Substrate-independent minds

[smcder]

At last, a purpose in existence.

Lol ... I know ...


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[Soupie]

"This might entail several things. Assuming that we don’t want the simulation to be turned off (as this would cause us to cease to exist), we should do everything in our power to keep whoever is simulating us interested in the simulation. This might cause us to pursue actions that are more likely to cause very dramatic events to happen. Also, if we believe that our simulators are willing to punish/reward people for certain behavior within the simulation, we should try to figure out what behavior they are going to reward and act on that. Thus, knowing that we are very probably living in a computer simulation should have a profound effect on the way we lead our lives."

Isn't this essentially what religious folk do?

And it's fun to consider some paranormal phenomena in this context: reincarnation, NDEs, OBEs, synchronicity, consciousness, ghosts/poltergeist, UFOs, etc. And I don't mean in the sense that these are all just tricks that are played on us, but in the sense that these may be phenomena that are possible because reality is a manufactured pattern of information.

Jacques Valle has talked about this a little bit, but not in this context per se. But he's speculated — and I'm paraphrasing — about all of reality being an interconnected information structure and some of our paranormal experiences — such as synchronicites — being a result of this interconnectedness of information, an interconnectedness not bound by time and space.

And while our bodies do seem to be bound by time and space, our minds — information, if you will — don't seem to be.

 

[smcder]

Isn't this essentially what religious folk do?

And it's fun to consider some paranormal phenomena in this context: reincarnation, NDEs, OBEs, synchronicity, consciousness, ghosts/poltergeist, UFOs, etc. And I don't mean in the sense that these are all just tricks that are played on us, but in the sense that these may be phenomena that are possible because reality is a manufactured pattern of information.

Jacques Valle has talked about this a little bit, but not in this context per se. But he's speculated — and I'm paraphrasing — about all of reality being an interconnected information structure and some of our paranormal experiences — such as synchronicites — being a result of this interconnectedness of information, an interconnectedness not bound by time and space.

And while our bodies do seem to be bound by time and space, our minds — information, if you will — don't seem to be.

Yes - that's the reference to Pascal:

Blaise Pascal

It's essentially "Pascal's Wager".



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[Soupie]

It's essentially "Pascal's Wager".

Yes. And what I'm saying -- and perhaps you are as well -- is what if the situations aren't just similar, but identical. That is, maybe the gods are the programmers, and maybe reality is the program. There are some who literally believe this to be the case. One intellectual in particular, Vox Day, has articulated this many times.

God is essentially a "video game designer" and reality is a big game He is playing. That narrative is already there, but when you add the "computer simulation" element, it becomes "scientific." I think what we're learning is that information and computation are substrate independent. So the "computer simulation" idea isn't really novel, it just gets more attention because it sounds more scientific. It's not a new question: Is reality a result of the work of gods/designers/creators/programmers or not? If it is, then there is intrinsic meaning built into our reality, if it isn't, then there is no intrinsic meaning.

 

[Soupie]

To clarify my position further, there is a profound difference between a star simulated by a computer, and a human brain simulated by a computer. A human brain simulated by a computer is essentially an electronic brain configured to process signals like a human brain, while a star is something else altogether. A "computer simulation of a giant star will not bend spacetime around the machine". However a computer simulation of a human brain might very well see the space around itself if hooked up to a camera.

@ufology, I don't disagree with your argument, but there is a subtle distinction I think the authors make that I want to highlight.

What I am understanding -- I think -- is that information while conceptually distinct from the neurons, is not physically distinct. That is, for every "bit" of information, there will be a physical neuron in a physical state "embodying" this information.

So we can talk of information in the abstract, but we mustn't forget that for every single bit of information, there is a physical correlate.

So, while a physical, organic brain with physical, organic neurons would be the same as a physical, silicone brain with physical, silicone neurons; it would not be the same as a non-physical, digital brain with non-physical, digital neurons.

Now, having said that, I don't really understand what a digital simulation of a brain would be. What does that mean? What is it to say that something is a digital simulation? What is a digital neuron? It wouldn't seem to be a physical neuron in any case, and that seems to be important to the authors.

A physical neuron would have real causal effect whereas as a digital neuron would not have real causal effect. This seems to be crucial, but I'll admit I'm not sure why or how. Is it that a physical neuron is responding to physical, causal laws, while a digital neuron is responding to programmed instructions, insulated from physical, causal laws? This might be the rub.

The authors speak of integrated information and one is tempted to think of this in the abstract, but this integrated information is correlated with and embodied by real, physical neurons with real, causal effect. But, I'm tempted to believe that so long as information is integrated, it shouldn't matter if it is integrated via physical or digital neurons, but the authors seem to disagree. However, I agree with you that they haven't made a strong enough case as to why.

We could say that there is of course a difference between, say, smoke coming from a real locomotive and smoke coming from a digital simulation of a locomotive. Even though we could create a working simulation of a locomotive that produced simulated smoke that behaved exactly like real, physical smoke, we would still say that simulated smoke was not like real smoke. (Real smoke is interacting with the causal effects of the physical universe; simulated smoke is interacting with programmed effects of a simulation.)

The problem is that the authors are saying consciousness is information. Unlike smoke, information is substrate independent. Smoke is physical molecules; information is not physical, but does require physical embodiment to exist. In my admittedly primitive understanding of such things, even digital information is physically embodied.

 

[smcder]

Yes. And what I'm saying -- and perhaps you are as well -- is what if the situations aren't just similar, but identical. That is, maybe the gods are the programmers, and maybe reality is the program. There are some who literally believe this to be the case. One intellectual in particular, Vox Day, has articulated this many times.

God is essentially a "video game designer" and reality is a big game He is playing. That narrative is already there, but when you add the "computer simulation" element, it becomes "scientific." I think what we're learning is that information and computation are substrate independent. So the "computer simulation" idea isn't really novel, it just gets more attention because it sounds more scientific. It's not a new question: Is reality a result of the work of gods/designers/creators/programmers or not? If it is, then there is intrinsic meaning built into our reality, if it isn't, then there is no intrinsic meaning.

Who programs our programmers?

If they don't have intrinsic meaning how do they insert it into our simulation?

Not scientific in that it can't be tested ... falsified ... unless we find red pills.

But. "sciencey" yes or sciencesque




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[smcder]

I've got to look up this Vox Day cat ... is that his human name? From now on I wish to be called:

7PH3N

Pronounced "sephen"

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[Wade]

I've got to look up this Vox Day cat ... is that his human name? From now on I wish to be called:

7PH3N

Pronounced "sephen"

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Sounds like a Star Wars character....or a a variant of the bird flu.

 

[smcder]

Sounds like a Star Wars character....or a a variant of the bird flu.

I am definitely contagious. By design.


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[smcder]

@Soupie

Th15 guy?

Theodore Beale - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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[Constance]

Who programs our programmers?

If they don't have intrinsic meaning how do they insert it into our simulation?

Not scientific in that it can't be tested ... falsified ... unless we find red pills.

But. "sciencey" yes or sciencesque

IIT 3.0 is discussed on the linked Wikipedia talk page, linked to three disciplines that are all implicated in the IIT theory and demonstrating the ambiguity presented so far in the theory. Perhaps this discussion will help us to focus our discussion better. I'll be gone this afternoon but will return later.

Talk:Integrated information theory - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

NOTE: SEE ESPECIALLY THE 'LOGIC' SECTION.

 

[Randall]

@ufology, I don't disagree with your argument, but there is a subtle distinction I think the authors make that I want to highlight.

What I am understanding -- I think -- is that information while conceptually distinct from the neurons, is not physically distinct. That is, for every "bit" of information, there will be a physical neuron in a physical state "embodying" this information.

So we can talk of information in the abstract, but we mustn't forget that for every single bit of information, there is a physical correlate.

So, while a physical, organic brain with physical, organic neurons would be the same as a physical, silicone brain with physical, silicone neurons; it would not be the same as a non-physical, digital brain with non-physical, digital neurons.

Now, having said that, I don't really understand what a digital simulation of a brain would be. What does that mean? What is it to say that something is a digital simulation? What is a digital neuron? It wouldn't seem to be a physical neuron in any case, and that seems to be important to the authors.

A physical neuron would have real causal effect whereas as a digital neuron would not have real causal effect. This seems to be crucial, but I'll admit I'm not sure why or how. Is it that a physical neuron is responding to physical, causal laws, while a digital neuron is responding to programmed instructions, insulated from physical, causal laws? This might be the rub.

The authors speak of integrated information and one is tempted to think of this in the abstract, but this integrated information is correlated with and embodied by real, physical neurons with real, causal effect. But, I'm tempted to believe that so long as information is integrated, it shouldn't matter if it is integrated via physical or digital neurons, but the authors seem to disagree. However, I agree with you that they haven't made a strong enough case as to why.

We could say that there is of course a difference between, say, smoke coming from a real locomotive and smoke coming from a digital simulation of a locomotive. Even though we could create a working simulation of a locomotive that produced simulated smoke that behaved exactly like real, physical smoke, we would still say that simulated smoke was not like real smoke. (Real smoke is interacting with the causal effects of the physical universe; simulated smoke is interacting with programmed effects of a simulation.)

The problem is that the authors are saying consciousness is information. Unlike smoke, information is substrate independent. Smoke is physical molecules; information is not physical, but does require physical embodiment to exist. In my admittedly primitive understanding of such things, even digital information is physically embodied.

You have the essential concept right, but that still doesn't validate their argument with respect to consciousness, at least if for the sake of discussion we're considering a computer brain and a virtual brain to be one in the same. If we wanted to get nitpicky, then technically the virtual brain would be something separate from the computer itself, nothing more than an image projected by screens. However the initial context wasn't framed in that manner. It was framed in the context of a computer ( an electronic brain ) vs. a human biological brain, and in both cases we're dealing with physical structures.

In an electronic simulation of a human brain, the neurons, which are a biological brain's micro-switches, are in fact made of material micro-switches ( transistors ). So while the materials are different, their essential nature is still the same. We're still talking brains to brains, not a brains to giant stars, and therefore we should expect some similarities between the two, especially if one is configured to operate as much like the other as possible. It may very well turn out that consciousness is dependent on engineering identical to a human brain in every respect, however we just don't know the answer to that yet.

In fact we may never know the answer. That's why I posted the clip from the movie Transcendence. Another excellent thought experiment is in the Star Trek TNG episode where the fate of Commander Data is put on trial. Is he simply Star Fleet property like a desktop computer, or a sentient being? This is essentially the same question that the paper in our discussion is asking: "Why should we not grant to this simulacrum the same consciousness we grant to a fellow human?"

A Clip From The Measure of a Man

 

[Constance]

@Soupie

Th15 guy?

Theodore Beale - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Seems this is one of his manifestations:

Vox Popoli

 

[Constance]

Note second proclamation in the series. ^^

 

[Soupie]

[The initial argument] was framed in the context of a computer ( an electronic brain ) vs. a human biological brain, and in both cases we're dealing with physical structures. ...

In an electronic simulation of a human brain, the neurons, which are a biological brain's micro-switches, are in fact made of material micro-switches ( transistors ). So while the materials are different, their essential nature is still the same. We're still talking brains to brains...

Hm, I'm not sure that's right. I think we can have:

(1) A physical, biological brain,
(2) A physical, non-biological brain, or
(3) A digital simulation of a brain

The authors of IIT seem to suggest that (1) and (2) can generate consciousness while (3) cannot.

One could argue that (2) and (3) are not really different; they are both computers processing information. However, I think we can say that these computers would process information differently, and that seems to be the key difference (at least to the authors). Moreover, we can see that (1) and (2) would process information in the same way, and the authors admit that both could thus generate consciousness.

Rightly or wrongly, IIT suggests that consciousness arises from information processed/organized/integrated in a particular manner.

 

[smcder]

Definition of Swarm Intelligence
Moffett Ants and the Art of War

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[Randall]

Hm, I'm not sure that's right. I think we can have:

(1) A physical, biological brain,
(2) A physical, non-biological brain, or
(3) A digital simulation of a brain

The authors of IIT seem to suggest that (1) and (2) can generate consciousness while (3) cannot.

One could argue that (2) and (3) are not really different; they are both computers processing information. However, I think we can say that these computers would process information differently, and that seems to be the key difference (at least to the authors). Moreover, we can see that (1) and (2) would process information in the same way, and the authors admit that both could thus generate consciousness.

Rightly or wrongly, IIT suggests that consciousness arises from information processed/organized/integrated in a particular manner.

The thing is, a digital simulation of a human brain ( 3 ) is simply a type of physical non-biological brain ( 2 ), configured to mimic a physical, biological brain ( 1 ), as closely as possible. Therefore assuming that ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) can possess consciousness, but ( 3 ) cannot, is faulty logic, and their reasons for making that assumption are equally as faulty. Apart from their straw man comparison ( a brain is not star ), they are assuming that ( 3 ) does not possess, to quote: "... real causal power, specifically the power of shaping the space of possible past and future states in a maximally irreducible way. "

Their statement above makes no sense. Nothing can shape the space of past states, if not for the simple reason that past states don't exist because they're in the past! But even if we take a sci-fi approach to time travel and assume that somehow we're actually able to have a causal influence on the past, there's no evidence that our own brains, which are assumed to possess consciousness, can do that either. We might even say the same about our capacity for consciously shaping our own future.

Scientific evidence clearly shows that our brains are making decisions before we become aware of them. Therefore our decisions only register in our consciousness after the fact, and therefore the whole question of our "causal effect" is thrown into question. The reasoning in their summary is hopelessly flawed in more than one way and therefore should not be blindly taken as an established fact, especially to prop-up ones own belief or desire for the way we wish things would be ( e.g. like the character who wants to dismantle Commander Data in the clip I posted earlier. )

However that doesn't mean that some of their other ideas don't seem reasonable. For example the idea that some complex systems may not possess consciousness while some simpler systems might possess consciousness. There is little doubt in my mind for example that a collection of 4 billion gears would not suddenly produce consciousness, even if they could all be connected and made to somehow turn.

 

[smcder]

IIT 3.0 is discussed on the linked Wikipedia talk page, linked to three disciplines that are all implicated in the IIT theory and demonstrating the ambiguity presented so far in the theory. Perhaps this discussion will help us to focus our discussion better. I'll be gone this afternoon but will return later.

Talk:Integrated information theory - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

NOTE: SEE ESPECIALLY THE 'LOGIC' SECTION.

A good place to start: with an intellectual exercise program: hand waving and faith leaping!


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[smcder]

IIT 3.0 is discussed on the linked Wikipedia talk page, linked to three disciplines that are all implicated in the IIT theory and demonstrating the ambiguity presented so far in the theory. Perhaps this discussion will help us to focus our discussion better. I'll be gone this afternoon but will return later.

Talk:Integrated information theory - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

NOTE: SEE ESPECIALLY THE 'LOGIC' SECTION.

"The "hard problem" is a non-scientific red herring concocted to uphold the long-standing view that consciousness is supernatural."

Read a lot of Chalmers has this one ... ;-)



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[Randall]

To be clear about my intent, none of my posts are making the claim that an electronic brain of any kind is certain to be developed that will produce consciousness as we know it, or for that matter, any consciousness at all. Consciousness as we know it can only be known by those who experience it for themselves. For all we really know, each individuals experience of consciousness has differences that if we were able to compare them to each other, would be far more profound than we tend to assume.

For example, maybe some people, like certain psychopaths, simply operate on observation and intellect, like biological automatons, capable of putting on a convincing act, but without possessing anything we would equate with our own consciousness at all. Who can say for sure? I can't. I don't think anyone can with 100% certainty. It's not possible to be someone else and one's self at the same time so as to be in a position to experientially make any comparison. All we can do is observe and surmise based on our limited perceptual and intellectual abilities. There is no machine analogous to an MRI or X-Ray that can take a scan and say, "There's your consciousness highlighted in blue."