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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10
- Thread starter Gene Steinberg
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As Owl said above:
"Now, we all know that panpsychism is a strawman and we know the strawman only wanted a brain. Correct? Correct! So ...
Let S = strawman
Let B = the brain that he wants
If we just perform the disjunctive correlative on the intersectional conjugation of the conjuctivitis involved in the preliminary fascia of the lacunae - we soon realize that only by taking the suare root of S can we begin to approximate the tangential function which inter-splices the non-conjungal elimination. And therefore ... taking a deep breath ... it's rather obvious that
S is either greater than B or less than C and by transitivity B is therefore roughly non-equal to C
QED
Piglet and Pooh stare, mouths open.
Owl stands by waiting for applause. After a few moments, he gives up a mighty WHO in disgust.
Owl Who! Who! Well, I see you two cannot be taught. As I always say a waist is a terrible thing to mind - Owl pokes Pooh in his overfull belly and Pooh laughs heartily
Pooh I see your point!
Piglet laughs heartily as Owl flies away in disgust
Owl who who who ???
!"
@Michael Allen, welcome back from wherever you were and wherever you've gone.
Now let's all clear out our ears, if not our brains, with this classic album:
Now let's all clear out our ears, if not our brains, with this classic album:
Randall
J. Randall Murphy
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smcder
Paranormal Adept
What have and are you reading, Burnt?
Karakostas, Vassilios and Zafiris, Elias (2017) Contextual Semantics in Quantum Mechanics from a Categorical Point of View. Synthese, 194 (3). pp. 847-886. ISSN 0039-7857
Download (386kB) |
Abstract
The category-theoretic representation of quantum event structures provides a canonical setting for confronting the fundamental problem of truth valuation in quantum mechanics as exemplified, in particular, by Kochen–Specker’s theorem. In the present study, this is realized on the basis of the existence of a categorical adjunction between the category of sheaves of variable local Boolean frames, constituting a topos, and the category of quantum event algebras. We show explicitly that the latter category is equipped with an object of truth values, or classifying object, which constitutes the appropriate tool for assigning truth values to propositions describing the behavior of quantum systems. Effectively, this category-theoretic representation scheme circumvents consistently the semantic ambiguity with respect to truth valuation that is inherent in conventional quantum mechanics by inducing an objective contextual account of truth in the quantum domain of discourse. The philosophical implications of the resulting account are analyzed. We argue that it subscribes neither to a pragmatic instrumental nor to a relative notion of truth. Such an account essentially denies that there can be a universal context of reference or an Archimedean standpoint from which to evaluate logically the totality of facts of nature.
Contextual Semantics in Quantum Mechanics from a Categorical Point of View - Philsci-ArchiveContextual Semantics in Quantum Mechanics from a Categorical Point of View - Philsci-Archive
Download (386kB) |
Abstract
The category-theoretic representation of quantum event structures provides a canonical setting for confronting the fundamental problem of truth valuation in quantum mechanics as exemplified, in particular, by Kochen–Specker’s theorem. In the present study, this is realized on the basis of the existence of a categorical adjunction between the category of sheaves of variable local Boolean frames, constituting a topos, and the category of quantum event algebras. We show explicitly that the latter category is equipped with an object of truth values, or classifying object, which constitutes the appropriate tool for assigning truth values to propositions describing the behavior of quantum systems. Effectively, this category-theoretic representation scheme circumvents consistently the semantic ambiguity with respect to truth valuation that is inherent in conventional quantum mechanics by inducing an objective contextual account of truth in the quantum domain of discourse. The philosophical implications of the resulting account are analyzed. We argue that it subscribes neither to a pragmatic instrumental nor to a relative notion of truth. Such an account essentially denies that there can be a universal context of reference or an Archimedean standpoint from which to evaluate logically the totality of facts of nature.
Contextual Semantics in Quantum Mechanics from a Categorical Point of View - Philsci-ArchiveContextual Semantics in Quantum Mechanics from a Categorical Point of View - Philsci-Archive
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From the concluding section of that paper:
". . . What makes a proposition true, therefore, is not that [it] is relative to the context (as an alethic relativist must hold, see, for instance, MacFarlane 2005) but whether or not the conditions in question obtain. The obtainment of the conditions implies that it is possible for us to make, in an overall consistent manner, meaningful statements that the properties attributed to quantum objects are part of physical reality. In our approach, therefore, the reason that a proposition is true is because it designates an objectively existing state of affairs, albeit of a contextual nature. In relation to the latter, we wish to emphasize the fact that, in contrast to a panoptical "view from nowhere" of the classical paradigm, the general epistemological implication of quantum theory acknowledges in an essential way a contextual character of knowledge. The classical idea that one can reasonably talk about "all entities", as if the terms "entity" or "object" had a unique, fixed meaning, independently of the appeal to a particular context of reference, is inadequate in the microphysical level of discourse. Whereas in the old classical paradigm, reality was conceived as an absolute concept totally independent of the process of knowledge, in the new quantum paradigm, epistemology
[2Transcendental reasoning is understood in contemporary terms as the method of inquiry seeking to inves-
tigate the necessary conditions or presuppositions for the possibility of some given actuality from within the
sphere constrained by those conditions. A genuinely transcendental approach, therefore, operates prereflectively from within our worldly conditions, standards, and practices in order to examine the preconditions and limits of experience or knowledge, thus opposing any supposedly transcendent, non-perspectival, metaphysically fixed point of reference. A collection of essays focusing on the broader framework of transcendental inquiry, both in its historical context as well as its more recent appearance in philosophizing, has been edited by Malpas (2003).]
-- namely, the understanding of the process of knowing -- has to be explicitly included in the description of natural phenomena. Epistemology necessarily becomes now an integral part of the theory, an issue pointing at the same time at the meta-theoretical, philosophical level towards an interconnection among epistemological and ontological considerations."
". . . What makes a proposition true, therefore, is not that [it] is relative to the context (as an alethic relativist must hold, see, for instance, MacFarlane 2005) but whether or not the conditions in question obtain. The obtainment of the conditions implies that it is possible for us to make, in an overall consistent manner, meaningful statements that the properties attributed to quantum objects are part of physical reality. In our approach, therefore, the reason that a proposition is true is because it designates an objectively existing state of affairs, albeit of a contextual nature. In relation to the latter, we wish to emphasize the fact that, in contrast to a panoptical "view from nowhere" of the classical paradigm, the general epistemological implication of quantum theory acknowledges in an essential way a contextual character of knowledge. The classical idea that one can reasonably talk about "all entities", as if the terms "entity" or "object" had a unique, fixed meaning, independently of the appeal to a particular context of reference, is inadequate in the microphysical level of discourse. Whereas in the old classical paradigm, reality was conceived as an absolute concept totally independent of the process of knowledge, in the new quantum paradigm, epistemology
[2Transcendental reasoning is understood in contemporary terms as the method of inquiry seeking to inves-
tigate the necessary conditions or presuppositions for the possibility of some given actuality from within the
sphere constrained by those conditions. A genuinely transcendental approach, therefore, operates prereflectively from within our worldly conditions, standards, and practices in order to examine the preconditions and limits of experience or knowledge, thus opposing any supposedly transcendent, non-perspectival, metaphysically fixed point of reference. A collection of essays focusing on the broader framework of transcendental inquiry, both in its historical context as well as its more recent appearance in philosophizing, has been edited by Malpas (2003).]
-- namely, the understanding of the process of knowing -- has to be explicitly included in the description of natural phenomena. Epistemology necessarily becomes now an integral part of the theory, an issue pointing at the same time at the meta-theoretical, philosophical level towards an interconnection among epistemological and ontological considerations."
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Randall
J. Randall Murphy
Here's the summary in a one liner:
"In our approach, therefore, the reason that a proposition is true is because it designates an objectively existing state of affairs, albeit of a contextual nature."
Makes perfect sense to me. What's next?
Or if readers need more on truth: The Correspondence Theory of Truth (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
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Randall
J. Randall Murphy
Maybe the lyrics would help:
"Elephant Talk"
Writer(s): William Scott Bruford, Adrian Belew, Robert Fripp, Anthony Charles Levin
Talk, it's only talk
Arguments, agreements, advice, answers
Articulate announcements
It's only talk
Talk, it's only talk
Babble, burble, banter, bicker bicker bicker
Brouhaha, balderdash, ballyhoo
It's only talk
Back talk
Talk talk talk, it's only talk
Comments, cliches, commentary, controversy
Chatter, chit-chat, chit-chat, chit-chat
Conversation, contradiction, criticism
It's only talk
Cheap talk
Talk, talk, it's only talk
Debates, discussions
These are words with a D this time
Dialogue, dualogue, diatribe
Dissention, declamation
Double talk, double talk
Talk, talk, it's all talk
Too much talk
Small talk
Talk that trash
Expressions, editorials, expugnations, exclamations, enfadulations
It's all talk
Elephant talk, elephant talk, elephant talk
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Randall
J. Randall Murphy
While We're on the subject of talk ...
Pink Floyd - Keep Talking
For millions of years mankind lived just like the animals
Then something happened which unleashed the power of our imagination
We learned to talk
There's a silence surrounding me
I can't seem to think straight
I'll sit in the corner
No one can bother me
I think I should speak now
I can't seem to speak now
My words won't come out right
I feel like I'm drowning
I'm feeling weak now
But I can't show my weakness
I sometimes wonder
Where do we go from here
It doesn't have to be like this
All we need to do is make sure we keep talking
Why won't you talk to me
You never talk to me
What are you thinking
What are you feeling
Why won't you talk to me
You never talk to me
What are you thinking
Where do we go from here
It doesn't have to be like this
All we need to do is make sure we keep talking
Why won't you talk to me
You never talk to me
What are you thinking
What are you feeling
Why won't you talk to me
You never talk to me
What are you thinking
What are you feeling
I feel like I'm drowning
You know I can't breathe now
We're going nowhere
We're going nowhere
Writer(s): Polly Annie Samson, David Jon Gilmour, Richard Wright
For millions of years mankind lived just like the animals
Then something happened which unleashed the power of our imagination
We learned to talk
There's a silence surrounding me
I can't seem to think straight
I'll sit in the corner
No one can bother me
I think I should speak now
I can't seem to speak now
My words won't come out right
I feel like I'm drowning
I'm feeling weak now
But I can't show my weakness
I sometimes wonder
Where do we go from here
It doesn't have to be like this
All we need to do is make sure we keep talking
Why won't you talk to me
You never talk to me
What are you thinking
What are you feeling
Why won't you talk to me
You never talk to me
What are you thinking
Where do we go from here
It doesn't have to be like this
All we need to do is make sure we keep talking
Why won't you talk to me
You never talk to me
What are you thinking
What are you feeling
Why won't you talk to me
You never talk to me
What are you thinking
What are you feeling
I feel like I'm drowning
You know I can't breathe now
We're going nowhere
We're going nowhere
Writer(s): Polly Annie Samson, David Jon Gilmour, Richard Wright
Here is an amazon link to samples from the text of the Malpas book referred to at the end of the clarifying footnote quoted in my post above:
https://www.amazon.com/dp/0415863031/?tag=rockoids-20
https://www.amazon.com/dp/0415863031/?tag=rockoids-20
Minding the Gap: Epistemology & Philosophy of Science in the Two Traditions
By Christopher Norris
Minding the Gap
By Christopher Norris
Minding the Gap
THE TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD AND (POST-)EMPIRICIST
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
SAMI PIHLSTROM and ARTO SIITONEN
First two pages available from Springer at this link:
https://page-one.live.cf.public.springer.com/pdf/preview/10.1007/s10838-005-7163-6
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
SAMI PIHLSTROM and ARTO SIITONEN
First two pages available from Springer at this link:
https://page-one.live.cf.public.springer.com/pdf/preview/10.1007/s10838-005-7163-6
smcder
Paranormal Adept
Very interesting ... I found a good review on the Notre Dame site of another book by Norris and also this spirited defense of philosophy in the face of a recent attack by Stephen Hawking that Norris wrote for Philosophy Now:
Hawking contra Philosophy | Issue 82 | Philosophy Now
"Predictably enough the journalists went off to find themselves media-friendly philosophers – not hard to do nowadays – who would argue the contrary case in a suitably vigorous way. On the whole the responses, or those that I came across, seemed overly anxious to strike a conciliatory note, or to grant Hawking’s thesis some measure of truth as judged by the standards of the natural science community while tactfully dissenting with regard to philosophy and the human sciences. I think the case needs stating more firmly and, perhaps, less tactfully since otherwise it looks like a forced retreat to cover internal disarray. Besides, there is good reason to mount a much sturdier defence on principled grounds. These have to do with the scientists’ need to philosophize and their proneness to philosophize badly or commit certain avoidable errors if they don’t take at least some passing interest in what philosophers have to say."
Neurophilosophy and Its Discontents
How Do We Understand Consciousness Without Becoming Complicit in that Understanding?
GABRIELLE BENETTE JACKSON
http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/philosophy/people/faculty_pages/NeuroPhilosophy IAS letter 9-29-14.pdf
I'd also like to read the following recently published paper by Jackson and will order it through Interlibrary Loan since it does not appear to be available online except behind a paywall at Springer Verlag.
Seeing what is not seen
Published August 17 in the journal
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Abstract
This paper connects ideas from twentieth century Gestalt psychology, experiments in vision science, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. I propose that when we engage in simple sensorimotor tasks whose successful completion is open, our behavior may be motivated by practical perceptual awareness alone, responding to invariant features of the perceptual field that are invisible to other forms of perceptual awareness. On this view, we see more than we think we see, as evidenced by our skillful bodily behavior.
Keywords
Shape constancy Isomorphism Medial axis Merleau-Ponty Presence of absence Perceptual awareness Skill
Seeing what is not seen
How Do We Understand Consciousness Without Becoming Complicit in that Understanding?
GABRIELLE BENETTE JACKSON
http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/philosophy/people/faculty_pages/NeuroPhilosophy IAS letter 9-29-14.pdf
I'd also like to read the following recently published paper by Jackson and will order it through Interlibrary Loan since it does not appear to be available online except behind a paywall at Springer Verlag.
Seeing what is not seen
Published August 17 in the journal
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Abstract
This paper connects ideas from twentieth century Gestalt psychology, experiments in vision science, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. I propose that when we engage in simple sensorimotor tasks whose successful completion is open, our behavior may be motivated by practical perceptual awareness alone, responding to invariant features of the perceptual field that are invisible to other forms of perceptual awareness. On this view, we see more than we think we see, as evidenced by our skillful bodily behavior.
Keywords
Shape constancy Isomorphism Medial axis Merleau-Ponty Presence of absence Perceptual awareness Skill
Seeing what is not seen
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What's next is understanding what is meant, what is signified, what becomes clear when we comprehend the "contextual nature" of what we experience and 'know'.
This response by Christopher Norris to Hawkings's recent misunderstanding of philosophy's role in science is excellent. Would you also post a link to the NDPR review you referenced of another of Norris's books? Thanks.
David Morris, Rethinking development: introduction to a special section of Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences.
Abstract:
This introduction to a special section of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences reviews some historical and contemporary results concerning the role of development in cognition and experience, arguing that at this juncture development is an important topic for research in phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. It then suggests some ways in which the concept of development is in need of rethinking, in relation to the phenomena, and reviews the contributions that articles in the section make toward this purpose.
Research Interests:
Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Biology, Developmental Biology, Evolutionary Developmental Biology, Phenomenology, Dynamical Systems Approach to Cognition, and Dynamic Systems Theory
Rethinking Development: Introduction to a Special section of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
I've sent a request to David Morris to make the full article available at academia.edu.
Abstract:
This introduction to a special section of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences reviews some historical and contemporary results concerning the role of development in cognition and experience, arguing that at this juncture development is an important topic for research in phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. It then suggests some ways in which the concept of development is in need of rethinking, in relation to the phenomena, and reviews the contributions that articles in the section make toward this purpose.
Research Interests:
Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Biology, Developmental Biology, Evolutionary Developmental Biology, Phenomenology, Dynamical Systems Approach to Cognition, and Dynamic Systems Theory
Rethinking Development: Introduction to a Special section of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
I've sent a request to David Morris to make the full article available at academia.edu.
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