Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10

[Constance]

As I recall you wrote to Velmans a while back to ask a question and received a reply. I'll search the thread to find out what your question was and what his response was. In the meantime it would be interesting to hear his response if you write to him again concerning the conjecture underscored above.

Here is an interesting post from 2014 by you, @Soupie, that turned up earliest in my search for your reference to Velman's reflexive monism. It was in response to a post by @Jeff Davis, and I think we'll need to read posts preceding and following it to get the full context of where we were back then:


"Jeff Davis said: ↑
@Jeff Davis

IMO consciousness is the envelope that gives us the ability to operate physically in a universe that is informational in composition.
Click to expand...

Soupie replied:

I'm not sure I follow you completely, but this sentence reminded me of this quote that Langan features in the introduction to his CTMU:

@Jeff Davis
The secret IMO is that there is no subconscious whatsoever, rather, we all have a universal informational collective available to us that we merely formulate to include a survival based relevance to ourselves. ... IMO, the subconscious is most likely universal consciousness, whose entrance is limited via the naturally displaced temporal adjustment of our physical existence. Possibly due to our physical existence's mortality based survival instincts, we find little critically mandated need or requirement for this non-temporal expanse of consciousness.
Click to expand...

Soupie replied:

This is certainly an interesting idea.

If I'm not mistaken, I think it is based on phenomena such as OBEs and NDEs as well as episodic numinous experiences. Furthermore, I agree that the mind is distinct from the brain and that the mind extends from the body. I also think it's possible that minds exist/operate in a field. I think it's possible and likely that minds can interact.

However, my approach to these phenomena is much more natural as opposed to supernatural. (Thus my monism.)

I think our reflexive state of consciousness is inferior (for lack of a better term) to our non-reflexive states of consciousness. To me, this makes sense if what science tells us is true: that is, that non-reflexive states of consciousness have evolved and sustained terrestrial organisms for billions of years and - at least in human organisms - the reflexive state of consciousness is comparatively young.

This sense of something greater than our "selves" may not be a supernatural connection to the core of reality or a universal consciousness, but rather a sense of non-conscious states of experience.

Last edited: Apr 21, 2014
Soupie, Apr 21, 2014 Report
#1601"

 

[Soupie]

@Soupie I have been thinking about your why, how, and what (WHW)? You say that I don't WHW phenomenal consciousness.
This is how you determine a paper's WHW score (not to be confused with the WHF score):
why proceeds with a 'because'. How proceeds with a 'by'. what proceeds with an 'is'.
Search the paper for those terms (some, particularly 'is's, will be blind alleys of course)

P1

I suggest that the concept of merit in this context can be best explored through the notion of qualitative relevance—the Oxford English Dictionary defines “qualitative” as “pertaining to or concerned with quality, where quality relates to merit or value. . .”. The idea is that biochemical assimilation must assign, not a static attribution of merit in relation to an environmental particular, but rather a qualitative attribution whose merit can subsequently be qualified by the relevance that those qualitative attributions might (or might not) have on an individual’s changing survival demands. This ensures that there is a flexible indirect correspondence between how an environmental particular is assimilated qualitatively such that its relevance to survival might thereby be evaluated and weighted—depending on the changing needs of the individual and changing nature of the environment. In practice what this means is that a replicating lineage will tend to evolve biochemical mechanisms whose complexity and interrelations will evince attributions to or stances towards environmental particulars in distinct ways that are relevant qualitatively. These qualitative distinctions themselves will in some way signify the subtle nature of the stance that an individual might adopt to environmental particulars in a way that will reflect its attitude to such things as resting, conserving or expending energy, interesting a mate, locating food and avoiding various kinds of hazards. These may be filtered further in nuanced ways depending on the relevance of complex environmental features.

What I am proposing, in broad terms, is that replication ultimately facilitates the emergence and ongoing evolution—courtesy of a generational discourse—of a meaningful correspondence that qualifies a unique qualitative ontology: physiological function inevitably imposes assignations of qualitative relevance on the physical properties of the environment. Clearly then, this thesis opposes the view that environmental properties possess qualities or qualitative information independently from the observing subject (see Dennett 1991, pp. 375–83; Lycan 1996, pp. 72–5; Rosenthal 1991; and Tye 1995, p. 100). ...

I am of the view that biochemical and neurological mechanisms are capable of delineating, notably in a qualitatively relevant manner, any kind of environmental particular, be it for example, a particular electromagnetic wavelength, chemical compound, vibration frequency and amplitude, pressure, pH etc. One could go further and surmise that this account of the emergence and evolution of a qualitative ontology is a first step naturalistic response to the challenge that Chalmers’ (1995) coined ‘the hard problem’ (see also Nagel 1974). Of course, regarding the hard problem, Chalmers was referring specifically to the phenomenal qualitative content of conscious experience, to which humans can directly relate from personal experience. He was not suggesting that the biochemical mechanisms of plants or of primitive animals was relevant to the problem of qualitative content. Nevertheless, what I have been arguing is that the precedent is there in evolving biochemical mechanisms for a nuanced qualitative ontology to evolve in increasing sophistication from the most primitive to the most complex of organisms. ...

In this first part, I introduced the idea that generational discourse—courtesy of replication—determines a meaningful correspondence between the environment and biochemical mechanisms. I argued that an accurate correspondence is of survival benefit to a replicating lineage and suggested that this accurate and meaningful correspondence can be equated to a physiological class of knowledge which is distinct from but bears a relation to conceptual knowledge. I have further argued that replication leads to qualitatively relevant biochemical mechanisms and subsequently qualifies the emergence and evolution of a unique qualitative ontology. I have suggested that this might be relevant to the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness which is to explain phenomenal experience. I will now expand on these basic ideas in Part II and argue that there is yet another distinct class of environmental discourse and meaningful correspondence that creates its own unique ontological class.

Part II
Experiential Discourse: a Unique Class of Real-Time Qualitative Evaluation

I am of the view that biochemical mechanisms can assimilate the qualitative relevance of environmental particulars in as variedly nuanced ways as there are environmental particulars where doing so proves relevant to survival. For the same reason a replicating lineage does not characterize properties that are physically irrelevant, or indeed, not physical at all. Qualitative assimilation must be bound by constraints of a physical and relevant kind. Such constraints include the temporal and spatial. Even so, a creature that possesses only innate capabilities does not relate individualistically to those kinds of physical constraints. For such creatures, there is no uniquely individuated spatiotemporal world-view; their responsivity to the environment and its spatiotemporal constraints is a relation only of replicative importance to the lineage. In essence, these individuals are merely automata, acting like a qualitative environmental ‘barometer’ on behalf of or in the interests of the species.

[In the above, you describe how organisms/species might evolve physiologies that enable them to adaptively interact with the environment. As I've frequently noted, this is pretty standard theory of evolution stuff.

However, you do make the radical suggestion that with the emergence of replication and adaptation in nature a new "qualitative" ontology has emerged. You suggest that this might be relevant to the Hard Problem.

Soon thereafter, at the start of section 2, however, you make it very clear that regardless of the emergence of replication and adaptation, these organisms are no more than automata.

Okay, then.

I don't disagree. Furthermore, @smcder might produce for us examples of robots/programs that can "adaptively" interact with the environment via "physiologies" that have been manmade. These robots are approaching the complexity of cells and perhaps even insects.

I do think your idea that replication and adaptation introduce into the world a process of "quality," merit, or just plan old subjective good and bad is very interesting.

While I don't believe these provide us with the germs of phenomenality or sentience/feeling, I do think—as I've noted—that they provide the germs of "subjective" points of view.

I dont have time to comment on the following section atm, but I wonder if @smcder would agree that you make a HUGE leap; going from mindless automata to *phenomenally experiencing* (?) organisms in seemingly one step? Soupie]

But there is a transitional imperative. As autonomic mechanisms and sensory facilities evolve in sophistication—which is inevitable because the greater the sophistication the greater the potential environmental responsivity—there is the increased likelihood that a creature’s assimilation of multiple environmental stimulations will generate overly complex inclinations, and thereby evince conflicting or cyclical behavioural motivations. Consequently, the survival precedent is to evolve mechanisms that manage the opportunities and conflicts that might arise from the multiple assimilations of the interoceptive and exteroceptive environments. The remit of this management is to determine their relative importance and thereby to prioritize certain qualitative assimilations over others. In other words, the benefit in the management is its potential to evaluate the qualitative milieu.

In Part I, I emphasized that the discourse upon which physiological adaptation relies occurs over a generation timeline between a replicating lineage and its environment. This is not the case with creatures that that have the capacity to evaluate and thereby prioritize the relative importance of their qualitative assimilations. Such creatures are engaged in an additional and unique class of discourse that takes place on a real-time basis.
Individual’s evaluation of a qualitatively assimilated environmental particular: “Is this qualitative assimilation that which is most relevant to my needs?”
Individual’s neural weighting: “no, so instigate a search for another more pertinent qualitative experience.” Alternatively, “yes, so engage further with that environmental particular.”
This class of experiential discourse is made possible by the unique capabilities of neural networks which have rapid transcellular connectivity.3 Neural networks can rapidly evaluate the respective merits of biochemical assimilations. In reality, the term “evaluation” here refers to an incredibly diverse range of neurological and biochemical processes. From a behaviourist perspective, though, the important distinction between evaluation and mere biochemical assimilation is that evaluation facilitates behavioural adaptation courtesy of a continuous interactive experiential discourse while assimilation alone only facilitates physiological adaptation due to generational discourse. In both instances, the term “facilitates” is a functional consequence of a particular kind of interactive mechanism, namely replication in the case of generation discourse, and neural mechanisms in the case of experiential discourse. Both grant the potential for a particular class of meaningful correspondence to evolve. With generational discourse, an organism’s innately acquired physiology, in essence, qualifies the statement, “this complex set of biochemical capabilities is currently best suited to the environment for the survival of the replicating lineage”. With experiential discourse, the evaluative process is one that qualifies the statement, “this particular qualitative experience event is the most relevant to the survival of the individual (which, as it happens, is also of relevance to the survival of the lineage)”.4 What we can say of the former is that the meaningful correspondence determines a physiological class of knowledge about the world that is qualitatively relevant to the survival of a replicating lineage. Of the latter, we can say that the meaningful correspondence determines a phenomenal class of knowledge where worldly events are qualified meaningfully as a phenomenon of continually changing qualitative experiences that inform and motivate relevant action. ...

[!?!?

I think there is some super interesting stuff here which i will get to asap. Soupie]

 

[smcder]

@Soupie writes:

I don't disagree. Furthermore, @smcder might produce for us examples of robots/programs that can "adaptively" interact with the environment via "physiologies" that have been manmade. These robots are approaching the complexity of cells and perhaps even insects.

Vehicles

Braitenberg vehicle - Wikipedia

 

[smcder]

@Soupie

I dont have time to comment on the following section atm, but I wonder if @smcder would agree that you make a HUGE leap; going from mindless automata to *phenomenally experiencing* (?) organisms in seemingly one step? Soupie]

yes

 

[smcder]

@Soupie writes:

[In the above, you describe how organisms/species might evolve physiologies that enable them to adaptively interact with the environment. As I've frequently noted, this is pretty standard theory of evolution stuff.

However, you do make the radical suggestion that with the emergence of replication and adaptation in nature a new "qualitative" ontology has emerged. You suggest that this might be relevant to the Hard Problem.

I'm not following how that is radical? I am interpreting "qualitative ontology" as consciousness, essentially - the role of consciousness ... and I am assuming that at least some biologists/scientists would "standardly" think consciousness has a role to play ... that the idea that it does would at least not be radical - even if they can't "explain" it? A couple of examples from a Google search:

• A New Theory Explains How Consciousness Evolved (Attention Schema Theory)
  
• Evolution and Consciousness | Berkeley Scientific - Many scientists agree that self-awareness evolved because of the benefits it contributes understanding others and social situations, implying that self-awareness is intrinsically connected to other-awareness. This suggests that there was an advantage for the individual in understanding others, and therefore that competition and cooperation played a pivotal role in how human evolution progressed. Consciousness, then, is an experience, and our capacity for mental construction and time travel allows us to compare current situations with past and future ones. Mental trial and error is much more efficient than actual trial and error, so this part of the decision making process greatly reduces the chance of failure. This extends to our interactions with others – we use our own experiences in order to predict the behavior of others. Mirror neuron experiments in humans and monkeys favor this view.

Tyler Burge, Perception: Where Mind Begins - PhilPapers

Unfortunately behind a pay wall, but there is a YouTube presentation of the paper.

Abstract
What are the earliest beings that have minds in evolutionary order? Two marks of mind are consciousness and representation. I focus on representation. I distinguish a psychologically distinctive notion of representation from a family of notions, often called ‘representation’, that invoke information, causation, and/or function. The psychologically distinctive notion implies that a representational state has veridicality conditions as an aspect of its nature. Perception is the most primitive type of representational state. It is a natural psychological kind, recognized in a mature science: perceptual psychology. This kind involves a type of objectification, and is marked by perceptual constancies. The simplest animals known to exhibit perceptual constancies, perception, and representation in a distinctively psychological sense, are certain arthropods. Representational mind, or representational psychology, begins in the arthropods. We lack scientific knowledge about the beginnings of consciousness. Consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for perception. I conclude by reflecting on the kinds mind and psychology.

• Two marks of mind are consciousness and representation

This acknowledges the importance of consciousness to theories of mind. If I remember, Burge lays some significance on our not knowing much about consciousness and so he focuses on representation - (reading between the lines, this seems the standard approach of pursuing what you do know something about hoping it will lead into areas you don't ...)

Representational mind, or representational psychology, begins in the arthropods. We lack scientific knowledge about the beginnings of consciousness. Consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for perception.

And there is the work of Panksepp we have looked at ... @Pharoah I believe you had some contact with Panksepp?

 

[smcder]

No, the question was for you since you are the one among us who has apparently explored the inner reaches of your consciousness, where you've sensed or seen levels of being that most of us do not encounter.

Recently I have found meditation and relaxation techniques, self-hypnosis to be very helpful in dealing with my illness - particularly with pain. Prior to that, I did have some experience with meditation in terms of thought stopping, thought awareness - (this was not unlike the cognitive technique I was taught for coping with OCD - Jeffrey Schwartz's book was invaluable to me twenty years ago in getting a handle on OCD.

I wasn't able to find the link again, so I'm not sure of the context, but I do find this fascinating:

"Rather, Buddhist accounts would seem to depict it as a collective reality built by people which manifests on another plane of existence (specifically somewhere between the 23rd and 27th layer). In order to create a place like that one needs to bring together many individuals in a state of consciousness that exhibits bliss, enlightenment and benevolence. A pure land has no reality of its own; its existence is the result of the states of consciousness of its inhabitants. Thus, the very reason why Shambhala can even exist as a place somewhere outside of us is because it is already a potential place that exists within us."

Another idea along these lines is that of Tulpas or thought forms, an idea which was also explored by Besant and Leadbeater:

The Project Gutenberg eBook of Thought-forms, by Annie Besant.

From your writings it seems you have had some extraordinary experiences - to sonder of a lazy Sunday afternoon sounds like a wonderful experience, I wonder how Stevens would have written about it ...

 

[smcder]

The mention @Pharoah makes of "neural networks" above leads to some of the thought experiments Braitenberg makes in later chapters of Vehicles ... "Mnemotrix" wire I think is his term for what is, essentially, a memristor (see the recent history of memristors) - so if we contruct a Braitenberg vehicle with Mnemotrix and use a genetic algorithm to evolve its relationship to the environment, would we expect, under the right conditions for such a vehicle to become sentient? Braitenberg says yes, well prior to recent advances in memristors and genetic algorithms - HCT also says "yes" - (unless, of course, sentience is substrate dependent ... )

Substrate Dependence

1. of course it's not substrate dependent! Nature used Carbon because it was "cheap" and plentiful! So anything should work! You just have to configure it correctly.

2. of course it IS substrate dependent!! Nature used Carbon and water, because they have very unique chemical and physical properties, one of which is sentience ...

BUT

2. breaks down into a kind of carbon-psychism, meaning there is something about carbon (or some other material in neurons) that has sentience or potential sentience ... or something about the ability of carbon to bond in certain configurations that has sentience ... the objection to @Soupie's argument for substrate independence (it's all just matter) is to reply that "water is substrate dependent" - and if consciousness is configuration dependent, it may therefore be substrate dependent.

It's simple, really. ;-)

 

[smcder]

So what I think @Soupie is looking for is not answered by HCT. HCT is a framework that says why consciousness evolves - because it has evolutionary benefit to the organism, but I think a lot of people say that - and that is one kind of why - but as Burge says consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for perception - so is consciousness inevitable? Even sentience? Run the tape again, as Gould would say, and we might have a thriving biome sans consciousness and it might even achieve some cognitive sophistication - (I believe some scientists still believe consciousness is only a feature of the higher mammals, maybe even the anthropoids - of course some philosophers deny its existence entirely!).

But the nitty gritty how it does not address. I think we are conditioned by our very recent technological success to think of how in terms of technology - we know how something works when we can build it - an answer to the hard problem might involve the ability to synthesize sentience in the laboratory or to point to the exact moment when a neural network becomes sentient (either in simulation or in a developing embryo - right there, literally when we can point to certain configurations, or a certain density of feedback loops - this is the Integrated Information theory) ... HCT doesn't give this kind of how but I'm not sure it offers a softer kind of how, except to say that this is something organisms can develop in the course of relating to what is salient in their environment. But how?? How????

;-)

Aside that may be disturbing:

I recently had a medical procedure involving light sedation and I came out early - I was put back under immediately but I still remembered waking ... perhaps more happened while I was awake that I do not remember - a reminder of the essence of memory to consciousness - as I have mentioned, one possibility is that anesthesia works by immediately erasing momentary experience - so one might be in alternating states of agony and oblivion throughout an eight hour surgery and wake with no memory and no recorded trauma and yet have experienced an almost infinite number of momentary agonies. Is that plausible? Does it make a difference. How would we know if this is the case? We have reports of persons being awake during surgeries and unable to alert their surgeons. Would this form of torture be ethical? You could argue one was not harmed if there is ultimately no memory or alteration by the trauma (which raises the intriguing possibility of PTSD for something that one can't remember).

 

[smcder]

HCT ends where Phenomenology begins, Phenomenology begins with the rather vertiginous observation tha

YOU are HERE
​

And it continuously reminds you of that - the first practice of the phenomenologist is to stay oriented to that fact. Certain cultures orient their bodies in terms of the cardinal directions and maintain that no matter where they are - deep inside the maze-like halls of a modern building, they will point to their (right) arm and refer to it as the "north-west" unerringly, so the phenomenologist begins every thought with an orientation. Heideggerians are always situated in their lives and perspectives and can choose to relate to this authentically or inauthentically

The question @Soupie raises above about "judging brains" vs judging people I think sorts the three positions: CR, HCT and phenomenology nicely. I illustrated this indirectly with my response to his question of why don't we try and answer our own questions about HCT? I gave him HCT's answer when he wanted more of a "folk" or phenomenological answer - and yet, it's not clear HCT sees either as relevant - on the other hand its not easy to see why he would ask such a question if HCT were true in the first place - every theory that purports to explain everything, has to explain itself - that means HCT has to be a plausible result of HCT AND it means every question you might ask of someone else, is already answered by HCT, so too is your own frustration at having to ask such a question.

This is a variant on Plantinga's "defeater" of naturalism: brains evolved to survive and reproduce not theorize, therefore any theory a brain produces is in service to its survival, ultimately, and is therefore unreliable in terms of its relationship to (T)ruth - there are of course, responses to this argument, but it is at least as sticky as Kim's overdetermination and downward causation arguments. What is so very interesting is that the "world" is so absolutely full of such "sticky" arguments.

 

[Soupie]

So what I think @Soupie is looking for is not answered by HCT. HCT is a framework that says why consciousness evolves - because it has evolutionary benefit to the organism, but I think a lot of people say that - and that is one kind of why - but as Burge says consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for perception - so is consciousness inevitable? Even sentience? Run the tape again, as Gould would say, and we might have a thriving biome sans consciousness and it might even achieve some cognitive sophistication - (I believe some scientists still believe consciousness is only a feature of the higher mammals, maybe even the anthropoids - of course some philosophers deny its existence entirely!).

But the nitty gritty how it does not address. I think we are conditioned by our very recent technological success to think of how in terms of technology - we know how something works when we can build it - an answer to the hard problem might involve the ability to synthesize sentience in the laboratory or to point to the exact moment when a neural network becomes sentient (either in simulation or in a developing embryo - right there, literally when we can point to certain configurations, or a certain density of feedback loops - this is the Integrated Information theory) ... HCT doesn't give this kind of how but I'm not sure it offers a softer kind of how, except to say that this is something organisms can develop in the course of relating to what is salient in their environment. But how?? How????

Yes. @Pharoah and HCT answer "why phenomenal" consciousness by "saying" because it's adaptive. As you note, many people say this. What pharoah/hct fail to "show" is why it's adaptive. It's not enough to say it is, why it is must be shown. In this regard, HCT has not overcome overdetermination. HCT does not show any adaptive work that phenomenal consciousness does that is not already done by "physiological mechanisms." [Note: non-materialist physicalism might resolve overdetermination by saying physiological mechanisms that assimilate qualitatively relevant environmental particulars just is phenomenal consciousness viewed from the 3rd person perspective.]

Yes, again. HCT does not provide a "causal" how. Further, I would say that HCT indicates a "how" that is substrate independent. Here's why:

Pharoah/HCT is all about processes, not substrates. The processes of replication, adaption, delineating, weighting, assimilating, etc.

It seems (I think) that HCT argues that phenomenality/sentience strongly emerges from these processes.

But these processes can all be designed (in theory) by humans. They are all weakly emergent processes. And these processes needn't arise via natural selection. There is nothing magical about these processes that allows phenomenal consciousness to spring out of them—especially as HCT doesn't have any work for phenomenal consciousness to do.

Re CR and substrate independence

My response to "water" being SD would be to say, sure, but liquid is not SD. Water is merely one kind of liquid.

Thus, we might say that "green" is one kind of phenomenal quality and "anger" is another. Green and anger are two kinds of sentience, just as water and oil are two kinds of liquid.

But the difference between water and consciousness are well established. While both can be views as a substrate (at least imo) it's easy to see how water (liquid) weakly emerges from physical processes; but it's not easy to see how phenomenal consciousness might emerge from physical processes.

As I've noted, I imagine that phenomenal consciousness does indeed "emerge" from more primitive processes, I just don't think they are physical processes.

 

[smcder]

Yes. @Pharoah and HCT answer "why phenomenal" consciousness by "saying" because it's adaptive. As you note, many people say this. What pharoah/hct fail to "show" is why it's adaptive. It's not enough to say it is, why it is must be shown. In this regard, HCT has not overcome overdetermination. HCT does not show any adaptive work that phenomenal consciousness does that is not already done by "physiological mechanisms." [Note: non-materialist physicalism might resolve overdetermination by saying physiological mechanisms that assimilate qualitatively relevant environmental particulars just is phenomenal consciousness viewed from the 3rd person perspective.]

Yes, again. HCT does not provide a "causal" how. Further, I would say that HCT indicates a "how" that is substrate independent. Here's why:

Pharoah/HCT is all about processes, not substrates. The processes of replication, adaption, delineating, weighting, assimilating, etc.

It seems (I think) that HCT argues that phenomenality/sentience strongly emerges from these processes.

But these processes can all be designed (in theory) by humans. They are all weakly emergent processes. And these processes needn't arise via natural selection. There is nothing magical about these processes that allows phenomenal consciousness to spring out of them—especially as HCT doesn't have any work for phenomenal consciousness to do.

Re CR and substrate independence

My response to "water" being SD would be to say, sure, but liquid is not SD. Water is merely one kind of liquid.

Thus, we might say that "green" is one kind of phenomenal quality and "anger" is another. Green and anger are two kinds of sentience, just as water and oil are two kinds of liquid.

But the difference between water and consciousness are well established. While both can be views as a substrate (at least imo) it's easy to see how water (liquid) weakly emerges from physical processes; but it's not easy to see how phenomenal consciousness might emerge from physical processes.

As I've noted, I imagine that phenomenal consciousness does indeed "emerge" from more primitive processes, I just don't think they are physical processes.

But these processes can all be designed (in theory) by humans. They are all weakly emergent processes. And these processes needn't arise via natural selection. There is nothing magical about these processes that allows phenomenal consciousness to spring out of them—especially as HCT doesn't have any work for phenomenal consciousness to do.

Except if you argue that humans arise from natural selection ... ;-)

My response to "water" being SD would be to say, sure, but liquid is not SD. Water is merely one kind of liquid.

No, not merely. Water is substrate dependent because water (with its unique properties) can only be made from Hydrogen and Oxygen. The argument is that consciousness can only be made by brains which can only be made from Carbon. Do a search for unique properties of Carbon and unique properties of water - you will find discussions about why life depends on the unique properties of each - Sillicone has been put forward as a possible substrate for life because it shares many characteristics of carbon.

The claim for SI in AI is that you can build a complex enough structure with say ... tinkertoys:



Original Tinkertoy Computer | X39.81 | Computer History Museum

that it could become sentient - (the one above just plays Tic Tac Toe ... but it never loses).

Again, the argument to beat is Strawson's reminder that we don't know enough about matter to say that it can't be sentient. Conscious Realism just re-creates the same problems in the inverse.

 

[Pharoah]

P1

I suggest that the concept of merit in this context can be best explored through the notion of qualitative relevance—the Oxford English Dictionary defines “qualitative” as “pertaining to or concerned with quality, where quality relates to merit or value. . .”. The idea is that biochemical assimilation must assign, not a static attribution of merit in relation to an environmental particular, but rather a qualitative attribution whose merit can subsequently be qualified by the relevance that those qualitative attributions might (or might not) have on an individual’s changing survival demands. This ensures that there is a flexible indirect correspondence between how an environmental particular is assimilated qualitatively such that its relevance to survival might thereby be evaluated and weighted—depending on the changing needs of the individual and changing nature of the environment. In practice what thi

@Soupie
"However, you do make the radical suggestion that with the emergence of replication and adaptation in nature a new "qualitative" ontology has emerged. You suggest that this might be relevant to the Hard Problem."
Yes you a right. It is radical and nothing remotely like it has been said before.

 

[smcder]

@Soupie
"However, you do make the radical suggestion that with the emergence of replication and adaptation in nature a new "qualitative" ontology has emerged. You suggest that this might be relevant to the Hard Problem."
Yes you a right. It is radical and nothing remotely like it has been said before.
The thesis is not about as @smcder describes it in his response to you. @smcder's is misrepresenting what it is about.

What is it about?

"It is radical and nothing remotely like it has been said before."

That is an absolutely enormous claim in philosophy - and it claims a very broad familiarity with the enormous number of theories that precede it, which is unlikely for one person to have, which is why theories are put out there and not developed in isolation - in fact, it would be an unprecedented one in modern times - even the most radical theories (think of Relativity) were immediately understood by some of Einstein's peers and then eventually (could be) understood by practically everyone - we have books in the JNF section that explain relativity ... even within a year (without the internet) the community appreciated what he had done.

What tends to happen at this juncture is that you get very frustrated which is very understandable - but so do we, because it's hard to imagine that what is radical about this claim can't be put into a fairly brief statement or at least indicated obliquely by drawing out some of its consequences - which is why I have asked for what predictions HCT makes or how could it be supported by evidence?

 

[smcder]

And I have read:

" ... the desire to communicate through language was the motivational impetus that would have led to the evolution of specialized language centres in the brain: the compulsive desire to speak came first, and the physiology gradually evolved to realize the potential benefits of that discursive capability."



http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Pharoah_fqxi_23-02-17.pdf

Summary

Hierarchical Construct Theory advances the thesis that the maintenance of stability through the re-acquisition of an equilibrium state is fundamental to the interaction of physical forms. It proposes that Newton’s application of this principle to material bodies of mass is limited in scope and can be further applied to other classes of physical interaction and classes of body (called ‘constructs’). The consequence of exploring this thesis is that it indicates that interaction leads to the evolution of form due to the reacquisition of equilibria, and subsequently to the emergence of transcendent dynamic physical constructs that instantiate contrasting types of environmentally interactive mechanisms. Ultimately, these mechanisms inevitably evolve in a way that qualifies the qualitative significance of environmental particulars and, eventually, to individuated identities with a subjective qualitative worldview

 

[Pharoah]

The how bit I cut from the paper... in order to simplify the conceptual task for reviewers. I basically have stuck with articulating two key concepts. The concept of discourse at each hierachical level and the concept of emerging mechanisms of environmental engagement determining in each level an ontologically new meaningful correspondence

 

[smcder]

The how bit I cut from the paper... in order to simplify the conceptual task for reviewers. I basically have stuck with articulating two key concepts. The concept of discourse at each hierachical level and the concept of emerging mechanisms of environmental engagement determining in each level an ontologically new meaningful correspondence

Can we see the how bit? I would think that would be the most radical part and the part you would want to publish?

What do you mean by "simplify the conceptual task for the reviewers"?

 

[Pharoah]

How did gravity make the apple fall downwards? This is not a question that Newton was troubled to answer.. It is in large part an empirical question... In fact, it's the Easy Problem

 

[smcder]

How did gravity make the apple fall downwards? This is not a question that Newton was troubled to answer.. It is in large part an empirical question... In fact, it's the Easy Problem

Then just tell us! as I understand it, the story of Newton and gravity is a little complex ...

 

[Soupie]

@smcder

Re the intentional stance and theory of mind

I know I’m not the only one to wonder about the following, but I want to bounce this off of you.

The IS/TOM are the ability/practice of attributing (or acting as if) mental states—beliefs, intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc.— to others. (We’ll leave oneself out of it for a moment.)

So for examples:

One might watch an ant walking towards a sugar cube and think “he’s probably happy that he found the sugar. He loves sweet stuff. He wants to take it back to the colony to feed the others.”

The trick here is that the ant may indeed be phenomenally experiencing happiness, and he may feel love toward the sugar, and he may be feeling a desire (want) to take it to his colony. Right? At this point, theoretically, we can’t say yes or no for sure.

(2) A robot moving around on a table is able to avoid the edge of the table and rest at a battery charging spot to recharge. We might think “it doesn’t want to fall off the edge and break. It’s low on power so it want to recharge.” We probably wouldn’t say it was “happy” to recharge… but if there was a glowing, pulsing green light while it was recharging, I imagine some children might say/think it was feeling happy.

So is this situation equally tricky? I think most people would say no. I’m guessing that would use two arguments: (1) The ant is more complex than any robot, therefore the ant is really conscious and the robot is not, or (2) the ant is made of carbon/is alive, the robot is made of metal/is not living. (May actually be two different arguments.)

But what about the following scenario:

(3) Earth is visited by a flying saucer. Out step two humanoids. They move and “talk” fluidly. For all intents and purposes they appear to be organic. However, these beings share that they are not organic. And yet, they share that they still need to “breath” “eat” and “drink” to recharge. They even smile when they “eat.” Furthermore, after 2 days of visiting, the two beings “give birth” to a 3rd humanoid by combining structured materials taken from each of them. These beings ask many questions and seem to explore and inspect all around them.

Human observers think to themselves “my, these aliens sure are curious. They want to learn all about us and Earth. They enjoy eating too. And exploring.

If asked, could we say whether these beings had phenomenal consciousness? What about our 2 arguments: complexity and living? These aliens appear to be both complex--at least as complex as humans--and alive. We can easily attribute beliefs, intents, desires, pretending, knowledge to them...

But are they really phenomenally conscious, or are they just complex automata?

As you know, some scientists and philosophers apparently believe that no organisms except humans are phenomenally conscious and that all are automata. Some even believe that humans are automata.

Although to complicate things, some also believe that humans and some organisms may possess phenomenal consciousness (beliefs, intents, desires, pretending, knowledge) but that these things are epiphenomenal.

So I guess the question I’m asking @smcder, the curious thing, is that we can use the IS and TOM to makes sense/predictions about objects we encounter (even bouncy balls, storms, etc.) but we do--at the same time--believe that some objects (namely organisms) actually have minds, right?

It seems that the main benefit of the IS and TOM is to help us understand and make predictions about the behaviors of complex objects, namely organisms.

This has led some people to suggest that our minds, indeed, serve the same purpose. That is, our bodies are made up of trillions of cells, dozens of organs, and multiple body parts that all must “pull” together for a common cause. Survival.

How do we get all these players on the same page? Relatively simple input-output mechanisms only go so far. At some point, a more flexible, responsive, real-time, UNIFIED, control mechanism is needed. Furthermore, sometimes short term needs/wants need to be put aside in favor of long-term needs/wants, and on and on. Where will we ever find such a thing!?

Interestingly, the unified, phenomenal mind that we humans possess would seem to fit the bill, right?

But… the hard problem, overdetermination, and downward causation. (Not too mention the binding problem.) Damn! But it makes sooo much sense for our phenomenal minds to play a central role in flexibly, responsively, spatiotemporally, on-the-fly, and unitedly guiding, well, ourselves.

But… the hard problem, overdetermination, and downward causation.

You already know my approach to overcoming this tetralemma, monism.

When I get more moments, I will explain why I don’t think “idealism” has (indeed can’t have) the same problems as material-physicalism in reverse.

 

[Soupie]

And I have read:

" ... the desire to communicate through language was the motivational impetus that would have led to the evolution of specialized language centres in the brain: the compulsive desire to speak came first, and the physiology gradually evolved to realize the potential benefits of that discursive capability."



http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Pharoah_fqxi_23-02-17.pdf

Yikes.

How did gravity make the apple fall downwards? This is not a question that Newton was troubled to answer.. It is in large part an empirical question... In fact, it's the Easy Problem

Considering the how of both gravity and phenomenal consciousness remain unexplained after millennia, I'm going to disagree.