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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 9

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"Awareness" is the term that needs to critiqued. The notion that recursive looping and supposed resulting 'transcendental' integration of information in computers is equivalent to 'awareness' in humans is an example of wish-fulfillment in the reasoning of proponents of general AI. Even knowing one day "everything a human brain can do" will not bring us to an understanding of what embodied consciousness in our species and others can and does do out of the influences of subconscious mentation.

I remember writing the same objection here when we first discussed Tononi's Integrated Information Theory. That was at a time when Tononi issued a fourth version of IIT that attempted to take account of phenomenological experience. What he produced at that point was inadequate to account for the 'phenomenology of perception' as analyzed by Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenological philosophers. We need the insights of the phenomenologists to begin to understand the nature of consciousness, but we also need the insights of evolutionary biologists, affective neuroscientists, psychologists who have uncovered to various extents the subconscious influences affecting what we become conscious of (and how we become conscious of it), philosophers that have struggled for several millenia with the mind-body problem in both the East and the West, and also the history of what can be called 'spiritual experiences' in human beings as pursued in both psychical and paranormal research and in the history of mysticism. What a long way we have yet to go in plumbing the origins and depths of consciousness.

Agreed - Mangan's paper is referred to in the Panksepp paper you link above:

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/95b1/87b876eb74b8e9cc9a8bc468bd9845ee3a71.pdf

"This type of anoetic consciousness may include aspects of the ‘‘fringe consciousness” that has been extensively discussed by Mangan (2001) along with the accompanying dozen commentaries. In our view, this ‘‘free water of consciousness”, that has been underestimated empirically, is largely affective (Panksepp, 2003), based on ancient systems that encode basic (primary-process) emotional and motivational survival values, that are encapsulated within the concept of raw affective consciousness (Panksepp, 2008)."

Sensation's Ghost - the Non-sensory Fringe of Consciousness
http://www.theassc.org/files/assc/2509.pdf


KEYWORDS Consciousness, fringe, inattention, nonsensory experience, implicit cognition, voluntary retrieval, feeling-of-knowing, emotion, qualia.

ABSTRACT Non-sensory experiences represent almost all context information in consciousness. They condition most aspects of conscious cognition including voluntary retrieval, perception, monitoring, problem solving, emotion, evaluation, meaning recognition. Many peculiar aspects of non-sensory qualia (e.g., they resist being 'grasped' by an act of attention) are explained as adaptations shaped by the cognitive functions they serve. The most important nonsensory experience is coherence or "rightness." Rightness represents degrees of context fit among contents in consciousness, and between conscious and non-conscious processes. Rightness (not familiarity) is the feeling-of-knowing in implicit cognition. The experience of rightness suggests that neural mechanisms "compute" signals indicating the global dynamics of network integration.

This is a good piece of neuro-phenomenology and this paper is an interesting response to Mangan:

http://journalpsyche.org/files/0xbb19.pdf

KEYWORDS Consciousness, Fringe, Nonsensory Experience, Phenomenology, Husserl

ABSTRACT “Sensation’s Ghost” identifies one type of non-sensory experience, the quasi-feelings that attend perception, inflecting them vaguely and globally. Following Husserl, I suggest that non-sensory awareness includes much more than the fringe elements Mangan discusses. Every perceptual property can be either sensed, or apprehended in a non-sensory manner. Non-sensory apprehensions are nonetheless part of the occurrent conscious awareness of objects and scenes.
 
Substrate: a substance or layer that underlies something, or on which some process occurs, ... (Google)

When I refer to consciousness (feeling) as a substrate, I mean it in the sense above, as a layer that underlies the processes of mind and mind-independent processes that we perceive.

Emergence is not a term that is central to my argument, except to say that consciousness-as-substrate must have properties that allow complex processes to emerge within it.

Often the concept of emergence is invoked to explain how consciousness (feeling) could be a property of physical processes. I'm not making that argument.

Illusion, like emergence, is not a term that is central to my argument. What is central to my argument is the role perspective plays in the challenge of understanding how consciousness relates to matter (which I will refer to as the Mind Body Problem [MBP]).

Perspective: a particular attitude toward or way of regarding something; a point of view. (Google)

All perception involves such perspective. When an organism perceives a stimulus, the relationship is X & X1, where X is the stimulus and X1 is the corresponding state of the organism.

There will always be a dissociation between the stimulus and the corresponding state of the organism. They are not identical.

Rather than refer to this relationship as an illusion, we can refer to is as a matter of perspective.

For example, given stimulus X, two different perceiving organisms will assume two different corresponding states, say, X1 and X2.

Thus, each organism will have a unique perspective on any given stimulus. Even a brief review of the literature outlining the physiological state changes associated with perception will provide one with a sense of their immense complexity.

Identity. This one is very tricky because it is a conceptually loaded term. So, I will try clarify here what I mean when I argue that the organism and the mind are "identical."

Imagine that you--a perceiving organism--perceive three objects (stimuli). Let's refer to these three objects as X, Y, and Z. As outlined above, the process of perception involves you--the organism--undergoing state changes as you perceive each of these three objects. Your state changes will correspond with each of these objects, allowing you to perceive them.

However, since we know that there remains a dissociation between each of the corresponding state changes and the objects themselves, we know that your perceptions will be perspectival.

X & X1
Y & Y1
Z & Z1

Let's imagine that X is actually a banana. What we need to understand is that our perception 'banana" is not identical to the corresponding stimulus in front of us in mind-independent reality. There remains the dissociation noted above. And again, as noted, different organisms will have different perspectives on stimulus X.

Let's imagine that Y is actually a flower. Our perception of Y as a 'flower' will differ from a butterfly's perception of Y. There really is stimulus Y out there in mind-independent reality, but there will remain a dissociation between our's and the butterfly's perceptions of stimulus Y.

Now, what if I say that when a human perceives stimulus Z they see a human. We know there is a dissociation between stimulus Z and our perception 'human.' Stimulus Z and the perception 'human' are not identical.

A 'human' is merely our human perspective on stimulus Z. What is stimulus Z? Stimulus Z is the mind.

What I am suggesting is that the Mind Body Problem is a problem of perspective, not ontology.

The mind and body seem to be two distinct "things" only because when we perceive the mind, we see a body.

The body is the mind viewed from the 3rd-person perspective.


Yes, getting matter from consciousness-as-substrate is easier than getting consciousness (feeling) from matter.

How do you get matter from mind?

The answer is that we already do. All 3rd person knowledge comes directly through 1st-person experience (and intersubjective experience).

Said differently: How the mind (consciousness) relates to the body (matter) is an open question, but it is a fact to say that matter is only ever known within (a) the mind.

In other words, we already know that consciousness can contain matter.

Another response is that while consciousness-as-substrate just is feeling, that does not mean that consciousness-as-substrate doesn't have other properties or that other properties cannot or do not emerge from consciousness-as-substrate.

Again, the MBP is an open question. However, via introspection, we know that consciousness (aka the stream of consciousness) is diverse, dynamic, structured, patterned, and differentiated.

So it is self-evident that consciousness (and therefore my theoretical consciousness-as-substrate) is not homogeneous.

Therefore, consciousness (no matter its relation to the body) must have properties which allow it to be heterogenous.


I can't answer that question. But as outlined above, it seems that consciousness (feeling) does indeed have properties that allow it to differentiate.

To answer this question "how," researches will need to continue using the scientific method coupled with phenomenology, while continuing to tease apart (as far as we are able) mind-dependent properties and mind-independent properties.


Due to the differentiated nature of the mind, it's logical to deduce that consciousness has properties which allow such differentiation.


I agree. I will continue to think of ways of empirically testing this hypothesis. Obviously, that's going to be problematic considering we can't even empirically prove that anyone is conscious.


I agree that no view is currently adequate. However, the above view seems to me to have the most going for it at the moment.

Duh! I should have seen this ...

"So it is self-evident that consciousness (and therefore my theoretical consciousness-as-substrate) is not homogeneous."

At the point I would call it matter!
 
Duh! I should have seen this ...

"So it is self-evident that consciousness (and therefore my theoretical consciousness-as-substrate) is not homogeneous."

At the point I would call it matter!
The Hard Problem exists because we make a conceptual distinction between consciousness (feeling) and matter, or at least the properties* of matter. Extension in space, mass, spin, etc. (I know it would bore Constance to tears, but that's where I want to go next. Just what is matter at its most fundamental level? What is our current understanding?)

What you seem to be suggesting smcder is that as soon as I suggest that this consciousness (feeling) can move from a homogeneous state into a heterogeneous state, that I am claiming a miracle occurred. I mean, you're not wrong.

But is t that essentially what we do with matter? It began as a singualarity (homo) and the Big Bang occurred (miracle) and now matter is differentiated (hetero)?

What is matter?
 
There are so many ways to show how very, very tightly intertwined subjective experience and the body are. From all other perspectives save the perceptual, 3rd person perspective, the mind and body seem to be identical.

There are countless threads of evidence suggesting the mind and body are one.

The Hard Problem is a flag telling us we're making a wrong assumption about things.

Russel and others (the real physicalist) tell us: perception and physics cannot show us the intrinsic nature of matter (reality), they can only present us with its extrinsic nature (and even then we have to discern which properties are Mind-independent and which Mind-dependent.)

I think this is one of those "once you see it, you can't unsee it" things.
 
The Hard Problem exists because we make a conceptual distinction between consciousness (feeling) and matter, or at least the properties* of matter. Extension in space, mass, spin, etc. (I know it would bore Constance to tears, but that's where I want to go next. Just what is matter at its most fundamental level? What is our current understanding?)

What you seem to be suggesting smcder is that as soon as I suggest that this consciousness (feeling) can move from a homogeneous state into a heterogeneous state, that I am claiming a miracle occurred. I mean, you're not wrong.

But is t that essentially what we do with matter? It began as a singualarity (homo) and the Big Bang occurred (miracle) and now matter is differentiated (hetero)?

What is matter?

"But is t that essentially what we do with matter?"

Yes, that's my point!
 
There are so many ways to show how very, very tightly intertwined subjective experience and the body are. From all other perspectives save the perceptual, 3rd person perspective, the mind and body seem to be identical.

There are countless threads of evidence suggesting the mind and body are one.

The Hard Problem is a flag telling us we're making a wrong assumption about things.

Russel and others (the real physicalist) tell us: perception and physics cannot show us the intrinsic nature of matter (reality), they can only present us with its extrinsic nature (and even then we have to discern which properties are Mind-independent and which Mind-dependent.)

I think this is one of those "once you see it, you can't unsee it" things.

Russel says that the intrinsic nature of matter is consciousness.

If that's all you've been saying ...
 
47_starchild2.jpg
 
Steve wrote: "Again, it seems to me just as hard to get matter/minds from consciousness-as-substrate as to get mind from "brute" matter - further evidence is that both require "emergence" to get there ..."

Soupie wrote: "Emergence is not a term that is central to my argument, except to say that consciousness-as-substrate must have properties that allow complex processes to emerge within it.

Steve replied: OK, that alone makes "emergence" central to your argument!

I agree. Emergence is involved in @Soupie's proposed ontology, but evolution and development -- which enable emergence -- seem to be excluded from that ontology in terms of both consciousness/mind and matter. The apparently insurmountable problem with a single substrate of 'feeling/consciousness' such as @Soupie proposes is that it seems to be impossible -- at least for us humans at this point in our evolution -- to identify the means by which a presumed homogenous substrate of 'feeling/consciousness' could differentiate within itself into 'mind' and 'matter' without the sensed presence of something to become conscious of. As Husserl wrote: "Consciousness is always consciousness of something." Thus: "No consciousness without things; no things without consciousness." In phenomenology and affective neuroscience, the sense of 'self-presence' develops and emerges from sensed awareness of the presence of a physically material environment characterized by perceived things and perceived gestalts.

@Soupie writes above that "consciousness-as-substrate must have properties that allow complex processes to emerge within it." If so, the challenge to be met is to discover and describe what those intrinsic "properties" are and how they can bifurcate into 'things' and the awareness and conscious experience of things.

In complex systems theory, physicists have been able to demonstrate that physical forces and fields interact with one another in the evolution of the physical universe. We think we understand that the quantum substrate reveals both interactive particles and interacting fields continually transitioning/transposing into and out of one another. We can imagine but not demonstrate that 'consciousness' or 'protoconsciousness' exists in either particles or fields or both -- {or possibly in their transpositions from one state into another} -- but we are unable to demonstrate the existence in particles or fields of

a)
'feeling' {as sensation/sensibility, biological capabilities developing into awareness and emotion in living organisms}, or

b) 'consciousness' in its demonstrated layered and interactive complexity, or

c) 'mind' as integrated feeling, intelligence, and accumulating reason and insight emerging from conscious experience of 'being in the world'.

Might it be that the transitions/transformations between particle states and field states in the q substrate, which we observe indirectly and cannot yet explain, somehow constitute interacting self-dissipative complex systems, of which there are many examples in physics? Evan Thompson et al have also described biologically living organisms as self-dissipative complex systems. If the alternating states measureable in the q substrate, either separately or interactively, constitute 'self-dissipate complex system(s)', might there be an actual bridge here between the so-called 'hard sciences' and the 'life sciences'? I have no idea, but this might be a subject we could explore here, following the experiments and theories of those quantum physicists who are participating in interdisciplinary consciousness studies.

The metaphysical nature of recent conversations here inclines me to join Colin McGinn in his "new mysterianism" -- his acceptance of the limits of our species' knowledge and insight in the effort to understand what consciousness is.
 
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Russel says that the intrinsic nature of matter is consciousness.

If that's all you've been saying ...
Yes. With the caveat that what we perceive to be the extrinsic nature/properties of intrinsically conscious matter are tangeled up with our human perceptual systems.
 
Steve wrote: "Again, it seems to me just as hard to get matter/minds from consciousness-as-substrate as to get mind from "brute" matter - further evidence is that both require "emergence" to get there ..."

Soupie wrote: "Emergence is not a term that is central to my argument, except to say that consciousness-as-substrate must have properties that allow complex processes to emerge within it.

Steve replied: OK, that alone makes "emergence" central to your argument!

I agree. Emergence is involved in @Soupie's proposed ontology, but evolution and development -- which enable emergence -- seem to be excluded from that ontology in terms of both consciousness/mind and matter. The apparently insurmountable problem with a single substrate of 'feeling/consciousness' such as @Soupie proposes is that it seems to be impossible -- at least for us humans at this point in our evolution -- to identify the means by which a presumed homogenous substrate of 'feeling/consciousness' could differentiate within itself into 'mind' and 'matter' without the sensed presence of something to become conscious of. As Husserl wrote: "Consciousness is always consciousness of something." Thus: "No consciousness without things; no things without consciousness." In phenomenology and affective neuroscience, the sense of 'self-presence' develops and emerges from sensed awareness of the presence of a physically material environment characterized by perceived things and perceived gestalts.

@Soupie writes above that "consciousness-as-substrate must have properties that allow complex processes to emerge within it." If so, the challenge to be met is to discover and describe what those intrinsic "properties" are and how they can bifurcate into 'things' and the awareness and conscious experience of things.

In complex systems theory, physicists have been able to demonstrate that physical forces and fields interact with one another in the evolution of the physical universe. We think we understand that the quantum substrate reveals both interactive particles and interacting fields continually transitioning/transposing into and out of one another. We can imagine but not demonstrate that 'consciousness' or 'protoconsciousness' exists in either particles or fields or both -- {or possibly in their transpositions from one state into another} -- but we are unable to demonstrate the existence in particles or fields of

a)
'feeling' {as sensation/sensibility, biological capabilities developing into awareness and emotion in living organisms}, or

b) 'consciousness' in its demonstrated layered and interactive complexity, or

c) 'mind' as integrated feeling, intelligence, and accumulating reason and insight emerging from conscious experience of 'being in the world'.

Might it be that the transitions/transformations between particle states and field states in the q substrate, which we observe indirectly and cannot yet explain, somehow constitute interacting self-dissipative complex systems, of which there are many examples in physics? Evan Thompson et al have also described biologically living organisms as self-dissipative complex systems. If the alternating states measureable in the q substrate, either separately or interactively, constitute 'self-dissipate complex system(s)', might there be an actual bridge here between the so-called 'hard sciences' and the 'life sciences'? I have no idea, but this might be a subject we could explore here, following the experiments and theories of those quantum physicists who are participating in interdisciplinary consciousness studies.

The metaphysical nature of recent conversations here inclines me to join Colin McGinn in his "new mysterianism" -- his acceptance of the limits of our species' knowledge and insight in the effort to understand what consciousness is.

well and succinctly put
 
Is Reality Digital or Analog? Essay contest. There are some good ones.

FQXi - Foundational Questions Institute

Quantum Theory without Quantization
Ken Wharton

Essay Abstract

The only evidence we have for a discrete reality comes from quantum measurements; without invoking these measurements, quantum theory describes continuous entities. This seeming contradiction can be resolved via analysis that treats measurements as boundary constraints. It is well-known that boundaries can induce apparently-discrete behavior in continuous systems, and strong analogies can be drawn to the case of quantum measurement. If quantum discreteness arises in this manner, this would not only indicate an analog reality, but would also offer a solution to the so-called "measurement problem".

Author Bio
Ken Wharton is an Associate Professor in the Department of Physics and Astronomy at San Jose State University. His research is focused on the foundations of quantum theory, with a particular interest in fully time-symmetric approaches.
 
The first place essay:

Is Reality Digital or Analog?
Jarmo Makela

Essay Abstract
A report of a discussion with Isaac Newton.

Author Bio
I received my PhD in theoretial physics from the University of Jyv‰skyl‰, Finland, in 1994, and did a post-doc in the Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics of the University of Cambridge during the years 1995-1996. Since the year 2000 I have worked as a Senior Lecturer of mathematics and physics in the Vaasa University of Applied Sciences located in Vaasa, Finland.
 
Is Reality Digital or Analog? Essay contest. There are some good ones.

FQXi - Foundational Questions Institute

Quantum Theory without Quantization
Ken Wharton

Essay Abstract

The only evidence we have for a discrete reality comes from quantum measurements; without invoking these measurements, quantum theory describes continuous entities. This seeming contradiction can be resolved via analysis that treats measurements as boundary constraints. It is well-known that boundaries can induce apparently-discrete behavior in continuous systems, and strong analogies can be drawn to the case of quantum measurement. If quantum discreteness arises in this manner, this would not only indicate an analog reality, but would also offer a solution to the so-called "measurement problem".

Author Bio
Ken Wharton is an Associate Professor in the Department of Physics and Astronomy at San Jose State University. His research is focused on the foundations of quantum theory, with a particular interest in fully time-symmetric approaches.

Excellent resource for us at this point, @Soupie. I plan to read all of the linked essays. I started with the one linked below, which I recommend.

Physics and the Integers, David Tong

Abstract: I review how discrete structures, embodied in the integers, appear in the laws of physics, from quantum mechanics to statistical mechanics to the Standard Model. I argue that the integers are emergent. If we are looking to build the future laws of physics, discrete mathematics is no better a starting point than the rules of scrabble.

http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Tong_integers.pdf
 
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Here is a ramifying extract from the Wharton essay @Soupie referenced first:

". . . Even if we were in possession of a unified physical theory that explained all known experimental and observational data, we would still not be able to definitively answer the question of whether reality was fundamentally continuous or discrete. If our unified theory was based on a continuous ontology, there would always be the possibility that this was simply an approximation for an underlying discrete reality, too fine for our experiments to detect. Conversely, if the unified theory were based on discrete elements, future experiments might one day reveal that those elements emerged from an underlying continuous structure. Examples in this category include solitons (particle-like solutions of non-linear wave equations), or the discrete modes in continuous boundary-value problems, such as laser cavities.

Of course, we are not in possession of a unified theory. Of the two pillars of modern physics, general relativity (GR) is clearly in the continuum camp, but GR fundamentally conflicts with quantum theory (QT), a formalism with both continuous elements (quantum fields) and discrete elements (atomic energy levels, etc.). Naıvely, one might give more weight to GR’s principle-based framework than to the wishy-washy position of QT. But this view is not currently popular. Many physicists think that QT implies a discrete substructure for GR’s continuous spacetime, and the vast majority of the effort in reconciling these pillars lies in “quantizing gravity”, as opposed to finding a GR-compatible revision of QT.

But this conclusion is by no means definitive, especially when one considers that one of the biggest unresolved issues of QT – the “Measurement Problem” – is directly related to this discrete/continuous division. In a simplified nutshell, the QT formalism distinguishes between observations made from outside a system (which yield discrete results) and interactions within a system (which are treated much more continuously). This isn’t tenable because there’s no objective definition of a “system”; it can always be expanded to include any “outside” observations. The measurement problem is how objectively different mathematical procedures could possibly be associated with an apparently subjective parsing of joint vs. separate systems.

In this essay, I argue that the details of this unresolved tension (between the continuous and discrete aspects of QT) provide us with important clues as to whether nature is fundamentally digital or analog. Far from implying that fundamentally nature is somehow both (a meaningless position that many otherwiserational people have tried to adopt), QT is more likely describing a parameter regime where one of these descriptions is emerging from the other. After all, there are many known examples of discreteness arising from an underlying continuity, and vice-versa. This essay argues that the best analogies to QT are found in the discrete modes of continuous boundary value problems. If the discreteness of QT does indeed arise in this manner, then (together with GR) all of modern physics would be built upon a continuous foundation. 1 1 Whether this foundation would be fundamental, or emergent from a deeper discreteness, would remain to be seen.

Although discreteness only enters QT when one takes a measurement, many popular descriptions give the contrary impression that QT describes discrete entities, regardless of whether or not a “measurement” occurs. This is a fault that lies partially with poor word choices (including the very word “quantum”), but also arises from the natural assumption that measurements merely reveal an underlying reality. Here is a typical quote from Wikipedia [1]:

'A quantum mechanical system or particle that is bound – that is, confined spatially – can only take on certain discrete values of energy. This contrasts with classical particles, which can have any energy.'

This quote implies that a quantum system must always exist in one of several discrete modes, but such a statement is contradicted by the mathematics of QT. The fact is that a quantum system can be in any “superposition” of these different energy states, corresponding to a smooth continuum. An unmeasured single electron in an atom is therefore completely unconstrained by anything discrete, a stubborn fact that is difficult for many students to wrap their heads around after learning about atomic shells and quantum numbers.

Of course, when an energy measurement is made on an atomic electron, discreteness finally rears its head; the electron is never found in a superposition of different energy states, but always has one of several discrete energy values. One could argue that the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics is built around these discrete energies, but the way that these values come about is by solving a continuous boundary value problem (the wavefunction of the electron has to fall off to zero in all directions, sufficiently fast), making this an example of how quantized values naturally emerge when solving such problems in a bounded continuum. (More examples of “boundary-induced quantization” will be covered in Section III.)

Retreating to something that doesn’t have a spacetime representation – like quantum spin – doesn’t help the case for a fundamental discreteness. Inaccurate comments such as: ‘The spin of the electron can only be up or down’ are simply false, unless one is talking about the result of an actual measurement. In QT an electron spin lives on a continuous mathematical surface known as the Bloch sphere. Indeed, there exists a well-known, one-to-one correspondence between the mathematics of an unmeasured (quantum) electron spin and the (classical) polarization of a plane electromagnetic wave.[2, 3] This connection, combined with the clear continuum nature of the latter, makes it untenable to claim that former is built upon a discrete foundation.

The final line of retreat would be that quantum mechanics talks about discrete particles, which is true to a point. Quantum mechanics was designed to discuss a well-defined number of particles; in that sense, a discreteness has been put in by hand. But a more general theory which can handle particle creation and destruction – quantum field theory (QFT) – allows superpositions of different particle number states. (This should be no surprise, as QFT is built upon continuous fields!) Even when it comes to something as basic as particle number, nature is only discrete when we actually take a measurement.

But if things are discrete whenever we look, why wouldn’t they also be discrete when we don’t look? While this classical logic is tempting, it simply doesn’t stand up to the most basic quantum experiments. Take the double-slit experiment, where single particles pass through two closely-spaced slits (one particle at a time), and form a two-slit interference pattern as if the particles were continuous waves. Whenever one looks to see which slit the particle passes through, the interference pattern disappears. It only reappears when we don’t look. Any theory which demanded the same behavior, whether there was a measurement or not, would be unable to explain a vast array of similar observations.

Further insights can be gleaned from imprecise, or “weak” measurements. True, all measurements are imprecise to some extent. But there’s evidence that this non-exactness is not merely due to measurement 3 imprecision. For example, every observed transition between two atomic energy states has a “linewidth”, or range of possible energies, a non-discrete phenomenon that significantly impacts the real-world behavior of lasers. In another example, if one sends particles through a slit, the resulting behavior is only explicable in terms a wave that passes through the entire span of the slit. As one changes the size of the slit, the discreteness somehow automatically compensates. Dialing down the measurement sensitivity, as in recent “weak measurement” experiments, has also been observed to gradually destroy the discreteness predicted by quantum mechanics.[4, 5] It is as if particles somehow know how precisely they are being measured, and conspire to only be as discrete as the measurement precision demands.

This behavior is consistent with the known limit: If one takes away all measurements, QT turns out to be not quantized at all. This is in itself evidence of a continuous foundation for QT – with the enormous elephant in the room being the measurement problem, and the apparent discreteness that this process somehow generates. In the next sections, I’ll talk more about how the act of ‘looking’ could have such dramatic consequences, and how this might be our biggest clue as to what is really going on.

III. BOUNDARY-INDUCED QUANTIZATION
. . . . .

http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Wharton_FQX3.pdf
 
There's several of these that I would quibble with, and will address at some point. So, I think this is a good thought experiment but would disagree that it works.

The difference between what I am saying and panpsychism, I think, is that I am not saying that consciousness (feeling) is a property that this substrate has along with mass, extension, spin, etc.

I am saying that this substrate just is consciousness (feeling).

But what I am really, really trying to say is, I think, what @Michael Allen has been trying to say. Consciousness (feeling) isn't anything special, or additional, it just is matter. When I think of this consciousness (feeling) substrate, I really just think of it as Being.

There is a difference between this substrate and the complex structures that arise within it. Structures that are minds or subjective experience or memory.

Consciousness (feeling) isn't something that emerges from some physical processes. It is the substrate of everything. Being is the substrate of everything.

Within this substrate arise organisms with minds and subjective experience.

The notion that there are two, ontologically distinct substances or substrates is due to perception and how perception works. Perceptuon is a process of simulation which leads to the illusion of dualisms.

Re arise versus emerge. I'm not suggesting that matter is something irreducible that emerges from mind or vice versa.

So when I use the word emerge I mean it in the sense of "form." I pattern forming within a substrate.


Matter is something special. And then again it is nothing special--beyond what we have in consideration of these queer "material" elements. The "just" part of the sentence is sheer arrogance (not by your, in general...) ... i.e. to say that I am "just" me is an attempt to compress my entire history into something that in itself can be fully ascertained as a static entity with no dynamism whatsoever. Our language is bewitching, in that it allows us to place an entire cosmos of relations between the world and WORLD into a sound-byte that has the appearance of taking the place of the entire affair of existence.

So to say that "consciousness" is just matter...is the understatement of the year. Why? Because we still do not fully understand the hows, whys, and ways...of "matter." We can change the names and labels all we want, and pretend we have complete comprehension and understanding because we can place parts of the world into hierarchical posets...that in itself does not answer the question. Nor do we even (after the fact) see the utility of our original methods of questioning.
 
You might find this book interesting: Sacred Or Neural?

We might not be able to explain all the details about how the brain and nervous system make consciousness happen, but they do it somehow, and what's more, we don't even need to know exactly how it's done in order to replicate the phenomena. That's because humans have been physically replicating the phenomena for millennia via reproduction. This might seem like a trivialization, but it's not. It's inescapable proof that consciousness arises from a purely physical process, which is the assembly of billions upon billions upon billions of tiny pieces of physical stuff from the surrounding environment.

Replicating the phenomenon of consciousness is therefore proven possible by replicating the design that gives rise to it. The only question is whether or not the design can be replicated with other materials and still produce the same results, and that is not a trivial question either. Yet it seems to get glossed over by AI enthusiasts who focus on concepts like processing. Processing power and microchips may be entirely beside the point. It might be like thinking you can replicate a working piano by constructing the entire thing out of a solid piece of stone. It just won't perform as well if at all. ( There. Just to make everyone happy I didn't use the magnet analogy again. ).
 
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Matter is something special. And then again it is nothing special--beyond what we have in consideration of these queer "material" elements. The "just" part of the sentence is sheer arrogance (not by your, in general...) ... i.e. to say that I am "just" me is an attempt to compress my entire history into something that in itself can be fully ascertained as a static entity with no dynamism whatsoever. Our language is bewitching, in that it allows us to place an entire cosmos of relations between the world and WORLD into a sound-byte that has the appearance of taking the place of the entire affair of existence.

So to say that "consciousness" is just matter...is the understatement of the year. Why? Because we still do not fully understand the hows, whys, and ways...of "matter." We can change the names and labels all we want, and pretend we have complete comprehension and understanding because we can place parts of the world into hierarchical posets...that in itself does not answer the question. Nor do we even (after the fact) see the utility of our original methods of questioning.
Just to be clear, the use of "just is" and "nothing special" is to clarify the relationship between consciousness (feeling) and matter.

My argument is that consciousness (feeling) is not an ontologically distinct substance/substrate from matter, nor is consciousness (feeling) an irreducible substance/substrate that emerges from or "oozes" from neural or some other physical process.

Thus the claim the consciousness (feeling) just is matter and is nothing special, isn't a claim that matter is nothing special or just is something simple; it's a claim that consciousness (feeling) and matter are ontologically identical.

How this can be though is the question. The answer is that it's a matter of perspective.

---

I'm gonna toss this analogy out there and see if there's any takers...

Life is to matter as subjective experience is to consciousness (feeling).

That is, life is a process that manifests within the substrate of matter; subjective experience is a process that manifests within the substrate of consciousness (feeling).

Said differently: The mainstream thinking is that consciousness (feeling) and subjective experience arise together via neural processes in the brain.

This is akin to saying that matter and life arise together. But we know that life is a processes that arises within the substrate of matter.

I argue that so too subjective experience is a process that arises within the substrate of consciousness (experience).

Finally, extension, mass, spin, and processes such as life are properties and processes of matter as perceived from the 3rd person perspective; phenomenality/feeling and processes such as subjective experience are properties and processes of matter as experienced from the 1st person perspective.
 
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It's inescapable proof that consciousness arises from a purely physical process, which is the assembly of billions upon billions upon billions of tiny pieces of physical stuff from the surrounding environment.
It's inescapable proof that subjective experience arises with human organisms/brains.

There's (1) no evidence that consciousness (feeling) arises from any physical process, including neural processes, and (2) there's no physical model that can even sniff at a mechanical explanation for the former.

There are however physical models which can explain some aspects of subjective experience indicating that in principle it may be possible to explain subjective experience in mechanical/function terms.

But this is different from explaining the origin/nature of consciousness (feeling) in mechanical/functional terms.
 
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Here is a ramifying extract from the Wharton essay @Soupie referenced first:

". . . Even if we were in possession of a unified physical theory that explained all known experimental and observational data, we would still not be able to definitively answer the question of whether reality was fundamentally continuous or discrete. If our unified theory was based on a continuous ontology, there would always be the possibility that this was simply an approximation for an underlying discrete reality, too fine for our experiments to detect. Conversely, if the unified theory were based on discrete elements, future experiments might one day reveal that those elements emerged from an underlying continuous structure. Examples in this category include solitons (particle-like solutions of non-linear wave equations), or the discrete modes in continuous boundary-value problems, such as laser cavities.

Of course, we are not in possession of a unified theory. Of the two pillars of modern physics, general relativity (GR) is clearly in the continuum camp, but GR fundamentally conflicts with quantum theory (QT), a formalism with both continuous elements (quantum fields) and discrete elements (atomic energy levels, etc.). Naıvely, one might give more weight to GR’s principle-based framework than to the wishy-washy position of QT. But this view is not currently popular. Many physicists think that QT implies a discrete substructure for GR’s continuous spacetime, and the vast majority of the effort in reconciling these pillars lies in “quantizing gravity”, as opposed to finding a GR-compatible revision of QT.

But this conclusion is by no means definitive, especially when one considers that one of the biggest unresolved issues of QT – the “Measurement Problem” – is directly related to this discrete/continuous division. In a simplified nutshell, the QT formalism distinguishes between observations made from outside a system (which yield discrete results) and interactions within a system (which are treated much more continuously). This isn’t tenable because there’s no objective definition of a “system”; it can always be expanded to include any “outside” observations. The measurement problem is how objectively different mathematical procedures could possibly be associated with an apparently subjective parsing of joint vs. separate systems.

In this essay, I argue that the details of this unresolved tension (between the continuous and discrete aspects of QT) provide us with important clues as to whether nature is fundamentally digital or analog. Far from implying that fundamentally nature is somehow both (a meaningless position that many otherwiserational people have tried to adopt), QT is more likely describing a parameter regime where one of these descriptions is emerging from the other. After all, there are many known examples of discreteness arising from an underlying continuity, and vice-versa. This essay argues that the best analogies to QT are found in the discrete modes of continuous boundary value problems. If the discreteness of QT does indeed arise in this manner, then (together with GR) all of modern physics would be built upon a continuous foundation. 1 1 Whether this foundation would be fundamental, or emergent from a deeper discreteness, would remain to be seen.

Although discreteness only enters QT when one takes a measurement, many popular descriptions give the contrary impression that QT describes discrete entities, regardless of whether or not a “measurement” occurs. This is a fault that lies partially with poor word choices (including the very word “quantum”), but also arises from the natural assumption that measurements merely reveal an underlying reality. Here is a typical quote from Wikipedia [1]:

'A quantum mechanical system or particle that is bound – that is, confined spatially – can only take on certain discrete values of energy. This contrasts with classical particles, which can have any energy.'

This quote implies that a quantum system must always exist in one of several discrete modes, but such a statement is contradicted by the mathematics of QT. The fact is that a quantum system can be in any “superposition” of these different energy states, corresponding to a smooth continuum. An unmeasured single electron in an atom is therefore completely unconstrained by anything discrete, a stubborn fact that is difficult for many students to wrap their heads around after learning about atomic shells and quantum numbers.

Of course, when an energy measurement is made on an atomic electron, discreteness finally rears its head; the electron is never found in a superposition of different energy states, but always has one of several discrete energy values. One could argue that the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics is built around these discrete energies, but the way that these values come about is by solving a continuous boundary value problem (the wavefunction of the electron has to fall off to zero in all directions, sufficiently fast), making this an example of how quantized values naturally emerge when solving such problems in a bounded continuum. (More examples of “boundary-induced quantization” will be covered in Section III.)

Retreating to something that doesn’t have a spacetime representation – like quantum spin – doesn’t help the case for a fundamental discreteness. Inaccurate comments such as: ‘The spin of the electron can only be up or down’ are simply false, unless one is talking about the result of an actual measurement. In QT an electron spin lives on a continuous mathematical surface known as the Bloch sphere. Indeed, there exists a well-known, one-to-one correspondence between the mathematics of an unmeasured (quantum) electron spin and the (classical) polarization of a plane electromagnetic wave.[2, 3] This connection, combined with the clear continuum nature of the latter, makes it untenable to claim that former is built upon a discrete foundation.

The final line of retreat would be that quantum mechanics talks about discrete particles, which is true to a point. Quantum mechanics was designed to discuss a well-defined number of particles; in that sense, a discreteness has been put in by hand. But a more general theory which can handle particle creation and destruction – quantum field theory (QFT) – allows superpositions of different particle number states. (This should be no surprise, as QFT is built upon continuous fields!) Even when it comes to something as basic as particle number, nature is only discrete when we actually take a measurement.

But if things are discrete whenever we look, why wouldn’t they also be discrete when we don’t look? While this classical logic is tempting, it simply doesn’t stand up to the most basic quantum experiments. Take the double-slit experiment, where single particles pass through two closely-spaced slits (one particle at a time), and form a two-slit interference pattern as if the particles were continuous waves. Whenever one looks to see which slit the particle passes through, the interference pattern disappears. It only reappears when we don’t look. Any theory which demanded the same behavior, whether there was a measurement or not, would be unable to explain a vast array of similar observations.

Further insights can be gleaned from imprecise, or “weak” measurements. True, all measurements are imprecise to some extent. But there’s evidence that this non-exactness is not merely due to measurement 3 imprecision. For example, every observed transition between two atomic energy states has a “linewidth”, or range of possible energies, a non-discrete phenomenon that significantly impacts the real-world behavior of lasers. In another example, if one sends particles through a slit, the resulting behavior is only explicable in terms a wave that passes through the entire span of the slit. As one changes the size of the slit, the discreteness somehow automatically compensates. Dialing down the measurement sensitivity, as in recent “weak measurement” experiments, has also been observed to gradually destroy the discreteness predicted by quantum mechanics.[4, 5] It is as if particles somehow know how precisely they are being measured, and conspire to only be as discrete as the measurement precision demands.

This behavior is consistent with the known limit: If one takes away all measurements, QT turns out to be not quantized at all. This is in itself evidence of a continuous foundation for QT – with the enormous elephant in the room being the measurement problem, and the apparent discreteness that this process somehow generates. In the next sections, I’ll talk more about how the act of ‘looking’ could have such dramatic consequences, and how this might be our biggest clue as to what is really going on.

III. BOUNDARY-INDUCED QUANTIZATION
. . . . .

http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Wharton_FQX3.pdf
@smcder

If consciousness (feeling) is primary in relation to matter or fundamental a la panpsychism, and if reality—at least at the layer of consciousness and matter—is analog, then an answer to the combination problem is within reach methinks.

In chalmers approach to panprotopsychism, he seems to assume that reality—at least at the layer of consciousness-matter—is digital, consisting of quarks/electrons.

So the combination problem asks how these units of proto-consciousness can combine into a unified field of subjective experience.

But if this consciousness-matter substrate is analog, then it is already unified, and subjective experiential processes (1st person perspective) and neural processes (3rd person perspective) are not combinatorial processes but rather filtrative processes.

Not unlike methinks a rainbow of colors being filtered out from pure white.

I know, if, if, if...
 
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