Michael Allen
Paranormal Adept
Some additional helpful links
Probably an earlier version of the joint paper (this one authored by Davis)
http://www.ufoskeptic.org/davis.html
Additionally I am somewhat plagued by the statement
Several reasons
(1) Goes back to my argument against a meme popularized by Sagan, "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." I spent some time laying out how science is a methodology which tests and reduces these things down to their basic components bringing them more in-line with human cognition.
(2) Presumably, if a hypothesis was strange enough to explain the facts, then the facticity of those facts (now merely mental artifacts) would vanish. Strangeness appears to be some kind of metaphysical presumption that coheres to certain propositions--either that or a parasitic propositional attitude that has no meaning in the framework of science. Perhaps colloquially we might refer to "strangeness" as an icon for something like (just brainstorming here)
(a) Frequencies and expected values...probabilities, data parameter estimation, etc
(b) Outside human cognition (how do we know this?)
(c) Barely outside human cognition (but how do we know this?)
(d) Anti-intuitive (too relative...depends on one's "intuition" or cognitive framework)
Indeed, one might argue for the excesses or deficiencies of "strangeness" in Einstein's General ToR (as of the date of his first publication on the subject)--either way.
So I have a problem with the usage of the term "strangeness" in any sort of scientific context outside of frequencies, expected values of random variables and parameter estimation.
Probably an earlier version of the joint paper (this one authored by Davis)
http://www.ufoskeptic.org/davis.html
Additionally I am somewhat plagued by the statement
In the view of the authors, current hypotheses are not strange enough to explain the facts of the phenomenon.
Several reasons
(1) Goes back to my argument against a meme popularized by Sagan, "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." I spent some time laying out how science is a methodology which tests and reduces these things down to their basic components bringing them more in-line with human cognition.
(2) Presumably, if a hypothesis was strange enough to explain the facts, then the facticity of those facts (now merely mental artifacts) would vanish. Strangeness appears to be some kind of metaphysical presumption that coheres to certain propositions--either that or a parasitic propositional attitude that has no meaning in the framework of science. Perhaps colloquially we might refer to "strangeness" as an icon for something like (just brainstorming here)
(a) Frequencies and expected values...probabilities, data parameter estimation, etc
(b) Outside human cognition (how do we know this?)
(c) Barely outside human cognition (but how do we know this?)
(d) Anti-intuitive (too relative...depends on one's "intuition" or cognitive framework)
Indeed, one might argue for the excesses or deficiencies of "strangeness" in Einstein's General ToR (as of the date of his first publication on the subject)--either way.
So I have a problem with the usage of the term "strangeness" in any sort of scientific context outside of frequencies, expected values of random variables and parameter estimation.