NEW! LOWEST RATES EVER -- SUPPORT THE SHOW AND ENJOY THE VERY BEST PREMIUM PARACAST EXPERIENCE! Welcome to The Paracast+, eight years young! For a low subscription fee, you can download the ad-free version of The Paracast and the exclusive, member-only, After The Paracast bonus podcast, featuring color commentary, exclusive interviews, the continuation of interviews that began on the main episode of The Paracast. We also offer lifetime memberships! Flash! Take advantage of our lowest rates ever! Act now! It's easier than ever to susbcribe! You can sign up right here!
Not to mentioned that we've discussed ad nauseam why analogies such as brain-mind/bulb-light are fundamentally problematic.Sorry Randle, I don't have the energy to respond to this. Carry on.
It may be that representation is an extra step that isn't needed for complex behavior. But then what is phenomenal consciousness then if not representations (in the loose sense, meaning not an exact miniature model of the what-is) of what is?Another site for Wilson...
Dr Andrew D Wilson
"...but I can't see how a body can phenomenally perceive without some form of representation/intention."
I'm not following this...representation seems an extra step...the way early robots tried to map a room before attempting to drive across it...Brooks came along with subsumptive architecture and sensors wired to effectors and produced capable robots of very little brain.
Understandable.Sorry Randle, I don't have the energy to respond to this. Carry on.
Pretty much everything here has been discussed ad nauseam between you guys , but not every reader who comes here has followed the thread from day one like we have, and therefore they may not be aware of the discussions you mention or know that that any I'm aware of don't invalidate the light bulb analogy as I have used it. Perhaps however I've missed some other response to the analogy that is more coherent than past objections. If so, by all means post a link to the specific post(s) and I'll have a look.Not to mentioned that we've discussed ad nauseam why analogies such as brain-mind/bulb-light are fundamentally problematic.
Umwelt: Edge.org, as described there may not be relevant to a phenomenological perspective. The behavior of the tick in the example ( for example ) could be the result of a simple mechanistic response.... If all complex behavior can be exhibited by organisms via embodied knowledge (stimulus/response) then what role is here for the umwelt to play? Is it simply doubly epiphenomenal?
Anything in the thread or literature related to emergence, weak or strong.Pretty much everything here has been discussed ad nauseam between you guys , but not every reader who comes here has followed the thread from day one like we have, and therefore they may not be aware of the discussions you mention or know that that any I'm aware of don't invalidate the light bulb analogy as I have used it. Perhaps however I've missed some other response to the analogy that is more coherent than past objections. If so, by all means post a link to the specific post(s) and I'll have a look.
Yes, I think this is correct. However, others (maybe?) interpret the umwelt as being phenomenal in nature.Umwelt: Edge.org, as described there may not be relevant to a phenomenological perspective. The behavior of the tick in the example ( for example ) could be the result of a simple mechanistic response.
Here is an extract from a paper the whole of which might be helpful to us in gaining a grip on the concept of 'representation'. The paper is entitled "The Ontology of Concepts—Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?"; the author is Eric Margolis.
". . . The Psychological View is the default position in many areas of cognitive science and enjoys a good deal of support in the philosophy of mind. It is at the center of a rich and powerful model of the mind, but two of its benefits are especially worth mentioning. The first is the promise of explaining the productivity of thought. Productivity refers to the fact that, under suitable idealization, there is no upper bound to the range of semantically distinct thoughts. One way of appreciating just how vast our cognitive capacities are is to consider the thoughts associated with the sentences of a natural language. As Noam Chomsky has noted, nearly every sentence we speak or hear is a sentence we have never before encountered, but despite the novelty of these sentences, we have no difficulty entertaining the corresponding thoughts. (The sentences of this paper are an example. It’s unlikely that readers have come across most of these very sentences before.) The psychologist George Miller (1995) makes the point all the more vivid by focusing on just 20-word sentences, asking how many of these we can understand. Assuming conservatively that there are on average 10 words to draw from for each word choice as a sentence is constructed, the implication is that we understand at least 1020 20-word sentences. That’s one hundred million trillion of them. By comparison, the human brain contains roughly 1011 neurons, and the number of seconds in the history of the Universe is estimated to be on the order of 1017. So assuming that each sentence corresponds to a distinct thought,3 and sticking only to 20-word sentences (that is, ignoring not just longer sentences but also shorter ones), the number of thoughts we arrive at is more than a billion times the number of neurons in the brain and about a thousand times the number seconds in the history of the Universe.4 According to RTM and the Psychological View, this is just the tip of the iceberg. Once we abstract away from limitations of memory and attention and other factors that interact with our thinking, the human capacity for entertaining new thoughts is without limits. The actual thoughts that people entertain in their lifetime constitute a tiny and idiosyncratic subset of the thoughts that their conceptual system makes possible. . . ."
Isn't there a line in Alice in Wonderland about thinking six impossible things before breakfast?
Pretty much everything here has been discussed ad nauseam between you guys , but not every reader who comes here has followed the thread from day one like we have, and therefore they may not be aware of the discussions you mention or know that that any I'm aware of don't invalidate the light bulb analogy as I have used it. Perhaps however I've missed some other response to the analogy that is more coherent than past objections. If so, by all means post a link to the specific post(s) and I'll have a look.
It may be that representation is an extra step that isn't needed for complex behavior. But then what is phenomenal consciousness then if not representations (in the loose sense, meaning not an exact miniature model of the what-is) of what is?
If all complex behavior can be exhibited by organisms via embodied knowledge (stimulus/response) then what role is here for the umwelt to play? Is it simply doubly epiphenomenal?
Yes, I think this is correct. However, others (maybe?) interpret the umwelt as being phenomenal in nature.
But, again, this discussion begs the question, if all behavior—and i mean all—can be explained mechanistically, what is phenomenal consciousness, and why did and how does it evolve? (Note: thats a rhetorical question.)
In this context it was; I certainly am not expecting Ufology to provide an answer.Not a rhetorical question.
In this context it was; I certainly am not expecting Ufology to provide an answer.
I think we do make models of "what is"...but not when, for example, we catch baseballs.
It was simpler to just run a search. There's nothing new on it. Only a very few entries in the whole series of threads. I don't think that qualifies as "duscussed ad nauseum". But ignoring it's relevance does appear to qualify as vincible ignorance.We remember more of what we've read and discussed here in the last three years than you do since you haven't been here for a lot of/perhaps most of that time. The remedy would be for you to read the sections of the thread you haven't seen before.
Some relevant stuff here if you guys haven't seen it yet. I actually find it more effective to simply listen to most of this one than watch and listen:On catching baseballs... Notes from Two Scientific Psychologists: Prospective Control I: The Outfielder Problem The blog has a number of posts on affordances, too, looks like...
Some relevant stuff here if you guys haven't seen it yet. I actually find it more effective to simply listen to most of this one than watch and listen: