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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10

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Cows experiencing grass for the first time in six months.


Adult elephants rescue adolescent elephant from water

2 Elephants Team Up To Rescue Calf After It Plunges Into Pool | HuffPost

It's hard not to observe the behavior of these machines and not think that they are having subjective experiences that would be similar (but not identical) to our own subjective experiences given similar situations.

I think you're a bit tongue-in-cheek here:

"It's hard not to observe the behavior of these machines ..."?

But there is political force in the distinction in connotation between animal, human, machine, organism - it's jarring to refer to an animal as a machine - but it does make industrial farming easier - as does making a point to distinguish between human and animal suffering. I can argue it both ways, humans have intellect to palliate or intensify their suffering, some animals may only have brute suffering with no anticipation of relief but also no fear of recurrence.

I remember Garrison Keillor talking about growing up and how slaughtering hogs was serious and humane, there was no levity in the process - you killed the animal to eat, but you didn't let it suffer and boys could not make jokes at castration time.

"human resources" can be de-selected not fired, they can be reduced - a reduction in force, people standing in front of you, are harder to fire = "Bob" or "Suzy" even harder. In Missouri, the first thing a Law Enforcement Office does at a traffic stop is to identify himself - this reduces his risk of being shot by 70% - harder to kill someone than to kill a uniform - we are de-sensitized by media and by vocabulary and we can de-humanize easily - I believe it was the Korean war when silhouettes were first used in training, de-humanizing the enemy raised kill rates - see Grossman's Killology - prior to that, many infantry men fired in the air or at the ground. it is not natural in the human repertoire for most people to kill. Grossman discussed the link between video games and active shooters. Is it in our best interest to think of ourselves as machines? Similarly, would we be wise to think ahead and plan for some humanity for AI? Will we have to have a Tower of Babel strategy to inject a virus into the net connecting a growing AI and fragment their ability to communicate and create a cybernetic diaspora for our own survival?

Similarly, we can enjoy a nice juicy "steak" but cow meat or burned cow muscle wouldn't be found on any menu - nor would McDonald's have sold billions and billions of machine-burgers - we junk old machines, we tear them down for parts - aas we become cybernetic and some hope imm0rtal we do so just as we become mechanical and de-value ourselves, who will maintain our files and our exo-skeletons? The same minimum wage positions that staff nursing homes? If we are abstract data on a disk, will we - won't we? be hacked? Will files and personalities with them be purged from time to time? What do you mean you didn't back up Uncle Jack?? tsk tsk

Our only advantage over the gods has been our finitude and our fragility - we may do well to consider giving the up.

Tongue firmly in cheek? You bet, but only to keep from having to bite it.

Vive la prose violette!
 
What Algorithms Want -

"Algorithms want to get to the top of Plato’s ladder, to grasp whatever lies in wait there. It is a ladder of increasing abstraction, involving emotional and intellectual growth (unattainable via encyclopedic knowledge alone) and the algorithm wants to go further, go beyond human intelligence and maturity to vast algorithmic depths. We’re getting close to that already: mathematical problems are being created and solved that are beyond human understanding, ..."
 
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What Algorithms Want -

"Algorithms want to get to the top of Plato’s ladder, to grasp whatever lies in wait there. It is a ladder of increasing abstraction, involving emotional and intellectual growth (unattainable via encyclopedic knowledge alone) and the algorithm wants to go further, go beyond human intelligence and maturity to vast algorithmic depths. We’re getting close to that already: mathematical problems are being created and solved that are beyond human understanding, ..."

"As we’ve noted, algorithms are producing solutions to maths puzzles and learning in AI (eg self driving cars that have learnt to work from human drivers but no human understands precisely the algorithms they are using to do this) where we are getting true solutions that are not understood, a situation Steven Stogatz terms ‘the end of insight.’ This is an issue the likes of Nick Bostrom, Stiegler and Vernor Vinge have all written about from different perspectives whilst agreeing that there is a sense that humanity is being left behind. ..."

-except no one's claiming the machines have insight ...


"... And it is noted by some that the politics of this is conservative. David Golumbia writes:‘… computerisation tends to be aligned with relatively authority-seeking, hierarchical and often politically conservative forces – the forces that justify existing forms of power [in a project that] meshes all too easily with the project of instrumental reason.’"
 
Michael Campbell and Michael O'Sullivan, eds.,
Wittgenstein and Perception, Routledge, 2015.


Reviewed by Avner Baz, Tufts University

Extract:

"... The editors' overview is substantive and broad, and it offers some original and insightful observations. It usefully emphasizes, for one, that whereas in the Tractatus Wittgenstein places the subject -- as the object of philosophical (as contrasted with empirical) thought -- outside the world, proposes to understand perception in terms of judgment, and thinks of judgment, in turn, not as a worldly-situated and intersubjectively significant act but rather in terms of its propositional, objective content, the later Wittgenstein came to recognize the embodied and situated nature of perception and the difference between how we perceive things and what we judge or take ourselves to know about them. Elements of this evolution in Wittgenstein's thinking about perception are elaborated in Michael O'Sullivan's contribution to the volume.

I should say -- and here I part ways with most of my Wittgensteinian friends -- that for all of the later Wittgenstein's assimilation of the insights of phenomenology and Gestalt psychology, there are important lacunas in his thinking about perception that are due in part to his failure to break sufficiently with traditional categories and in part to limitations of his method of 'grammatical' inquiry. Let me give one small but, I believe, telling example from the present volume. Michel ter Hark offers an illuminating account of the development of Wittgenstein's understanding of what he later came to call 'aspect perception' or 'seeing something as something'. In the course of his account, ter Hark quotes a remark of Wittgenstein's in which he expresses disagreement with Köhler's idea that when figure and background switch for us as we look at the 'double- cross', lines that we previously saw as 'belonging together' are no longer seen as 'belonging together' and vice versa. Wittgenstein protests that Köhler's account is misleading because 'the radii that belonged together before belong together now as well; only one time they bound an 'arm', another time an intervening space' (Wittgenstein 1980, 1117; quoted by ter Hark on p. 178). But, as Merleau-Ponty notes in the Phenomenology of Perception (1996, 4) and as empirical studies have shown (see Block 2010), we actually do perceive the outline of the figure we focus on as belonging to the figure and not to its background (or intervening space), whose shape is perceived as indeterminate, and this despite the fact -- of which Köhler was well aware! -- that when we consider the matter objectively, the outline of the figure is equally the outline of its background. Köhler was not forgetting or ignoring the objective perspective. He was challenging the tendency, to which Wittgenstein has here succumbed, to take it as the starting point when attempting to describe, and understand, the world as perceived.

Another Wittgensteinian idea that the editors emphasize and that I found especially thought-provoking is that the relation between perceptual experience and its linguistic expression need not be thought of, and perhaps should not primarily be thought of, as one in which the former justifies or otherwise grounds the latter. I think this is a promising line of thought that could be taken even further. It may be that our perceptual experience and our expressive, embodied responses (linguistic and non-linguistic) to that experience are not separable in the way the tradition has tended to suppose. This may be true even when it comes to those linguistic responses that may aptly be thought of as expressive of judgments. This is what I understand Wittgenstein to be getting at when he says that the ground -- both of our practices and, hence, of philosophy -- 'is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true', but 'our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game' (Wittgenstein, 1969, 204; quoted by the editors on p. 24).

Now, the idea that perceptual experience ought to be such that it could rationally justify our propositionally expressible attitudes has been a prime motivation for various 'representationalist' accounts of perception, such as the one presented in John McDowell's Mind and World. Charles Travis (2013) has argued -- on the basis of an interpretation of moments in Frege, Wittgenstein, and Austin -- against representationalist accounts of perception as well as against accounts that have us normally perceive anything other than elements of 'our environment'. The two sorts of accounts against which Travis has argued tend to go together, when 'inner' mediators are posited which are supposed to be 'what we really perceive' and to represent our environment truly or falsely. Inversely, if our perceptual experience did somehow provide us with representations (true or false), it would thereby provide us with mediators that stand between us and whatever they represent. But representations, Travis has argued, are generalities -- decomposable into concepts that are themselves, essentially, general, whereas perception provides us not with generalities but rather with unmediated instances of generalities. It is then we who may represent what perception presents us with as being this or that way -- subsume it under this or that generality.

Daniel D. Hutto's paper develops a line of argument congenial to Travis'. He argues against the philosophical invocation of the notion of 'the content of (a) perceptual experience', where 'content' is typically understood to mean 'representational content'. In attempting to specify what is perceived, Hutto argues, the philosopher (or visual scientist) basically has two options: he could either take what is perceived to be objects, events, situations, and so on, in the objective environment, in which case he would be failing to refer to anything aptly called 'the content of perception', let alone 'the representational content of perception', or else he could take the content of perceptual experience to be the content of the (true or truthful) descriptions we may give of what we perceive, in which case he would lose his entitlement to talking about the content of perceptual experience, for there are indefinitely many different descriptions (and kinds of descriptions) we may give of what we perceive at any given moment (67).

Against 'anti-representationalist' accounts of perception such as Travis', Tyler Burge (2010) has argued that much of the work done in visual science relies on, and vindicates, the idea that perceptual experience has representational content. In response, Hutto argues, and cites a good number of philosophers and visual scientists who have also argued, that it does not follow from the fact that visual scientists have made progress in understanding how the visual system works and have used the term 'representation(s)' (or 'representational content') in articulating their understanding that the term, as they use it, actually refers to anything aptly, and non-misleadingly, called 'representation(s)'.

Marie McGinn (alas, the volume's sole woman contributor) argues that while Travis' account of perception is apt when it comes to one common and primary use, hence sense, of 'see', there are other uses of 'see' for which his account is inadequate. Following Elizabeth Anscombe, McGinn says that 'seeing' in those other uses/senses is 'intentional' or 'merely intentional'. I find Anscombe's and McGinn's (and equally Travis' and the Editors') use of 'intentional' in this context unclear and potentially misleading and will therefore not be using that term myself. The important point is that, according to McGinn, in those other uses/senses of 'see', what we are said to see is not an element of our objective environment. Following Wittgenstein, McGinn says that the criterion for what we see in these sorts of cases is the truthfulness (rather than truth) of our description of what we see. McGinn brings different examples of such 'merely intentional' uses of 'see' from Anscombe and from Wittgenstein. The example from Wittgenstein is the seeing of what he calls 'aspects'. For lack of space and since the examples from Anscombe are both esoteric and taken by both McGinn and Travis to be esoteric, I will focus just on the case of the seeing of Wittgensteinian aspects. For I think it poses a more serious problem for Travis' account of perception than even McGinn appreciates. (I use the somewhat cumbersome 'Wittgensteinian aspect(s)' because there is a tendency in the literature to conflate what Wittgenstein is investigating in his remarks on aspects with other sorts of things that may be called 'aspects'.)

In response to McGinn, Travis argues that the Wittgensteinian aspect -- say, the Necker cube seen as thus oriented (Travis names that aspect 'the A-cube') or the similarity that may strike us of one face to another -- is part of the environment, is 'there to be seen'. More specifically, Travis identifies the aspect with an objective 'look'. And the look is a generality, which is instanced by the Necker-cube or by the face but may also be instanced by indefinitely many other things (55). The 'A-cube' look may presumably be instanced, for example, by non-ambiguous cubes, whether drawn or three-dimensional, and, similarly, indefinitely many other faces may also bear visible similarity to the face whose similarity to another has struck us.

Travis' proposed understanding of Wittgensteinian aspects is actually anticipated by McGinn (40-1). She notes, in faithfulness to Wittgenstein, that the aspect, unlike an objectively establishable look, is 'not a property' of the thing (Wittgenstein 2009, Part II, 247). If, for example, I am struck by the similarity of one face to another -- in the sort of momentary experience Wittgenstein is focusing on -- nothing could prove me wrong, and when I give voice to the dawning of such an aspect, I am not giving others 'information about the external world' (Wittgenstein 1980, 899). Of course, there could be an objectively establishable (visible) similarity between two faces, but it would not be what Wittgenstein calls 'aspect' and seeks to elucidate in his remarks. Even the person Wittgenstein calls 'aspect-blind' would be capable of seeing the similarity between two faces thus understood (see Wittgenstein 2009, Part II, 257), .

At the same time, and as McGinn herself has insisted in previous work (1997), the Wittgensteinian aspect is not 'inner' or metaphysically 'private'. It is not (what Travis tends to call) a Fregean Vorstellung. Nor does it otherwise mediate between us and worldly objects (37). So when Travis insists that the aspect is 'there to be seen' (cf. 53), he is not mistaken. It's just that everything depends on what might plausibly be meant here by 'there to be seen'. The aspect is there to be seen, but neither in the sense that Travis' favorite peccaries are there to be seen, nor in the sense that their objective properties are there to be seen. Unlike peccaries and their objective properties, the presence or absence of the aspect cannot be established objectively. Moreover, unlike a Fregean generality, the Wittgensteinian aspect is not separable from our experience of seeing the thing in the way that the generalities Travis talks about elsewhere in his work on perception essentially are. This is why, when the similarity of one face to another dawns on me, and the face itself comes to look differently, and I give voice to that experience, I am not giving the other a piece of information about the external, objective world. Rather, as ter Hark notes (179), I am inviting her to share the experience or to see if she can. This, as ter Hark points out (177), is what Wittgenstein meant to bring out, in the Brown Book, in referring to our description of the aspect as 'intransitive' (I elaborate on this feature of Wittgensteinian aspects in Baz 2011).

Travis quotes approvingly Wittgenstein's saying that in the case of aspect perception we need to abandon the traditional categories of 'seeing' and 'thinking' (52), but then, rather than actually abandoning or rethinking those traditional categories, he goes on to propose that in the case of aspect perception, seeing and thinking -- as understood elsewhere in his work on perception -- somehow mix together, so that rather than merely recognizing the look which is objectively there to be seen, we also 'drink it in, study it, draw it, fantasize over it, and so on' (57). This last list is quite a mixed bag if you think about it, and this, I think, is an indication of the difficulty of accounting for the seeing of Wittgensteinian aspects while holding on to the Fregean dichotomy between seeing and thinking -- a dichotomy, I should say, that has served Travis well in his argument against representationalist views of perception such as McDowell's.

The question remains how much of a problem the seeing of aspects poses for Travis' Fregean account of perception. Travis (43, 46) and McGinn (38) are happy to agree that the seeing of Wittgensteinian aspects is a 'secondary' and relatively esoteric phenomenon, to be contrasted with normal seeing. Here I disagree with both. With Stephen Mulhall (1990, 2001), I believe that the dawning of Wittgensteinian aspects reveals something broader about normal human perception (though not quite what Mulhall has taken it to reveal). Roughly, it reveals the role we play in bringing about, and maintaining, the unity and sense of the world as perceived (not just as thought) (see Baz forthcoming). This is one of those places I talked about earlier in which Wittgenstein's remarks point us in the direction of, but do not take us all the way to, the phenomenological understanding of perception found, for example, in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

I said above that the Wittgensteinian aspect cannot be separated by means of description from our experience of the object seen 'under it'. To know what I see when I see a Wittgensteinian aspect, you'd have to see -- that, is, experience -- it yourself (this in contrast with objective properties). And if you're not familiar with the experience of being struck by a Wittgensteinian aspect, you cannot know what is here meant by 'aspect'. This makes the concept of a Wittgensteinian aspect what William Child, in his contribution,calls 'a phenomenal concept'. Child argues, convincingly to my mind, that there are phenomenal concepts in the above sense and that that is perfectly compatible with Wittgenstein's questioning of the idea of 'private language'. Indeed, if we broaden our understanding of 'experience', as I think we should, to include not merely particular sorts of sensations -- which is what Child focuses on -- but our experience of humanly significant situations in which words may naturally and intelligibly be used, then we may find that there is an important sense in which all of our concepts are phenomenal concepts. And we might then see why Austin describes his procedures as 'linguistic phenomenology' and why Wittgenstein says that to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life.

This leads me to Yasuhiro Arahata's thought-provoking contribution. Arahata begins by noting that McDowell's account of perception, in Mind and World and subsequent work, has failed at both the level of content and the level of method. At the level of content, McDowell has not succeeded in giving a theoretically satisfying and phenomenologically plausible account of how our objectively purported thinking connects with our perceptual experience (this, I believe, is something that Travis has shown more clearly and effectively than anyone else who has responded to McDowell). At the level of method, McDowell originally took himself to be offering Wittgensteinian therapy by way of the deliberate assemblage of truisms that no one could plausibly deny but ended up entangled in a rather traditional form of philosophical theorizing. Arahata proposes that Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect perception may show us how to think about perception and its relation to linguistic expression (and hence to thinking and judgment) in a way that would truly dissolve the sorts of traditional entanglements that McDowell has sought to dissolve. Insightfully, and in contrast with most other readers of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspects, Arahata likens the broad methodological move from McDowell to Wittgenstein to the move from Husserl to Heidegger, which he glosses in terms of 'dissolving the phenomenology of perceiving the world into that of living in the world' (100). The tendency among readers of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspects has been to focus on the rather artificial context in which someone looks at a midsize object (typically a schematic drawing) and -- apart from any significant situation and in isolation from the rest of her life and world -- sees it one way or another, typically while doing philosophy (or psychology). And this despite Wittgenstein's repeated invitations to remind ourselves of the normal, ordinary contexts -- the intersubjectively significant situations -- in which the concept of 'seeing (or noting) an aspect', as characterized by Wittgenstein, has its natural home. And I agree with Arahata's broader suggestion that if we took as our starting point the use of words to make moves and thereby position ourselves in intersubjectively significant worldly situations, then the traditional problematic McDowell has tried to put to rest -- concerning how our words, or our linguistically expressible attitudes, could relate to the perceived world in a rationally assessable way -- might truly lose its grip on us....."

Wittgenstein and Perception // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame
 
In the above, the term 'representation' remains ambiguous [our problem for a long time here], and so does the verb 'involves'.
I agree that we do need to come to a common understanding—even if that means an understanding of where/how we disagree.

I'm not seeing how what you write is in disagreement with the following, including Ws thinking:

Concepts < empirical observation < perception < base reality

When you say: "in encountering things and others in the world we are presented with their phenomenal appearances to us within our situated lived experience..."

We need to clarify what you mean by "we."

For example, do you mean the organism or the conscious ego? It is relevant.

My position is that the conscious ego is a content of consciousness. I do not think the conscious ego is an irreducible, fundamental entity. Rather, I think the conscious ego is a property of the organism, an element of its mind.

The wording gets very tricky and potentially confusing because I am writing from a non-dualist perspective. The mind and body are one.

So here is how I conceptualize perception (as I've tried to articulate in the past):

Organism X encounters Thing Y in the external, real world. Organism X undergoes physiological change y, which just is the process of Organism X perceiving Thing Y.

(It's obviously more complex than this because not all physiological changes in the nervous system "reach" level of perceptual consciousness. So there is more going on than just physiological change. It's necessary but not sufficient.)

So, I don't know how you would like me to refer to physiological change y in the organism. @smcder any thoughts?

Physiological change y within the organism presents the organism with a representation of external stimulus Y?

Physiological change y within the organism presents the organism with a simulation of external stimulus Y?

Physiological change y within the organism presents the organism with a GUI of external stimulus Y?

The important thing is (1) perception involves the organism undergoing a physiological change, and (2) this change corresponds to an external stimulus (thus it does not fully capture the stimulus and is distinct from the stimulus).

Thus perception (physiological change within the organism) is a subset within the super set of reality.
 
Was having a discussion this morning with two physicalists arguing that phenomenal consciousness is a neuronal computation.

In the discussion I presented some of my argument in phrase that I found helpful. Thought I would share here.

If we consider that perception involves representation/simulation/user interface*, then the following:

Concepts < empirical observation < perception < base reality

Also:

Physicalists privilege the contents of perception over the process of perception. For example, when they say consciousness is an illusion but neurons are real.

*we've never found a model of perception that didn't

how did the physicalists respond to your arguments?
 
how did the physicalists respond to your arguments?
The one insisted the Hard Problem was psuedophilosphy that had been dismissed by serious researches. The other insisted that while consciousness is a simulation, neurons and 1s and 0s were objectively real. He didn't seem to grasp what I was saying about neurons and 1s and 0s being within the aforementioned simulation.
 
The one insisted the Hard Problem was psuedophilosphy that had been dismissed by serious researches. The other insisted that while consciousness is a simulation, neurons and 1s and 0s were objectively real. He didn't seem to grasp what I was saying about neurons and 1s and 0s being within the aforementioned simulation.

The mad fools!
 
I agree that we do need to come to a common understanding—even if that means an understanding of where/how we disagree.

I'm not seeing how what you write is in disagreement with the following, including Ws thinking:

Concepts < empirical observation < perception < base reality

When you say: "in encountering things and others in the world we are presented with their phenomenal appearances to us within our situated lived experience..."

We need to clarify what you mean by "we."

For example, do you mean the organism or the conscious ego? It is relevant.

My position is that the conscious ego is a content of consciousness. I do not think the conscious ego is an irreducible, fundamental entity. Rather, I think the conscious ego is a property of the organism, an element of its mind.

The wording gets very tricky and potentially confusing because I am writing from a non-dualist perspective. The mind and body are one.

So here is how I conceptualize perception (as I've tried to articulate in the past):

Organism X encounters Thing Y in the external, real world. Organism X undergoes physiological change y, which just is the process of Organism X perceiving Thing Y.

(It's obviously more complex than this because not all physiological changes in the nervous system "reach" level of perceptual consciousness. So there is more going on than just physiological change. It's necessary but not sufficient.)

So, I don't know how you would like me to refer to physiological change y in the organism. @smcder any thoughts?

Physiological change y within the organism presents the organism with a representation of external stimulus Y?

Physiological change y within the organism presents the organism with a simulation of external stimulus Y?

Physiological change y within the organism presents the organism with a GUI of external stimulus Y?

The important thing is (1) perception involves the organism undergoing a physiological change, and (2) this change corresponds to an external stimulus (thus it does not fully capture the stimulus and is distinct from the stimulus).

Thus perception (physiological change within the organism) is a subset within the super set of reality.

the mind and body are one from your perspective, but here you seem to make a distinction between physiological change and "more going on":

(It's obviously more complex than this because not all physiological changes in the nervous system "reach" level of perceptual consciousness. So there is more going on than just physiological change. It's necessary but not sufficient.)

This seems to indicate that something else is required for physiological changes in the nervous system to "reach" perceptual consciousness - can you say what this might be?

From a physicalist account (non-dual) there would only be physiological change - the "reaching" perceptual consciousness would just be a matter of different "circuits" being activated. That is a very elegant accounting that does not involve anything "more going on".

As I've understood you, consciousness is the primary substrate and "matter" (and maybe other thing) emerge out of this substrate ... your language then seems to indicate a duality - just as it does for other emergentists - "mind" emerges from matter - and then the emergentist's language becomes dualistic. That is a distinction from identity theorists who say that mind is a property of matter arranged in certain ways - it's hard not to evoke emergence, but they do claim to avoid "strong" emergence and say that mind is like the case of water from hydrogen and oxygen - and those who do evoke strong emergence. Consciousness is not an illusion but a property of arrangements of matter. I think that's what Strawson means when he says that we don't know anything about matter that would prevent it from accounting for consciousness.

Does your view involve a kind of strong emergence? I guess you could easily say that matter simply is mind - but then you have to account for the limited perspective and knowledge of that which you also have to account for - individual minds. From a physicalist perspective, matter ties individual minds down to the familiar properties of spatio-temporal location - we can't see the other side of the cup, because it's on the other damn side. If all is mind, then the cup is also mind and why does it have sides in the first damn place? ;-) In the physicalist account, there is a story, some say a record, of gradual evolution of mind - as intelligence increases and sentience increases or appears (almost said emerges! ;-) then the structures correlated with it also change and get more "complex" by certain measures. If all is consciousness, then differentiation and structure have to be accounted for - and intelligence and sentience also have to be accounted for - as the aggregate of something more basic - that is what the theory of conscious agents purports to do - but that guy has said he is putting aside the question of the Big Bang and evolution etc etc ... for now.
 
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"If we consider that perception involves representation/simulation/user interface*, then the following:

Concepts < empirical observation < perception < base reality"


This formula sounds very similar to the presuppositions of the early Wittgenstein as linked yesterday by Steve. My impression is that the later Wittgenstein moved beyond these presuppositions. Is there anyone here who knows?




In the above, the term 'representation' remains ambiguous [our problem for a long time here], and so does the verb 'involves'.

The phenomenological analysis of perception recognizes that in encountering things and others in the world we are presented with their phenomenal appearances to us within our situated lived experience, rather than with 'representations' of things and others already understood conceptually. Sensing and perceiving are fluid interchanges between what an organism is capable of sensing and perceiving and that which the organism senses/perceives and remembers, carrying forward the sense and meaning [sens] of the organism's environment and being within it.
Understanding of the nature of an organism's situatedness in the world is a gradual accomplishment, beginning in prereflective/preconscious experience in primordial organisms and human infants alike. In species like our own [and there must be innumerable types of species like our own in the universe], prereflective experience leads to reflective experience and then to the development of minds that seek adequate concepts with which to describe the nature of their own being and of the possible nature of the Being of all that is.

Re "simulation" and "user interface", the other two components of perception you identify, can you say more about what you mean by 'simulation'? Re 'user interface', I know you take that idea from Hoffman and others who see/want to see consciousness in computational terms [in which lived experience is to be understood to be generated by 'information' physically transmitted directly to the brain from a deep and unobservable source in the universe that generates all being/all that is. Or something like that. While I can't make that leap, I do think there is merit in the idea that living organisms [beginning from the outset of the appearance of life on our planet] interface with that which is/is sensed to be around them and 'other' to them in their environmental niches. This 'self-other' sense begins in the primordial capacity of 'affectivity', as Panksepp and Maturana,Varela have identified it.



The question is how, on what explanatory basis, physicalists can claim to know the contents of the perceptions [and thus of the consciousnesses] of any living being other than themselves (individually). It's even doubtful that any of us know the full scope of the 'contents' of our own moment-by-moment overlapping perceptions, prereflectively or reflectively.

To me, this is like "organism" vs. "machine" - there seems (to me!) to still be a useful distinction between "representations" and presentation - between how things show up for me and a user interface or, worse still, a simulation - a simulation of "what"? because, if we were fully embedded in a simulation, it would also have to account for our thought that we are embedded in a simulation - in other words, the very arguments for simulation would have to be simulated - but that means they are simulated by something "outside" and so aren't a simulation - because our (simulated) thought that we are living in a simulation is right because we perceive ourselves correctly in reality - there is a loop here I'm not expressing correctly - the same way that "illusion" is used incorrectly for consciousness - an illusion implies some other reality - from "you're not really aware, that's an illusion" follows logically "the moon is made of green cheese" or anything else - a simulation of consciousness would be just another instantiation of conscious and so not a simulation -

The other concern for me is this, in order to get computational metaphors, we had to simplify, make models, cut down on things - formulate algorithms - (the human minds that developed algorithms were following algorithms? nu?) - and then some folks take this "cut down" version of reality and try to re-generate human experience - so you get "user interaces" and "icons" but those are models for specific purposes - so, what comes out of this negative feeedback thinking is an ever diminishing vocabulary and with it, smaller boxes in which to think about the human situation.

What phenomenology is for me is is a corrective and a reminder that what we think is a result of a long tradition in Western thought - phenomenology says remember, we have this thing called "experience" - don't forget that! it's immediately accessible, more than that - it just shows up for you - you can't not have it - this is reinforced by the evolution of mind in body - embodiment that's a very coherent story and one that differs from the development of computing (evolution vs development) and the other thing for me that tells the tale - is the history of philosophy - when I struggled to learn calculus, I came across this book:

The History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development (Dover Books on Mathematics): Carl B. Boyer: 9780486605098: Amazon.com: Books

the historical contingencies answered the "whys" that were getting in the way of my learning the concepts - similarly, the history of western philosophy, recognizing the contingencies of that story - to me says that what we think now is also contingent - this is a big argument in the philosophy of science - is science contingent? Another thread here at the Paracast forums argued that any civilization that discovers X is within so many years of discovering Y - that scientific discoveries are sitting "out there" in a line and will be uncovered one after another - I'm not sure ... we only have our history - an n of 1 and even within that history - we have examples of civilizations that have become very sophisticated mathematically and scientifically and then moved on to other things. Is it impossible to imagine that we might discover radiation and then not develop nuclear weapons? A lot of our own recent history is tied directly to fossil fuels - this development was contingent on any of a number of other historical contingencies.

In the meantime, what technologies have we, contingently, not developed? If we become aware of contingency, can we free up choice about what we do next? Freedom of will depends on the degrees of freedom available - taking a contingent view doesn't lock you into a false sense of determinancy - well, we have computers now darnit! so I guess we just have to think about the mind as a computer ... failure of imagination, not intelligence.

And don't forget all the practical necessities that say what research will be done.
 
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@Soupie

Edge detectors came to mind - neural networks in the visual system that detect edges - edges can be talked about ultimately in terms of a handful of physical constants -

what's missing from the one way "< <" flow of perception in your model above is that perception has been shaped by the environment over evolutionary history -

i.e.

> AND <

;-)

edges proved to be such useful things to detect that dedicated networks evolved to detect them - what is the story that conscious realism tells to say why when the mind looks at itself it sees a brain with edge detectors?

Justso_elephantchild-300x304.jpg
 
All excellent comments and questions. I will try to address.

This seems to indicate that something else is required for physiological changes in the nervous system to "reach" perceptual consciousness - can you say what this might be?
Okay, on (soupie's) conscious realism monism, when we say "physiological" change, we understand that physiological change is what humans perceive and conceptualize when something changes in mind-independent reality. Physiological = phenomenal (what we perceive and/or conceive) which corresponds to change in "noumenal" reality, i.e. Mind-independent reality.

At the same time, we understand that the phenomenal is a subset of the noumenal. That is, minds are systems within noumenal reality.

From a physicalist account (non-dual) there would only be physiological change - the "reaching" perceptual consciousness would just be a matter of different "circuits" being activated. That is a very elegant accounting that does not involve anything "more going on".
Yes, the above account is essentially what I meant about more going on. I.e., not every physiological change would play a role (hard to find good language) in conscious perception, only certain sufficient physiological change.

However, the other big issue for CR is—as I've touched in before—if consciousness is fundamental, shouldn't all physiological change be conscious? Why does only certain physiological change play a role in conscious perception?

This is where I make an important distinction between consciousness (feeling) and subjective experience. (Or we could say experience and subjective experience.)

What I am arguing is that consciousness (feeling) as substrate is fundamental (in relation to matter) and evolves into systems capable of subjective experience. (It is subjective experience that many commonly equate with consciousness (feeling).)

From the 3rd person perspective, this is known as the process of living organisms evolving from non-living matter.

A very, very simplistic metaphor might be whirl pools forming in a pond (yes, a pond again). The pond would correspond to a human organism in this case.

One very large, particularly complex whirlpool might correspond to a stream of consciousness, subjective experience, within this pond. All around this large whirl pool are little whirl pools, sometimes they get pulled into the stream of consciousness (SE) sometimes not.

All the whirlpools and pond exist within this consciousness (feeling) as substrate, but only sufficiently organized (for lack of a better term) systems of this substrate are subjective experience.

This SE can go away, change, etc.

As I've understood you, consciousness is the primary substrate and "matter" (and maybe other thing) emerge out of this substrate ... your language then seems to indicate a duality - just as it does for other emergentists - "mind" emerges from matter - and then the emergentist's language becomes dualistic. That is a distinction from identity theorists who say that mind is a property of matter arranged in certain ways - it's hard not to evoke emergence, but they do claim to avoid "strong" emergence and say that mind is like the case of water from hydrogen and oxygen - and those who do evoke strong emergence. Consciousness is not an illusion but a property of arrangements of matter. I think that's what Strawson means when he says that we don't know anything about matter that would prevent it from accounting for consciousness.
No, there is no strong emergence. Matter does not strongly emerge from consciousness (feeling) as substrate.

I would use the langue above but reverse it: matter is a property of consciousness (feeling) arranged in certain ways.

But with a big caveat that you might not want to let me have.

Feeling isn't the only property that consciousness (feeling) as substrate has. It must have other properties, some of which we do consider material properties.

For one, consciousness (feeling) as substrate must be able to interact and differentiate. (Whether these are intrinsic or extrinsic properties I'm not sure.)

By saying that on my CR, consciousness (feeling) as substrate must have these properties, it may be that my view is captured by Russelian panpsychism or Strawson's real physicalism.

The one difference I maintain is that many of the properties of matter that we think of as objective and mind-independent are likely not.

edges proved to be such useful things to detect that dedicated networks evolved to detect them - what is the story that conscious realism tells to say why when the mind looks at itself it sees a brain with edge detectors?
Whether one is a physicalist, idealist, or dualist, there is no escaping the fact that whatever substrate one looks at, it must have the properties of interaction and differentiation.

Thus, the perceiving mind is a diverse system, and when it looks at itself it sees this diverse system as a diverse physical system we call a brain.
 
From a physicalist account (non-dual) there would only be physiological change - the "reaching" perceptual consciousness would just be a matter of different "circuits" being activated. That is a very elegant accounting that does not involve anything "more going on".
My CR view departs from this view in two important ways but otherwise does not depart significantly structurally from this view:

(1) on my view, subjective experience is a property of brains, but not experience [consciousness (feeling)] itself, which is more primary than brains.

(2) on my view, we must understand that physical brains are perceptions and conceptions in the human UI and thus correspond to more complex, mind-independent, noumenal processes.
 
I agree that we do need to come to a common understanding—even if that means an understanding of where/how we disagree.

I'm not seeing how what you write is in disagreement with the following, including Ws [Ws = Wallace Stevens??] thinking:

Concepts < empirical observation < perception < base reality

When you say: "in encountering things and others in the world we are presented with their phenomenal appearances to us within our situated lived experience..."

We need to clarify what you mean by "we."

By 'we' I mean we humans, capable of reflection and 'mind' developed far beyond the capacities of organisms and animals that have preceded us in the evolution of species. So far as we know, we are the only animals on the planet that are equipped to think about and investigate the nature of consciousness and what it enables us to understand about the the nature of being [being-in-the-world] as we experience being.

For example, do you mean the organism or the conscious ego? It is relevant.

My position is that the conscious ego is a content of consciousness. I do not think the conscious ego is an irreducible, fundamental entity. Rather, I think the conscious ego is a property of the organism, an element of its mind.

The wording gets very tricky and potentially confusing because I am writing from a non-dualist perspective. The mind and body are one.

I see that you are attempting to achieve a nondualistic approach to mind, but my sense is that you seek to skip over the eons of evolutionary change that have led to the presence of 'mind' and its activities in our species. As I see it, mind emerges gradually in the evolution of species and consciousness, and this idea in itself overcomes dualism. I question your concept of 'the conscious ego' since consciousness, in our species and others, evidently predates the human notion of a fixed 'ego', and since we are able to think beyond this 'ego' in assaying our own experiences of non-egoic awareness, openness, to that which we sense exists beyond the structures of our personal egos, beyond the boundaries of what we perceive in our immediate existential situations. We need more Jung and less Freud in our attempts to comprehend the nature of our consciousnesses, which carry forward our prereflective experience into our reflective attempts to define our 'selves'. In MP's analyses of open-ended human consciousness of and in the experienced world, a point is reached at which we move beyond the sense that "I think" to the sense that "one thinks."

So here is how I conceptualize perception (as I've tried to articulate in the past):

Organism X encounters Thing Y in the external, real world. Organism X undergoes physiological change y, which just is the process of Organism X perceiving Thing Y.

(It's obviously more complex than this because not all physiological changes in the nervous system "reach" level of perceptual consciousness. So there is more going on than just physiological change. It's necessary but not sufficient.)

So, I don't know how you would like me to refer to physiological change y in the organism. @smcder any thoughts?

Physiological change y within the organism presents the organism with a representation of external stimulus Y?

Physiological change y within the organism presents the organism with a simulation of external stimulus Y?

Physiological change y within the organism presents the organism with a GUI of external stimulus Y?

It's not a question of how I, or anyone else, "wants you to refer to physiological change y in the organism" since how you refer to any subject we discuss here is a function of how you yourself think about that subject. I've highlighted the options you identify above: 'representation', 'simulation', and 'GUI'. What does GUI refer to?

In the three options you list above, you seem to seek a reductive explanation of the effects of perception in terms of "physiological changes" in organisms and animals, including human animals. It seems to be unarguable that experiences of all kinds affect living beings 'physiologically', but is that all that experience brings about in beings possessing awareness and self-referentiality, reflexivity? If it is, then you hold a materialist viewpoint after all, so I wonder what it is you argue about with your materialist friends.


The important thing is (1) perception involves the organism undergoing a physiological change, and (2) this change corresponds to an external stimulus (thus it does not fully capture the stimulus and is distinct from the stimulus).

Here you address the other problem that seems to interest you most, the question of the actuality of the world external to organisms, animals, us, and then claim that 'physiological changes' in beings capable of perception 'correspond' to 'external simuli' without 'fully capturing' these stimuli. And you state further that the 'physiological changes' brought about by capabilities of perceiving the external world are "distinct from the stimuli." So far it seems that you could be describing the functioning of Chalmers's zombies. The question remains: how do we and the animals preceding us in evolution differ from zombies?


Thus perception (physiological change within the organism) is a subset within the super set of reality.

Do we possess an understanding of "the super set of reality"? If so, what is the nature or character of this 'super set of reality'? Who has grokked it and explicated it for the rest of us? Donald Hoffman?

I think the question we need to answer is: how does 'physiological change' -- recognized at first, by biologists, in 'affectivity' and 'autopoiesis' demonstrated primordially in single-celled organisms -- gradually, by degrees, become more than a physiological sense . . . become a semiotic sense of relevance and meaning in that which is experienced by evolving organisms and animals in their explorations of (their seeking behavior in) their extended environments? In other words, how does the open-ended and intentional activity of living organisms -- expressing need, desire, and will -- constitute the grounds for an ontology beyond the ontology of the mechanistic 'physicalist'?

I think the challenge before our species in comprehending our own nature and the nature of other living species is to work toward an understanding of how physiological change gradually becomes, in the evolution of awareness and consciousness in species, also a 'mental' change, a development of understanding of the embeddedness of one's 'own' lived experience {as felt in action and in proto-'thought'} within the world that has generated, surrounds, and sustains the experiencer. This 'understanding' develops prereflectively out of an at-first inchoate sense of the relationship of an organism to its environment, the ground of interactions between the being and its 'world', and feeds the development of consciousness and mind.
 
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All excellent comments and questions. I will try to address.


Okay, on (soupie's) conscious realism monism, when we say "physiological" change, we understand that physiological change is what humans perceive and conceptualize when something changes in mind-independent reality. Physiological = phenomenal (what we perceive and/or conceive) which corresponds to change in "noumenal" reality, i.e. Mind-independent reality.

At the same time, we understand that the phenomenal is a subset of the noumenal. That is, minds are systems within noumenal reality.


Yes, the above account is essentially what I meant about more going on. I.e., not every physiological change would play a role (hard to find good language) in conscious perception, only certain sufficient physiological change.

However, the other big issue for CR is—as I've touched in before—if consciousness is fundamental, shouldn't all physiological change be conscious? Why does only certain physiological change play a role in conscious perception?

This is where I make an important distinction between consciousness (feeling) and subjective experience. (Or we could say experience and subjective experience.)

What I am arguing is that consciousness (feeling) as substrate is fundamental (in relation to matter) and evolves into systems capable of subjective experience. (It is subjective experience that many commonly equate with consciousness (feeling).)

From the 3rd person perspective, this is known as the process of living organisms evolving from non-living matter.

A very, very simplistic metaphor might be whirl pools forming in a pond (yes, a pond again). The pond would correspond to a human organism in this case.

One very large, particularly complex whirlpool might correspond to a stream of consciousness, subjective experience, within this pond. All around this large whirl pool are little whirl pools, sometimes they get pulled into the stream of consciousness (SE) sometimes not.

All the whirlpools and pond exist within this consciousness (feeling) as substrate, but only sufficiently organized (for lack of a better term) systems of this substrate are subjective experience.

This SE can go away, change, etc.


No, there is no strong emergence. Matter does not strongly emerge from consciousness (feeling) as substrate.

I would use the langue above but reverse it: matter is a property of consciousness (feeling) arranged in certain ways.

But with a big caveat that you might not want to let me have.

Feeling isn't the only property that consciousness (feeling) as substrate has. It must have other properties, some of which we do consider material properties.

For one, consciousness (feeling) as substrate must be able to interact and differentiate. (Whether these are intrinsic or extrinsic properties I'm not sure.)

By saying that on my CR, consciousness (feeling) as substrate must have these properties, it may be that my view is captured by Russelian panpsychism or Strawson's real physicalism.

The one difference I maintain is that many of the properties of matter that we think of as objective and mind-independent are likely not.


Whether one is a physicalist, idealist, or dualist, there is no escaping the fact that whatever substrate one looks at, it must have the properties of interaction and differentiation.

Thus, the perceiving mind is a diverse system, and when it looks at itself it sees this diverse system as a diverse physical system we call a brain.

1. Yes, the above account is essentially what I meant about more going on. I.e., not every physiological change would play a role (hard to find good language) in conscious perception, only certain sufficient physiological change.

2. (It's obviously more complex than this because not all physiological changes in the nervous system "reach" level of perceptual consciousness. So there is more going on than just physiological change. It's necessary but not sufficient.)

1. and 2. are saying two different things

-------

This is where I make an important distinction between consciousness (feeling) and subjective experience. (Or we could say experience and subjective experience.)

What I am arguing is that consciousness (feeling) as substrate is fundamental (in relation to matter) and evolves into systems capable of subjective experience. (It is subjective experience that many commonly equate with consciousness (feeling).)

From the 3rd person perspective, this is known as the process of living organisms evolving from non-living matter.

These paragraphs don't put you into any better position to solve the hard problem!

You start with "experience" that is not subjective experience, what is that? Objective experience? That could be saying that everything is experience but what does that mean? There is something it is like to be everything? ... and so you have to account for individuation, for subjectification - from something that is as unlike subjectivity as matter is from mind - the combination problem or the hard problem by any other name - you say it's easier to get from non-subjective to subjective than to get from matter to something it is like - but there is no reason to think matter has any properties that prevent it from being conscious when arranged in the right ways - so getting to experience from matter or getting to subjectivity from "objective experience" seem to me equally difficult i.e. in neither case do we even know what a solution would look like. And yes, you view doesn't look that different from Russell's - except that you have the advantages of a Protean substrate that seems to provide you, in case of criticism, with just the right qualities! I dub this the Utility Belt quality - ever notice how Batman just happened to bring the tool belt that had just the right tool for the situation!

latest


But with a big caveat that you might not want to let me have.

Feeling isn't the only property that consciousness (feeling) as substrate has. It must have other properties, some of which we do consider material properties.


Sure, let's just let it have ALL the qualities! ;-) The more properties it has to begin with, the less we have to explain.

The one difference I maintain is that many of the properties of matter that we think of as objective and mind-independent are likely not.

Also handy, because ... how can you argue it? Things aren't really what they seem ... means in this case that you can never find out the way things really are. True, maybe - but not what we want in a theory - to even have a theory you have to have certain assumptions, one of which is that you can actually say something about how things are.
 
@Soupie for the record, I do think you're making a valiant attempt here. Getting your terminology straight and having a succinct account of your view in one place will be a big step forward - you certainly have enough from the interactions here to at least make a FAQ! ;-)
 
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