Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10

[smcder]

"What do you mean, "too many words!"? there are neither to many nor too few" " ... Amadeus?

Yes ... lol ... I think I need to come up with some new memes ... ;-)

 

[smcder]

Artificial Sentience

HCT in principle "yes" in practice "no" what is the principle and what the practice?

If the argument turns on ontological emergence - then we are saying more than that sentience is ontologically emergent, but also that:

• there is no path to sentience except through ontological emergence
• there is no "artificial path" to ontological emergence

This is somewhat like Searle's argument for biological naturalism - he says only brains can produce sentience and there are no artificial brains, only biological ones.

Are we prepared to say that? Or can the argument against artificial sentience (in practice) turn on other things?

 

[smcder]

A reasonable answer, that takes the "in practice" hint ... is that sentience, in practice, requires biochemistry (or other suitable substrate, which, I think, in practice, requires a biochemistry - it must, in a word, "equilibriate") and a suitable evolutionary history.

 

[smcder]

I'm re-reading The Emergence of Qualitative attribution, Phenomenal experience and Being

Abstract: I argue that the physiological, phenomenal and conceptual constitute a trichotomous hierarchy of emergent classes. I claim that each class employs a distinctive type of interactive mechanism that facilitates a meaningful class of environmental discourse. I advocate, therefore, that each have a causal relation with the environment through physical interaction, but that their specific class of mechanism qualifies distinctively the meaningfulness of that interaction and subsequent responses to it. Consequently, I argue that the causal chain of physical interaction feeds distinctive axiological constructions that are ontologically distinct for each class. Within the limitations of the interactive mechanisms of each class, increasingly sophisticated forms tend to evolve. The increase in sophistication in each class inevitably leads to the emergence of the novel mechanism particular to the next class in the hierarchy. In essence, there is an emergent hierarchy of evolving classes delineated by the nature of their mechanism of environmental engagement. Specifically, I argue that biochemical mechanisms have a tendency to evolve meaningfully, specifically in a way that is both qualitatively relevant and responsive to environmental particulars. I explain that these mechanisms set in play an organizational imperative that leads to the emergence of the capacity to evaluate and prioritize qualitative biochemical assimilations which, inevitably, generates a subjectively individuated experience phenomenon. I then relate this to the novel characteristics of the human perspective.

in post #1095 above @Constance writes:

"I can't find anything to argue with there except perhaps for the continued use of the word 'mechanism', which in my view perpetuates the physicalist/objectivist assumption that the world as experienced in and through consciousness can be accounted for mechanically and thus deterministically."

@Pharoah notes that he is a physicalist (mostly)

I am mostly a physicalist and the physicalist interpretation is no less valid as a vision of objective reality.

So I want to keep "physicalist/objectivist", mechanism", "determination", "causation", "causal chains", "physical interactions" etc. in mind as I read this.

 

[smcder]

The Emergence of Qualitative attribution, Phenomenal experience and Being

I think this is a well written abstract, with a lot of information - @Pharoah I'm trying to lay bare my thought processes as I go, so not everything noted here is a question or problem, but marginalia, that I hope to go back to and put everything back together later off of -

Abstract

• I argue that the physiological, phenomenal and conceptual constitute a three-part hierarchy of emergent classes.
• Each class employs a distinctive type of interactive mechanism that facilitates a meaningful class of environmental discourse.

interactive mechanism
environmental discourse (see more later in this paper)

From 1 and 2

• each class has a causal relation with the environment through physical interaction. (causality)

smcder the “distinctive type of interactive mechanism that facilitates a meaningful class of environmental discourse” is a physical interaction, a physical mechanism

• BUT the specific class of mechanism qualifies distinctively the meaningfulness of that interaction and subsequent responses to it.

• I argue that the causal chain of physical interaction feeds distinctive axiological? constructions that are ontologically distinct for each class.
  
  • Axiology the branch of philosophy dealing with values, as those of ethics, aesthetics, or religion.
• Within the limitations of the interactive mechanisms of each class, increasingly sophisticated forms tend to evolve.
  
  
• The increase in sophistication in each class inevitably leads to the emergence of the novel mechanism particular to the next class in the hierarchy.
  
  
• In essence, there is an emergent hierarchy of evolving classes delineated by the nature of their mechanism of environmental engagement.

Specifically, I argue that biochemical mechanisms have a tendency (inevitably,?) to evolve meaningfully, specifically in a way that is both qualitatively relevant and responsive to environmental particulars. I explain that these mechanisms set in play an organizational imperative that leads to the emergence of the capacity to evaluate and prioritize qualitative biochemical assimilations which, inevitably, generates a subjectively individuated experience phenomenon. I then relate this to the novel characteristics of the human perspective.

***@Soupie - the last two lines (in the full context of the Abstract are the how/why of consciousness offered under HCT. I want to keep this in mind.

 

[smcder]

"Nevertheless, the scientists themselves succeed in acquiring significant knowledge from Edna’s eDNA—both about the species of which she was a member and the environment in which the species evolved. If the humans can be justified in believing in the particular facts pertaining to Edna and her environment, it would seem their knowledge relies exclusively on Edna’s biochemical mechanisms as revealed by her eDNA. The knowledge the scientists accrue has not been compiled from disparate disciplines; they did not collate their knowledge, for example, from geologists, climatologists, archaeologists, chemists, biologists and so on. I think they did, that knowledge is implicit in what they do know and from human cognitive abilities Rather, their knowledge has been compiled from only one source. This one source—Edna’s eDNA—contains all the necessary information. Therefore, is it not the case that the human geneticists derive all their conceptually constructed knowledge about Edna and her environment solely from the study and interpretation—interpretation being analogous to translation—of Edna’s physiologically constructed knowledge which was accurately and responsively informed by the environment in which her species replicated and evolved? If so, can it be true that there is such a thing as physiological knowledge, which is in some way distinct from conceptual knowledge?"

• the scientists succeed in acquiring significant knowledge from Edna’s eDNA—about her species and the environment in which it evolved
• (If) the humans can be justified in believing in the particular facts pertaining to Edna and her environment, it would seem their knowledge relies exclusively on Edna’s biochemical mechanisms as revealed by her eDNA.
  • The knowledge the scientists accrue has not been compiled from disparate disciplines; they did not collate their knowledge, for example, from geologists, climatologists, archaeologists, chemists, biologists and so on.
    • Pharoah argues the scientists knowledge relies exclusively on Edna's biochemical mechanisms (as revealed by the DNA) - note the scientists know a lot of things, and the knowledge has been compiled ... tacitly, implicitly in the technology and the scientist's working knowledge of DNA/environment ... so while they did not have knowledge directly about the geology, climate, etc directly, this knowledge has been established - if that is possible then it strengthens the argument that all of that knowledge can be had from the eDNA - but note the field work had to be done at some point, so what the scientists can get out of eDNA is predicated on what they know about DNA generally - nothing here supports the idea that geological/climate surveys had to be done at some point and correlated to DNA/eDNA - biochemical data/knowledge/understanding alone isn't sufficient, and the "knowledge in the eDNA is only available to those who have lots of other knowledge already - the question is does that effect the next step in the argument?

• Rather, their knowledge has been compiled from only one source. This one source—Edna’s eDNA—contains all the necessary information. Therefore, is it not the case that the human geneticists derive all their conceptually constructed knowledge about Edna and her environment solely from the study and interpretation—interpretation being analogous to translation?—of Edna’s physiologically constructed knowledge which was accurately and responsively informed by the environment in which her species replicated and evolved? If so, can it be true that there is such a thing as physiological knowledge, which is in some way distinct from conceptual knowledge?"

So the argument runs:

IF (given)

• scientists find eDNA
• scientists, only using EDNA's eDNA find out lots about EDNA and the environment in which she evolved
• the scientists have technology and "complete" knowledge/information on the eDNA/environmental relationship AND
• smcder that knowledge is based on the work of previous scientists which probably has to include correlating the biochemical data in DNA with geological/environmental surveys
• given all that knowledge, IF the scientists can learn about EDNA and her environment

Does it follow that there is such a thing as physiological knowledge, distinct from conceptual knowledge?

 

[smcder]

@Soupie

Re if I say so

You don't think mechanical sensors can sense environmental stimuli? What term would you use?

Yeah about the evolution of sensors: what is so magical about a physical mechanism that evolved to sense a particular environmental stimuli vs a physical mechanism that was designed to sense a particular environmental stimuli?

I've been meaning to ask you.

• If robots become autonomous, able to reproduce with variation and adapt (in whatever manner) - will we say they evolved or just that they evolve?
• If the scientists found, beside EDNA, one of these:

• Does it follow that there is such a thing as electro-mechanical knowledge distinct from physiological knowledge, distinct from conceptual knowledge?

 

[smcder]

Pharoah "The alternative provides a unified concept of information as a relation of meaning in a world of interactions where self-regulatory processes lead to increasingly complex structures that have an observer-dependent informational relation to and about the world with which they interact. * The view that information is not some thing that exists independently of the observer but is [solely?] {probably not 'solely} a function of an observer’s dynamic construction inverts the syntactic–semantic dilemma for there is no requisite translation of one to the other in the derivation of meaningful content. The observer is itself a construction that defines the environment qualitatively and quantitatively and from that position then qualifies information in those self-referential terms."

{P, you might revise the above to read something like this: "The view that information is not some thing that exists independently of an existent ( i.e., a species of life that is aware of itself as existing within a temporally changing environment) but functions in relation to the existent's own dynamically developing nature inverts the syntactic-semantic dilemma, for there is no determined translation of one to the other in the realization of meaningful experience.} Note: the same idea might become clearer if you rewrite/restructure that sentence.}

Steve concluded his post with a demand:



Do you think that proponents of the concept of information Pharoah is critiqueing and seeking to overcome have "explained how" their theory works out in the evolution of species and the development of conscious existents such as ourselves thinking and acting in the production of the historical cultures and ideas we have developed to shape our human world? What are the explanations of proponents of the current mechanistic paradigm re 'information concerning how the 'information' they presume to exist in a closed system out there in the world/cosmos becomes usable for and by conscious living species such as ours in our constructing multivarious cultural worlds upon the bare earth in the history of human experience on our planet? Let's take Anvil Seth's 'explanations', for example, in the paper I linked a few days ago. Do you find those adequate to 'explain' the spectrum of human experience and expression in philosophical discourse, science, art, and sociopolitical theory and practices?

I'm not having a problem following @Pharoah's reasoning and arguments and I can't figure out why you are.



I can't find anything to argue with there except perhaps for the continued use of the word 'mechanism', which in my view perpetuates the physicalist/objectivist assumption that the world as experienced in and through consciousness can be accounted for mechanically and thus deterministically. Unfortunately our languages lag behind our accumulating insights into the nature of organisms, living animals, and ourselves -- of life itself -- in terms of the nature of lived being as distinguishable from the nature of the being of things, objects, and purely physical fields and forces. One has only to consider the manifest variety of perspectives, ideas, and expressions of being-in-the-world that our species has produced in five to seven millennia to realize the difference that consciousness as developed in our existentially lived being brings into the world. We obviously feel the need to account for all that we experience, understand, and think about, but to date we obviously fall short of doing so. .

...

Not a demand ... that's what the ;-) is indicates ...

Here is the post (#1081) with my notes in bold italics
-----------
And here is your "elevator speech" for HCT smcder an "elevator speech" is something you can use to briefly explain a complex topic to someone you happen to catch on an elevator - this statement (below) is a compact statement of that type

Pharoah "The alternative provides a unified concept of information as a relation of meaning in a world of interactions where self-regulatory processes lead to increasingly complex structures that have an observer-dependent informational relation to and about the world with which they interact. *The view that information is not some thing that exists independently of the observer but is solely a function of an observer’s dynamic construction inverts the syntactic–semantic dilemma for there is no requisite translation of one to the other in the derivation of meaningful content. The observer is itself a construction that defines the environment qualitatively and quantitatively and from that position then qualifies information in those self-referential terms."

*Now ... all you gotta do is explain how. ;-) smcder I made a post this morning to @Soupie about the "how" and "why" of HCT ... again, the smile above is meant to note that it has been a long standing part of the discussion of HCT.
-----------

@Constance writes:

I'm not having a problem following @Pharoah's reasoning and arguments and I can't figure out why you are.

I'm not sure I am either ... ? I know that I am improving my understanding of HCT.

@Constance writes:

I can't find anything to argue with there except perhaps for the continued use of the word 'mechanism', which in my view perpetuates the physicalist/objectivist assumption that the world as experienced in and through consciousness can be accounted for mechanically and thus deterministically.

I noted in a post this morning that @Pharoah says he is a "physicalist" and that I want to keep that and your concerns above re:

the physicalist/objectivist assumption that the world as experienced in and through consciousness can be accounted for mechanically and thus deterministically

... in mind as I read his paper ... I don't necessarily think HCT ultimately makes these assumptions, but it is a question we can go ahead and put to @Pharoah:

Does (or to what extent) does HCT make the physicalist/objectivist assumption that the world as experienced in and through consciousness can be accounted for mechanically and thus deterministically ?

 

[smcder]

@Soupie

Yeah about the evolution of sensors: what is so magical about a physical mechanism that evolved to sense a particular environmental stimuli vs a physical mechanism that was designed to sense a particular environmental stimuli?

The magic is in ontological emergence ... birds do it, bees do it (confidentially, even educated fleas do it) but it's a question on the table whether robots do it ...

 

[smcder]

This seems terribly, horribly, relevant:

EXPLAINING EMERGENCE:- towards an ontology of levels

Abstract
The vitalism/reductionism debate in the life sciences shows that the idea of emergence as something principally unexplainable will often be falsified by the development of science. Nevertheless, the concept of emergence keeps reappearing in various sciences, and cannot easily be dispensed with in an evolutionary world-view. We argue that what is needed is an ontological non-reductionist theory of levels of reality which includes a concept of emergence, and which can support an evolutionary account of the origin of levels. Classical explication of emergence as `the creation of new properties' is discussed critically, and specific distinctions between various kinds of emergence is introduced for the purpose of developing an ontology of levels, framed in a materialistic and evolutionary perspective. A concept of the relation between levels as being inclusive is suggested, permitting the `local' existence of different ontologies. We identify, as a working hypothesis, four primary levels and explicate their nonhomomorphic interlevel relations. Explainability of emergence in relation to determinism and predictability is considered. Recent research in self-organizing non-linear dynamical systems represents a revival of the scientific study of emergence, and we argue that these recent developments can be seen as a step toward a final `devitalisation' of emergence.

• emergence as something exceptional and in principle unexplainable by science may be over-riden in the history of science (vitalism)
• metaphysical/ontological reflections on levels of reality has arisen in many subfields of science
• and the authors argue that non-reductionist theories of levels imply emergence, emergence is necessary to the evolutionary account of levels of reality
  • section 2 the classical explication - emergence as "creation of new properties"
    • necessary distinctions for the purpose of a general ontology of levels
    • refine the concept of the relation between levels - to permit the local existence of different ontologies
  • section 3 the tension between the classical ideals of science in describing the properties of natural systems and the idea of emergence
  • section 4 an ontological theory of levels (physical, biological, psychological and sociological)

 

[Pharoah]

At Wikipedia—doesn't get any more mainstream than that—there are multiple conceptions of information offered. Here is the most relevant for organisms and sensing/perceiving:

Information - Wikipedia

As sensory input

Often information can be viewed as a type of input to an organism or system. Inputs are of two kinds; some inputs are important to the function of the organism (for example, food) or system (energy) by themselves. In his book Sensory Ecology[5] Dusenbery called these causal inputs. Other inputs (information) are important only because they are associated with causal inputs and can be used to predictthe occurrence of a causal input at a later time (and perhaps another place). Some information is important because of association with other information but eventually there must be a connection to a causal input. In practice, information is usually carried by weak stimuli that must be detected by specialized sensory systems and amplified by energy inputs before they can be functional to the organism or system. For example, light is mainly (but not only, e.g. plants can grow in the direction of the lightsource) a causal input to plants but for animals it only provides information. The colored light reflected from a flower is too weak to do much photosynthetic work but the visual system of the bee detects it and the bee's nervous system uses the information to guide the bee to the flower, where the bee often finds nectar or pollen, which are causal inputs, serving a nutritional function."

Re if I say so

You don't think mechanical sensors can sense environmental stimuli? What term would you use?

Yeah about the evolution of sensors: what is so magical about a physical mechanism that evolved to sense a particular environmental stimuli vs a physical mechanism that was designed to sense a particular environmental stimuli?

I've been meaning to ask you.

I don't get it... you quote/reference the wiki stuff that supports my argument of what the orthodox position is... I am missing your point or not understanding your position... (?)
on sensing:
a sun shines on a puddle. The puddle evaporates.
Say you put the puddle (ie. water) in a special container with tubes. As the water evaporates into the tubes the energy is harnessed and drives a little mechanism which makes wheels on the container rotate. The device rolls out of the sun into the shade and stops (evaporation of th water stops). The device nay, the puddle evidently was 'sensing' the sun... is this your claim? According to the IS we can assume puddle intentionality. I have made a detailed critique of the IS. And my information argument is my best attempt at undermining the observer-independent stance on information... and HCT says that an ontological hierarchy must be present. At the present time I cannot be more forceful in my argument. There is no magic to it really... it is all physical stuff, (mostly).

 

[Soupie]

A reasonable answer, that takes the "in practice" hint ... is that sentience, in practice, requires biochemistry (or other suitable substrate, which, I think, in practice, requires a biochemistry - it must, in a word, "equilibriate") and a suitable evolutionary history.

I'm not following how the SEH is necessary.

For ex

Imagine a scenario where we can completely reproduce an apparently conscious organism from scratch in the lab. Same materials and everything. It didn't evolve but was made in the lab.

Since it didn't have a SEH would it not be conscious?

Are we saying the individual organism must have a SEH or just the structure of the organism must have a SEH.

Either way I don't see the significance.

 

[smcder]

I don't get it... you quote/reference the wiki stuff that supports my argument of what the orthodox position is... I am missing your point or not understanding your position... (?)
on sensing:
a sun shines on a puddle. The puddle evaporates.
Say you put the puddle (ie. water) in a special container with tubes. As the water evaporates into the tubes the energy is harnessed and drives a little mechanism which makes wheels on the container rotate. The device rolls out of the sun into the shade and stops (evaporation of th water stops). The device nay, the puddle evidently was 'sensing' the sun... is this your claim? According to the IS we can assume puddle intentionality. I have made a detailed critique of the IS. And my information argument is my best attempt at undermining the observer-independent stance on information... and HCT says that an ontological hierarchy must be present. At the present time I cannot be more forceful in my argument. There is no magic to it really... it is all physical stuff, (mostly).

 

[Soupie]

I don't get it... you quote/reference the wiki stuff that supports my argument of what the orthodox position is... I am missing your point or not understanding your position... (?)
on sensing:
a sun shines on a puddle. The puddle evaporates.
Say you put the puddle (ie. water) in a special container with tubes. As the water evaporates into the tubes the energy is harnessed and drives a little mechanism which makes wheels on the container rotate. The device rolls out of the sun into the shade and stops (evaporation of th water stops). The device nay, the puddle evidently was 'sensing' the sun... is this your claim? According to the IS we can assume puddle intentionality. I have made a detailed critique of the IS. And my information argument is my best attempt at undermining the observer-independent stance on information... and HCT says that an ontological hierarchy must be present. At the present time I cannot be more forceful in my argument. There is no magic to it really... it is all physical stuff, (mostly).

The wiki section I quote does not support the notion that information is interprant independent.

 

[Pharoah]

At the end of his challenging paper "THE PROBLEM OF INFORMATION AND THE NATURALIZATION OF MENTAL CONTENT, @Pharoah quotes a sentence from MP's Phenomenology of Perception which provides a guide on how to understand the development of this paper:

“Matter, life and mind must participate unequally in the nature of form; they must represent different degrees of integration and, finally, must constitute a hierarchy in which individuality is progressively achieved.”

Here is a brief essay on key elements of MP's philosophy that should illuminate that quotation and enable us to comprehend the significance of this remarkable paper Pharoah has given us:

Philosophical Connections: Merleau-Ponty

@Constance. I forgot about that quote stuck on at the end of the paper!! wish I knew where I got it from! Any idea?

 

[smcder]

I'm not following how the SEH is necessary.

For ex

Imagine a scenario where we can completely reproduce an apparently conscious organism from scratch in the lab. Same materials and everything. It didn't evolve but was made in the lab.

Since it didn't have a SEH would it not be conscious?

Are we saying the individual organism must have a SEH or just the structure of the organism must have a SEH.

Either way I don't see the significance.

Well, if we reproduce it, it's a reproduction and therefore has a suitable SEH. (that's your hint)

 

[smcder]

@Constance. I forgot about that quote stuck on at the end of the paper!! wish I knew where I got it from! Any idea?

Google it - you get it a ton of hits, must be a relatively popular quote ...

 

[Pharoah]

Alien? !
?

 

[Pharoah]

The wiki section I quote does not support the notion that information is interprant independent.

this bit below?

information is usually carried by weak stimuli that must be detected by specialized sensory systems and amplified by energ

 

[Soupie]

this bit below?

But the stimuli is only considered information in this instance because it is relevant to the organism.