smcder
Paranormal Adept
But I think you may have to read further or you'll miss his final move and point...i.e. phenomenal knowledge must reside in the domain of the absolute.
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Source?
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But I think you may have to read further or you'll miss his final move and point...i.e. phenomenal knowledge must reside in the domain of the absolute.
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Everything resides within the absolute. But knowledge that resides within the absolute is not therefore absolute knowledge.
The question I'm asking is essentially whether absolute knowledge is attainable. The answer so far seems to be a resounding no.
I do wonder how philosophers of math would answer that question however.
It doesn't take much trickery with words and syntax to muddle a notion--which is probably why Schopenhauer considered Hegel mostly nonsense. However I think there are subtle lessons to be learned.
To apply "identity" as a relation between "thought" and "being" unfortunately ends the discussion (if following the normal rules and procedures...i.e. semantics and meaning) because we end up with what appears to be nothing more than a vacuous "it is what it is" truism.
"Absolute Knowledge" ambiguously divides into knowledge obtained within the framework of the absolute (or totality) or could be "absolute" (different sense) "knowledge of the absolute."
I think this is where people like Schopenhauer tune out and begin from scratch...and I don't blame them.
Instead there are some who will continue to have a fetish over what is fundamentally unattainable by an embodied self within the world from which they emerged. You are right to consider the "philosophers of math" at this point...tis precisely the point Kurt Godel indicated in his famous "Incompleteness" theorem and to some extent is illustrated in microcosm as "this sentence I am saying is false."
At this point I don't have much else to add that will be meaningful to expand my (or your) understanding ... there are many thoughts floating in my head right now and they are all arguing with each other
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I very much like the thread requesting a comparison between the asserted independence of 'god' and 'mathematics,' respectively
He's a bit too dismissive of Hegel...but that's just my first reaction (yes I am biased). Other than that his works are a breath of fresh air for those looking for a few rays of common sense to emerge from that period.
Other than that I cannot comment.
A tall order since I am myself often thrown into confusion trying to parse out Hegel. I think one good start may be looking into some of Heidegger's commentaries and analyses of Hegel. Regarding Schopenhaur, I did not mean to imply his contributions are 'trivial'...but to contribute a commentary on his role in the advancement of philosophy will require additional digging and reading on my part.I think you should 'comment' on your view that Schopenhauer provides merely "a few rays of common sense." That is, if you see Schopenhauer's contributions as trivial when you set him alongside your view of Hegel's philosophy, please do tell us more. In your now proceeding to provide interpretations of parts of Hegel's Introduction to The Phenomenology of Spirit (including Findlay's, which I am now also reading), you take us to a core issue in epistemology with which we have been struggling all along in this thread, and I for one hope we can develop a discussion of it. Last night I copied out this interpretation by Findlay of the significance of section 75 of Hegel's introduction:
…"75. That we might have knowledge of a sort, e.g. of phenomena, but not of what absolutely is, is a wholly obscure notion to which no one has managed to give any clear meaning. (Even knowledge of Schein or Erscheinung, Hegel is later to insist, is knowledge- of how things really appear to be or manifestly are.)”
Let's follow this thread in Hegel and also in Schopenhauer and then into phenomenological philosophy proper. Why don't we all read Hegel's introduction itself and try together to work out its meaning, which seems to me at this point to anticipate existential phenomenology as more fully developed in the 20th century?
I think you should 'comment' on your view that Schopenhauer provides merely "a few rays of common sense." That is, if you see Schopenhauer's contributions as trivial when you set him alongside your view of Hegel's philosophy, please do tell us more. In your now proceeding to provide interpretations of parts of Hegel's Introduction to The Phenomenology of Spirit (including Findlay's, which I am now also reading), you take us to a core issue in epistemology with which we have been struggling all along in this thread, and I for one hope we can develop a discussion of it. Last night I copied out this interpretation by Findlay of the significance of section 75 of Hegel's introduction:
…"75. That we might have knowledge of a sort, e.g. of phenomena, but not of what absolutely is, is a wholly obscure notion to which no one has managed to give any clear meaning. (Even knowledge of Schein or Erscheinung, Hegel is later to insist, is knowledge- of how things really appear to be or manifestly are.)”
Let's follow this thread in Hegel and also in Schopenhauer and then into phenomenological philosophy proper. Why don't we all read Hegel's introduction itself and try together to work out its meaning, which seems to me at this point to anticipate existential phenomenology as more fully developed in the 20th century?
@Constance Based on the Archdruid's characterization of Schopenhauer's thinking, he provides a way past dualism. A way that began with Kant's recognizing the distinction between phenomena and noumena. So I would think Kant had moved beyond dualism as well.
Why would that be interesting?It would be interesting to find out whether Kant scholars and contemporary philosophers think Kant moved beyond dualism.
It would be interesting to find out whether Kant scholars and contemporary philosophers think Kant moved beyond dualism. My impression is that he didn't, but I haven't read most of Kant. It seems that Schopenhauer did not overcome dualism either, though he pointed the way toward the experiential grounds on which phenomenology ultimately does so.
Sums up this thread perfectly.It doesn't take much trickery with words and syntax to muddle a notion ...
For those interested...my youtube channel:
Why would that be interesting?