Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10

[smcder]

And here is your "elevator speech" for HCT

Pharoah "The alternative provides a unified concept of information as a relation of meaning in a world of interactions where self-regulatory processes lead to increasingly complex structures that have an observer-dependent informational relation to and about the world with which they interact. * The view that information is not some thing that exists independently of the observer but is solely a function of an observer’s dynamic construction inverts the syntactic–semantic dilemma for there is no requisite translation of one to the other in the derivation of meaningful content. The observer is itself a construction that defines the environment qualitatively and quantitatively and from that position then qualifies information in those self-referential terms."

*Now ... all you gotta do is explain how. ;-)

 

[smcder]

Pharoah "My intention now is to explore the idea that information is contingent on an OASE’s interacting dynamic construct itself. I interpret Searle (2013) as advancing a comparable view when he proposes that ‘Information is only information relative to some consciousness that assigns the informational status’7 (sec. 6).8 But here I present a more expansive proposal. While Searle’s view relates only to consciousness, I am of the view that the stance applies to all OASEs whose particular construction leads to coherent discriminatory responses to environmental interactions."

The Bootstrapping principle.

1. "In other words, Dorato is interpreting Rovelli as saying that if an entity can be said to have ‘information’ (as an existing value or property), that information is only a potential whose realization becomes manifest by an OASE, which, through interaction, thereby determines its value-attribution (See also Johnson 2013).9 In other words, RQM is an OASE-dependent stance."

Which is not quite the same as:

2. "The alternative, which I am defending in this paper, states that the existence of information is entirely dependent on the nature of the construction of any given OASE."

because 1. admits of/permits ("if") an entity to be said to have information, but only as a potential become manifest by OASE and 2. is stronger, saying the existence of information is entirely dependent on OASE ... I'm not sure 2.) is gonna hold up ...

 

[smcder]

Pharoah "The consequences of an expansionist observer-dependent stance—a stance that goes beyond conscious agency alone, as with Searle—is that it allows for the possibility that a host of different classes of physical construct possess differing classes of informational relations to their environment in virtue of their mechanism of interactive engagement. In Part 3, I will consider what those classes might be specifically and indicate how the identification of those classes undermines the notion of a homogenous complexity greyscale and supports instead the notion of ontological emergence. In this section however, I will endeavour to focus on the claim that information is OASE-dependent. This involves exploring ideas concerning the evolution of states of equilibrium."

It's an interesting approach - many strong emergentists hold that consciousness is the sole case of SE (ok, I know Chalmers has said that, but probably "many people are saying" that ...) and don't look to WE examples (boids!) to support that - SE and WE really are two different things, entirely ... but I digress.

far from equilibrium and complex dynamic equilibrium ... problematic

"On their account, living systems resist transitions to high entropic states, warding-off thermodynamic equilibrium (Schrodinger, Boltzmann, Ellis et al, Deacon, Prigogine….). The contrasting position is that living organisms are examples of a ‘complex dynamic equilibrium’. Here, dynamic equilibrium is not of the kind expressed in chemistry but more akin to the way biologists might speak of it. On this account, far from warding-off equilibrium, living organisms are proactively maintaining a complex dynamic equilibrium state. Here, the idea of equilibrium is that of a state remaining stable through continual dynamic adjustment (Le Chatelier, ****, Pieper ****, Corning and Kline ****). I take the view that living organisms unquestionably maintain a dynamic adaptive equilibrium and in doing so stave off thermodynamic equilibrium."



I do get the distinction, but you only deal with the one, so why not avoid the confusing comparison? The Merleau-Ponty bit does add considerably to it - but if you drop the first definition, it still strengthens and clarifies - at any rate, you may have to draw the distinction out a bit, and you may be doing this in the editing.

Pharoah

"What we have here, in contrast to the idea expressed in the first passage, is that, rather than reacting unidirectionally to causal impetuses, some bodies absorb the impact of interactive exchanges and reacquire a balance through adjustments in the internal dynamics. I think of this as relating to dynamic equilibrium because there is no direct mechanical correspondence which could promote a statistical outcome following multiple interactions of such kind. Rather, the adjustment is internalized by the dynamics of the structure. In the former, equilibrium is expressed in virtue of the mechanical actions of the whole, in the latter, equilibrium is expressed in virtue of internal adjustments of the individual OASE. "

good - it may just be a matter of getting this up under the first "passage" - feels like this needs a bit of moving around.

 

[smcder]

At this point, the SEP article on biological information becomes relevant and challenging - (as does Braitenberg's Vehicles) ... you kind of gain and lose points here:

"Clearly, Merleau-Ponty subscribes to the OASE-dependent stance: what would otherwise be bland causal mechanics becomes qualified in an informational way by the internal law of the organism, that is, by the adjustment of the internal dynamics of the organism.10 But what is this ‘internal law’ that undermines the notion of a direct causal correspondence? Well, we can say confidently that the internal law must be that which ensures the maintenance of a dynamic equilibrium following interaction because a dynamic equilibrium is what persists. Consequently, when an OASE responds to an interaction by adjusting its internal dynamics to acquire a new equilibrium state, we are noting that it is adjusting to that end, and can conclude therefore, that whatever else it could be, this end must be the observance of the internal law."

This is a bit of a let down, because the law of equilibrium is also a little bland. I was expecting, you know, the great OZ and got the little man behind the curtain! ;-) Not really, but I couldn't resist the comparison.

And then it just gets a little circular:

Pharoah "And, insofar as there is a dynamic equilibrium at any given instance we can say that an OASE’s dynamic construct itself must be that which qualifies the nature of its response to interactive impulses in observance of its internal law. Consequently, if we say of an OASE’s dynamic state that it responds differently to differing interactive impulses in subtle observance of its internal law, we can surmise that all its responses to interaction are informational of any given and specific class of interactive impulse due to the nature of its particular dynamic state. Subsequently, we can note that there is an ongoing informational relation between an evolving OASE’s equilibrium state (its ‘construct’) and the environment with which it interacts—a relation where the nature of an OASE’s construct qualifies the informational relationship it has with its environmental in virtue of its adaptive observance of its internal law. The key claim is that if there exists an informational characteristic to physical interaction it is not a commodity that is transmitted by a direct causal correspondence from one entity to another but instead reflects the existing internal dynamics of any given OASE as it adjusts internally to interactive engagement to maintain its dynamic equilibrium state."

THE END…

I do understand this gets better with ontological emergence, and it is fascinating in a "In the beginning, there was Equilibrium ... " sort of way - but that's where @Soupie's anguished howl of "How? How?" comes in - so that's what I am looking forward to tackling next.

 

[smcder]

@Pharoah

this is all good and current?

Abstract: I argue that the physiological, phenomenal and conceptual constitute a trichotomous hierarchy of emergent classes. I claim that each class employs a distinctive type of interactive mechanism that facilitates a meaningful class of environmental discourse. I advocate, therefore, that each have a causal relation with the environment through physical interaction, but that their specific class of mechanism qualifies distinctively the meaningfulness of that interaction and subsequent responses to it. Consequently, I argue that the causal chain of physical interaction feeds distinctive axiological constructions that are ontologically distinct for each class. Within the limitations of the interactive mechanisms of each class, increasingly sophisticated forms tend to evolve. The increase in sophistication in each class inevitably leads to the emergence of the novel mechanism particular to the next class in the hierarchy. In essence, there is an emergent hierarchy of evolving classes delineated by the nature of their mechanism of environmental engagement. Specifically, I argue that biochemical mechanisms have a tendency to evolve meaningfully, specifically in a way that is both qualitatively relevant and responsive to environmental particulars. I explain that these mechanisms set in play an organizational imperative that leads to the emergence of the capacity to evaluate and prioritize qualitative biochemical assimilations which, inevitably, generates a subjectively individuated experience phenomenon. I then relate this to the novel characteristics of the human perspective.

 

[Pharoah]

There is nothing better thsn ignoring whether the face is attractive or ugly and instead getting the scalpel out and dissecting the subject, Dr @smcder... fantastic feedback. You have restored my sight.

 

[smcder]

There is nothing better thsn ignoring whether the face is attractive or ugly and instead getting the scalpel out and dissecting the subject, Dr @smcder... fantastic feedback. You have restored my sight.

I hope it's helpful, you'll find (rightly) the flaws in my critique - I'll come back around too and re-read everything to see how it has sifted out and with another kind of eye.

 

[Soupie]

@Pharoah

This is the first fork in the road, if the reader takes it, he may be off the path for good ...

three statements made in the paper:

1. I argue instead (part 2) that information is qualified and quantified wholly by the very nature of the construction of an OASE.
2. The OASE-dependent stance is the view that information is contingent, in absolutist terms(?), on the nature of an OASE’s interacting dynamic construct itself rather than on any informational property of environment.
3. In other words, the claim I make is that an OASE’s dynamic construct is what qualifies the informational nature of the environment qua (?) information does not exist ‘out there’ independently.

I've yet to encounter a formal description of information as ever being interprant-independent. Any notion of information I've encountered involved, essentially, an object, sign, and interprant.

When considering which of these three might be the "information," most will say it's the sign.

As the sign is generally external to the interprant, it's is said that information is "out there." But I would argue that formally it is understood that an object is only a sign—that is, is only information—if there is an interprant.

To me, this is a matter of semantics, not metaphysics.

However, once the language of the intentional stance enters the picture, i.e. meaning, things do get murky, quickly.

If a robot moves away from certain harmful em waves based on the response of a sensor able to distinguish them, can we say that this em waves are meaningful to the robot?

I will need to dig in to your and searle's discussion of systems that behave as-if stimuli are meaning and systems that really do experience stimuli as meaningful.

What do phenomenal consciousness have to do with the origin and nature of meaning?

What's the difference between the two systems above, the one the acts as-if things are meaningful to it and the one for which things really are experienced as meaningful?

Remember, there is no current model which would allow phenomenal consciousness to weakly emerge from physical processes. Models which describe phen consciousness as strongly emerging fail to find any causal work for it to do, and if they did, a causal model explaining how.

As it is, the relation between information and meaning is akin to the relation between brain and mind, it certainly seems like they are curiously, closely related but just how is elusive.

 

[Pharoah]

I've yet to encounter a formal description of information as ever being interprant-independent. Any notion of information I've encountered involved, essentially, an object, sign, and interprant.

When considering which of these three might be the "information," most will say it's the sign.

As the sign is generally external to the interprant, it's is said that information is "out there." But I would argue that formally it is understood that an object is only a sign—that is, is only information—if there is an interprant.

To me, this is a matter of semantics, not metaphysics.

However, once the language of the intentional stance enters the picture, i.e. meaning, things do get murky, quickly.

If a robot moves away from certain harmful em waves based on the response of a sensor able to distinguish them, can we say that this em waves are meaningful to the robot?

I will need to dig in to your and searle's discussion of systems that behave as-if stimuli are meaning and systems that really do experience stimuli as meaningful.

What do phenomenal consciousness have to do with the origin and nature of meaning?

What's the difference between the two systems above, the one the acts as-if things are meaningful to it and the one for which things really are experienced as meaningful?

Remember, there is no current model which would allow phenomenal consciousness to weakly emerge from physical processes. Models which describe phen consciousness as strongly emerging fail to find any causal work for it to do, and if they did, a causal model explaining how.

As it is, the relation between information and meaning is akin to the relation between brain and mind, it certainly seems like they are curiously, closely related but just how is elusive.

"If a robot moves away from certain harmful em waves based on the response of a sensor able to distinguish them, can we say that this em waves are meaningful to the robot?"
If information is out there, then there is nothing to distinguish the robot from any other information processing capability. Consequently the intentional stance can apply and there is a debate regarding its validity.
If on the other hand, information is not out there but is something to do with a system's ascription to its environment, then meaning is absent from the robot and we can replace our understanding if its capabilties as a complex set of mechanistic correspondences.
I remember not liking Chalmers weak/strong emergence distinuction... remind me of the difference?
If information is in the eye of the behilder, then the nature of the beholder determines the nature of the infrmational character of its nvironmental interactions. This is where HCT comes in.

 

[Soupie]

"If a robot moves away from certain harmful em waves based on the response of a sensor able to distinguish them, can we say that this em waves are meaningful to the robot?"
If information is out there, then there is nothing to distinguish the robot from any other information processing capability.

Information is not "out there" and I don't know any formal argument suggesting otherwise. Do you?

Consequently the intentional stance can apply and there is a debate regarding its validity.

If on the other hand, information is not out there but is something to do with a system's ascription to its environment, then meaning is absent from the robot and we can replace our understanding if its capabilties as a complex set of mechanistic correspondences.

The robot has evolved to ascribe meaning to the environment: robots that sense and move away from X em waves survive, robots that don't sense and move away from X em die.

Meaning is present in the robot.

I remember not liking Chalmers weak/strong emergence distinuction... remind me of the difference?

Weak emergence would be a case of phen consciousness emerging from physical processes via processes we can see, predict, and explain. Strong emergence says consciousness just does emerge from physical processes in a way that we can't see, predict, or explain.

If information is in the eye of the behilder, then the nature of the beholder determines the nature of the infrmational character of its nvironmental interactions. This is where HCT comes in.

This is the standard understanding of information.

There might be robots that move toward X em waves. Because those em waves are good for them.

X em waves are the object, but act as a sign (information) to the two different robots which are the interpants. The "meaning" of the sign (x em waves) is different for each robot, good for one bad for the other.

And there might be robots that don't sense em waves at all. Thus X em waves would not be information to these robots.

But this is just a stance. These processes can also be completely explained via pure physics but would obviously be very complex.

 

[smcder]

The problem, as I see it, concerns assumptions about causation. The above throws into questions the sentiment that emergence seems to say that thoughts ‘are caused by’ (physical) processes but that they then take on their own causal powers of their own with downward causal consequences.

What HCT advocates is that correspondence, in certain distinct examples of such kinds as above, can be of a different class in virtue of the nature of the interactive mechanisms of certain systems. A1 and A2 indicate not just a different action, but a different class of action pertaining to the nature of the meaning derived by the particular mechanisms of S1 contrasting with S2 concerning the same I (I might be, for example, the sun, S1 a heliotropic plant, S2 a human, A1 the plant’s movement and A2 a human’s utterances about the sun’s location). Typically, when thinking of cause and effect, people think of objective physical interaction. Alternatively, the notion of an ontologically distinct hierarchy demands that we reconsider this view and understand that it is the mechanism of interactive engagement that determines distinct classes of action (qualitative, phenomenal, conceptual). The fact that a higher level may influence a lower level (downward causation) is coincidental to the purpose of the actions of that higher level system in consequence to its meaningful response to environmental interaction.

in terms of the robot (or more broadly A-Life) sentience question

• what is the root of the above? is it something in the biochemistry/physics - is it substrate dependent?

@Pharoah you mentioned it would have to go "deeper"

I puzzle over this quite a bit. I once thought that HCT indicated that artificial consciousness was possible, and with it, sentience... (in theory HCT says yes, but in practise I am more confident the answer is negative). Certainly, HCT indicates you have to go deeper than the artificial neural level.

Let's go deeper! What makes you more confident? I agree - in that the ANN as we have it pales in complexity with the biological neuron, but what else? It's not just complexity - I think it's substrate dependent and I think everything has to be in the right place, that said, I think it's also a range - I think some birds have phenomenal consciousness, and this is biologically related to a neo-palladium, that is a structure that has a different evolutionary history than the neo-cortex, which may say something about how likely consciousness is to evolve - so too the octopus ... without panpsychism, on a strictly biological level, p-consciousness may be more likely than we think - and our own form, may take some looking at (I'll expand on this later, maybe) ... but also dependent on a deep history .... you can't just run a sufficiently complex simulation or create some self-replicating molecules or robots and let em loose - it takes:

• complexity
• very small size
• lots of 'em!
• and a long time

and even this is necessary but may not be sufficient ...

 

[Pharoah]

This is the SEP article.

Biological Information (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

This:

• namely, that information is qualified and quantified wholly by the very nature of the construction of an OASE.

Is @Pharoah 's statement.

I think that what is qualitatively relevant is not determined wholly by what pharoah calls "the very nature of the construction of an OASE" nor wholly by the environment. And that it may be useful to be able to look at "information" in both ways.

HCT talks of 3 existing levels from replicating organisms upwards. But the hierarchy extends downwards. So a chemicql element, as an OASE of a material class, does have a meaningful engagement with the environment. The informational character it ascribes to environmental interaction is well described by chemical and physical sciences... it reacts accordingly and the ontology populates our ideas of what the world is constructed from, namely solid, liquid and gaseous stuff. Further down the hierarchy is the quantum world which is maybe another different ontological realm of meaningful engagement. Each level is connected and physical but distinct in terms of the OASE's and the meaning they derive from interaction

 

[Pharoah]

the great representation bug-a-boo of 2017

@Pharoah writes:

"Bateson’s (1970) stance, that information out there can be equated to differences that make a difference, provokes an equivalent inquiry. By what power or authority does any complex mechanism of physics qualify what a difference actually is? Alternatively, what physical process enables the identification and comparable measurement of differences and thereby determine the transformation of unqualified differences into something that is meaningfully differentiated and consequently informing? To measure a difference is surely to qualify something as meaningfully differentiated. Smcder this is a bit tricky as it slips in your usage of “meaningful” - may need to build the argument a bit ... What this stance is advocating contentiously This stance contends that an OASE—in compliance with physical laws—has the means of fixing (or storing) various ‘informational properties’ quantitatively, qualitatively and temporally such that it can relate one information bit to another and thereby assimilate their comparable relationship and determine a relative value of one to another. I contend this is the unjustified faith in the notion that there exists an elemental physical process that measures difference comparatively and therefore potentially meaningfully.

To my mind representationist theories in all their current guises, and the language of representationalism generally, start from the dubious premise that there is such a thing, a priori, as a physical entity that possesses the “know-how” to qualify and measure difference. The other issue is that representationalism is fully committed to the concept of information as an OASE-independent measurable commodity that objectively exists. From this stance, the concept of information is one that functions very much like the now debunked, yet once widely supported idea, of an all-pervasive ‘aether’ which filled space and facilitated the propagation of electromagnetic and gravitational forces: equivalently, information serves as a universal and all pervasive medium or commodity that somehow enables the transmission, storage and comparative evaluation of value attribution. Consequently, in many contexts, the term ‘system’ has become the term that refers to the complex mechanism, function and/or process that does the reading and that does the manipulating of ‘the information-aether’. It is ‘The System’ that conveniently enables the attribution of a natural or intrinsic self-governance and directedness. In this manner, in the lexicon of academia, the term ‘system’ stands in as the information-meaning-maker par excellence: "

smcder in brief, this stance asks: "why do we need consciousness, when we have information?" (this strikes me as analogous to a presentation at Google on energy limitations - the Googlers asked "why do we need energy, when we have technology?")

...

@Pharoah quote by Dennett, I believe:

Now, everybody in computer science, with few exceptions, they understand this because they understand how computers work, and they realise that the understanding isn’t in the CPU, it’s in the system. . . that’s where all the competence, all the understanding lies. . . [09:14]

That and the following paragraph (just below) really get down to it:

Pharoah "In relation to mentality then, the conceptual basis underpinning the term system, which has become central to the predominant expository language, facilitates the equivocation between a syntactic–semantic dichotomy. This dichotomy must exist because the concept ‘system’ assumes the role of a facilitator through which external syntactical information-aether gets re-presented as content that is meaningful. It is a convenient bridging concept that plugs the syntactic–semantic gap created by the idea that information is a commodity that exists out there in the environment." (except there are "simply too many words!") ;-)



It may be you could make that point earlier (and often).

"What do you mean, "too many words!"? there are neither to many nor too few" " ... Amadeus?

 

[Pharoah]

Information is not "out there" and I don't know any formal argument suggesting otherwise. Do you?


The robot has evolved to ascribe meaning to the environment: robots that sense and move away from X em waves survive, robots that don't sense and move away from X em die.

Meaning is present in the robot.


Weak emergence would be a case of phen consciousness emerging from physical processes via processes we can see, predict, and explain. Strong emergence says consciousness just does emerge from physical processes in a way that we can't see, predict, or explain.


This is the standard understanding of information.

There might be robots that move toward X em waves. Because those em waves are good for them.

X em waves are the object, but act as a sign (information) to the two different robots which are the interpants. The "meaning" of the sign (x em waves) is different for each robot, good for one bad for the other.

And there might be robots that don't sense em waves at all. Thus X em waves would not be information to these robots.

But this is just a stance. These processes can also be completely explained via pure physics but would obviously be very complex.

Well... I say what I think is the orthodox position on informstion and quote a few prominent contributors and statements to that effect and you say that is not the orthodox position. That is just weard. Can you reference anyone to support your view that I have it the wrong way round, and am basically existing in a parallel universe to you?
"The robot has evolved" and "senses"... if you say so

 

[Constance]

And here is your "elevator speech" for HCT:

Pharoah "The alternative provides a unified concept of information as a relation of meaning in a world of interactions where self-regulatory processes lead to increasingly complex structures that have an observer-dependent informational relation to and about the world with which they interact. * The view that information is not some thing that exists independently of the observer but is [solely?] {probably not 'solely} a function of an observer’s dynamic construction inverts the syntactic–semantic dilemma for there is no requisite translation of one to the other in the derivation of meaningful content. The observer is itself a construction that defines the environment qualitatively and quantitatively and from that position then qualifies information in those self-referential terms."

{P, you might revise the above to read something like this: "The view that information is not some thing that exists independently of an existent ( i.e., a species of life that is aware of itself as existing within a temporally changing environment) but functions in relation to the existent's own dynamically developing nature inverts the syntactic-semantic dilemma, for there is no determined translation of one to the other in the realization of meaningful experience.} Note: the same idea might become clearer if you rewrite/restructure that sentence.}

Steve concluded his post with a demand:

*Now ... all you gotta do is explain how. ;-)

Do you think that proponents of the concept of information Pharoah is critiqueing and seeking to overcome have "explained how" their theory works out in the evolution of species and the development of conscious existents such as ourselves thinking and acting in the production of the historical cultures and ideas we have developed to shape our human world? What are the explanations of proponents of the current mechanistic paradigm re 'information concerning how the 'information' they presume to exist in a closed system out there in the world/cosmos becomes usable for and by conscious living species such as ours in our constructing multivarious cultural worlds upon the bare earth in the history of human experience on our planet? Let's take Anvil Seth's 'explanations', for example, in the paper I linked a few days ago. Do you find those adequate to 'explain' the spectrum of human experience and expression in philosophical discourse, science, art, and sociopolitical theory and practices?

I'm not having a problem following @Pharoah's reasoning and arguments and I can't figure out why you are.

@Pharoah

this is all good and current?

Abstract: I argue that the physiological, phenomenal and conceptual constitute a trichotomous hierarchy of emergent classes. I claim that each class employs a distinctive type of interactive mechanism that facilitates a meaningful class of environmental discourse. I advocate, therefore, that each have a causal relation with the environment through physical interaction, but that their specific class of mechanism qualifies distinctively the meaningfulness of that interaction and subsequent responses to it. Consequently, I argue that the causal chain of physical interaction feeds distinctive axiological constructions that are ontologically distinct for each class. Within the limitations of the interactive mechanisms of each class, increasingly sophisticated forms tend to evolve. The increase in sophistication in each class inevitably leads to the emergence of the novel mechanism particular to the next class in the hierarchy. In essence, there is an emergent hierarchy of evolving classes delineated by the nature of their mechanism of environmental engagement. Specifically, I argue that biochemical mechanisms have a tendency to evolve meaningfully, specifically in a way that is both qualitatively relevant and responsive to environmental particulars. I explain that these mechanisms set in play an organizational imperative that leads to the emergence of the capacity to evaluate and prioritize qualitative biochemical assimilations which, inevitably, generates a subjectively individuated experience phenomenon. I then relate this to the novel characteristics of the human perspective.

I can't find anything to argue with there except perhaps for the continued use of the word 'mechanism', which in my view perpetuates the physicalist/objectivist assumption that the world as experienced in and through consciousness can be accounted for mechanically and thus deterministically. Unfortunately our languages lag behind our accumulating insights into the nature of organisms, living animals, and ourselves -- of life itself -- in terms of the nature of lived being as distinguishable from the nature of the being of things, objects, and purely physical fields and forces. One has only to consider the manifest variety of perspectives, ideas, and expressions of being-in-the-world that our species has produced in five to seven millennia to realize the difference that consciousness as developed in our existentially lived being brings into the world. We obviously feel the need to account for all that we experience, understand, and think about, but to date we obviously fall short of doing so. .

I've yet to encounter a formal description of information as ever being interprant-independent. Any notion of information I've encountered involved, essentially, an object, sign, and interprant.

When considering which of these three might be the "information," most will say it's the sign.

As the sign is generally external to the interprant, it's is said that information is "out there."

That's a naieve conclusion, as I think you see:

But I would argue that formally it is understood that an object is only a sign—that is, is only information—if there is an interpretant.

Yes, as Peirce showed us.

To me, this is a matter of semantics, not metaphysics.

It can't be that by 'semantics' you mean 'language'. So if you believe, as you say above, "that an object is only a sign—that is, is only information—if there is an interpretant," how can the existence of interpretants not be "a matter of metaphysics" [i.e., metaphysics seeking an adequate theory of being] and thus a matter of developing an adequate ontology?

 

[Pharoah]

Pharoah "My intention now is to explore the idea that information is contingent on an OASE’s interacting dynamic construct itself. I interpret Searle (2013) as advancing a comparable view when he proposes that ‘Information is only information relative to some consciousness that assigns the informational status’7 (sec. 6).8 But here I present a more expansive proposal. While Searle’s view relates only to consciousness, I am of the view that the stance applies to all OASEs whose particular construction leads to coherent discriminatory responses to environmental interactions."

The Bootstrapping principle.

1. "In other words, Dorato is interpreting Rovelli as saying that if an entity can be said to have ‘information’ (as an existing value or property), that information is only a potential whose realization becomes manifest by an OASE, which, through interaction, thereby determines its value-attribution (See also Johnson 2013).9 In other words, RQM is an OASE-dependent stance."

Which is not quite the same as:

2. "The alternative, which I am defending in this paper, states that the existence of information is entirely dependent on the nature of the construction of any given OASE."

because 1. admits of/permits ("if") an entity to be said to have information, but only as a potential become manifest by OASE and 2. is stronger, saying the existence of information is entirely dependent on OASE ... I'm not sure 2.) is gonna hold up ...

agree... am redoing...

 

[smcder]

agree... am redoing...

Good. I'm glad what I'm doing is helpful. When its not, let me know.

 

[Soupie]

Well... I say what I think is the orthodox position on informstion and quote a few prominent contributors and statements to that effect and you say that is not the orthodox position. That is just weard. Can you reference anyone to support your view that I have it the wrong way round, and am basically existing in a parallel universe to you?
"The robot has evolved" and "senses"... if you say so

At Wikipedia—doesn't get any more mainstream than that—there are multiple conceptions of information offered. Here is the most relevant for organisms and sensing/perceiving:

Information - Wikipedia

As sensory input

Often information can be viewed as a type of input to an organism or system. Inputs are of two kinds; some inputs are important to the function of the organism (for example, food) or system (energy) by themselves. In his book Sensory Ecology[5] Dusenbery called these causal inputs. Other inputs (information) are important only because they are associated with causal inputs and can be used to predictthe occurrence of a causal input at a later time (and perhaps another place). Some information is important because of association with other information but eventually there must be a connection to a causal input. In practice, information is usually carried by weak stimuli that must be detected by specialized sensory systems and amplified by energy inputs before they can be functional to the organism or system. For example, light is mainly (but not only, e.g. plants can grow in the direction of the lightsource) a causal input to plants but for animals it only provides information. The colored light reflected from a flower is too weak to do much photosynthetic work but the visual system of the bee detects it and the bee's nervous system uses the information to guide the bee to the flower, where the bee often finds nectar or pollen, which are causal inputs, serving a nutritional function."

Re if I say so

You don't think mechanical sensors can sense environmental stimuli? What term would you use?

Yeah about the evolution of sensors: what is so magical about a physical mechanism that evolved to sense a particular environmental stimuli vs a physical mechanism that was designed to sense a particular environmental stimuli?

I've been meaning to ask you.

 

[Constance]

At the end of his challenging paper "THE PROBLEM OF INFORMATION AND THE NATURALIZATION OF MENTAL CONTENT, @Pharoah quotes a sentence from MP's Phenomenology of Perception which provides a guide on how to understand the development of this paper:

“Matter, life and mind must participate unequally in the nature of form; they must represent different degrees of integration and, finally, must constitute a hierarchy in which individuality is progressively achieved.”

Here is a brief essay on key elements of MP's philosophy that should illuminate that quotation and enable us to comprehend the significance of this remarkable paper Pharoah has given us:

Philosophical Connections: Merleau-Ponty

 

[Constance]

[to @Pharoah] You don't think mechanical sensors can sense environmental stimuli? What term would you use?

Yeah about the evolution of sensors: what is so magical about a physical mechanism that evolved to sense a particular environmental stimuli vs a physical mechanism that was designed to sense a particular environmental stimuli?

I've been meaning to ask you.

I think you might be able to answer those questions for yourself if you read the essay I linked just above.