston (pdf) have suggested that dreaming is an adaptation where the brain is engaged in complexity reduction via synthetic prediction errors. They propose that consciousness arose as a consequence of the ability to create such inner virtual reality. This places the theory in the company of Revonsuo and Metzinger, who have proposed similar ideas albeit without the PEM machinery. It would mean that creatures who do not dream are not conscious.

I think this is an intriguing idea. It is at least as appealing as some of the other theories of consciousness out there (IIT, HOT, loops, AIR, GNWS). I don’t think it alone is going to be enough, however. One reason is that there must be something about waking perceptual inference specifically that relates to consciousness, and the dreaming theory doesn’t very strongly provide this link. A better strategy is to look at all the theories of consciousness, and identify the elements in them that are supported by different aspects of PEM (while being prepared to jettison the elements that are not). Then combine all these elements and this will then be a patchwork-style PEM theory of consciousness."

It seems that you like this latter suggestion by the blogger you've linked us to here. It's what you're arguing that we should all do -- adopt this 'techno-neuro interface' hypothesis and "jettison" everything discovered and expressed in other hypotheses and theories about consciousness that it cannot account for -- or even entertain. Reductivism really does appear to have become a chronic affliction in our time, the anti-intellectual progeny of the long dominance of the materialist-objectivist paradigm in human science. Well, you're welcome to it. I'm going to pass on reading further apologetics for your currently favored hypothesis.

 

[Randall]

I agree. Which is why—even though the predicitve processing paradigm can't answer the hp—it is nonetheless interesting to note that what we are conscious of is the predictions and not the errors. So I agree that this reductive approach is helpful.

However you know I disagree with the comparison between consciousness and magnetism. Consciousness (what it's like) has no identified objective function and/or influence on the physical world. There is no way to demonstrate, objectively, consciousness having an influence on the physical world.

This is not the case with magnetic fields. While we currently cannot "see" them with the naked eye nor with other devices, it's easy to objectively see their influence on the physical world. Also, there are fluid dynamic models of magnetism. What follows is that any fluid can display magnetic field-like properties.

My point is that while the reductive approach to consciousness is a worthy endeavor we have to recognize that consciousness is a phenomenon unlike any other.

All very good points, but they don't nullify the analogy between magnetism and consciousness. There was a time when magnetic fields were neither seen nor measured. Then the odd behavior of certain materials offered a clue that something was going on. In the case of consciousness, we seem to already be fully aware that something is going on. For measurement, is a change in the direction of a floating needle really all that different in principle from someone demonstrating signs of consciousness? Not really. Either way we don't see the magnetism or the consciousness. We only see how the materials react. A needle moves, a person speaks.

 

[smcder]

Anesthesia ... Consciousness stops? The brain doesn't? We have reports... Confounded by memory. Maybe you feel everything and remember nothing. If all goes well.

 

[smcder]

Meditation ... anesthesia .... Surgery without anesthesia

 

[Randall]

Anesthesia ... Consciousness stops? The brain doesn't? We have reports... Confounded by memory. Maybe you feel everything and remember nothing. If all goes well. Meditation ... anesthesia .... Surgery without anesthesia ...

OK. The point being?

 

[smcder]

OK. The point being?

Search terms for when I have time to respond.

We really do need to get you away from that magnetism metaphor ... ;-)

Soupie, I want to break down that depression determinism thing too.

Did y'all watch the Searle, clip? Randall that's partly why I've not come to the same conclusion as you.

 

[smcder]

Google:
How do we know people are unconscious during anesthesia? ( don't feel pain ...) do some people remember what happens under anesthesia? Loss of consciousness vs moment by moment amnesia ... We all have been told about something we did that we don't remember but we don't assume we were unconscious.

Dreams as re-processed memories ... So we "remember" through a dream process.

Conscious dying... The goal of maintaining awareness into death.

 

[smcder]

Researchers finally acknowledge link between anesthesia and memory loss -- Sott.net

So anesthesia isn't as clear cut a case of turning consciousness on and off ...

 

[Randall]

We really do need to get you away from that magnetism metaphor ... ;-)

Getting bored with it? Maybe I should go with supermodels instead. Like we don't know why supermodels are hot, but we know hotness when we see it, and a reductive approach seems to do it less justice. Like looking at individual hair strands won't give you a complete picture, yet there seems to be little doubt that supermodelishness supervenes on the physical .. lol. Better? If supermodels don't do it for you, maybe exotic cars, like Ferraris? Or what?

 

[smcder]

Haven't had an Academia.edu update in a while ... This just popped in my email:


TOP PAPERS FROM YOUR NEWSFEED




Shelli Joye
California Institute of Integral Studies, Philosophy, Cosmology, and Consciousness, Post-Doc
Quantum Physics and Consciousness - SAND16 Presentation

The Pribram-Bohm holoflux theory of consciousness views reality as one energy, cycling mathematically, lens-like, in a process of transformation manifesting in three regions, modes, or hypostases: (1) electromagnetic energy in space–time, (2) holoflux energy in the transcendent, implicate order, and (3) vibrating isospheres at the boundary, the transition gap separating the implicate from the explicate orders.

DOWNLOAD BOOKMARK




Patrizio Tressoldi
Università degli Studi di Padova, Dipartimento di Psicologia Generale, Faculty Member
Emergence of qualia from brain activity or from an interaction of proto- consciousness with the brain: which one is the weirder? Available evidence and a research agenda

Reviewing status: The review of this article was author-mediated. The ScienceOpen editorial office has verified and confirmed the identities of the reviewers. The endorsement statement and reviewers names are provided below. The article is also available for continuous post-publication peer review on its dedicated ScienceOpen homepage. ABSTRACT This contribution to the science of consciousness aims at comparing how two different theories can explain the emergence of different qualia experiences: meta-awareness, meta-cognition, the placebo effect, out-of-body experiences, cognitive therapy,...

 

[smcder]

Interface Theory of Perception: The Cognitive Revolution That Wasn’t | Nikola Vukovic, PhD

 

[smcder]

Michael Shermer on IT

Did Humans Evolve to See Things as They Really Are?