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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 8

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From the Wikipedia entry on Schmeider:

Astrobiology and Artificial Intelligence (A.I.)


Schneider is among those researchers who believe that the most intelligent alien beings we encounter will be "postbiological in nature", being forms of artificial intelligence. (See also Paul Davies, Steven J. Dick, Martin Rees and Seth Shostak.) She is the first to contend that they would be superintelligent, and that we can predict the shape of some of these superintelligences would be like.[4][9][28]

Their reason for the claim that the most intelligent aliens will be "postbiological" is called the "short window observation.” This holds that by the time any society learns to transmit radio signals, they're likely just a few hundred years from upgrading their own biology.[4][9][28] As Elon Musk puts it biological beings would be just a "biological boot loader for digital superintelligence."[29]

Schneider poses two questions: first, how can we understand the thinking of superintelligences? And, second, if this is the direction intelligence is going, will these superintelligent beings even be conscious?

She poses a "hard problem of AI consciousness" that is similar in some respects to David Chalmers hard problem of consciousness, which concerns the human case.[30]

The problem is: how can we know that silicon is the right sort of medium for conscious experience?[2][4][28]

Drawing from work in cognitive science, Schneider identifies ways that humans might understand the advanced thought patterns of certain kinds of superintelligences – namely, those that are modeled after the biological beings that created them. And she urges that under the right circumstances the A.I. may be conscious.[9][28]
 
A Systems Approach to the Mind-Body Problem

(1) The fundamental nature of reality.

The fundamental nature of reality is a multiverse of unbounded potential:

"In the quantum model there are no explicit individual entities. There is only the unified quantum system and its state transitions. It is only once we shift to the classical equivalent that the individual systems are explicitly represented. Due to the unified quantum foundation the interactions between the individual systems exhibit global coherence.

This suggests that fundamentally there is only a single unified system that undergoes state transitions. The quantum state vector represents a multiverse wherein all possible universal configurations are represented as potentialities.

Thus there are no explicit systems or system interactions, there is only a unified whole that is represented by changing probability distributions within a multiverse. However the classical picture is logically equivalent, thus another way of looking at the situation is in terms of individual systems and system interactions.

Thus there are two ways of interpreting the same situation. Either everything is one and whole or all things are separate and individual. This apparent duality can be inferred from the same reality generative information process by interpreting it in different ways. (Ringland 52)"

When we interpret reality as consisting of individual, interacting systems, it provides us with a powerful conceptual approach to the Mind-Body Problem.

(2) Systems and the Nature of Perception

"An individual system has 4 aspects:

1. It has a state.

2. It has interfaces:

• an input interface,
• an output interface,
• a self-interaction channel where its input and output interfaces intersect,
• input channels where its input interface intersects another system’s
output interface,
• output channels where its output interface intersects another system’s
input interface.

3. It has an "animating" process, which is the operation of "computing" a new system state. (Which I interpret as a causal/interactive nature.)

4. It has an observable form or appearance, i.e., when the system's output interface intersects with the input channels of another system. (heavily edited from Ringwald 15)"

These 4 aspects of a system lead to the following 4 aspects of system perception:

"1. A system can only perceive the information that flows through its input interface. This information only informs the system of the appearances of itself and other systems. Hence the other aspects such as state, interfaces and animating process are imperceptible.

2. Thus from a system’s perspective it appears as if it is an individual entity that simply exists within a space filled with interacting entities, all of which are known by their appearances.

3. The interactions between these entities are tangible and for all intents and purposes they seem ‘physical’ because all systems are emergent from and embedded within the same information space.

4. The systems respond to the perceived appearances as if they were all that exists because this is all that they can experience. Thus perceptions are constructs of the appearances of systems and the systems experience of perceptions as their (physical) universe. (heavily edited from Ringwald 15)"

(3) How this Relates to the Mind-Body Problem

The Mind-Body problem is the problem of explaining how the seemingly physical body interacts with the seemingly non-physical mind.

Applying the systems approach to the problem gives us the following:

(1) The fundamental nature of reality is neither physical nor mental.

(2) The fundamental nature of Being appears to be a multiverse wherein all possibilities exist.

(3) Out of this unbound potential emerge systems such as atoms, molecules, cells, and organisms.

(4) These systems interface inducing state changes within one another.

(5) The state changes (or animating process) that each system undergoes is equivalent to perception.

(6) However, since organisms perceive only the appearances of other systems (by way of their own input interfaces), the world is perceived as being only "physical" and subsequently devoid of experience/feeling/consciousness/what-its-likeness.

However, just because we only perceive appearances of systems (including ourselves)--and not the experiences of systems (including ourselves)-- does not mean that systems (including ourselves) do not have experiences.
On the contrary, the systems approach gives us very good reason to believe that all systems have/are experiences. However, this is not to say that atoms, molecules, and cells have self-conscious minds such as ours.

"It is far more plausible that systems experience each other and respond, thereby changing state. It is only from a naïve realist perspective, which focuses solely on the appearances (content of experience), that one may postulate the existence of ‘inanimate’ systems and then formulate equations that describe the changing appearances. Then, being totally unaware of the underlying experiential processes that actually drive the system dynamics, it is proposed that
the equations themselves are some kind of ‘law’ that the inanimate systems mysteriously ‘follow’. (Ringwald 66)"

(4) The Systems Approach to The Combination Problem

If a system, such as an organism, is really a system of systems, how is it that this Super System experiences one stream of consciousness (if indeed an organism does experience only one stream of consciousness)?

"Regarding the mental aspect (felt inner experience) we cannot observe another’s experiential process, however our own experiential process proves that systems can have such a thing as an experiential process. Furthermore, all of the easy problems of consciousness mentioned above can be explained in terms of information processing by sub-systems such as sensory organs, nervous systems, brains, neurons, synapses and so on. Thus awareness of felt experience is a subjective observation of the inner processes of many interacting sub-systems, which integrate and result in the experiential process of a super-system.

This is related to the way that interacting sub-systems produce the appearance of a single super-system via a meta system transition, which was discussed in sec. 2.5.1. Hence a meta system transition can be empirical; producing complex objects of perception (‘physcial’ objects), or it can be subjective; producing a complex experiential process (mind).

Thus our awareness of having a mind can be conceptualised as a subjective meta system transition by which the experiential processes of sub-systems appear to form into a single experiential process.
Given that the sub-systems are animated by information processes, this explains the manner in which information processes can produce an experiential process that seems, in every respect, to be mental [Soupie: That is, seeming to be distinct from the "physical."] (Ringwald 65)"

Section 2.5.1

"This approach also highlights the connection between interaction and complex systems. If the two systems A and B interact then we need to model their joint probability, likewise if they interact they participate as sub-systems of the complex system AB. Thus the fact of interaction and the fact of being sub-systems are different ways of thinking about the same situation. If a group of systems are strongly interacting it is perceived as a single complex system whereas weakly interacting systems are perceived as separate systems. The process whereby a group of sub-systems is perceived to become a single super-system is called a meta system transition. However, as we see here, nothing fundamentally new is created when a super-system seemingly comes into existence; rather the super-system is an emergent property of coordinated sub-system interactions. (Ringwald 21)"

That whole section is incredibly interesting and expresses the same ideas regarding scale/emergence as Theile and Kafatos.

(5) The Nature of Fundamental Reality

What is the nature of the animating process that powers the state changes of systems?

"There are two logically equivalent mathematical formulations of quantum mechanics; matrix mechanics (developed by Heisenberg) and wave mechanics (developed by Schrodinger). In the early days of quantum mechanics both of these emerged at much the same time. There was much debate over which approach was preferable and people gravitated towards wave mechanics because the matrix mathematics was unfamiliar and the mathematics of waves was already familiar due to its application in classical physics. It was also believed that waves were more ‘physical’ than abstract information processes represented by matrices.

However it was later noticed by Max Born that quantum waves were distinctly non-physical in the sense that they were not a physical wave travelling through something but instead they were waves of the complex square root of probabilites, which had to be squared in order to result in anything physically meaningful. They were therefore numbers that cycled in the manner of waves in order to participate in a purely computational process. Thus the ‘physicallity’
of wave mechanics was only superficial.
(Ringwald 58)"

"The superficially ‘physical’ waves, or any physicalist interpretation of quantum mechanics, cannot lead towards any great insight into the nature of quantum processes. Hence there have been many statements such as

“The theory has, indeed, two powerful bodies of fact in its favour, and only one thing against it. First, in its favour are all the marvellous agreements that the theory has had with every experimental result to date. Second, and to me almost as important, it is a theory of astonishing and profound mathematical beauty. The one thing
that can be said against it is that it makes absolutely no sense!” (Ringwald 59)"

"In the context of the systems paradigm the “laws of physics” are descriptions of observable behaviour, whilst the causative principle is the animating process of the whole system, which gives rise to the experiential processes of all systems. The laws of physics provide insights into the structure of the system model that the simulator uses to animate the simulation, but they are not causative in themselves. Thus ‘experience’ is not something that must arise from the interactions of inanimate systems; rather, it is the driving force of all interactions between animate systems. (Ringwald 66)"

Source: System Science of Virtual Reality: Toward the Unification of Empirical and Subjective Science
 
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A Systems Approach to the Mind-Body Problem

(1) The fundamental nature of reality.

The fundamental nature of reality is a multiverse of unbounded potential:

"In the quantum model there are no explicit individual entities. There is only the unified quantum system and its state transitions. It is only once we shift to the classical equivalent that the individual systems are explicitly represented. Due to the unified quantum foundation the interactions between the individual systems exhibit global coherence.

This suggests that fundamentally there is only a single unified system that undergoes state transitions. The quantum state vector represents a multiverse wherein all possible universal configurations are represented as potentialities.

Thus there are no explicit systems or system interactions, there is only a unified whole that is represented by changing probability distributions within a multiverse. However the classical picture is logically equivalent, thus another way of looking at the situation is in terms of individual systems and system interactions.

Thus there are two ways of interpreting the same situation. Either everything is one and whole or all things are separate and individual. This apparent duality can be inferred from the same reality generative information process by interpreting it in different ways. (Ringland 52)"

When we interpret reality as consisting of individual, interacting systems, it provides us with a powerful conceptual approach to the Mind-Body Problem.

(2) Systems and the Nature of Perception

"An individual system has 4 aspects:

1. It has a state.

2. It has interfaces:

• an input interface,
• an output interface,
• a self-interaction channel where its input and output interfaces intersect,
• input channels where its input interface intersects another system’s
output interface,
• output channels where its output interface intersects another system’s
input interface.

3. It has an "animating" process, which is the operation of "computing" a new system state.

4. It has an observable form or appearance, i.e., when the system's output interface intersects with the input channels of another system. (heavily edited from Ringwald 15)"

These 4 aspects of a system lead to the following 4 aspects of system perception:

"1. A system can only perceive the information that flows through its input interface. This information only informs the system of the appearances of itself and other systems. Hence the other aspects such as state, interfaces and animating process are imperceptible.

2. Thus from a system’s perspective it appears as if it is an individual entity that simply exists within a space filled with interacting entities, all of which are known by their appearances.

3. The interactions between these entities are tangible and for all intents and purposes they seem ‘physical’ because all systems are emergent from and embedded within the same information space.

4. The systems respond to the perceived appearances as if they were all that exists because this is all that they can experience. Thus perceptions are constructs of the appearances of systems and the systems experience of perceptions as their (physical) universe. (heavily edited from Ringwald 15)"

(3) How this Relates to the Mind-Body Problem

The Mind-Body problem is the problem of explaining how the seemingly physical body interacts with the seemingly non-physical mind.

Applying the systems approach to the problem gives us the following:

(1) The fundamental nature of reality is neither physical nor mental.

(2) The fundamental nature of Being appears to be a multiverse wherein all possibilities exist.

(3) Out of this unbound potential emerge systems such as atoms, molecules, cells, and organisms.

(4) These systems interface inducing state changes within one another.

(5) The state changes (or animating process) that each system undergoes is equivalent to perception.

(6) However, since organisms perceive only the appearances of other systems (by way of their own input interfaces), the world is perceived as being only "physical" and subsequently devoid of experience/feeling/consciousness/what-its-likeness.

However, just because we only perceive appearances of systems (including ourselves)--and not the experiences of systems (including ourselves)-- does not mean that systems (including ourselves) do not have experiences.
On the contrary, the systems approach gives us very good reason to believe that all systems have/are experiences. However, this is not to say that atoms, molecules, and cells have self-conscious minds such as ours.

"It is far more plausible that systems experience each other and respond, thereby changing state. It is only from a naïve realist perspective, which focuses solely on the appearances (content of experience), that one may postulate the existence of ‘inanimate’ systems and then formulate equations that describe the changing appearances. Then, being totally unaware of the underlying experiential processes that actually drive the system dynamics, it is proposed that
the equations themselves are some kind of ‘law’ that the inanimate systems mysteriously ‘follow’. (Ringwald 66)"

(4) The Systems Approach to The Combination Problem

If a system, such as an organism, is really a system of systems, how is it that this Super System experiences one stream of consciousness (if indeed an organism does experience only one stream of consciousness)?

"Regarding the mental aspect (felt inner experience) we cannot observe another’s experiential process, however our own experiential process proves that systems can have such a thing as an experiential process. Furthermore, all of the easy problems of consciousness mentioned above can be explained in terms of information processing by sub-systems such as sensory organs, nervous systems, brains, neurons, synapses and so on. Thus awareness of felt experience is a subjective observation of the inner processes of many interacting sub-systems, which integrate and result in the experiential process of a super-system.

This is related to the way that interacting sub-systems produce the appearance of a single super-system via a meta system transition, which was discussed in sec. 2.5.1. Hence a meta system transition can be empirical; producing complex objects of perception (‘physcial’ objects), or it can be subjective; producing a complex experiential process (mind).

Thus our awareness of having a mind can be conceptualised as a subjective meta system transition by which the experiential processes of sub-systems appear to form into a single experiential process.
Given that the sub-systems are animated by information processes, this explains the manner in which information processes can produce an experiential process that seems, in every respect, to be mental [Soupie: That is, seeming to be distinct from the "physical."] (Ringwald 65)"

Section 2.5.1

"This approach also highlights the connection between interaction and complex systems. If the two systems A and B interact then we need to model their joint probability, likewise if they interact they participate as sub-systems of the complex system AB. Thus the fact of interaction and the fact of being sub-systems are different ways of thinking about the same situation. If a group of systems are strongly interacting it is perceived as a single complex system whereas weakly interacting systems are perceived as separate systems. The process whereby a group of sub-systems is perceived to become a single super-system is called a meta system transition. However, as we see here, nothing fundamentally new is created when a super-system seemingly comes into existence; rather the super-system is an emergent property of coordinated sub-system interactions. (Ringwald 21)"

That whole section is incredibly interesting and expresses the same ideas regarding scale/emergence as Theile and Kafatos.

(5) The Nature of Fundamental Reality

What is the nature of the animating process that powers the state changes of systems?

"There are two logically equivalent mathematical formulations of quantum mechanics; matrix mechanics (developed by Heisenberg) and wave mechanics (developed by Schrodinger). In the early days of quantum mechanics both of these emerged at much the same time. There was much debate over which approach was preferable and people gravitated towards wave mechanics because the matrix mathematics was unfamiliar and the mathematics of waves was already familiar due to its application in classical physics. It was also believed that waves were more ‘physical’ than abstract information processes represented by matrices.

However it was later noticed by Max Born that quantum waves were distinctly non-physical in the sense that they were not a physical wave travelling through something but instead they were waves of the complex square root of probabilites, which had to be squared in order to result in anything physically meaningful. They were therefore numbers that cycled in the manner of waves in order to participate in a purely computational process. Thus the ‘physicallity’
of wave mechanics was only superficial.
(Ringwald 58)"

"The superficially ‘physical’ waves, or any physicalist interpretation of quantum mechanics, cannot lead towards any great insight into the nature of quantum processes. Hence there have been many statements such as

“The theory has, indeed, two powerful bodies of fact in its favour, and only one thing against it. First, in its favour are all the marvellous agreements that the theory has had with every experimental result to date. Second, and to me almost as important, it is a theory of astonishing and profound mathematical beauty. The one thing
that can be said against it is that it makes absolutely no sense!” (Ringwald 59)"

"In the context of the systems paradigm the “laws of physics” are descriptions of observable behaviour, whilst the causative principle is the animating process of the whole system, which gives rise to the experiential processes of all systems. The laws of physics provide insights into the structure of the system model that the simulator uses to animate the simulation, but they are not causative in themselves. Thus ‘experience’ is not something that must arise from the interactions of inanimate systems; rather, it is the driving force of all interactions between animate systems. (Ringwald 66)"

Source: System Science of Virtual Reality: Toward the Unification of Empirical and Subjective Science

"Bandwidth limit exceeded error" on that link
 
keywords: naturalizing phenomenology, semiotics, C.S. Pierce

Naturalizing phenomenology - A philosophical imperative. - PubMed - NCBI

Looking at a non-reductionistic approach to science via the later work of M-P and Charles Sanders Pierce.

Looking for an online copy of this paper I came across the following paper, the introduction to an issue of the journal Man and World published in 1997 that presents a collection of papers by seminal thinkers in the contemporary project of naturalizing phenomenology.

Man and World 30: 259–270, 1997. 259 c 1997
Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Hermeneutics and the natural sciences: Introduction ROBERT P. CREASE Department of Philosophy, SUNY, Stony Brook, USA


http://www.philosophy1.narod.ru/www/html/library/pdf/135782.pdf
 
Science is the practice of careful perception (observation). Consciousness ontologically precedes and enables perception (perception is a subset within consciousness). Hence, consciousness is imperceptible (unobservable).

The ontology of science (physicalism/objectivism) is based on how things appear to observers/perceivers, not on how things are in themselves.

Because of this the Hard Problem.
 
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The compatibility of property dualism and substance materialism

"In this paper, I argue that Schneider’s case for incompatibility between these two positions fails. After briefly laying out her case for incompatibility, I present an account of substance—one that relies on a relational ontology—that makes the combination of substance materialism and property dualism unproblematic. Then I show that even under the theories of substance that Schneider considers—those that rely on a constituent ontology—there still is no incompatibility problem."
Looks good, but I've already past the point where dualism is any sort of concern within my present worldview, so I don't see a need to revisit the issue there or pay $40 USD for the reference material.
 
Last edited:
"Schneider claims some of the most popular versions of physicalism are at odds with commonly accepted positions about substance and properties in the related field of metaphysics.[1][8][22][23][24][25] Further, the mathematical nature of fundamental physical theories undermines physicalism itself. Fundamental physical entities are defined mathematically, and the physicalist must consider what makes mathematical statements true. This is an issue dealt with in the field of philosophy of mathematics.[2][26]The most viable theories in that domain, when combined with a physicalist approach, yield unworkable versions of physicalism. At best, physicalism becomes a form of dualism – a dualism of the abstract and concrete. And it fares as poorly as substance and property dualism with respect to explaining mental causation. Physicalism, thus understood, loses its customary advantages over competing theories.[1][8][27]"
I think the key phrases above are, "... some of the most popular versions of physicalism ..." and "... commonly accepted positions ...". The formulation is therefore based on prevailing viewpoints as outlined in existing works that appear to be cherry picked to support the initial claim. What about alternatives. For example, I don't seem to have any problem accepting that there are subjective mental realities and objective non-mental realities and that although both are constructed of something physical, only one of those realities is experienced by our consciousness. Technically I suppose that makes me some sort of physicalist/dualist, but not of any "popular" or "commonly accepted" ilk.
 
What about alternatives. For example, I don't seem to have any problem accepting that there are subjective mental realities and objective non-mental realities and that although both are constructed of something physical, only one of those realities is experienced by our consciousness.
If I follow him, which I'm almost sure I don't, it seems that this alternative includes an "alternative" definition of "physical."

phys·i·cal
ˈfizik(ə)l/
adjective

1.
of or relating to the body as opposed to the mind.
"a whole range of physical and mental challenges"
synonyms: bodily, corporeal, corporal, somatic;

More 2.
of or relating to things perceived through the senses as opposed to the mind; tangible or concrete.
"pleasant physical environments"
synonyms: material, concrete, tangible, palpable, solid, substantial, real, actual, visible
"the physical universe"

If the mind/consciousness is physical, as he claims, then we should be able to perceive it. (Spoiler: We can't.)

If the mind is physical but he agrees that it cannot be perceived, then he is using a made-up definition of "physical."

Ps I'm sure he will trot out "we can't perceive magnetic fields. We can observe their effects. We can't perceive consciousness. We can observe its effects, ie, emotions effect people."

However we've already discussed ad nuaseum that (a) consciousness is not like a (magnetic) field, (b) there are physical models of magnetic fields (fluid dynamics) but no physical models of consciousness.
 
Last edited:
A Systems Approach to the Mind-Body Problem

(1) The fundamental nature of reality.

The fundamental nature of reality is a multiverse of unbounded potential:

"In the quantum model there are no explicit individual entities. There is only the unified quantum system and its state transitions. It is only once we shift to the classical equivalent that the individual systems are explicitly represented. Due to the unified quantum foundation the interactions between the individual systems exhibit global coherence.

This suggests that fundamentally there is only a single unified system that undergoes state transitions. The quantum state vector represents a multiverse wherein all possible universal configurations are represented as potentialities.

Thus there are no explicit systems or system interactions, there is only a unified whole that is represented by changing probability distributions within a multiverse. However the classical picture is logically equivalent, thus another way of looking at the situation is in terms of individual systems and system interactions.

Thus there are two ways of interpreting the same situation. Either everything is one and whole or all things are separate and individual. This apparent duality can be inferred from the same reality generative information process by interpreting it in different ways. (Ringland 52)"

When we interpret reality as consisting of individual, interacting systems, it provides us with a powerful conceptual approach to the Mind-Body Problem.

(2) Systems and the Nature of Perception

"An individual system has 4 aspects:

1. It has a state.

2. It has interfaces:

• an input interface,
• an output interface,
• a self-interaction channel where its input and output interfaces intersect,
• input channels where its input interface intersects another system’s
output interface,
• output channels where its output interface intersects another system’s
input interface.

3. It has an "animating" process, which is the operation of "computing" a new system state. (Which I interpret as a causal/interactive nature.)

4. It has an observable form or appearance, i.e., when the system's output interface intersects with the input channels of another system. (heavily edited from Ringwald 15)"

These 4 aspects of a system lead to the following 4 aspects of system perception:

"1. A system can only perceive the information that flows through its input interface. This information only informs the system of the appearances of itself and other systems. Hence the other aspects such as state, interfaces and animating process are imperceptible.

2. Thus from a system’s perspective it appears as if it is an individual entity that simply exists within a space filled with interacting entities, all of which are known by their appearances.

3. The interactions between these entities are tangible and for all intents and purposes they seem ‘physical’ because all systems are emergent from and embedded within the same information space.

4. The systems respond to the perceived appearances as if they were all that exists because this is all that they can experience. Thus perceptions are constructs of the appearances of systems and the systems experience of perceptions as their (physical) universe. (heavily edited from Ringwald 15)"

(3) How this Relates to the Mind-Body Problem

The Mind-Body problem is the problem of explaining how the seemingly physical body interacts with the seemingly non-physical mind.

Applying the systems approach to the problem gives us the following:

(1) The fundamental nature of reality is neither physical nor mental.

(2) The fundamental nature of Being appears to be a multiverse wherein all possibilities exist.

(3) Out of this unbound potential emerge systems such as atoms, molecules, cells, and organisms.

(4) These systems interface inducing state changes within one another.

(5) The state changes (or animating process) that each system undergoes is equivalent to perception.

(6) However, since organisms perceive only the appearances of other systems (by way of their own input interfaces), the world is perceived as being only "physical" and subsequently devoid of experience/feeling/consciousness/what-its-likeness.

However, just because we only perceive appearances of systems (including ourselves)--and not the experiences of systems (including ourselves)-- does not mean that systems (including ourselves) do not have experiences.
On the contrary, the systems approach gives us very good reason to believe that all systems have/are experiences. However, this is not to say that atoms, molecules, and cells have self-conscious minds such as ours.

"It is far more plausible that systems experience each other and respond, thereby changing state. It is only from a naïve realist perspective, which focuses solely on the appearances (content of experience), that one may postulate the existence of ‘inanimate’ systems and then formulate equations that describe the changing appearances. Then, being totally unaware of the underlying experiential processes that actually drive the system dynamics, it is proposed that
the equations themselves are some kind of ‘law’ that the inanimate systems mysteriously ‘follow’. (Ringwald 66)"

(4) The Systems Approach to The Combination Problem

If a system, such as an organism, is really a system of systems, how is it that this Super System experiences one stream of consciousness (if indeed an organism does experience only one stream of consciousness)?

"Regarding the mental aspect (felt inner experience) we cannot observe another’s experiential process, however our own experiential process proves that systems can have such a thing as an experiential process. Furthermore, all of the easy problems of consciousness mentioned above can be explained in terms of information processing by sub-systems such as sensory organs, nervous systems, brains, neurons, synapses and so on. Thus awareness of felt experience is a subjective observation of the inner processes of many interacting sub-systems, which integrate and result in the experiential process of a super-system.

This is related to the way that interacting sub-systems produce the appearance of a single super-system via a meta system transition, which was discussed in sec. 2.5.1. Hence a meta system transition can be empirical; producing complex objects of perception (‘physcial’ objects), or it can be subjective; producing a complex experiential process (mind).

Thus our awareness of having a mind can be conceptualised as a subjective meta system transition by which the experiential processes of sub-systems appear to form into a single experiential process.
Given that the sub-systems are animated by information processes, this explains the manner in which information processes can produce an experiential process that seems, in every respect, to be mental [Soupie: That is, seeming to be distinct from the "physical."] (Ringwald 65)"

Section 2.5.1

"This approach also highlights the connection between interaction and complex systems. If the two systems A and B interact then we need to model their joint probability, likewise if they interact they participate as sub-systems of the complex system AB. Thus the fact of interaction and the fact of being sub-systems are different ways of thinking about the same situation. If a group of systems are strongly interacting it is perceived as a single complex system whereas weakly interacting systems are perceived as separate systems. The process whereby a group of sub-systems is perceived to become a single super-system is called a meta system transition. However, as we see here, nothing fundamentally new is created when a super-system seemingly comes into existence; rather the super-system is an emergent property of coordinated sub-system interactions. (Ringwald 21)"

That whole section is incredibly interesting and expresses the same ideas regarding scale/emergence as Theile and Kafatos.

(5) The Nature of Fundamental Reality

What is the nature of the animating process that powers the state changes of systems?

"There are two logically equivalent mathematical formulations of quantum mechanics; matrix mechanics (developed by Heisenberg) and wave mechanics (developed by Schrodinger). In the early days of quantum mechanics both of these emerged at much the same time. There was much debate over which approach was preferable and people gravitated towards wave mechanics because the matrix mathematics was unfamiliar and the mathematics of waves was already familiar due to its application in classical physics. It was also believed that waves were more ‘physical’ than abstract information processes represented by matrices.

However it was later noticed by Max Born that quantum waves were distinctly non-physical in the sense that they were not a physical wave travelling through something but instead they were waves of the complex square root of probabilites, which had to be squared in order to result in anything physically meaningful. They were therefore numbers that cycled in the manner of waves in order to participate in a purely computational process. Thus the ‘physicallity’
of wave mechanics was only superficial.
(Ringwald 58)"

"The superficially ‘physical’ waves, or any physicalist interpretation of quantum mechanics, cannot lead towards any great insight into the nature of quantum processes. Hence there have been many statements such as

“The theory has, indeed, two powerful bodies of fact in its favour, and only one thing against it. First, in its favour are all the marvellous agreements that the theory has had with every experimental result to date. Second, and to me almost as important, it is a theory of astonishing and profound mathematical beauty. The one thing
that can be said against it is that it makes absolutely no sense!” (Ringwald 59)"

"In the context of the systems paradigm the “laws of physics” are descriptions of observable behaviour, whilst the causative principle is the animating process of the whole system, which gives rise to the experiential processes of all systems. The laws of physics provide insights into the structure of the system model that the simulator uses to animate the simulation, but they are not causative in themselves. Thus ‘experience’ is not something that must arise from the interactions of inanimate systems; rather, it is the driving force of all interactions between animate systems. (Ringwald 66)"

Source: System Science of Virtual Reality: Toward the Unification of Empirical and Subjective Science

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Science is the practice of careful perception (observation). Consciousness ontologically precedes and enables perception (perception is a subset within consciousness).


One of the questions before science is how ontologically preexisting consciousness "enables perception." A question science probably cannot hope to answer is 'what is the nature of 'ontologically preexisting consciousness by contrast with awareness and consciousness as these capacities are evolved and developed in biologically living organisms and species. Kafatos's quantum-based theory of the origin of 'awareness' seems to me to be persuasive, at least a beginning effort to trace consciousness back to an incipient form of awareness in non-living systems.

I would say, following phenomenological philosophy, that perception is not, as you express it, "a subset of consciousness," but rather a further development/extension of what we can conceive of in Kafatos-Theise's terms as 'ontologically primordial awareness' in quantum interations and entanglement. Once biological life arises with a fuller sense of felt awareness of its location in an environmental situation [autopoiesis], the plenitude of the sensing of the sensible world evolves through the succeeding evolutionary development of the five or six senses we can identify that build further access to the world beyond the primordially lived sense of touch. If so, perception is an outgrowth of awareness and consciousness rather than being a 'subset' of consciousness.


Hence, consciousness is imperceptible (unobservable).

I don't think so, since we experience our own consciousness of things, others, and 'world' in the development of reflective consciousness arising out of the sense/sensing of and orientation to our local reality already achieved in prereflective consciousness. And of course we could not think about and investigate consciousness as we do in interdisciplinary consciousness studies if we did not for the most part agree that consciousness exists and that we experience many aspects of it in our own lived being. Modern science has left lived experience and consciousness outside the purview of what it investigates until recently, during the decades during which consciousness has been taken up as a subject that science must also address.

The ontology of science (physicalism/objectivism) is based on how things appear to observers/perceivers, not on how things are in themselves.

Science, at theoretical levels, at least realizes by now, as philosophers did earlier, that we cannot know the nature of things in themselves, nor understand the nature of all-that-is (to the extent that we can perceive it) at this point in earth life and earth science.

Because of this the Hard Problem.

The hard problem as Chalmers's expressed it is a challenge to the presuppositional objectivism at the core of still-dominantly materialist science. We experience more in and of the world than we can reduce to mathematical measurements or the present state of language [which, as human cultural expression, is always conditioned by presuppositions against which we can and do think].
 
I think the key phrases above are, "... some of the most popular versions of physicalism ..." and "... commonly accepted positions ...". The formulation is therefore based on prevailing viewpoints as outlined in existing works that appear to be cherry picked to support the initial claim. What about alternatives. For example, I don't seem to have any problem accepting that there are subjective mental realities and objective non-mental realities and that although both are constructed of something physical, only one of those realities is experienced by our consciousness. Technically I suppose that makes me some sort of physicalist/dualist, but not of any "popular" or "commonly accepted" ilk.

Don't feel like the lone ranger. Your conjecture is in line with that of many scientists and others whose thinking expresses 'scientistic' presuppositions, to wit, presupposing that everything that is is "constructed of something physical" and that a description of 'reality' can be fully accomplished through objective and mathematical 'measurements' of things, fields, and processes, including life, the living, and their lived experience.

ETA: Part of the present confusion arises in the quantum revolution, now more than a century in the past, and the failure of physicists since then to agree on a theory of quantum physics that can be applied to comprehending the generation of systems, fields, forces, and life {lived reality} in the universe presumably formed out of the interactions and entanglements recognizable in the q substrate. Again, see Kafatos for a theory that attempts to follow the complexity of the evolution of natural and conscious systems arising from the q substrate. His theory overcomes the 'hard problem' by recognizing that mind, the mental, and indeed the spiritual are all incipient in the quantum substrate, and thus that 'physicalism' does not cover everything that we seek to comprehend.
 
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I don't think so, since we experience our own consciousness of things, others, and 'world' in the development of reflective consciousness arising out of the sense/sensing of and orientation to our local reality already achieved in prereflective consciousness.
I make a distinction between conscious experience and conscious perception. That is, consciousness is more than just perception, it is affect and concept as well. Thus I say that perception is but one aspect of consciousness, or a subset of consciousness.

Therefore we can't perceive consciousness but we can reflectively experience consciousness.
 
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If so, perception is an outgrowth of awareness and consciousness rather than being a 'subset' of consciousness.
This is the concept I meant to capture.

Perception is an outgrowth of awareness/consciousness; however, we cannot perceive (i.e. See, smell, taste, touch, measure, etc) our own consciousness nor the consciousnesses of others.

We must explore consciousness via phenomenology, philosophy, and math.
 
Don't feel like the lone ranger.
No problem. I'm not much into masks and guns.
Your conjecture is in line with that of many scientists and others whose thinking expresses 'scientistic' presuppositions, to wit, presupposing that everything that is is "constructed of something physical" and that a description of 'reality' can be fully accomplished through objective and mathematical 'measurements' of things, fields, and processes, including life, the living, and their lived experience.
My view is a bit different than you suggest. I think that reality has two contexts, the subjective and the objective, and that objective descriptions involve objective terms like fields, particles, strings, materials and so on, and that subjective descriptions attempt to convey personal experience through language.
ETA: Part of the present confusion arises in the quantum revolution, now more than a century in the past, and the failure of physicists since then to agree on a theory of quantum physics that can be applied to comprehending the generation of systems, fields, forces, and life {lived reality} in the universe presumably formed out of the interactions and entanglements recognizable in the q substrate. Again, see Kafatos for a theory that attempts to follow the complexity of the evolution of natural and conscious systems arising from the q substrate. His theory overcomes the 'hard problem' by recognizing that mind, the mental, and indeed the spiritual are all incipient in the quantum substrate, and thus that 'physicalism' does not cover everything that we seek to comprehend.
Trying to "overcome the hard problem" is like trying to overcome the canvas in order to see the picture. It's a dead-end path. On the other hand, by simply accepting that there are two possible contexts for the word "reality", we can move-on to explore the relationships between the two.
 
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No problem. I'm not much into masks and guns. My view is a bit different than you suggest. I think that reality has two contexts, the subjective and the objective, and that objective descriptions involve objective terms like fields, particles, strings, materials and so on, and that subjective descriptions attempt to convey personal experience through language. Trying to "overcome the hard problem" is like trying to overcome the canvas in order to see the picture. It's a dead-end path. On the other hand, simply accepting that there are two possible contexts for the word "reality", we can move-on to explore the relationships between the two.

Git yer own dang thread!! Oh wait .... Youve GOT one!

;-)
 
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