You mean bear more fruit in enabling us to understand how a deep structure of interaction and thus awareness in being and nature becomes in species like ours the consciousness we are capable of, and indeed rely on for our investigation of what-is? If we look to AI to account to us for the nature of our understanding of 'what-is' the question becomes, how can AI do so if it does not experience what-is in the way we do? [ETA: note that what we think we understand about what-is conditions what we do and how we attempt to justify what we do. Our species has in all eras of its presence on earth based its behaviors, actions, and ethics on whatever partial understanding it has had of the nature of 'what-is'.] I think we need to understand both the long evolution of consciousness in living beings and to appreciate the contributions of biology and neuroscience [affective neuroscience] in their analyses of the steps along the way to the development of consciousness as our species experiences it. [ETA: But there is a much greater task to be accomplished by philosophy and science -- to bring us closer to a deeper understanding of the nature of consciousness as an expression of the nature of being and thus of the ontological structure of Being as a whole.]
The so-called 'easy' problems and the 'hard problem' can be sorted out/categorized as 'different' in the manner in which our species, especially in the modern period of our history of ideas, tends to categorize things and living beings in order to understand them. But categorical thinking is a scientific/intellectual overlay we place on what-is and, as we have seen, is not the only way in which humans have appreciated/understood and thought about the nature of what-is as we encounter it in our local world -- our temporal, historical, existential mileau which is both unique to us in our situation in spacetime and yet, more fundamentally, ontologically, a partial expression of the integrations of Being as a whole. I think we sense these larger and deeper integrations, but do not, outside phenomenological thinking, come closer to appreciating them, understanding them. The phenomenologists, Strawson, and Kafatos do bring us closer to understanding them, imo.
Would you expand on that idea with some specific details? This would be an interesting topic to explore. For example, ‘emergence’ and ‘supervenience’ are theories intended to explain a variety of complex changes revealed in some of our species’ specific/specialized investigations of how nature works. How deep do these theoretical concepts go in investigating the intrinsic structure of what has evolved in nature and more fundamentally in being as Kafatos explicates it.
Yes, to the underscored statement above. Would you and/or Steve [@smcder] expand on what you mean by "naive realism." My impression is that this term has been used in various ways, and for a variety of purposes [mostly dismissive] by both analytical philosophers and cognitive neuroscientists. Kant's and Husserl's contributions (early and late) to our understanding of the nature of human perception are critically important in the history of the recognition of the difference between 'things in themselves', which are closed to us, and 'things as seen' which are available to us in our openness to them, and clarified and interpreted in their meaning and significance by phenomenological philosophers [who in turn are justified in referring to analytical philosophy and objectivist science as 'naive' in their categorical approach to reality {what-is} as it is known/understood in lived experience].