Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 9

[Soupie]

If Strawson were to hold that reality just is constituted of conscious particles, then I would say my view differs from his Real Materialism.

However, if Strawson holds that reality just is fundamentally consciousness and physics and matter is what we get when humans perceive, observe, or otherwise measure this consciousness substrate, then our views would be equal.

I think many people are so accustomed to thinking of consciousness as synonymous with mind that it is difficult for them to grok the concept of pure experience/consciousness a la William James.

And the notion that this pure experience/consciousness might have properties that we can (begin to) approximate with our physics and maths is just too much.

But that is what I am saying. And that's what I believe Strawson and Russell were saying.

Re Idealism

Again, often the notion of Idealism is the reality is one mind. I'm not suggesting reality is one mind, only that our physical reality is fundamentally pure experience/consciousness.

I'm suggesting that mind form within the background of pure experience. We experience minds from the "inside" by way of being minds. We experience other minds from the "outside" to matter by way of perception (state change), observation, and measurement.

As far as reality being "immaterial," I really struggle with this. What does this mean?

Material might mean reality just is material (and nothing else). Since I reject this, does this mean that I think reality is immaterial?

Immaterial might mean that reality doesn't have properties that we map via physics. Since I reject this, does this mean I don't think reality is immaterial?

 

[smcder]

"I'm not saying that consciousness does not have properties. I believe it does. To what extent quantum and classical physics reveal those properties I'm not sure."

It would be consistent to say, given that Strawson is a materialist-hard determinist, the properties of cs. are just those of matter plus the intrinsic properties (consciousness). Is that your view?

 

[Soupie]

Ok good ... Maybe I'm making progress. (And I don't want to lose track of the discussion on Psi.)

Strawson writes:

"Human conscious experience is wholly a matter of physical goings-on in the body and in particular the brain."

Is that also your position?

That sounds odd if we forget that Strawson believes (physical) reality is fundamentally consciousness.

And this is exactly what I believe (at least in the case of humans):

Human conscious experience (i.e. human minds) is a matter of state changes in the body/brain.

 

[smcder]

If Strawson were to hold that reality just is constituted of conscious particles, then I would say my view differs from his Real Materialism.

However, if Strawson holds that reality just is fundamentally consciousness and physics and matter is what we get when humans perceive, observe, or otherwise measure this consciousness substrate, then our views would be equal.

I think many people are so accustomed to thinking of consciousness as synonymous with mind that it is difficult for them to grok the concept of pure experience/consciousness a la William James.

And the notion that this pure experience/consciousness might have properties that we can (begin to) approximate with our physics and maths is just too much.

But that is what I am saying. And that's what I believe Strawson and Russell were saying.

Re Idealism

Again, often the notion of Idealism is the reality is one mind. I'm not suggesting reality is one mind, only that our physical reality is fundamentally pure experience/consciousness.

I'm suggesting that mind form within the background of pure experience. We experience minds from the "inside" by way of being minds. We experience other minds from the "outside" to matter by way of perception (state change), observation, and measurement.

As far as reality being "immaterial," I really struggle with this. What does this mean?

Material might mean reality just is material (and nothing else). Since I reject this, does this mean that I think reality is immaterial?

Immaterial might mean that reality doesn't have properties that we map via physics. Since I reject this, does this mean I don't think reality is immaterial?

Is this your view

"Human conscious experience is wholly a matter of physical goings-on in the body and in particular the brain."

Or do you disagree?

 

[smcder]

That sounds odd if we forget that Strawson believes (physical) reality is fundamentally consciousness.

And this is exactly what I believe (at least in the case of humans):

Human conscious experience (i.e. human minds) is a matter of state changes in the body/brain.

A better question for you might be: are you a hard determinist? Do we have free will?

 

[smcder]

That sounds odd if we forget that Strawson believes (physical) reality is fundamentally consciousness.

And this is exactly what I believe (at least in the case of humans):

Human conscious experience (i.e. human minds) is a matter of state changes in the body/brain.

I think I'm seeing where your confusion is. Strawson I believe is a physicalist and materialist in very traditional terms - in fact he is arguung for a return to that Old Time Physicalism by snatching it from the jaws of the hard problem. He wants to extend the material just far enough to cover consciousness, you want to versa the vice.

 

[Soupie]

"I'm not saying that consciousness does not have properties. I believe it does. To what extent quantum and classical physics reveal those properties I'm not sure."

It would be consistent to say, given that Strawson is a materialist-hard determinist, the properties of cs. are just those of matter plus the intrinsic properties (consciousness). Is that your view?

Yes. But change "cs" to (human) mind.

And add the qualification/clarification that matter is the "externally" perceived structure of consciousness, while phenomenology is the "internally" being'd of consciousness.

I've articulated this view before: a mind experienced (be'd) from the "inside" is green, a mind viewed from "outside" is a brain/neurons/molecules/particles.

 

[smcder]

Yes. But change "cs" to (human) mind.

And add the qualification/clarification that matter is the "externally" perceived structure of consciousness, while phenomenology is the "internally" being of consciousness.

I've articulated this view before: a mind experienced (be'd) from the "inside" is green, a mind viewed from "outside" is a brain/neurons/molecules/particles.

Ok because above you say you don't know what the properties of conscious might be? I'm saying Strawson may only want to cede "what it is likeness" to cs. otherwise it's whirling atoms in the void. You down with that? We willl check on epiphenimenalism next.

Why change it to the (human) mind?

Are you a hard determinist? Do we have free will?

 

[Soupie]

A better question for you might be: are you a hard determinist? Do we have free will?

I'm agnostic.

If the order we experience is due to a linear causality, I'm not sure how human subjects/minds could have free will within this causal chain.

On the other hand, it could very well be that the order we experience is due to a nonlinear causality and that there is plenty of room for human subjects/minds to have free will.

Free will doesn't hinge on whether one is a materialist or a conscious realist, but rather on how we ultimately explain that order.

 

[Soupie]

Ok because above you say you don't know what the properties of conscious might be?

For instance, why is EM wave X experienced as green and not blue?

While the structure of the brain can seem to explain why we see three primary colors, the WIL of each color still seems arbitrary from the physical perspective.

I'm saying Strawson may only want to cede "what it is likeness" to cs. otherwise it's whirling atoms in the void. You down with that? We willl check on epiphenimenalism next.

I wonder if Strawson's view isnt more nuanced. He did add "human" experience to brain processes.

If Strawson claims that only human brains have consciousness and not all matter, than I think his view ceases to make logical sense. (Of course some would say that anyway.) Then he is faced with the HP.

Why change it to the (human) mind?

Because I believe certain properties of minds can be explained—even today—by the structures of brains.

However, I dont think consciousness (pure experience) can be explained at all by the structures of brains.

 

[smcder]

"I wonder if Strawson's view isnt more nuanced. He did add "human" experience to brain processes."

What else would there be for a RM besides "matter" and "experience"?

"While the structure of the brain can seem to explain why we see three primary colors, the WIL of each color still seems arbitrary from the physical perspective."

For RM experience IS physical. Qualia are physical -

"Human conscious experience is wholly a matter of physical goings-on in the body and in particular the brain."

What's arbitrary about that?

 

[smcder]

Ok so that's a difference from GS

"Human conscious experience is wholly a matter of physical goings-on in the body and in particular the brain."

 

[Soupie]

"I wonder if Strawson's view isnt more nuanced. He did add "human" experience to brain processes."

What else would there be for a RM besides "matter" and "experience"?

Im not sure how the quote and your question go together here.

My point was that Strawson may have been saying that all matter is conscioussness, but that human experience (as a form of consciousness) is all to do with the brain (a form of matter).

"While the structure of the brain can seem to explain why we see three primary colors, the WIL of each color still seems arbitrary from the physical perspective."

For RM experience IS physical. Qualia are physical -

"Human conscious experience is wholly a matter of physical goings-on in the body and in particular the brain."

What's arbitrary about that?

However, he does distinquish between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, but considers both kinds of properties to be physical.

So just calling them physical doesnt suddenly give us new knowledge.

Thus, while phenomenal blue and phenomenal green would both be physical properties on Strawson's view, he distinquishes them as intrinsic properties which wouldnt be explicable via extrinsic physical properties such as figure and movement.

The explanatory gap between intrinsic and extrinsic properties remains even if we recognize them as the result of "point of view."

I seriously wonder if its possible in principle or practice for humans to ever have an answer as to why physical state X of the organism just is experience X1.

 

[smcder]

"I seriously wonder if its possible in principle or practice for humans to ever have an answer as to why physical state X of the organism just is experience X1."

Isn't that the answer that is on offer? Physical state X (extrinsic view) "just is" experience X1 (intrinsic view) ... Some would ask where the gap is?

If not, what can you say about what such an answer would look like?

Strawson talks about the identity theory and also says the "picture of matter" (the image that some people hold in mind) that makes it hard for them to accept that the brain just is the mind just is the brain just is ....

He has a nice way of talking about how you can't deny the experience, the "mind" side of the mind = brain equation, so the "give" has to be on the brain side, the matter side. We think we know more about matter than we do. That helped me see the Identity Theory more clearly.

"I seriously wonder if its possible in principle or practice for humans to ever have an answer as to why physical state X of the organism just is experience X1." - Strawson might say that what you are asking for is an answer from physics, from what we know from physics about matter. But all we know about matter from physics is structure. He says there is no hope of answering the question by way of what we know about the structure of matter. Nagel comes back in to tell us what such an answer would look like in his example of looking at a brain scan and seeing the experience of tasting chocolate.

 

[smcder]

Michael Lockwood, Mind, Brain, and the Quantum: The Compound 'I' - PhilPapers

@Constance This is referenced in Strawson's paper on the myth of consciousness, there's a number of papers on QM and cs. linked from it.

This is a short article on the book by the "Information Pholosopher":

Michael Lockwood

This seems very much like the conception of time in The Arrival ( film)/ "Story of Your Life" (short story by Ted Chiang).

 

[smcder]

https://www.quantamagazine.org/20161102-quantum-neuroscience/

A new theory explains how fragile quantum states may be able to exist for hours or even days in our warm, wet brain. Experiments should soon test the idea.

The mere mention of “quantum consciousness” makes most physicists cringe, as the phrase seems to evoke the vague, insipid musings of a New Age guru. But if a new hypothesis proves to be correct, quantum effects might indeed play some role in human cognition. Matthew Fisher, a physicist at the University of California, Santa Barbara, raised eyebrows late last year when he published a paper in Annals of Physics proposing that the nuclear spins of phosphorus atoms could serve as rudimentary “qubits” in the brain — which would essentially enable the brain to function like a quantum computer.

 

[Constance]

I think this paper from Nagel, "CONCEIVING THE IMPOSSIBLE AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM," is helpful regarding the vagueness and vagaries of the metaphysical theory @Soupie has been arguing for. I would subtitle it with this revision of a line from Hamlet: "The fault [gap] is not in ourselves but in our concepts."

http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1172/conceiving.pdf

 

[smcder]

I think this paper from Nagel, "CONCEIVING THE IMPOSSIBLE AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM," is helpful regarding the vagueness and vagaries of the metaphysical theory @Soupie has been arguing for. I would subtitle it with this revision of a line from Hamlet: "The fault [gap] is not in ourselves but in our concepts."

http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1172/conceiving.pdf

Yes! There's the quote I was looking for:

"Yet I believe it is not irrational to hope that some day, long after we are all dead, people will be able to observe the operation of the brain and say, with true understanding, Thats what the experience of tasting chocolate looks like from the outside. Of course we already know what it looks like from far enough outside: the subject taking the first reverent mouthful of a hot fudge sundae, closing his eyes in rapture, and saying Yum.

But I have in mind some view or representation of the squishy brain itself, which in light of our understanding we will be able to see as tasting chocolate. While that is at the moment inconceivable, I think that it is what we would have to have to grasp what must be the truth about these matters."

 

[Constance]

Michael Lockwood, Mind, Brain, and the Quantum: The Compound 'I' - PhilPapers

@Constance This is referenced in Strawson's paper on the myth of consciousness, there's a number of papers on QM and cs. linked from it.
This is a short article on the book by the "Information Pholosopher":
Michael Lockwood
This seems very much like the conception of time in The Arrival ( film)/ "Story of Your Life" (short story by Ted Chiang).

Thanks. I looked up the Lockwood book on amazon and noted on the same page a link to Henry Stapp, Mindful Universe: Quantum Mechanics and the Participating Observer (The Frontiers Collection) 2nd ed. 2011 Edition, described briefly at its page at amazon:

"The classical mechanistic idea of nature that prevailed in science during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was an essentially mindless conception: the physically described aspects of nature were asserted to be completely determined by prior physically described aspects alone, with our conscious experiences entering only passively. During the twentieth century the classical concepts were found to be inadequate. In the new theory, quantum mechanics, our conscious experiences enter into the dynamics in specified ways not fixed by the physically described aspects alone. Consequences of this radical change in our understanding of the connection between mind and brain are described. This second edition contains two new chapters investigating the role of quantum phenomena in the problem of free will and in the placebo effect."

 

[Constance]

https://www.quantamagazine.org/20161102-quantum-neuroscience/

A new theory explains how fragile quantum states may be able to exist for hours or even days in our warm, wet brain. Experiments should soon test the idea.

That is a significant development; look forward to the results of those experiments.

The mere mention of “quantum consciousness” makes most physicists cringe, as the phrase seems to evoke the vague, insipid musings of a New Age guru. But if a new hypothesis proves to be correct, quantum effects might indeed play some role in human cognition. Matthew Fisher, a physicist at the University of California, Santa Barbara, raised eyebrows late last year when he published a paper in Annals of Physics proposing that the nuclear spins of phosphorus atoms could serve as rudimentary “qubits” in the brain — which would essentially enable the brain to function like a quantum computer.

I'll read the Quanta article and do a search with the terms 'qubits' and 'consciousness'. What I found deeply ramifying in the quantum mind theory developed in the George Williams paper you linked was that he kept his focus on consciousness as distinct from cognition, thus significantly expanding the need for and relevance of psi investigations for the project of understanding consciousness (which is the sine qua non for understanding mind).