Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11

[smcder]

My point in mentioning this is that it is the brain that decides what perception reveals reality is
My guess is that dogs are only interested if something smells or can be chewed when caught...?

They actually make dog tv that takes dog perception into account. High def helps too.

Don't guess...google.

;-)

 

[smcder]

Rethinking the senses and their interactions: the case for sensory pluralism

 

[Pharoah]

They actually make dog tv that takes dog perception into account. High def helps too.

Don't guess...google.

;-)

Oh yea. Of course.... like the tv for bats thing...

 

[Pharoah]

Rethinking the senses and their interactions: the case for sensory pluralism

How plural are we talkin’?

 

[Soupie]

There's not much on "narcissism" in perceptual systems after mid 2000s. Terminology may have changed.

I will have a look.

"Conclusion

The goal of this paper has been to upend the “traditional view” and to restore parity between what you perceive and what you conceive while accounting for the fact that neither perfectly mirrors what there is in the external world. This “perceptual gap” demands we reframe our understanding of conceptual representations: to close this gap we must move from concepts that are amodal symbol strings that represent objective reality to concepts that are narcissistic, therefore embodied and enactive. If we accept that concepts are, in some sense, constitutively narcissistic, this reframing can be supported by a healthy amount of empirical research. The solution presented in this paper is not the only one possible for closing the gap, and many questions still remain, including: which embodied-enactive account best captures the narcissism of our conceptual systems? What are the neural mechanisms and substrates involved? How does an account of embodied-enactive representations fit into the wider literature of mental representations? Despite these lingering issues, there is something satisfying about the conclusion that our internal representations need not account for all the external facts, just the facts that prove adaptive. In summary: what you see is what you get, but what you get is not necessarily what there is; what you get is about what you are and what you can do with what there is."

 

[Soupie]

There's not much on "narcissism" in perceptual systems after mid 2000s. Terminology may have changed.

I will contact victor parchment to see if he has literature to recommend.

I'd like to get my hands on this paper by Akins and Hahns.

"Color perception

The perception of colour has traditionally been considered fundamentally different, both in kind and in function, from the visual perception of other properties, such as shape, size, or ripeness as well as from the perception of objects such as triangles and goats. The traditional view of what makes colour unique among our visual percepts was first articulated by Aristotle. For him, colours are the proper objects of vision, they ground all other aspects of visual perception, and the perception of colour is so direct, the colours themselves enter the perceiver. This entry traces the history of colour perception theory as it discards various aspects of the Aristotelian view, while keeping two central theses: (1) if we did not see the colours, we could not see anything at all and (2) seeing colours is a matter of having a certain kind of sensory response to the world as opposed to constructing visual representations of it. The final section argues that current visual science gives us reason to discard these last remnants of Aristotle’s view."

 

[smcder]

I will contact victor parchment to see if he has literature to recommend.

I'd like to get my hands on this paper by Akins and Hahns.

"Color perception

The perception of colour has traditionally been considered fundamentally different, both in kind and in function, from the visual perception of other properties, such as shape, size, or ripeness as well as from the perception of objects such as triangles and goats. The traditional view of what makes colour unique among our visual percepts was first articulated by Aristotle. For him, colours are the proper objects of vision, they ground all other aspects of visual perception, and the perception of colour is so direct, the colours themselves enter the perceiver. This entry traces the history of colour perception theory as it discards various aspects of the Aristotelian view, while keeping two central theses: (1) if we did not see the colours, we could not see anything at all and (2) seeing colours is a matter of having a certain kind of sensory response to the world as opposed to constructing visual representations of it. The final section argues that current visual science gives us reason to discard these last remnants of Aristotle’s view."

This one? PDF link here:

More than Mere Colouring: The Role of Spectral Information in Human Vision | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science | Oxford Academic

 

[Constance]

Have to repost this from Steve:

"I am interested in virtually all issues in the philosophy of mind as well as the metaphysical and epistemic problems they engender—from the nature of mental representation and intentionality, to colour perception, embedded cognition, cognitive development, the emotions, consciousness and the self. What unifies all of these investigations is a neuro-philosophical approach. I begin any project with the problem as traditionally conceived by philosophy; then I look at what recent neuroscience has unearthed on the topic. The task is then to use the empirical literature to re-conceive of the traditional philosophical problem while at the same time using the philosophical insights to drive forward the experiments in neuroscience. I regard my work as essentially interdisciplinary (although in practice I tend to spend more time reading neuroscience simply because of the sheer volume and complexity of the recent scientific literature)."

Dr. Kathleen Akins - Department of Philosophy - Simon Fraser University

"Neurophilosophy" is an interdisciplinary field at the intersection of philosophy and the neurosciences. In neurophilosophy, we attempt to understand how various traditional, long-standing problems about the nature of the mind and the world can be resolved (or at least nudged towards resolution) by current findings within the neurosciences. My work incorporated current research within neurophysiology, neuropsychology, neurethology and psychophysics in order to understand the nature of perception, cognition, consciousness, the emotions and mental representation in general."

Dr. Kathleen Akins | Home

I like the interdisciplinary approach but it's clear that if we are epistemically dependent on "recent scientific literature" in toto then we are already lost. This is why I am interested in epistemic justification that does not depend on this knowledge which is simply unavailable anyway. Notice too that Akins takes an optimistic stance in her own researches. In part, we see the world as it is if we choose to see ourselves as seeing the world as it is - because we are part of and participate in the world being the way that it is. It may be that to see the world correctly, as it is, means taking the stance that we see the world as it is.

. . . if we are epistemically dependent on "recent scientific literature" in toto then we are already lost. This is why I am interested in epistemic justification that does not depend on this knowledge which is simply unavailable anyway. Notice too that Akins takes an optimistic stance in her own researches. In part, we see the world as it is if we choose to see ourselves as seeing the world as it is - because we are part of and participate in the world being the way that it is. It may be that to see the world correctly, as it is, means taking the stance that we see the world as it is.

Bravo.

 

[Constance]

Ergo color is not "out there" rather its internal to the organism. Surface reflectance is out there, not color.

Color arises and exists in the presence together, the integration, of what is qualitatively experienced by the organism by means of its senses and the environing world in which the organism has its experience of being. A third branch of thought is needed in order to overcome the struggle between 'direct perception' and 'indirect perception', direct realism and indirect realism.

 

[Constance]

https://www.sfu.ca/~kathleea/docs/Boring&Myopic.pdf

I can't read this on my phone and can't find it in a better version but it may be fine on PC or other...Akins' response to WILTBAB. Sure seems like we've come across it before.

We did, and I think it was you who brought Akins' work here.

 

[Randall]

As an aside, I just watched two movies ( actually three ) Blade Runner, Blade Runner 2049, and The Discovery ( Robert Redford ), all of which include death and consciousness as important facets. The Discovery was interesting in that the assumption was made that afterlives had been scientifically proven to exist, which led to a rampant increase in suicides because so many people wanted to get to wherever the other side is. I'd never considered that as a consequence of scientific proof of an afterlife. Plus my usual objections were met with interesting plot twists ( no spoilers here though ).

Suffice it to say that it was in the same vein as Flatliners, and that afterlives remain in the realm of sc-fi along with time travel. They're just plot devices. I also imagine, @Constance, that you would probably find all three exceedingly boring. Personally I was never a huge fan of Blade Runner ( but I like the Vangelis Sound Track ) and The Discovery is rather Grade B ( But then again I like Grade B sci-fi ).

​

 

[Constance]

http://faculty.fiu.edu/~hermanso/research/bats.pdf

Abstract: In “What is it like to be boring and myopic?” Kathleen Akins offers an interesting, empirically driven, argument for thinking that there is nothing that it is like to be a bat. She suggests that bats are “boring” in the sense that they are governed by behavioral scripts and simple, nonrepresentational, control loops, and are best characterized as biological automatons. Her approach has been well received by philosophers sympathetic to empirically informed philosophy of mind. But, despite its influence, her work has not met with any critical appraisal. It is argued that a reconsideration of the empirical results shows that bats are not boring automatons, driven by short input-output loops, instincts, and reflexes. Grounds are provided for thinking that bats satisfy a range of philosophically and scientifically interesting elaborations of the general idea that consciousness is best understood in terms of representational functions. A more complete examination of bat sensory capabilities suggests there is something that it is like after all. The discussion of bats is also used to develop an objection to strongly neurophilosophical approaches to animal consciousness.

. . . Grounds are provided for thinking that bats satisfy a range of philosophically and scientifically interesting elaborations of the general idea that consciousness is best understood in terms of representational functions. A more complete examination of bat sensory capabilities suggests there is something that it is like after all. The discussion of bats is also used to develop an objection to strongly neurophilosophical approaches to animal consciousness.

Excellent.

I find it endlessly curious that many/most? analytic philosophers and mainstream neuroscientists remain perplexed by the viewpoint that sensory capabilities enabling organisms to find their way in, navigate, adjust to, and thrive in their environments should also involve the experienced sense expressed and displayed by these organisms of their own presence in these environments and their grip on the reality of their existing in an actual world. The nature and structure of prereflective experience in phenomenological philosophy -- and studied in biology and affective neuroscience -- must be included in the attempt to understand what 'reality' is as lived, and what it signifies for the adequacy of human thought and science.

 

[Constance]

As an aside, I just watched two movies ( actually three ) Blade Runner, Blade Runner 2049, and The Discovery ( Robert Redford ), all of which include death and consciousness as important facets. The Discovery was interesting in that the assumption was made that afterlives had been scientifically proven to exist, which led to a rampant increase in suicides because so many people wanted to get to wherever the other side is. I'd never considered that as a consequence of scientific proof of an afterlife. Plus my usual objections were met with interesting plot twists ( no spoilers here though ).

Suffice it to say that it was in the same vein as Flatliners, and that afterlives remain in the realm of sc-fi along with time travel. They're just plot devices. I also imagine, @Constance, that you would probably find all three exceedingly boring. Personally I was never a huge fan of Blade Runner ( but I like the Vangelis Sound Track ) and The Discovery is rather Grade B ( But then again I like Grade B sci-fi ).

Good to see you back, Randal. I found Blade Runner anything but 'boring'; I found it riveting, over and above its vivid production values. My friends and I discussed that film for weeks.

 

[Constance]

The Problem of Perception (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

"Some philosophers agree with the Phenomenal Principle that whenever a sensory quality appears to be instantiated then it is instantiated, but deny that this entails the existence of sense-data. Rather, they hold that we should think of these qualities as modifications of the experience itself (Level 1). Hence when someone has an experience of something brown, something like brownness is instantiated, but in the experience itself, not an object. This is not to say that the experience is brown, but rather that the experience is modified in a certain way, the way we can call “perceiving brownly”. The canonical descriptions of perceptual experiences, then, employ adverbial modifications of the perceptual verbs: instead of describing an experience as someone’s “visually sensing a brown square”, the theory says that they are “visually sensing brownly and squarely”. This is why this theory is called the “adverbial theory”; but it is important to emphasise that it is more a theory about the phenomenal character of experience itself (Level 2) than it is a semantic analysis of sentences describing experience."

". . . This is why this theory is called the “adverbial theory”; but it is important to emphasise that it is more a theory about the phenomenal character of experience itself (Level 2) than it is a semantic analysis of sentences describing experience."


It was always a mistake to think that we could understand the nature of our experience by understanding the structures of our languages. A wrong road we can no longer take.

 

[Randall]

Good to see you back, Randal. I found Blade Runner anything but 'boring'; I found it riveting, over and above its vivid production values. My friends and I discussed that film for weeks.

Really? You never cease to surprise me. Have you also seen the sequel ( Blade Runner 2049 )? I'd heard a couple of negative reviews, but thought it was pretty good.

 

[Soupie]

I didn't get from the video that the difference in DR and IR is so miniscule as to be meaningless, I should wonder at the volume of literature generated thus! (or maybe I shouldn't), but the difference in DR and IR is the presence or absence of perceptual intermediaries and that, I suspect, is a significant difference.

Realism : Direct or Indirect?

"On various philosophy forums I've participated on, there have been arguments between those who call themselves 'direct realists' and those who call themselves 'indirect realists'. The question is apparently about perception. Do we experience reality directly, or do we experience it indirectly?

When I was first initiated to the conversation, I immediately took the indirect side -- There is a ball, photons bounce off the ball, the frequency of those photons is changed by some properties of the ball, the photons hit my retina activating light-sensitive cells, those cells send signals to my brain communicating that they were activated, the signals make it to the visual cortex and...you know...some stuff happens, and I experience the sight of a ball.

So, my first thought in the conversation about Indirect vs Direct realism was that there was a lot of stuff in between the ball and my experience of it, so, it must be indirect.

But then I found that direct realists don't actually disagree about any part of that sequence of events I described above. For them as well, at least the few that have bothered to respond, photons bounce off a ball, interact with our retinas, send signals to the brain, etc. The physical process is apparently the same for both sides of the debate.

And when two sides vehemently disagree on something, and then when the question is broken down into easy, answerable questions you find that they actually agree on every relevant question, that tends to be a pretty good hint that it's a wrong question.

So, is this a wrong question? Is this just a debate about definitions? Is it a semantic argument, or is there a meaningful difference between Direct and Indirect Realism? In the paraphrased words of Eliezer, "Is there any way-the-world-could-be—any state of affairs—that corresponds to Direct Realism being true, or Indirect Realism being true?""

As far as I can tell, it does boil down to semantics, if we assume monism. In none of the descriptions of DR and IR I've encountered has the MBP been raised.

This is relevant because if sense-datum are construed as a non-material, super natural substance, then the difference between IR and DR becomes significant.

However, as far as I can tell, sense-datum are not conceived by any party to be supernatural. In fact, I've read sense-datum as being synonymous with brain states.

So, again, if we assume a monist context, there does not seem to be any meaningful distinction between IR and DR. The difference seems to be semantic.

Quote: But then I found that direct realists don't actually disagree about any part of that sequence of events I described above. For them as well, at least the few that have bothered to respond, photons bounce off a ball, interact with our retinas, send signals to the brain, etc. The physical process is apparently the same for both sides of the debate.

Thus, as far as I can tell the difference is lies in how this process is semantically described.

A. We perceive brain states (sense datum) abut the world (IR)

B. We perceive the world via brain states (DR)

 

[smcder]

Realism : Direct or Indirect?

"On various philosophy forums I've participated on, there have been arguments between those who call themselves 'direct realists' and those who call themselves 'indirect realists'. The question is apparently about perception. Do we experience reality directly, or do we experience it indirectly?

When I was first initiated to the conversation, I immediately took the indirect side -- There is a ball, photons bounce off the ball, the frequency of those photons is changed by some properties of the ball, the photons hit my retina activating light-sensitive cells, those cells send signals to my brain communicating that they were activated, the signals make it to the visual cortex and...you know...some stuff happens, and I experience the sight of a ball.

So, my first thought in the conversation about Indirect vs Direct realism was that there was a lot of stuff in between the ball and my experience of it, so, it must be indirect.

But then I found that direct realists don't actually disagree about any part of that sequence of events I described above. For them as well, at least the few that have bothered to respond, photons bounce off a ball, interact with our retinas, send signals to the brain, etc. The physical process is apparently the same for both sides of the debate.

And when two sides vehemently disagree on something, and then when the question is broken down into easy, answerable questions you find that they actually agree on every relevant question, that tends to be a pretty good hint that it's a wrong question.

So, is this a wrong question? Is this just a debate about definitions? Is it a semantic argument, or is there a meaningful difference between Direct and Indirect Realism? In the paraphrased words of Eliezer, "Is there any way-the-world-could-be—any state of affairs—that corresponds to Direct Realism being true, or Indirect Realism being true?""

As far as I can tell, it does boil down to semantics, if we assume monism. In none of the descriptions of DR and IR I've encountered has the MBP been raised.

This is relevant because if sense-datum are construed as a non-material, super natural substance, then the difference between IR and DR becomes significant.

However, as far as I can tell, sense-datum are not conceived by any party to be supernatural. In fact, I've read sense-datum as being synonymous with brain states.

So, again, if we assume a monist context, there does not seem to be any meaningful distinction between IR and DR. The difference seems to be semantic.

Quote: But then I found that direct realists don't actually disagree about any part of that sequence of events I described above. For them as well, at least the few that have bothered to respond, photons bounce off a ball, interact with our retinas, send signals to the brain, etc. The physical process is apparently the same for both sides of the debate.

Thus, as far as I can tell the difference is lies in how this process is semantically described.

A. We perceive brain states (sense datum) abut the world (IR)

B. We perceive the world via brain states (DR)

How many speckles on the hen? Using only the sense datum, don't look at the hen.

 

[Pharoah]

Realism : Direct or Indirect?

"On various philosophy forums I've participated on, there have been arguments between those who call themselves 'direct realists' and those who call themselves 'indirect realists'. The question is apparently about perception. Do we experience reality directly, or do we experience it indirectly?

When I was first initiated to the conversation, I immediately took the indirect side -- There is a ball, photons bounce off the ball, the frequency of those photons is changed by some properties of the ball, the photons hit my retina activating light-sensitive cells, those cells send signals to my brain communicating that they were activated, the signals make it to the visual cortex and...you know...some stuff happens, and I experience the sight of a ball.

So, my first thought in the conversation about Indirect vs Direct realism was that there was a lot of stuff in between the ball and my experience of it, so, it must be indirect.

But then I found that direct realists don't actually disagree about any part of that sequence of events I described above. For them as well, at least the few that have bothered to respond, photons bounce off a ball, interact with our retinas, send signals to the brain, etc. The physical process is apparently the same for both sides of the debate.

And when two sides vehemently disagree on something, and then when the question is broken down into easy, answerable questions you find that they actually agree on every relevant question, that tends to be a pretty good hint that it's a wrong question.

So, is this a wrong question? Is this just a debate about definitions? Is it a semantic argument, or is there a meaningful difference between Direct and Indirect Realism? In the paraphrased words of Eliezer, "Is there any way-the-world-could-be—any state of affairs—that corresponds to Direct Realism being true, or Indirect Realism being true?""

As far as I can tell, it does boil down to semantics, if we assume monism. In none of the descriptions of DR and IR I've encountered has the MBP been raised.

This is relevant because if sense-datum are construed as a non-material, super natural substance, then the difference between IR and DR becomes significant.

However, as far as I can tell, sense-datum are not conceived by any party to be supernatural. In fact, I've read sense-datum as being synonymous with brain states.

So, again, if we assume a monist context, there does not seem to be any meaningful distinction between IR and DR. The difference seems to be semantic.

Quote: But then I found that direct realists don't actually disagree about any part of that sequence of events I described above. For them as well, at least the few that have bothered to respond, photons bounce off a ball, interact with our retinas, send signals to the brain, etc. The physical process is apparently the same for both sides of the debate.

Thus, as far as I can tell the difference is lies in how this process is semantically described.

A. We perceive brain states (sense datum) abut the world (IR)

B. We perceive the world via brain states (DR)

@Soupie Are you saying that no DR philosopher has articulated DR's distinction with clarity?
btw I listened years back to Searle giving a term of lectures via podcast... he described himself as a naive realist with explanation.

 

[Soupie]

How many speckles on the hen? Using only the sense datum, don't look at the hen.

But the sense datum are the hen.

The only question then is are we looking at the hen/sense datum or the <HEN>. If you say <HEN> you're a DR if you say hen/sense datum you're an IR.

 

[Soupie]

@Soupie Are you saying that no DR philosopher has articulated DR's distinction with clarity?
btw I listened years back to Searle giving a term of lectures via podcast... he described himself as a naive realist with explanation.

Im saying the difference is semantics.

How would you characterize the difference between DR and IR?